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Le diverse versioni sull'assassinio di György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics e sul ritrovamento del suo tesoro

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György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics fu vescovo di Várad, primate d'Ungheria, cardinale, ministro, cancelliere, sommo tesoriere, voivoda di Transilvania, giudice supremo e comandante militare, tutore dell'erede al trono d'Ungheria e luogotenente del regno magiaro.

Secondo Károly Sebesztha¹, la storia ungherese è ricca di uomini la cui grandezza sta nel fatto che con tutta la loro anima servono il bene pubblico antepoendolo agl'interessi privati. Con questi grandi uomini – è convinto Sebesztha – i loro contemporanei sono stati di solito ingrati. La loro forza d'animo, con cui seguono le proprie convinzioni, senza le quali non avrebbero raggiunto lo scopo prefissato, li ha però portati in conflitto con i propri contemporanei, i quali diffidavano delle novità ritenendo che esse avrebbero colpito i loro interessi. Ciò è valso anche per György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics, una delle figure più grandi e nobili della storia d'Ungheria. Se i suoi numerosi nemici – osserva Sebestha – non sono mai riusciti a trovare una vera scusa per farlo cadere, ciò significa che la sua vita privata fu immacolata.

“Martinuzzi – scrive il suo biografo Ognjeslav Utiešenović – è uno di quei personaggi storici che sono come le colonne portanti d'un palazzo o di un tempio greco [...] Il suo fu un assassinio non solo fisico ma anche morale”². Non tutti gli storici, però, hanno espresso un giudizio positivo su Martinuzzi, anche perché furono spesso influenzati dai giudizi dei suoi contemporanei, in genere poco lusinghieri nei confronti del nostro personaggio.

György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics nacque nel 1482 nel castello di Kamičac, in Croazia, da genitori nobili ma decaduti³. Passò l'infanzia alla corte di Giovanni Corvino, il figlio del re Mattia, e successivamente al servizio della madre di Giovanni Zápolya, Jadwiga Piasti, addetto ai lavori più umili. Dopo un'esperienza militare al servizio dello stesso Giovanni Zápolya e una monastica prima nel convento di Buda degli eremiti paolini, poi in quello polacco di Częstochowa e infine in quello ungherese di Lád (oggi Sajólad), nel 1528 passò definitivamente al servizio del re d'Ungheria, Giovanni Zápolya, che allora combatteva una

¹ Cfr. K. SEBESZTHA, *Fráter György élete* [Vita di frate György], Máramaros 1904.

² OG. UTIEŠENOVIC, *Lebensgeschichte des Cardinals Georg Utiešenović, genannt Martinisius*, Wien 1881, p. 1.

³ Sulle origini della famiglia di György Martinuzzi, la sua giovinezza e le fasi iniziali della carriera politica si veda l'articolo di A. PAPO, *György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics. Le origini, la giovinezza, gli esordi nella carriera politica*, in «Quaderni Vergeriani» (Duino Aurisina), III, n. 3, 2007, pp. 19-32.

cruenta guerra civile contro Ferdinando d'Asburgo, con cui divideva il trono⁴. Nominato 'provveditore regio' nel 1531, subentrò a Imre Czibak nella direzione dell'importante vescovado di Várad (1534); fu quindi nominato consigliere regio e sommo tesoriere, assumendo l'amministrazione del regno, che diresse con grande abilità. Dopo la morte dello Zápolya (1540), la presa di Buda da parte dei turchi (1541) e il trasferimento della corte reale in Transilvania, Martinuzzi, nominato anche tutore del figlio dello Zápolya, Giovanni Sigismondo, concentrò tutto il potere nelle proprie mani. Diresse in prima persona i negoziati ch'erano stati avviati tra i rappresentanti dei due re d'Ungheria per il trasferimento a Ferdinando d'Asburgo della parte di regno rimasta prima sotto la giurisdizione dello Zápolya, poi sotto quella della di lui vedova Isabella Jagellone. Le trattative, iniziate a Vienna nel 1535, sarebbero proseguite con alterne vicende inframmezzate da scontri armati tra le parti concorrenti, dalle frequenti discordie che scoppiavano tra la regina Isabella e il tesoriere e dalla continua minaccia ottomana⁵. L'arrivo in Transilvania dell'esercito asburgico del generale Giovanni Battista Castaldo, marchese di Cassano, forzò la conclusione dei negoziati, che ebbe luogo a Gyulafehérvár il 19 luglio 1551: la regina Isabella e il principe Giovanni Sigismondo trasferirono a Ferdinando d'Asburgo e ai suoi eredi i diritti sul Regno d'Ungheria e sulla Transilvania, ricevendone in cambio i ducati slesiani di Oppeln e Ratibor. La Porta non riconobbe il trattato di Gyulafehérvár e mandò un suo esercito nel Banato per restaurare lo *status quo*. Durante la campagna militare contro i turchi György Martinuzzi, personaggio divenuto 'scomodo' per la nuova classe dirigente asburgica, fu accusato di connivenza col nemico: ciò avrebbe segnato la sua condanna a morte. Su ordine di Ferdinando, il generale Castaldo lo fece assassinare in maniera efferata nel suo castello di Alvinc (oggi, Vințul de Jos, in Romania) la mattina del 17 dicembre 1551. Ferdinando e i suoi complici saranno tutti assolti con formula piena⁶.

In questo lavoro non entreremo nel merito dei motivi che hanno spinto Ferdinando d'Asburgo, il generale Castaldo e i suoi sicari a eliminare il frate paolino, nominato poco prima della morte cardinale della Chiesa di Roma⁷, né ci soffermeremo sul tema del 'processo Martinuzzi', che sarà oggetto d'un successivo lavoro, ma ci limiteremo a esporre le diverse versioni riportate nella letteratura sulla tragica morte di György Martinuzzi.

Dopo la conclusione dell'assedio della città e del castello di Lippa⁸ Martinuzzi e il generale Castaldo si trasferirono ad Alvinc (13 dicembre 1551): la guardia del frate fu

⁴ Si rimanda qui agli studi di G. NEMETH e A. PAPO, *La duplice elezione a re d'Ungheria di Giovanni Zápolya e Ferdinando d'Asburgo*, in «Ateneo Veneto» (Venezia), CLXXXIX, s. III, 1/II, 2002, pp. 17-59 e *La guerra civile ungherese*, in «Clio» (Roma), XLI, n. 1, gennaio-marzo 2005, pp. 115-44.

⁵ Sui negoziati cfr. A. PAPO, *György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics e i negoziati per la cessione della Transilvania alla Casa d'Austria*, in «Mediterrán Tanulmányok» (Szeged), XVII, 2008, pp. 1-29.

⁶ Sulla vicenda di Martinuzzi cfr. anche l'articolo di A. PAPO, *La figura di György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics nella storia e nella politica ungherese degli anni 1535-1551*, in «Studia historica adriatica ac danubiana» (Duino Aurisina), I, n. 1, 2008, pp. 53-69.

⁷ Si rimanda a questo proposito al saggio già citato dell'Autore György Martinuzzi Utyeszenics e i negoziati per la cessione della Transilvania alla Casa d'Austria.

⁸ Sulle vicende connesse con l'assedio di Lippa si veda I. SZANTO, *Küzdelem a török terjeszkedés ellen Magyarországon* [Lotta contro l'espansione turca in Ungheria], Budapest 1985, pp. 64-69.

alloggiata in uno dei due borghi in cui era suddiviso il paese, gli spagnoli nell'altro; i tedeschi furono ospitati in case separate perché non potessero incontrarsi tra di loro. Si diffuse subito la notizia secondo cui Martinuzzi aveva intenzione di indire una Dieta a Marosvásárhely per il 21 dicembre in cui proclamare l'insurrezione popolare contro l'occupazione asburgica⁹. Il generale Castaldo sollecitò allora il marchese Sforza Pallavicini a raggiungerlo ad Alvinc quanto prima possibile. Appena arrivato al castello del frate, il Pallavicini fu informato dal Castaldo dell'incarico che aveva ricevuto da Ferdinando: Martinuzzi non doveva uscire vivo da quel castello. La mattina – racconta Centorio – Martinuzzi nel dir messa dimenticò l'ostia ed elevò il solo calice: fu un presagio di morte¹⁰.

Castaldo ritenne quindi ch'era giunto il momento di prendere in considerazione l'ordine del re che decretava la morte di Martinuzzi: il pretesto furono – per Centorio – le notizie giunte da Venezia e da Costantinopoli da parte d'un principe ben informato di affari turchi (il re di Polonia?) secondo cui Martinuzzi aveva ordinato al *beylerbeyi* di Rumelia, il rinnegato serbo Mehmed Sokollu, di passare il Danubio e il Tibisco per occupare i castelli che il traditore Péter Petrovics aveva consegnato ai tedeschi e per annientare l'esercito di Ferdinando. Castaldo doveva eliminare Martinuzzi prima che lui diventasse pericoloso per il regno e per la cristianità; nel frattempo, doveva simulare amicizia col frate per non dargli il pretesto di attuare il suo piano e vigilare ed esser pronto a ogni evenienza.

L'ordine di Ferdinando che decretava l'eliminazione fisica del frate era stato consegnato al generale Castaldo il 23 ottobre 1551, mentre era in marcia verso Lippa, da Giuliano Salazar, cameriere privato del re dei Romani. La nota del sovrano, che sollecitava esplicitamente il generale Castaldo a uccidere il frate ("subito procurasse con ogni migliore modo possibile di farlo ammazzare"), rafforzò nel generale la convinzione del tradimento di Martinuzzi; Castaldo aveva infatti saputo anche da alcuni suoi informatori, oltreché dallo stesso re di Polonia, che il frate ormai tramava apertamente "di accordarsi co' Turchi e di ucciderlo con tutta la gente, che egli si trovava seco, e farsi assoluto Signore di Transilvania"¹¹. Lo stesso ordine fu rinnovato attraverso il conte Scipione di Arco.

⁹ Ne parla J.K. SCHULLER, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551 und Martinuzzi's Ende*, Hermannstadt 1862, pp. 54-55. Tamás Nádasdy confermò nella sua dichiarazione al processo Martinuzzi che in effetti era convinto che la regina Isabella non avesse mentito affermando, prima di lasciare il paese, che il frate s'era servito del pretesto di consegnare la Transilvania alla Casa d'Austria per strapparla invece dalle sue mani e governare da solo quel regno ("verum esse, quod regina dicebat in discessu ex Transsilvania, quod Frater Georgius sub pretextu dedendae provinciae Regiae Maiestati eam eriperet ex manibus suis et filii sui ut ipse solus dominaretur excluso etiam rege" [cit. ivi, nota 133]).

¹⁰ Cfr. A. CENTORIO, *De' Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania...*, Vinegia 1565, p. 143. Scrive Thuanus [J.A. THUANUS, *Historiarum sui temporis* (1543-1607), parte I, t. I, Parisiis 1604, lib. VII, p. 688]: "cum fieret, cenobii praesulem ex eo exitium Georgio sive praesagisse, sive imprecatum esse: animadversum et a domesticis, quod cum pridie quam periret, sacerdos coram eo sacrum vinum effuderit; quod tunc sacerdotis negligentiae assignatum, tamen Georgii necem portendisse, et eius sanguinem nox effusum iri significasse postea multi interpretati sunt".

¹¹ CENTORIO, *Commentarii cit.*, pp. 113-114. Cfr. anche THUANUS, *Historiarum sui temporis cit.*, VII, p. 679; a questo proposito Thuanus si rifà a Centorio, "scriptore cetera non negligendo, sed in Castaldi laudibus nimio: nam qui minus illi addicti, scripsere, Castaldum vafrum hominem, atque adeo marchionis illius Piscarii tot palmarum ducis, sed ingenii minus sinceri artibus instructum, quod

Seguiamo il racconto di Centorio. Il 16 dicembre, Castaldo incaricò il capitano Andrea Lopez, insieme col capitano Monino, col cavaliere Campeggio e con altri uomini del marchese Pallavicini, di eseguire entro la notte seguente il delittuoso mandato di uccidere Martinuzzi. Bisognava realizzare quell'impresa con estrema precisione, perché "oltre che'l Re ci perderebbe affatto il Regno, e la riputazione, eglino sariano con essi a pericolo di essere tutti morti"; avrebbero con ciò evitato la prevista rivolta dei transilvani. Gli promise che sarebbe stato ben ricompensato da Ferdinando. Per l'attuazione del piano gli ordinò che scegliesse tra le fanterie spagnole 24 archibugieri tra i più valenti, i quali non fossero riconosciuti dagli uomini del frate. I soldati dovevano introdursi nel castello il più cautamente possibile e occupare le quattro torri, dividendosi in sei per ciascuna di esse, dove avrebbero atteso gli ordini successivi. Chiamò quindi a sé il capitano Pedro d'Avila e gli ordinò che radunasse, ma senza tamburi e senza strepito, i soldati che si trovavano presso la porta di Szászsebes e che li portasse all'alba davanti all'ingresso principale del castello, ordinati in due squadroni con le rispettive bandiere, e che li attendessero gli ordini seguenti. Calò quindi la notte, una notte tempestosa con "venti horrendi, tempeste, romori insoliti nell'aere, un rivolgimento di porte e di fenestre per quel castello che pareva che'l tutto volesse profundare, et in somma si per l'aere adirato, come per quelle valli rivolgeva questa supernaturale violenza ogni cosa sottosopra, che pareva che tutti i Diavoli dell'Inferno fussero scatenati per quelle parti"¹².

Lo stesso 16 dicembre, cioè il giorno prima della sua tragica fine, Martinuzzi aveva mandato la propria guarnigione di 200 uomini e i suoi cuochi a Gyulaférvár, dove la mattina del 17 doveva essere preparata una colazione per lui e per Castaldo: il frate non avrebbe quindi potuto contare sull'aiuto della sua guardia del corpo.

Sopraggiunta l'alba del 17 dicembre (erroneamente il 18 secondo Centorio e il 19 secondo Thuanus¹³), gli aiducchi che stavano di guardia al castello aprirono la porta un po' prima del solito per far uscire i loro carri. Il capitano Lopez era già pronto per far entrare furtivamente i 24 archibugieri, come gli era stato comandato, approfittando appunto della confusione creata dall'uscita dei carri: nessuno se ne accorse. I soldati, vestiti alla "turchesca con robbe lunghe e larghe" che si erano procurate durante l'assedio di Lippa e che ben celavano le armi, furono dislocati nelle postazioni fissate. Il Lopez si recò quindi subito al posto stabilito dove l'aspettavano il Castaldo e il marchese Pallavicini, ch'era stato deputato capo dell'impresa. Il marchese portava con sé quattro gentiluomini italiani: il primo era il capitano Monino, il secondo il cavaliere Campeggio, il terzo Scaramuccia e l'ultimo un piacentino, tutti "huomini di molta confidenza e valenti". A questi si unirono quattro spagnoli scelti dal Lopez. Insieme con gli otto uomini, il marchese Pallavicini s'incamminò verso la camera del frate, preceduto dal segretario di Castaldo, Marco Antonio Ferrari. Il Ferrari, che teneva dei documenti in mano, chiese al segretario del frate, che stava per entrare nel suo alloggio per dargli la sveglia, il permesso di entrare con lui nella stanza del cardinale per chiedergli che firmasse delle carte per il marchese Pallavicini, in procinto di partire per Vienna. Il segretario di Castaldo era solito entrare nella camera del

Georgii gloriae invaderet, et thesauris illius, qui vero maiores esse ferebantur, inhiaret, auctorem Ferdinando fuisse, ut hominem interfici iuberet [...].

¹² CENTORIO, *Commentarii* cit., p. 144.

¹³ Cfr. THUANUS, *Historiarum sui temporis* cit., VII, p. 688.

frate anche in ore inconsuete, di giorno e di notte, ed era molto benvenuto da Martinuzzi, che gli “faceva affidamento di molti favori e carezze e dava di molti doni” e si fidava ciecamente di lui. Dopo aver chiuso la porta della stanza del corpo di guardia dove stavano bivaccando gli aiducchi, che a causa del maltempo della notte passata se ne stavano tutti attorno al fuoco senza accorgersi di quanto stava accadendo, il Ferrari bussò alla porta della sua camera. Ottenutone il permesso, il cameriere del frate l'aprì, il Ferrari vi entrò, seguito dal marchese Sforza Pallavicini, che aveva infilato piede e ginocchio dentro l'uscio impedendo che la porta fosse richiusa dal cameriere impedendo l'ingresso anche a lui. Frate György indossava ancora la veste da notte e sopra la veste una pelliccia: stava chino sopra un tavolo, sul quale teneva un orologio, un breviario “alla Romana”, e un libro delle sue memorie con appresso un calamaio. Il Ferrari gli consegnò le carte del Pallavicini, il frate si piegò per firmarle. Fu a questo punto che il Ferrari estrasse un coltello che portava nascosto con sé e ferì il cardinale nella gola “non però tale che lo potesse ammazzare”; il frate, raccolto in sé e dicendo “Virgomaria”, con una manata, “gagliardissimo che era”, lo spinse fino in fondo al tavolo facendo un rumore che richiamò l'attenzione del Pallavicini, il quale, posta mano alla spada, diede al frate una gran coltellata in testa, aprendogliela tutta. Subito dopo entrarono anche il Lopez e gli altri sicari; gli archibugieri gli spararono sul petto, il frate, “nell'apparire che fecero, altro non disse in latino se non queste parole: che cosa è questa fratelli, e dicendo Iesus Maria cadde spirando morto, e così ebbe fine il più superbo huomo del mondo, et il maggior occulto tiranno che mai vivesse, permettendo Dio, ch'ei morisse in quel proprio luogo”, che egli aveva fatto costruire sopra le fondamenta d'una chiesa antica e d'un monastero di religiosi, per l'abbattimento del quale l'abate gli aveva pronosticato quella morte”¹⁴.

Mentre si stava consumando l'attentato al frate, il Castaldo passeggiava nervosamente in un corridoio del castello. Avvertito della morte di Martinuzzi, si precipitò alla porta della fortezza facendone uscire gli aiducchi, che, sorpresi per quanto stava accadendo, persero la testa e si misero a correre verso il borgo.

Tutti quelli che parteciparono all'uccisione del frate – continua Centorio – patirono diversi infortuni: il marchese Sforza Pallavicini fu non molto tempo dopo sconfitto e fatto prigioniero dai turchi, da cui subì molti sinistri; il capitano Monino fu ammazzato con una scure a San Germano in Piemonte; Marco Antonio Ferrari fu fatto decapitare nel 1557 ad Alessandria per ordine del cardinale di Trento; un altro sicario fu fatto squartare dai francesi in Provenza; il Campeggio fu ucciso nel 1562 da un maiale selvatico in Boemia davanti agli occhi dell'imperatore Ferdinando. E per di più, la Transilvania non rimase a lungo sotto il dominio del re dei Romani: tornò di fatto sotto la sovranità di Giovanni Sigismondo. La morte del frate – conclude Centorio – fu quindi più dannosa che utile ai cristiani¹⁵. “Verum gratias ago Deo altissimo, qui praeter spem, res quietas permanere fecit, aliter vana erat spes quam in ipsis habebam”, scrisse invece il generale Castaldo al re Ferdinando¹⁶.

¹⁴ Cfr. CENTORIO, *Commentarii* cit., pp. 144-146.

¹⁵ Ivi, p. 146. Thuanus (ID., *Historiarum sui temporis* cit., VII, p. 690) si adegua al racconto di Centorio.

¹⁶ G.B. Castaldo a Ferdinando, Segesvár (Sighisoara), 3 gennaio 1552, Archivio di Stato di Vienna (in seguito: ASV), *Ungarische Akten*, fasc. 62, cc. 7/3-5.

Dopo l'assassinio, il generale Castaldo uscì dal castello per arrestare Ferenc Kendy, ch'era l'uomo più fidato del frate e l'unico che avrebbe potuto vendicare la morte del suo signore sollevando i transilvani contro i tedeschi. Gli uomini della guardia di Martinuzzi, comandati dal capitano Pál Bánk, che aveva partecipato alla spedizione di Lippa, credendosi in forte inferiorità numerica rispetto ai soldati del Castaldo, non osarono invece mettere mano alle armi rinviando la vendetta a tempi migliori. Se ne andarono nelle varie direzioni, lasciando il cadavere del frate insepolto, che rimase parecchi giorni (esattamente 70 giorni: dal 17 dicembre al 25 febbraio) a terra nudo, al buio, impietrito per il freddo, con la testa, il petto e le braccia mutilate e il sangue congelato: una visione macabra e compassionevole nello stesso tempo. Martinuzzi sarà sepolto da alcuni amici nella cattedrale di Gyulafehérvár, accanto alle tombe di János Hunyadi e di Giovanni Corvino, in un sepolcro fatto costruire dallo stesso Castaldo a spese di Ferdinando con l'epitaffio: "Omnibus moriendum est". Lo stesso giorno dell'uccisione del cardinale, Castaldo inviò un rapporto al re scrivendo in spagnolo: "A Dio è piaciuto chiamare fratello Giorgio dal mondo". Pregò il re di prendere in considerazione il fatto che era un comandante in un paese in rivolta, che aveva molti nemici, era senza soldati, senza soldi e senza viveri. Lasciata quindi Alvinc, si diresse verso Szászsebes (Sebeş, oggi in Romania) insieme con Ferenc Kendy. Il castello di Alvinc fu saccheggiato dagli uomini che vi erano rimasti di guardia: fu trovata nella camera del frate una cassetta con 12.000 fiorini d'oro, che il Lopez suddivise tra i suoi soldati riservandone per sé la parte maggiore. Venuto a conoscenza del saccheggio, il Castaldo mandò ad Alvinc il capitano Diego Velez perché mettesse fine ai disordini. Fu richiesto quindi a Vienna un commissario di Ferdinando, che provvedesse all'inventario dei tesori trovati¹⁷.

Il generale Castaldo, indignato per i saccheggi perpetrati al castello del frate, inviò da Szászsebes un proclama a tutti i castellani e servitori di Martinuzzi ("castellani varadiensis et quidam alii servitores quondam Fratris Georgii") invitandoli ad aderire alla parte di Ferdinando, anche con la promessa di consistenti somme di denaro come nel caso dei castellani di Újvár (Gherla, Romania), cui promise 4000 fiorini, o a quelli di Déva (Deva), cui ne promise 700. Scrisse quindi a Ferdinando che ormai tutto il regno era stato riappacificato ("Denique res ad quietem tendunt, speraque illas taliter accomodare que Regnum omne liberum et integrum Maiestati vestrae remaneat")¹⁸.

Fin qui Centorio. Miklós Istvánffy conferma grossomodo il racconto precedente e i nomi dei sicari, cui aggiunge due piacentini e Giovanni Mercado. Aperte le porte del castello all'alba, il capitano Lopez ne approfittò per farvi entrare i suoi uomini come pattuito col generale Castaldo. Dopodiché:

Marcus Antonius sica et minore ideoque occulto sclopeto instructus, Monacho preces matutinas exequenti per cubicularium puerum nuntiat, se habere arduum magnique momenti negotium cum eo paucis communicandum. Admissus in conclave literas profert ad Ferdinandum Regem in sui commendationem scriptas, quibus ut nomen suum

¹⁷ Cfr. CENTORIO, *Commentarii* cit., pp. 147-148.

¹⁸ G.B. Castaldo a Ferdinando I, Segesvár, 5 gennaio 1552, ASV, *Ungarische Akten*, fasc. 62, cc. 38r-39v.

subscribat, diligenter orat. Sumpto calamo, cum prono in literas vultu se inclinasset, ille pugione eius iugulum lethali ictu transadigit. Strepitu simul et clamore exorto Sforzia et caeteri decem numero irrumpunt, strictisque gladiis eum Christi Dei, divaeque Virginis matris opem implorantem circumsistunt, et ictus ingeminant. Marcus Antonius rabidae ferae instar procidentis et palpitantis pectori sclopetum intendit et glande traicit; nec mora reliqui multis caesim punctimque illatis vulneribus confodiunt [...].

Ferirono anche sette volte un giovane segretario di Martinuzzi, Ferenc Vas, che aveva cercato di chiedere aiuto, e lo lasciarono morto ("puerum quoque cui Francisco ferreo nomen erat, qui inermis attonitoque similis horribile facinus aspectabat, septem affectum plagis seminecem relinquunt, ac se cubiculo proripiunt"). Compiuto l'assassinio, il Mercado recise l'orecchio destro del frate "quae naturali adnato continuo pilosa erat" e lo spedì a Vienna, e da qui il macabro reperto raggiunse Praga "ut res Ferdinando evidentius acta constaret". Il cadavere rimase per più di settanta giorni insepolto e orrendamente mutilato nell'atrio della sua camera da letto. Istvánffy conferma la tragica sorte che colpì tutti gli autori del delitto: il marchese Sforza Pallavicini, catturato dai turchi, fustigato, si riscattò con l'oro; Marco Antonio Ferrari fu fatto impiccare da Ferdinando Gonzaga, prefetto imperiale di Milano; il Campeggio, perduta in una rissa la mano destra di cui s'era servito per uccidere il frate, fu qualche tempo dopo dilaniato da una fiera durante una battuta di caccia col seguito di Ferdinando; Scaramuccia fu ucciso da alcuni soldati nella Gallia Narbonense¹⁹.

Sistemati i 24 fanti spagnoli alla porta del castello che dava verso Szászsebes, il marchese Sforza Pallavicini e Andrea Lopez – seguiamo ora il racconto di Bethlen²⁰ – si diressero con quattro spagnoli "tacito passu" nella dimora del frate. Il segretario di Castaldo, Marco Antonio Ferrari, entrò per primo nella stanza di Martinuzzi, il quale stava "ad mensam inclinat". Il Ferrari gli sottopose alcune lettere per la firma, allorché:

mox Georgius, nullius doli conscius, arresto calamo, animum, oculos, manus ad scribendum intendit: tum Ferrarius strincta sica, geminam illi plagam repente infligit, alteram in iugulo, alteram in summo pectore. Ille insperato malo territur, invocato Divae Virginiae Matris nomine, correptum magna vi Ferrarium ad ima usque mensae subsellia deturbat.

Sentito lo strepito, il Pallavicini, che stava nelle vicinanze della stanza del frate irrumpit, strinctoque gladio caput Monachi ad cerebrum usque dividit:

necdum prostratum Ioannes Carridus (hic quoque Hispanus) dolone traicit, et extrema voce haec verba *Fratres quid commisis, quid commerci?* ingeminantem trucidat; cuius cadaver cruore taboque horribiliter deformatum, incredibilis rerum humanarum inconstantiae

¹⁹ Cfr. M. ISTVANFFY, *Regni hungarici historia libris XXXIV*, Coloniae Agrippinae 1724, lib. XVI, p. 191.

²⁰ W. BETHLEN, *Historia de rebus transsylvanicis*, t. I, Cibinii 1782, lib. IV, pp. 509-512.

exemplo, plus quam duobus mensibus iacuit neglectum inhumatumque in vestibolo cuculi [...].

Fu ucciso da sette pugnalate anche il cameriere di Martinuzzi, Ferenc Vas. Più sintetico è il racconto di Ferenc Forgách:

Ergo [*Castaldo, n.d.a.*] Marcum Antonium secretarium cum litteris paulo ante se praemittit, qui litteras legendas Georgio porrigeret, et inter legendum pugione percuteret, sese cum aliis in tempore affuturum. Marcus Antonius mandatum, ita, ut iussum est, exsequitur; ac statim ipse quoque cum Sforzia Pallavicino et Mercado irrumpunt, atque Georgium duorum sclopetorum glandibus, vulneribus autem quinque et sexaginta interfecerunt. Cum primum Marcus Antonius intravit, in lectulo preces matutinas orabat, et accepto vulnere, arreptoque illo, quid facis? inquit; cum ceteri ferirent: quid enim mali feci? saepius iteravit. Franciscum Vas nobilem adolescentem, adnitentem pro domino, septem plagis feriere; simul dispositis antea militibus castellum occupavere, direptis et in praedam conversis quae reperiabantur. Mercadus ut nobilior facinus ederet, et suam operam viriliter navatam aliquo signo testaretur, an quia iussus erat, aurem dextram discissam per postas ad Ferdinandum tulit, ac vespertinas preces solenni quadam die audienti praesentavit²¹.

“Così la Transilvania – commenta *Joseph von Hammer* – presentò per la seconda volta al sultano l’orrenda scena della strage de’ suoi partigiani, che come Gritti e Martinuzzi aveano sperato di promuovere il proprio interesse col tradire quello dei cristiani e dei musulmani, e di signoreggiare l’Ungheria e la Transilvania sotto l’ombra delle sciabole turche”²².

L’autore del manoscritto *Morte di frate Giorgio...* conservato alla Biblioteca Nazionale di Vienna²³ aggiunge poco di nuovo rispetto alle versioni di Centorio e di Istvánffy, per i quali fu senz’altro fonte determinante. In primo luogo ribadisce la connivenza di Martinuzzi col Turco; scrive infatti nella carta 43:

Avvisi da Costantinopoli come il detto frate ancor che seco fingesse di dar ciance al turco per tenerlo pacifico, nondimeno in effetto nascostamente praticava di riaccordarsi seco, offerendogli maggior tributo del solito e promettendo di mandare in perdizione i Spagnuoli e Todeschi, con che lo confermasse suo Voivoda e lo lasciasse governar pacificamente, di Sua Maestà, per cambio l’avea avvertito il Castaldo,

²¹ F. FORGACH, *De statu reipublicae hungaricae commentarii*, Pest 1866 (*MHH, Scriptores XVI*), lib. I, pp. 26-27.

²² J. VON HAMMER PURGSTALL, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, Pest 1827-1835, trad. ital. di S. Romanin, *Storia dell’impero osmano*, Venezia 1828-1830, lib. IX, p. 38.

²³ *Morte di Frate Giorgio, con alcune altre cose in Transsilvania et Ungaria successe negli anni 1551-1552*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (*Hofbibliothek*), Vienna, Cod. 7803, 89 cc. Anche György Pray [*Id., Annales Regum Hungariae*, vol. V, Vindobonae 1770, lib. V, pp. 445-446] si rifà al manoscritto ‘italiano’ di Vienna, e parla dell’uccisione di Martinuzzi e delle disavventure subite dai suoi assassini nella *Historia Regum Hungariae*, pars III, Budae 1801, pp. 111-114.

commettendogli espressamente, che quando si accorgesse che il frate fosse per venir a tal effetto lo prevenisse.

L'autore del manoscritto viennese precisa che Castaldo aveva deciso di obbedire all'incarico ricevuto di uccidere il frate, pur pregando Iddio che gli impedisse quell'atto se non fosse stato necessario per la difesa della religione. E chiarisce che furono il primo segretario di Castaldo, il milanese Francesco degli (delli) Streppati (non nominato da Centorio), e Marco Antonio Ferrari, entrato al servizio del cardinale, ad assumere in pratica l'incarico di assassinare Martinuzzi, anche se, in effetti, l'idea era scaturita dal primo, che poteva leggere le lettere e conoscere perciò gli ordini di Ferdinando. Decise di farlo, visto il pericolo incombente e dopo che non era riuscito a convincere il Castaldo ad assassinare lui stesso il monaco; capì anche che, se non avesse eseguito l'ordine del re, sarebbe stato anche lui in pericolo di vita. Decise pertanto di assassinare il cardinale non per rendere un servizio al suo signore, ma per fare un servizio al re e quindi a Dio. Resosi però conto di non poter agire da solo, ritenne opportuno coinvolgere anche il suo amico Ferrari. Ferrari accettò di essere coinvolto nell'assassinio giustificandosi che bisognava ammazzare Martinuzzi a causa della sua infedeltà. Era giunto finalmente il momento per eliminare il monaco (i turchi erano alle porte del regno), ed era necessario farlo anche a insaputa del loro padrone: un tentativo quindi di scagionare il generale Castaldo.

Dopo aver riflettuto a lungo, i due sicari decisero di dar corso all'impresa nello stesso castello di Alvinc. Il generale Castaldo, informato delle loro intenzioni, ritenne più facile e meno pericoloso uccidere Martinuzzi nella sua stessa abitazione e fece loro sapere tramite il Salazar che approvava la loro iniziativa. La sera stessa diede ordine a Ferrari di tenersi pronto per la mattina successiva. Fu convenuto tra i due potenziali assassini che sarebbe stato lo Streppati a dare al frate il primo colpo; ma, dopo aver parlato con Castaldo, Ferrari volle essere lui il primo a farlo.

Esiste anche un altro documento sull'assassinio di Martinuzzi: una relazione scritta da Marco Antonio Ferrari per il generale Castaldo e datata Kolozsvár, 19 febbraio 1552²⁴. Nella lettera, il Ferrari intendeva ricercare le cause della morte di Martinuzzi dando "avviso dei pochi meriti del Frate, dei demeriti et del successo della sua morte". La dichiarazione di Marco Antonio Ferrari è un atto d'accusa nei confronti di Martinuzzi, contro cui riporta prove che potrebbero apparire inequivocabili del suo tradimento, prove avallate anche dalla sua diretta testimonianza, ma è anche un atto liberatorio delle responsabilità del generale Castaldo.

E veniamo al racconto dell'assassinio di Martinuzzi nella versione dello stesso Ferrari. Il generale Castaldo, dopo aver dato ordine ai suoi soldati, ch'erano stati alloggiati in alcune case di Alvinc, di trovarsi davanti al castello all'apertura delle porte, confidò la sua volontà di ammazzare il frate al marchese Sforza Pallavicini e al capitano Pedro d'Avila, cui comandò d'introdurre nel castello sei o otto archibugieri. Nel frattempo, il Ferrari aveva contattato il Mercado e aveva ritenuto che il castello di Alvinc fosse il luogo più adatto dove eseguire l'assassinio del frate, dato che aveva notato una certa negligenza e scarsa

²⁴ Marco Antonio Ferrari, *Castaldo tábornok titkárának jelentése Martinuzzi meggyilkoltatásáról. 1552. február 19.* [Relazione di Marco Antonio Ferrari segretario del generale Castaldo, 19 febbraio 1552], in «Magyar Történelmi Társulat», XXIII, a cura di A. Nyári, Budapest 1877, pp. 241-258.

vigilanza da parte delle sue guardie, che, pur essendo ancora una quarantina in tutto, stavano di solito riunite in una stanza attorno al fuoco per ripararsi dal freddo. Pertanto, il Ferrari propose di far entrare due uomini nella stanza di Martinuzzi per compiere l'impresa, mentre altri quattro si sarebbero fermati a stazionare fuori della camera, otto-dieci archibugieri sarebbero rimasti giù nel cortile, altri soldati fuori del castello pronti a intervenire. Il Ferrari scelse anche l'arma per l'assassinio: un coltello (il Mercado avrebbe preferito un piccolo archibugio), e rimase a passare la notte con un pugnale nella manica steso su una panca davanti all'ingresso della camera del frate insieme con un suo compagno, Francisco, che aveva invece nascosto sotto le vesti un'accetta. Era ormai praticamente deciso che sarebbero stati loro due gli esecutori dell'assassinio. L'indomani mattina, il capitano d'Avila entrò nel castello con gli archibugieri senza essere visto, approfittando della pioggia e del tempaccio di quella giornata. Quindi il Castaldo, dopo aver scritto un paio di lettere ai castellani di Déva e di Szatmár (Satu Mare) cui intimò di restituire i loro castelli, convocò gli ufficiali partecipando loro la sua decisione d'ammazzare il frate, e ordinò che il Pallavicini entrasse con il Ferrari nella camera di Martinuzzi insieme con alcuni gentiluomini spagnoli perché fungessero da testimoni di quanto sarebbe successo. Quindi se ne partì per incontrare Ferenc Kendy; ma prima di lasciare il castello disse al suo segretario: "va, et fa l'effetto, et dopo corri ad alzare il ponte, et da dimano al Segretario". Nel frattempo il segretario del frate stava per avvisare Martinuzzi della visita del Pallavicini, ch'era accompagnato da quattro archibugieri. Fu allora che il Ferrari fece partire l'operazione: "Signore Sforza, - disse al marchese - il Signore ha detto che si faccia l'effetto" ed egli gli rispose "andiamo". Seguiamo a questo punto il racconto dello stesso Ferrari:

Et arrivando io dov'era il Segretario, gli domandai: «che cosa fa Monsignore?» et egli mi rispose «che non lo sapeva; et che per dubbio di non sconciarlo dalle sue orationi, no havea osato battere». Allhora io battei alla camera, et non mi fu risposto, tornai a battere, et così affacciò un paggio, al qual dissi: che 'l Signore Sforza era quivi per partire et che voleva bacciare le mani di Sua Signoria Reverendissima. Il paggio entrò medesimamente in sospetto, et volendo egli serrare la porta fra la qual prima io haveva interposto il piede, il Signore Sforza mi spinse, spinto lui anchora da quei di dietro, et così si aperse la porta con gran furia, et il Frate, il qual leggendo appoggiato ad tavola, s'alzò a quel atto et nel vedermi intrare con tanto rumore smarito si ritirò presso ad un muro, et io che mi haveva pensato poi che lo effetto si doveva fare, in due ch'era ben fatto dargli le pugnalate nella gola per ammazzarlo senza strepito, et senza ch'egli potesse grachiare, mosso da quel proprio pensiero gli tirai due colpi alla gola, et con l'uno io lo giunsi nella fontana della gola, et con l'altro tirandosi egli un poco da parte, lo venni a ferire al core; et dapoì ch'egli fu spogliato, si giudicò, che quel colpo et non nessun altro era mortale; et egli all'hora allargando le braccia cominciò a dire *ho, ho, ho*; qualche si volesse gridare, io non lo so, ma altri dicono, che egli disse: *oh domine, oh domine*, - et altri: *oh Maria, oh Maria*; - ma non è così. Ricordandomi io subito poi di quello, che mi havea commesso il Signore

di alzare il ponte, el qual era l'importanza del negotio, mi ritirai, et tanto più vedendo che di dietro mi calcavano.

Il Ferrari uscì quindi dalla stanza per dare ordine di sollevare il ponte del castello. Il Pallavicini completò l'impresa pugnalandolo il frate alla testa, mentre il capitano Monino gli sparava un'archibugiata che lo fece definitivamente cadere. Gli altri spagnoli infierirono con altre pugnolate contro il frate ormai cadavere e, in particolare, uno di loro si mise ad accoltellare anche i paggi ferendo tutti quelli che si trovavano nella camera. La qual cosa fece incollerire il generale Castaldo. Il segretario di Martinuzzi fu trovato nascosto in una stanza e fu salvato da Giovanni Alfonso Castaldo dalle grinfie dei soldati spagnoli che volevano ammazzarlo perché pensavano che stesse per chiamare rinforzi. Il generale Castaldo, da parte sua, licenziò la guardia del frate, lasciò una compagnia di spagnoli ad Alvinc e si ritirò a Szászsebes ordinando che nulla fosse toccato nel castello. Fu trovata nel castello di Alvinc una cassa con 11.000 ducati e 100 denari d'argento; di questo tesoro rimasero più o meno 300 ducati, il resto fu trafugato da quattro spagnoli, che furono però sorpresi e finirono in carcere. Andarono perdute anche le monete d'argento. Il Ferrari tenne per sé uno dei migliori cavalli del frate, che a ogni modo avrebbe messo a disposizione di Ferdinando. A Várád furono trovati "4000 et cinquecento marche d'argento, mille Lisimachi d'oro, i quali vagliano due scudi l'uno, mille et non so quanti fiorini d'oro, alcune anella false o di poco valore, due catene, una trista et una buona, di 200 pietre et 25 pietre di minera avenate d'oro grandi et piccole. Basta che 'l tutto non ascendi a 35.000-40.000 ducati". Del tesoro fu fatto fedele inventario alla presenza di András Báthori.

Hieronimus Ostermayer, anticipando l'uccisione del frate al 22 ottobre, scrive nella sua *Chronik* che il generale Castaldo, accortosi dopo la presa di Lippha che Martinuzzi intendeva passare dalla parte dei turchi (letteralmente "voleva farsi turco"), informò della cosa Ferdinando, il quale rispose dandogli mandato di uccidere il frate:

Als aber der General Obrist aus Verhaltung bey der Lippha vermerket, dass der Schatzmeister wollt Türkisch werden, hat er solches dem König zu Kund gethan, ist derowegen auf Befehl des Königs den 22 Tag Octobris zu Wintz in seinem Schloss von dem general umgebracht worden mit dieser List: es hat der General frühe vor Tag 3 Personen zu dem Schatzmeister geschickt, der eine hat dem Schatzmeister einen Brief gebracht, bis er ihm überlesen hat der andere ihn geschlossen, und der dritte durchstoichen. Auff dieses hat der General lassen ausrufen, dass jedermann soll still seyn, denn es des Königs Befehl wäre, der Schatzmeister ist unbegraben lang in einer Lade gelegen²⁵.

Il gesuita Antonio Possevino dà nella *Transilvania* questa versione dell'assassinio di Martinuzzi:

[...] dopo la resa del castello di Lippha, ritornarono dentro la Transilvania; et osservando il tempo [...] non prima eseguirono quel che macchinato avevano, ch'il decimo settimo di Dicembre sopravvenne. Venuti dunque ad Alwiincz, castello vicino ad Alba Giulia, egli

²⁵ H. OSTERMAYER, in G.J. KEMENY, *Deutsche Fundgruben der Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Klausenburg 1839, pp. 47-48.

[*Martinuzzi, n.d.a*] invitò il Castaldo ad un onorato convito, et gli diede tutte le stanze migliori, facendo parimente distribuire le più comode case ai nobili stranieri; et egli, solo con un cameriere et col suo capellano, si ritirò in una casetta privata, comandando a tutti i suoi che uscissero dal castello. Et avendogli poi la sera con liberalissima splendidezza trattati, doppo la cena se n'andò a dormire. Allo spuntar del giorno, avendo (si come soleva) recitate insieme col suo capellano l'hore canoniche, et mandato fuori il capellano, comparve il segretario di Castaldo, con alcuni eletti, a far quel sacrilego omicidio; et colui picchiando alla porta, al cameriere, il quale si affacciò, disse queste parole: *Di a Monsignore Illustrissimo, che in questo punto il Signore Sforza Pallavicino se ne vuole andare al re, et però vorrebbe baciargli la mano.*

Segue quindi la scena dell'assassinio:

Il Cardinale comandando che subito gli si aprisse, essi impetuosamente entrando, prima con un'archibugiata lo ferirono, ripetendo esso queste parole: *Che cosa ho fatto? Che cosa ho fatto?* Ma come era di complessione robusta, né così tosto moriva. Sopravenne uno Spagnolo, per soprannome Campo [*Campeggio, n.d.a.*], il quale non solo l'uccise, ma tagliatogli un orecchio, lo portò poi alla corte di Ferdinando, per assicurare coloro, che lo desideravano, di questa sceverata impresa, della quale era stato istrumento²⁶.

Ma "Dio volle esserne [...] presto et giusto giudice" – continua la nota del Possevino –: l'anno seguente il pascià di Buda fece una strage dei soldati che il Castaldo aveva mandato a "infestare" la città di Szeged; Temesvár fu presa dai turchi, che fecero a pezzi il Losonczy e con lui gli spagnoli e gli ungheresi che difendevano la città; il marchese Sforza Pallavicini, catturato dai turchi, si riscattò col denaro; i turchi ben presto riconquistarono molte altre fortezze mandando così in fumo le spese sostenute da Ferdinando per mantenere gli eserciti che aveva mandato in Transilvania²⁷.

E seguiamo ancora la morte di Martinuzzi nel racconto di uno storico veneziano, Andrea Morosini:

Iis de rebus [*la liberazione di Ulama, n.d.a.*] Ferdinandus certior factus, deque Cardinalis perfidia edoctus, vastos illius spiritus magis in posterum veritus, secretiora Castaldo illius interficiendi mandata dedit. Negotium Sfortia Pallavicinus suscepit, qui summo mane decimosexto kal. januariis, duobus e suis domesticis comitantibus, cum nondum custodes ad cubiculum convenissent, colloqui specie ingressus, Georgium obtruncavit; qui, quo ex humiliori loco in altissimum dignitatis,

²⁶ A. POSSEVINO, *Transilvania (1584)*, a cura di E. Veress, Budapest 1913 (*Fontes rerum transylvanicarum*, t. III), p. 81, anche in G. BASCAPE, *Le relazioni fra l'Italia e la Transilvania nel secolo XVI*, Roma 1931, p. 99.

²⁷ Ivi, pp. 81-82 (Veress) e 99-100 (Bascapè).

ac potentiae gradum sublatus fuerat, eo graviore lapsu corruisse visus est²⁸.

Nella cronaca di Ambrus Somogyi poco spazio è riservato alla morte del frate: il cronista si limita però a sottolineare che non fu ucciso per ordine di Ferdinando e a esprimere la sua incredulità che sia stato eliminato un tanto grande uomo "quem solum prae caeteris omnibus antea etiam in partibus Ioannis esse invidere dictitabat, nisi iussu eius"²⁹.

Merita infine di essere riportato anche il racconto, impreciso – vi si parla addirittura di decapitazione –, della morte di Martinuzzi nella versione del nunzio apostolico presso la corte imperiale, Pietro Bertano, vescovo di Fano:

Hoggi [8 gennaio 1552, n.d.a.] in questa hora del mezzo giorno è venuto nuova della morte del cardinal fra Giorgio la cui tragedia è verissima, ma li particolari non si sanno anchor minutamente. Dirò solo le cagioni della morte sua. Egli si mostrò fino nella presa del castel di Lippa esser turco, con mala soddisfazione di tutti quelli Ongari. In questo tempo fino alli 20 del passato che fu il giorno ultimo della sua vita, esso frate aveva intendimento co 'l Turco di farsi re di Ongaria et impadronirsi di tutto quel paese et di Transilvania, et comunicato il fatto co 'l suo consiglio, due di quelli, a quali il trattato non piaceva, lo scopersono al signor Giovan Battista Castaldo, il quale ben certificato della cosa, mandò quattro uomini al padiglione del cardinale, i quali furono il segretario del signor Giovan Battista, il signor Sforza Pallavicino, uno Ongaro et un Transilvano. I quali giunti alla sua camera del padiglione, il segretario gli dette di un pugnale nella gola, il signor Sforza con una percossa in capo lo fece cader in terra, et li due altri insieme con questi gli togliarno la testa, et portaronla nello esercito, talmente che volendo il frate farsi re, et far tagliare a pezzi tutti quelli Christiani dal Beglierbei, che dovea venire al effetto, ha conseguito il fine degno di lui, che fu come ho detto il 20 del passato, del qual caso Sua Santità non deve pigliarsi fastidio, perché egli fosse cardinale dapoi che era traditore, et insidiava alla Christianità³⁰.

²⁸ Andreae Mauroceni Senatoris, *Historia veneta* Ab anno MDXXI usque ad annum MDCXV, in *Degl'Istorici delle cose veneziane*, t. VI: *Istorie veneziane* di Andrea Morosini, Venezia 1719, p. 42.

²⁹ *Ambrosii Simigiani Historia rerum ungaricarum et transsilvanicarum*, a cura di J.K. Eder, t. II, Cibinii 184, lib. II, p. 55.

³⁰ P. Bertano a I. Monte, Innsbruck, 8 gen. 1552, in *Nuntiatuerberichte aus Deutschland 1533-1559*, vol. XII, *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Bertano und Pietro Camaiani 1550-1552*, a cura di G. Kupke, Berlin 1901, n. 51, pp. 138-139. Il nunzio pone quindi la morte di Martinuzzi il 20 dicembre. Si veda infine di S. TINODI in I. KATONA, *Historia critica regum Hungariae stirpis austriacae*, t. III, *Budae 1798* pp. 99-102, che così conclude: "Kegyetséggéért kegyetlen lön halála / testét el-temetni is nem hagyák vala / hetven napig a tornatzba állott-vala / Szent Mátyás más napján el-temetett vala [La sua morte fu crudele come lui / non lasciarono neanche seppellire il suo corpo / rimase disteso nell'atrio all'aperto per settanta giorni / fu sepolto il giorno dopo di san Mattia] (traduzione mia). M. SIGLERUS in KATONA, *Historia critica* cit., III, pp. 102-103 scrive: "Frater Georgius Dalmata [...] vir magnae in Hungaria auctoritatis [...] ob suspicionem Turcicae societatis et ergni affectationem, in arce Vincz a

Dell'insolito temporale che imperversò su Alvinc la notte del 16 dicembre e tutta la giornata del 17 parla anche Veit Goleil nel suo diario riportato da Hatvani e chiuso a Hermannstadt (Szeben, Sibiu) il 20 dicembre 1551. Sul retro del manoscritto è riportato l'epitaffio attribuito al medico di corte Giorgio Blandrata: "Confossus iacet Monachus, qui prodidit orbem, Pupillum et viduam seque Deum et patriam"³¹.

Il 5 gennaio la regina Isabella scrisse al generale Castaldo:

[...] veggiamo esser più sicuro il Regno nelle mani del Serenissimo Re dei Romani, che per dirgli il vero ne era gravissimo vedere ingrandir anzi diventar Re colui che era cagione delle nostre disgrazie, hora Iddio voglia benedir quanti amano la iustitia et dar felicità a chi punisce i traditori, si come è il voler divino, il quale tardando le iuste vendette, perciò non le dà minori, né si scorda degli oppressori, pregamo quella se far si potrà ne voglia più minutamente dare avviso, a ciò sappiamo in che maniera è stato ucciso [...] ³².

Ferdinando ricompensò Castaldo e gli altri complici dell'assassinio con oro, vestiti e pensioni e i soldati con 12 giornate aggiuntive di stipendio.

La morte violenta di Martinuzzi non colpì più che tanto la Porta: a Rustan lasciò scapparono di bocca queste parole di fronte all'ambasciatore francese Aramon: "È stato un uomo che ha sempre voluto essere doppio di quello che effettivamente era; non è stata una grande perdita"³³.

Si disse che Castaldo aveva ucciso Martinuzzi per il suo immenso tesoro, che aveva sottratto al re Giovanni defraudando lo stato, la regina e l'erede Giovanni Sigismondo³⁴. Si favoleggiava che il frate avesse raccolto milioni di fiorini d'oro e 200 sacchi di monete d'argento. Il resoconto di Castaldo parla invece di 4500 marchi in lingotti d'argento, di 1000 vecchie monete con l'effigie di Lisimaco, 1000 fiorini d'oro puro, alcune pietre

Sforzia et aliis Italicis militibus ictu bombardae percutitur, XVII die Decembris, mane, circa horam quartam. Sepultum est cadaver, iam graviter olens, Albae Iuliae".

³¹ Diario di Veit Goleil, in M. HATVANI, *Magyar történelmi okmánytár, a Brüsszeli Országos Levéltárból és a Burgundi Könyvtárból* [Collezione di documenti storici ungheresi degli Archivi Nazionali di Bruxelles e della Biblioteca di Borgogna], vol. II: 1538-1553, Pest 1858 (*MHH, Diplomataria II*).n. 220, pp. 275-294: 294.

³² La regina Isabella a G.B. Castaldo, Kassa, 5 gennaio 1552, ASV, *Ungarische Akten*, fasc. 62, cc. 31r-32r; anche in F.-B. BUCHHOLTZ, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinands I*, Wien 1831-38, vol. IX (*Urkunden-Band*), n. III, pp. 583-584, con la data del 4 gennaio.

³³ "[...] que c'estoit un homme, qui avoit toujours esté double de quelque coté qu'il eust été, et que ce n'estoit pas grande perte" [dispaccio da Venezia dell'ambasciatore francese Aramon, gennaio 1552, in E. CHARRIERE, *Négotiations de la France dans le Levant, vol. I, Paris 1848*, p. 177]. Il nunzio pontificio a Venezia, cardinale Tournon, rispose alla frase del vice doge "les cardinaux en ce temps [...] cy se pouvoient tuer aussi bien que d'autres" con queste parole: "les cardinaux, qui vouloient être tyrans et usurper les royaumes, comme faisoit ledit frère Goerges, estoient en ce danger" [Aramon al re di Francia, Venezia, 15 gennaio 1552, ivi, p. 175].

³⁴ "il a en son pouvoir le trésor dudit feu roy et la dotte de la reyne et tous ses joyaux et coffres entièrement", è riportato in un avviso ricevuto dall'ambasciatore del re di Francia, Antonio Rincon [CHARRIERE, *Negotiations de la France cit.*, p. 442].

preziose con venature d'oro, un serpente d'oro con dentro 1000 fiorini d'oro. Castaldo stesso scrisse al re d'aver trovato lui quel serpente che doveva contenere un tesoro d'inestimabile valore: le cose non stavano così, al massimo aveva un valore di 90 ducati. "Verum miror et stupefactus remaneo – scrisse Castaldo a Ferdinando – quomodo hic tam pauca reperta sint respectu multorum quae Fama erat hic asservata esse, nec dubitare possum quin castellani isti maiorem forsitan partem sustulerint, sed cum id de praesenti non constet, praesentiumque rerum status non requirat, ut convenientibus modis veritas eliciatur, usque ad opportunitiora tempora dissimulandum esse censeo"³⁵. "Il meraviglioso tesoro – scrisse il Castaldo al nunzio Girolamo Martinengo – che si stimava che avesse il frate, et che Vostra Signoria desidera d'intendere, si è poi risolto in una picciola miseria. Credo bene che siano state nascoste molte cose, ma non che ascendessero ad una parte di tanta somma. Unde si può forse concludersi, che questo huomo si sostenea più con la reputazione che con alcune altre cose [...]"³⁶. L'11 febbraio 1552 il Martinengo scriveva a Innocenzo del Monte annotando: "Quanto al spoglio, non trovo – per l'informationi che mi vengono date – che vada a quella somma che si sperava, ché dal re medemo intendo ch'oltre gli 12.000 ducati (che tanti dicono esser stati, et non quindici mille, come da principio scrissi) che furono mal' menati nel caso, sonsi ultimamente trovati in Oyvar [Újvár, n.d.a.] da sessanta mille fiorini in verghe d'argento, e da mille ducati in medaglie d'oro"³⁷. Pochi giorni dopo il valore stimato del tesoro era salito a 100.000 ducati ("Del spoglio – la nota è sempre del Martinengo –, per l'informationi che fin hora ho potuto havere, non trovo ch'arrivi a 100.000 ducati")³⁸. E ancora il 7 marzo il Martinengo scriveva al del Monte: "ci sono [medaglie d'oro, n.d.a.] per mille ducati, et antiche, et la maggior parte di Lysimaco, che già tutte di questa sorte ne furono trovate ragunate insieme più di 30 mille. Il resto del spoglio, che così di nuovo m'afferma il Castaldo, si risolve in poca quantità", anche se il nunzio aveva sentito alcuni servitori del cardinale parlare addirittura un tesoro di 500.000 ducati³⁹.

Molto dettagliatamente, Centorio⁴⁰ parla d'un tesoro costituito da:

- 1744 marchi d'oro in lingotti
- 4793 marchi d'argento
- 1000 antiche medaglie di Lisimaco, che valevano da 3 a 4 ducati l'una

³⁵ G.B. Castaldo a Ferdinando I, Újvár, 30 gen. 1552, in BUCHHOLTZ, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinands I* cit., vol. IX (*Urkunden-Band*), n. IV, pp. 584-585. Del ritrovamento del serpente si parla in UTIESENOVIC, *Lebensgeschichte des Cardinals* cit., p. 143.

³⁶ G.B. Castaldo a G. Martinengo, Kolozsvár, 20 febbraio 1552, in A. THEINER, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium historiam illustrantia*, vol. II, Zagrabiae 1875, n. 49, pp. 31-2 e in *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland 1533-1559*, vol. XVI, *Nuntiatur Delfinos. Legation Morones. Sendung Lippomanos (1554-1554)*, a cura di H. Goetz, Tübingen 1970, n. *10, pp. 318-321.

³⁷ G. Martinengo a I. del Monte, Vienna, 11 febbraio 1552, ivi, n. 49, pp. 96-99.

³⁸ Id. a Id., Vienna, 19 febbraio 1552, ivi, n. 50, pp. 99-102 e in THEINER, *Vetera Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium* cit., II, n. 48, p. 31.

³⁹ Id. a Id., Graz, 7 marzo 1552, in *Nuntiaturberichte* cit., XVI, n. 53, pp. 106-109.

⁴⁰ Cfr. CENTORIO, *Commentarii* cit., pp. 154-155. Cfr. anche THUANUS, *Historiarum sui temporis* cit., VII, p. 692.

- 20 pietre d'oro metallico, del tipo di quelle rinvenibili nei fiumi transilvani e del peso complessivo di 34 marchi
- verghe d'argento di miniera del valore di 933 marchi
- 6 vasi grandissimi d'argento indorati
- alcune catene d'oro del peso di 6 marchi e mezzo
- 32 grandi coppe d'oro con decorazioni d'argento
- 60 anelli d'oro con gemme
- un collare d'oro a forma di croce con rubini e diamanti
- 36 grandi coppe d'argento indorate
- 12 boccali e 12 bacili d'argento indorati
- varie tazze d'argento, piatti grandi e medi, coppe ecc.
- 1534 ducati d'oro ungheresi
- varie pellicce di zibellino da 80-100 pelli ciascuna
- altre pellicce di gran valore
- zaffiri e altri gioielli legati in oro
- drappi dorati, di seta, panni, tappeti, tapezzerie di valore inestimabile
- più 300 cavalli di razza, e ancora cavalli turchi e muli in gran numero
- una grandissima quantità di vettovaglie e munizioni.

Il tutto per un valore di 250.000 fiorini d'oro, a parte i beni trafugati ad Alvinc, a Várad, a Újvár e a Déva. Non si sa però quale parte di questo tesoro sia appartenuta a Martinuzzi, quale allo stato, di cui egli era tesoriere.

Ma dove finì la parte mancante? Forse non è mai esistita, se non nelle fantasticherie dei detrattori del frate. Il nipote del generale Castaldo, Giovanni Alfonso Castaldo, colse forse nel segno dicendo con coraggio a Isabella durante una sua visita in una delle sue dimore a Petrovica, in Polonia, vicino al confine ungaro-moldavo, dove la trovò in pessime condizioni andare "vagabonda e derelitta, con più carrette che genti per quelli boschi deserti", che cosa poteva possedere il frate se aveva dovuto condurre guerre ininterrottamente e aveva fatto infinite spese, se non altro per tenere tutti i nobili del paese contro di lei:

[*La Regina, n.d.a.*] anchor mi disse del tesoro del frate dolendosi, perché ben si sa che lo lasciava a suo figlio. Io li giurai solennemente che questo si è risolto in pochissima summa, la qual fu distribuita a li soldati parte, e parte dissipata, et che vostra Maestà [*Ferdinando, n.d.a.*] non ne ha havuto quanto sia in denaro, e che le cose di Wivar [*Újvár, n.d.a.*] per la maggior parte fu distribuita a li medesimi servitori del frate che domandavano chi una, et chi un'altra cosa, quelle di Varadino fur rubbate da li medesimi castellani, che vi lasciaro se non certa miseria che non valea nulla, e replicando che non era credibile che non havesse gran tesoro gli domandai, che potrà haver uno che del continuo havesse fatto guerra e che havea speso infinitamente, se non in altro modo in tener subordinati tutti li principali del Regno contra di lei, et in questo mi faticai largamente per dissuaderglielo⁴¹.

⁴¹ G.A. Castaldo a Ferdinando I, s.l., 2 ottobre 1553, ASV, *Ungarische Akten*, fasc. 72, cc. 2r-6v.

Bethlen racconta che furono trovate ad Alvinc 50.000 monete d'oro, che furono in gran parte usate per pagare il soldo ai mercenari; furono inoltre trovati nei possedi di Martinuzzi fuori Alvinc oggetti d'oro del peso di 872 libbre, oggetti d'argento del peso di 2387 libbre:

Lisimachia numismatica quatuor mille, quorum singula quaternis aureis Hungaricis aestimabantur; grumi auri grandiores seu palacrae ex arrugiis edunctae, aut in amnium Transsylvanorum ramentis lectae viginti, quae septemdecim pondo esse ferebantur; argenti in massam conflati quadringenta sexaginta sex pondo. Praeter haec vasa aurata praegrandia, pocula, paterae, torques, annuli, monilia varii generis, tum vero polubra, et aquales in abaci usum viginti quatuor. Domestica quoque supellex Regiae pene magnificentiae luxum ostentabat: vestes, aulea, tapetia, exoticarum pellium ingens numerus; tum aulici splendoris monumento ingentia; trecenti equi generosi armenti e Thracia sumptu incredibili comparati, phalerarum, ephippiorum, armorum, et quae huc pertinent omnium magna copia; iuxta haec armentum equarum generosioris notae⁴².

La regina Isabella chiese a Ferdinando che le venissero restituiti alcuni beni del marito ch'erano stati trovati nel tesoro del frate:

[...] oltre i danari, aveva il frate cose particolari come sono gioie e coppe della pia memoria del Serenissimo Re nostro marito, le quali non volsi dare in mano nostra, si come habiamo veduto e potranno testificare più persone maximo il proprio Camariero che è qua essendo queste cose non del Regno ma della antichità del figlio nostro. Vorressimo che la Maestà del Re dei Romani ne desse bona licentia di ricercarle e che Vostra Signoria illustrissima ne consigliasse come habbiamo fare. La preghiamo ne voglia havere in protettione questo figlio pupillo et orfano⁴³.

Chiese pure la restituzione delle "case delli cavalli del frate", o almeno della metà di esse, scuderie che erano state costruite da suo marito⁴⁴. "Se altro – scrisse la regina a Castaldo – non possiamo havere, al manco ne mandi delle reliquie santi de quella pelicia repezata o veramente delle ongie delli piedi quali ne apresentatione spesso; e laudato sia Iddio che [Martinuzzi, n.d.a.] non sarà Papa". E chiuse una delle sue lettere a Castaldo con queste aspre parole: "[...] dopo la morte di tanto potente e mostruoso animale, il quale vivo soleva produr tempeste, venti e procelle ad ogni suo piacere; sia ringraziato Iddio [...] la morte sua è stata come del rospo, che vivo avelena, e morto sana del veleno"⁴⁵.

⁴² BETHLEN, *Historia* cit., lib. IV, pp. 512-513.

⁴³ La regina Isabella a Ferdinando I, Kassa, gennaio 1552, in SCHULLER, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach* cit., n. 13, pp. 73-74.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ UTIESENOVIC, *Lebensgeschichte des Cardinals* cit., p. 142.

An introduction to the history of the language and literature of Malta

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A history of Maltese culture may be said to reflect in various ways the history of the whole community. Since, much more than in the case of larger countries, Malta could never do without foreign contacts, necessarily causative of a complex process of influences, such a history, be it political, social or cultural, is bound to assume a comparative character. What are euphemistically called foreign contacts were nothing less than foreign occupations. The conditions which characterise and modify the process of, say, a political history of subordination, may boil down to be the real causes of analogous conditions in the cultural field.

Conflicts of various natures did come to the fore throughout Maltese history. In the case of literary culture, the basic conflictuality seems to be linguistic and not necessarily cultural or psychological. The roots of the dualism to be discussed here are embedded in the soil of political experience: there were the foreign rulers and the natives, the ruled ones. Within the category of the ruled, social stratification manifested itself in linguistic diversity. The so-called uneducated class only knew Maltese, the native tongue, whereas the others could immediately distinguish between the language of culture, traditionally Italian, and the local dialect.

Considering the two major languages which assumed the role of primary media for literary expression, one has to start by distinguishing between Italian and Maltese. The relationship between Italian and Maltese has been looked at, up to a few years ago, as controversial, or worse still, as the unhappy intercourse between a Latin culture, the presence of which in the island goes back many centuries, and a Semitic one, characterised mainly by the basic Arabic structure of the popular language which, owing to the island's uninterrupted contacts with the outer world, adopted a Romance superstructure. One has to define the nature of the apparently contradictory relationship Italian-Maltese from a purely linguistic viewpoint. After getting a clear perspective of the 'Language Question', which constituted one of the major political preoccupations between 1880 and 1939, one may proceed to deal exclusively with the literary question.

THE LITERARY TRADITION

Considering the traditional presence of both languages in Malta, the first conclusion is that Maltese is prior to Italian as a spoken language, whilst there is hardly any proof that Italian was ever adopted as the habitual speech medium by any local section of the

population. The Arabs conquered Malta in 870 A.D. and thus laid the foundations for the language we now call Maltese, unique for being a Semitic tongue written in the Latin script. With the Norman conquest in 1090 A.D. the language of the island started to find itself open to extra-Arabic influences, a process which has widened the lexical stock and the syntactic patterns and which is still active nowadays.

When Maltese started to be written on a significant scale in the 17th century (other instances are being here purposely omitted since they are rather rare and sporadic), and then on a much wider popular level in the 18th and 19th centuries, Italian had already established itself as the only and unquestionable cultural language of the island and had a respectable literary tradition of its own. One of the earliest documents in Italian dates back to 1409. Maltese men of letters developed an uninterrupted local "Italian" literary movement which went on up to the Second World War period, whereas Maltese as a literary idiom started to prominently co-exist in the first half of the 19th century, and reached a respectable climax in its last decades. This considerable deposit of "Italian" literary output throughout the centuries, a large section of which is still in manuscript form at the National Library of Malta, is the work of both Maltese and foreign writers (who happened to spend a period of time or live in the island).

Thus, whilst Maltese has the historical priority on the level of the spoken language, Italian has the priority of being the almost exclusive written medium, for sociocultural affairs, for the longest period. The native language had only to wait for the arrival of a new mentality which would integrate an unwritten, popular tradition with a written, academically respectable one.

A highly significant and far reaching conclusion may be drawn at this stage. A certain section of the community adopted two distinct languages, within the same inhabited territory, for different purposes. The spoken language was Semitic, whereas the written one was Romance. It is a distinction which may account for a certain degree of Malta's inherent inconsistency in assessing its own identity, which is still present nowadays when English in various respects assumed the role previously granted to Italian and made new inroads which, according to the criteria set and declared by UNESCO and the Council of Europe, occupy a territory exclusively reserved for the native tongue. Again, the dualism English-Maltese is not only linguistic but also cultural, social and political. It is sufficiently safe, however, to presume that Maltese is still the common factor, the most efficient component in the definition of Malta as a distinct national community.

If one seeks to identify the literary spirit of the Maltese throughout the centuries, one should also find it obvious to include the said Italian-oriented Maltese production, thus rendering it the first, or preliminary, phase of the whole spectrum, itself leading towards the modern emancipation of Maltese. This approach would seek to establish the social motives which debarred Maltese from all cultural manifestations, and why it was somehow dishonourable to use it. It is paradoxical as much as it is logical that the major literary figures in the history of Maltese are all so-called converts; they were all authors well versed in Italian who, at a certain point in their life, discovered the sheer beauty and wealth of the native language, and eventually transformed it into a first-class literary medium.

Pietru Pawl Saydon (1895–1971), an eminent Biblical scholar of international repute, adamantly proved this point by dedicating not less than thirty years of his life to the translation of the whole Scripture from the original languages. Dun Karm (1871–1961), the

national poet, openly declared that he wanted to show that Maltese was in no way inferior to either Italian or any other language. At times through translation, but mainly through the creation of new works, he soon proved that what the language lacked was only a fine craftsman. And there he was, to prove that a whole tradition went utterly wrong.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ROMANTICISM

One should also seek to define the proper character of the Italian tradition. This can be done best through a comparative analysis of the peninsula's literature and of ways it influenced the island during a series of cultural epochs, such as Renaissance, Baroque, Illuminism and then Romanticism, by far the most important period so far as the formation of a national awareness in Malta is concerned. Romanticism, both Latin and Germanic, revalued the Illuminist concept of cultural diffusion and, while questioning the true significance and practicability of cosmopolitanism, fostered the cult of national languages. This epoch, fundamentally based on the discovery of the sense of personal and national individuality, coincides with the first serious efforts towards the rediscovery of Maltese as one of the most ancient patrimonies of the new emerging nation. This is how Mikiel Anton Vassalli (1764–1829) calls it in 1796 in the important introduction to his dictionary.

The antiquity of a popular language featured very significantly in the concept of nationalism which European romanticism sought to form and preach. Nineteenth century mentality shaped the future of both language and literature in Malta in the times to come. One of the more important results of Vassalli's political and scholarly contributions is the embryonic development of a nationalistic way of thinking which centred around two basic aspects of romantic philosophy and aesthetics: (i) the affirmation of the singular and collective identity (an experience emanating from the absolute devotion the romantics had for sentiment and passion, as opposed to the old and undisputed right enjoyed by the "goddess reason"); and (ii) the cultivation and diffusion of the national language as the most sacred component in the definition of the *patria* and as the most effective justification for a dominated community's claiming to be a nation and for the subsequent struggle against foreign rulers.

This new national belief promulgated by romantic Italy pervaded Malta during the period of the Risorgimento, namely during the first six decades of the nineteenth century, when writers, journalists and political rebels sought refuge in the island. Alongside their activity in favour of a united and independent homeland these refugees engaged themselves in an analogous mission: that of inviting the Maltese themselves to fight for their own political and cultural rights against the British colonial domination. This started to give rise to an ever wider utilisation of the native language and to the gradual growth of an indigenous literature fully aware of the political, social and cultural rights of the community.

Different cultures, political attitudes, world visions and social customs crossed each other in 19th century Malta and determined to a great extent the beliefs and modes of the people for a long time to come. What may superficially look like a mere historical background, buried in a relatively remote past, is actually the real foundation on which contemporary Malta is built. Languages were finally put in direct conflict, the past and the

present transformed themselves into two ways of being, and colonialism and the concept of sovereignty became items of a new national agenda which demanded that a decision should be ultimately taken. History in Malta is perhaps more debated than actually known; at times it even assumes the role of an arbiter between political parties in search of self-justification.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE AS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

What is this multidimensional self made up of? The religion of the Maltese, originally Christian, namely oriental (going back to about 60 A.D., as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles), has become Catholic, namely eminently Latin. The language of the Maltese is basically Semitic, dating back to the Arab occupation (870–1090), whereas the national culture is fundamentally European. Most of the terms used in liturgy are originally Semitic, whilst they form part of a Catholic ritual. Colonialism has left an indelible mark on all aspects of life in Malta, including the psychology of the average inhabitant, but political emancipation has provided the people with the full rights any people can dream of and strive for. The language is the most amazing example of how history in Malta is the final outcome of different components.

Perhaps the old man still lingers on in the Maltese, but he has to come to terms with himself and realize that he is politically new, namely free, enjoying all the means of self-determination. The supreme dignity of the nation lies in the remote past – in Malta there are some of the most outstanding temples of all prehistory – but contemporary life demands what is fashionably called development. Land development frequently implies the loss and utter destruction of whole areas intimately associated with the ancient past.

The island's heritage is essentially made of stone. Assuming the function of an imaginative archetypal pattern – as Maltese poetry amply shows – the stone signifies stability, continuity, actually a sort of historical eternity. But stones which constitute a building can also serve as toys; a whole building can be eventually demolished and the process seems to be endless. What is apparently a physical act may betray psychological traits. Whoever seems to be so moody in front of a stone may be moody in all his or her psycho-physical set-up. The superficial builder is perhaps a profound researcher. And what is being unearthed seems to be nothing less than the self, both individual and collective. To detect the relationship between individuality and collectivity may be enough to merely establish matters quantitatively.

This is what we normally mean by “a trend”, a massive, initially voluntary but finally instinctive, participation in an act. When such an act is shared by a relatively large portion of society, it is bound to take the shape of a ritual. And there we are: Maltese history recognises its prehistoric birth in ritual, and since then it seems that the islander has not changed substantially. His attitude towards his heritage in stone is still ritual. He builds churches with the same facility he constructs villas; a church may resemble a villa, and vice-versa. A church is not only useful but also symbolical; so is a Maltese house. It is not merely an abode; it is also an image.

All this may drive home the point that different cultures did not simply meet in Malta and leave their trace. They have also produced a specific psychological frame, an unquenchable thirst for new, hitherto unknown, tastes. All the different cultures which form

the island's remote history – Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, Normans, British, just to mention major ones – simultaneously denote submission to superior forces and the gradual formation of an indigenous identity through assimilation and adaption of foreign influences. In other words, foreign dominations have also moulded the Maltese character, and the latter has proved itself strong enough as to reshape whatever it had been subjected to. The literary spirit of the island can be summed up along these lines.

The main evidence of this phenomenon is to be found in the language. It is obviously the most characteristic feature of the island's national identity. It is primarily owing to the fact that Malta has got its own ancient language that it survived as a distinct nation and overcome the temptation of integrating itself with foreign countries and the danger of being absorbed by them. The paradox can be outlined as follows: whilst the Maltese tongue sharply distinguishes the island community from any other, it is also an unquestionable document of linguistic subjugation. The Maltese language is a source of pride as well as evidence of colonialism. What was initially an Arabic dialect imposed on the then tinier community grew up into a fully fledged language. Since the Norman conquest Maltese has been extensively exposed to non-Arabic, essentially Sicilian and Italian influences. Even English words introduced into Maltese have to adapt themselves to the local linguistic forms. The end-product is unique: Maltese is distinct to the extent of being a Semitic language hugely enriched by Romance elements.

A brief account of what is known as "The Language Question" may throw more light on the way different cultures flourished in Malta whilst giving room to the formation of a mature sense of modern national awareness.

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

Malta's insularity largely accounts for the development of an indigenous popular culture, segregated from the main foreign currents. Traditional mentality, which largely accounts for what real Malta still is, expressed complete faithfulness to the conditions of the simple life of the people, a predominantly rural and religious condition taken up by preoccupations of a subdued rather than rebellious nature, concerned with the family rather than with the nation.

The geographical position and the political history of the island brought about a very close link with Italy. Traditional European culture was mainly Italian. The Order of St. John (1530–1798) managed to transform the island into a cultural centre which had its own respectable place within the Mediterranean spectrum. It was not surprising at all that Napoleon himself imposed his own power there in 1798. Owing to isolation, however, this multidimensional influx adopted the local 'original' aspects. The most significant feature of this experience is that Malta formed a literary culture written in Italian by the Maltese themselves. For whole centuries no intellectual doubted that one was Maltese while writing in Italian and according to the Italian thematic and stylistic patterns. The local intelligentsia, belonging spiritually to a wider context of an Italo-Maltese world transcending geographical demarcations, found its real historical self in forming an integral part of at least a big sector of the region. Boundaries were not considered to be territorial.

In other words, the concept of a local Maltese culture was not limited. It did not simply recognise the isolated product, created and considered without any relationship with the outer world. What we now term 'foreign' was only 'outer'. Isolation, therefore, and insularity were not synonymous. Again, this is paradoxical: it was, as already stated, through insularity that the island managed to create for itself its own indigenous culture, but the source of initial inspiration was not isolation. Maltese writers expressing themselves in Italian were adequately conscious of what was happening in the nearby country. The major texts of Italian literature were very well known to them, and their educational apparatus relied to a great extent on them. On the other side of the fence there were the common people, speaking a traditionally dowsdrodden dialect, deprived of any official recognition, which up to the first decades of the twentieth century still lacked a standardised orthographical system.

The language of the Maltese relied for many centuries on an almost exclusively oral tradition. It therefore had all the necessary credentials for claiming to be the only real language of the Maltese; it was the oldest language known to exist in the island. It also had the inner strength of survival and automatically served for all the purposes of popular expression and communication. It was spoken by the whole community. Undignified though it seemed, it went on from strength to strength, becoming more resourceful and precise. It had a massive social function, it was the means of religious expression, it guaranteed solidarity within the social class of its speakers. One day, when new trends of thought were to reach Malta from central Europe, this 'unworthy' speech medium was bound to attain the full recognition it warranted. The two distinct cultures, emblematic of two distinct social classes, were destined either to come in direct conflict with each other (as it happened on the political level) or to find a proper meeting point where the dignity of the written tradition could be assumed by the undignified unwritten one.

Both options were actually taken, and all this is being stated with hindsight and in the light of scientific research. In the early decades of this century, however, things could not be, and were not, so simple and clear-cut.

Let us look at the phenomenon from another angle. The old Italian element of Maltese culture, particularly the literary one, is also a valid component of political psychology: the intelligentsia considered itself an integral part of the Mediterranean Sea which incorporated it in the Italian segment of the same region. Therefore the self-expression of Maltese writers in Italian was the self-expression of the Maltese as such, or better, of members of a community living in isolation on a small island which had fundamental points of reference that overcome introversion and provincialism.

It is against this background that the upheaval on the level of party politics can be safely understood. Up to the first decades of the 19th century the Maltese outlook was that (i) the country had an old cultural identity closely related to the presence of Latin culture and that the language of culture was Italian; (ii) the introduction of English constituted a serious threat to national identity, inasmuch as English was not only "the foreign language" but also the speech habit of the coloniser. English could easily give a new advantage to the British ruler in the field of expression, by disrupting the normal expression and communication both of the leaders and of the cultured sector of the population.

The democratic awareness in favour of the people who knew only Maltese still had to reach maturity, as it did when writers who traditionally wrote in Italian discovered the sheer

strength and beauty of the Maltese tongue, and embarked on a wide programme of cultural diffusion through literature or articles of a general nature written in an elegant Maltese style. Journalism is itself indicative of cross-cultures in action and reaction within a set environment.

The introduction of the foreign language (English) and the removal of the traditionally local one (Italian) were considered as another clear example of British despotism. On the other hand, except in the minds of a few isolated individuals, it was too early for the Maltese language to be seen in its proper perspective of a famous and precious monument of antiquity, worthy of esteem, as it was called by Vassalli in 1791. Vassalli himself expressed his progressive ideas, inspired by the Illuministic and Romantic principles he inherited from France and Italy, in Italian. All the protagonists of the cultural development of Maltese, like Guze' Muscat Azzopardi, Dun Karm, Manwel Dimech and Ninu Cremona, wrote extensively in Italian. But things were bound to follow a different course as the whole world situation changed radically.

In the whole Language Question, the practical co-existence of Maltese, as opposed to Italian (the medium of traditional Maltese culture), and English (the medium of colonial Malta) was the difficult conclusion which Maltese society was not yet able to reach. Nonetheless, all this can be understood in its historical context. The emergence of Maltese as the national language and of both Maltese and English as the official languages finally solved a thorny problem which had survived for centuries. The Constitution of Independent Malta (1964) recognises and sanctions this reality. Maltese is taught in all schools and at all levels, and has its own Department at the University since the late thirties. It is officially recognised as a medium of instruction and, together with English, is the official language of the University. Books in Maltese abound, covering a wide area of subjects, though most books are still literary. Literature itself is considered as an important way of individual and collective expression. There is no doubt that Maltese is nowadays the best means for anyone who wants to convey any sort of message and in the best way to most people. Both the Church and political parties make full use of Maltese in both the written and the spoken levels.

During the Language Question period the struggle had transformed itself into a confrontation between dignity and power, that is, between tradition and imperialism. Pro-Maltese organisations tried to keep away from party politics as much as possible. However, political activity was the main, if not the only, platform for any efforts to be done in favour of the introduction of Maltese as the officially new point of reference. The Language Question did not take long in appearing in its truest dimension: a fight for national identity against the plan of Anglicization.

Since a language is not only a system of expression but also a complex manifestation of a whole way of life, the difference between the Latin, or better Mediterranean pattern of behaviour, and the English one renders the Language Question a psychological problem as well. An analysis of analogous movements in other countries may easily conduce to similar conclusions.

THE AFTERMATH

In the meantime, however, English could no longer be merely considered as the language of an Empire but steadily grew into an important vehicle for international communication. It was no longer possible to identify it solely with Britain, and it was necessary to adopt it as an instrument for relating with the outer world. In actual fact, since the post-war period it ended up with assuming the role previously played by Italian. The real innovation which occurred in this battle for cultural identification was the emergence of Maltese as the truly distinctive language of the country. Politicians and intellectuals now understood that it was mainly this traditionally dethroned language, inherited by word of mouth since the 9th century A.D., itself evidence of colonialism, that had kept the community united and nourished its sense of national individuality.

The conflict between the two great cultural forces which exerted their fullest influence on Maltese sensibility, the Italian and the British, found a way of expressing itself through the recognition and the emancipation of the popular language. The assertion of Maltese, implying the automatic affirmation of ethnic, cultural and political prerogatives, could be best executed by writers who were well versed in the foreign, and locally esteemed, media. This is what happened since Vassalli and De Soldanis, up to Cuschieri and Dun Karm. This process of mediation, however, is not lacking in points of contact with either of the two foreign cultures. Maltese national identity was to be consolidated through, among other factors, the radical modification of the central role traditionally played by Italian, although it was the culture of the nearby peninsula which formed the personality of the Maltese writers themselves. Most of them, in fact, spent long years writing exclusively in Italian before trying their hand in the native language. Dun Karm himself passed his fortieth year before producing his first lyric in the vernacular. Throughout the twentieth century they have expressed themselves in Maltese.

Time and the course of events healed a number of historical prejudices, and the two languages were to be identified with different values traditionally alien to them. For instance, following the Second World War, Italian was not primarily considered as the classical medium of culture but as the language of a country which bombed the island; English did not go on being emblematic of colonial domination, but started to be identified with the country which defended Malta.

The importance which Maltese now enjoys in all spheres of life in the island is indicative of a normal situation prevailing in a republic resembling any other in the continent. It is mainly through Maltese that the island state presents its claim to be a nation on its own.

Agli inizi dell'epoca Horthy: un documento del Labour Party sul terrore bianco in Ungheria (1920)

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Il documento del *British Labour Party* sull'inizio dell'epoca Horthy in Ungheria, a cura di Arthur Henderson e di C.W. Bowerman, appare come pubblicazione congiunta delle *Trade Unions*¹ e dello stesso partito. Dei suoi curatori, il più noto era Arthur Henderson, esponente di spicco del *Labour Party*².

L'aspetto più interessante dello scritto è però nella sua contemporanea apparizione in Inghilterra e in Italia, dove è pubblicato dalla casa editrice del P.S.I. (*Partito Socialista Italiano*), allora egemonizzato dai massimalisti³.

Se ci si può chiedere cosa spinge proprio i socialisti italiani a pubblicare il documento sull'Ungheria del *Labour Party*, è lecito pensare all'umanitarismo del socialismo mondiale, ma un altro motivo dell'interesse del P.S.I. per il *terrore bianco* in Ungheria può risiedere anche nella contemporanea condizione del partito italiano: infatti, dopo il fallimento dell'occupazione delle fabbriche, terminata o in via di conclusione proprio nel 1920⁴, il socialismo italiano inizia a subire, se non un *terrore*, il *terrorismo bianco* dello squadristo fascista⁵. A ciò si può aggiungere un altro motivo: contemporaneamente alla pubblicazione

¹ Le *Trade Unions* erano all'epoca i sindacati inglesi (A.R.).

² Su Arthur Henderson cfr. Leonardo Rapone, *La socialdemocrazia europea tra le due guerre. Dall'organizzazione della pace alla resistenza al fascismo*, Roma, Carocci, 1999, p. 47, p. 52, p. 55, p. 70, p. 77, pp. 87-88, p. 90, p. 94, p. 99, p. 114, p. 125, pp. 126-127, p. 129, p. 137, p. 151, pp. 154-155, pp. 165-173, p. 175, p. 186, p. 190, p. 192, pp. 198-200, p. 203, pp. 206-207, pp. 221-222, p. 225, p. 227, p. 229, pp. 265-266, pp. 273-276, pp. 280-284, pp. 292-296, pp. 298-300, pp. 306-308, pp. 310-312, p. 333, pp. 335-336, pp. 338-341, pp. 358-359, pp. 367-368, pp. 400-402.

³ Cfr. *Il terrore bianco in Ungheria*, Milano, Società Editrice Avanti, 1920 (Collana *Documenti della Rivoluzione*, n° 22, da cui si cita: d'ora in poi *Il terrore bianco...*). Un accenno al documento è in Giuseppe Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani e il terrore bianco in Ungheria (1919-1920)*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria tra decadentismo e avanguardia*, a cura di Zsuzsa Kovács e Péter Sárközy, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990, p. 139, che – *ivi*, p. 138 – parla anche della collana *Documenti della Rivoluzione*, in cui si pubblicano questo ed altri opuscoli sull'Ungheria (d'ora in poi *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*)

⁴ Su questa esperienza cfr. Paolo Spriano, *L'occupazione delle fabbriche. Settembre 1920*, Torino, Einaudi, 1964.

⁵ Sulla condizione del P.S.I. in quel periodo cfr. Gaetano Arfè, *Storia del socialismo italiano (1892-1926)*, Torino, Einaudi, 1977, pp. 250-286. Sullo squadristo fascista che, se non *terrore*, può essere definito *terrorismo bianco* (senza contare la presenza nelle sue file di numerosi ex-militari delusi, possibile analogia con la situazione ungherese) cfr. Luigi Salvatorelli-Giovanni Mira, *Storia d'Italia nel periodo fascista*, Torino, Einaudi, 1964, pp. 115-192; Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il*

del documento dei confratelli inglesi, una delegazione del P.S.I., composta dai due deputati Alceste Della Seta e Angelo Vella, è in Ungheria proprio per parlare – anche ser fra molti limiti – con le vittime del *terrore bianco*⁶.

Al di là dei motivi per cui si pubblica anche in Italia l'opuscolo laburista⁷, esso si apre con un *Rapporto* della delegazione inglese in Ungheria che, oltre ad essere un'*Introduzione* alle successive testimonianze, entra però subito in argomento⁸.

Infatti, dopo una breve premessa sulle modalità dell'inchiesta – concretatasi in una raccolta di testimonianze a Vienna e a Budapest –⁹, lo scritto elenca i *soggetti di lavoro* analizzati, tutti legati ad una repressione politica che in Ungheria ha innescato una serie di brutalità e di violenze criiminali¹⁰ e, subito dopo, accusa direttamente Horthy, che “ (...) era pienamente a conoscenza di quei delitti e li incoraggiava”¹¹.

rivoluzionario (1883-1920), Torino, Einaudi, 1965, pp. 419-662; Alexander J. De Grand, *Breve storia del fascismo*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1997, pp. 27-46. Ma sul fenomeno specifico dello squadristo cfr. Mimmo Franzinelli, *Squadristi. Protagonisti e tecniche della violenza fascista 1919-1922*, Milano, Mondadori, 2004.

⁶ Sulla circostanza cfr. G. Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., pp. 139-141.

⁷ Sull'argomento cfr. János Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, a cura di Stuart John Woolf, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1971, pp. 131-137; Roberto Ruspanti, *Un regno senza re: l'Ungheria di Horthy (1919-1944)*, in Id., *Dal Tevere al Danubio. Percorsi di un magiarista italiano fra storia poesia e letteratura*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1997, pp. 245-249; Pasquale Fornaro, *Due aspetti della svolta autoritaria tra le due guerre: fascismo e horthismo*, in AA.VV., *Italia e Ungheria dagli anni trenta agli anni ottanta*, a cura di Péter Sárközy, Budapest, Editrice Universitas, 1998, pp. 44-46; László Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe. A history of Hungary*, Budapest, Millennium Publishing House, 1999, pp. 339-341; Adriano Papo-Gizella Németh Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2000, pp. 418-420; Ferenc Pollmann, *Guerre, révolutions, contre-révolution-Traité de Trianon (1914-1920)*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans d'histoire hongroise*, a cura di István György Tóth, Budapest, Corvina-Osiris, 2003, pp. 533-534; Enzo Collotti, *Fascismo fascismi*, Firenze, Sansoni, 2004, pp. 181-183; Edgar Hösch, *Storia dei paesi balcanici. Dalle origini ai giorni nostri*, Torino, Einaudi, 2005, p. 209; Pasquale Fornaro, *Ungheria*, Milano, Edizioni Unicopli, 2006, pp. 73-78; Henry Bogdan, *Storia dei paesi dell'Est*, Torino, Società Editrice Internazionale, 2006, pp. 214-216; Gizella Németh-Papo-Adriano Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea. Dalla monarchia dualista ai giorni nostri*, Roma, Carocci, 2008, pp. 41-46. Per una testimonianza coeva sugli avvenimenti cfr. Mihály Karolyi (sic!), *Memorie di un patriota. Dall'aristocrazia austro-ungarica al processo Rajk*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1957, pp. 183-187 (d'ora in poi tutti i riferimenti bibliografici saranno posti in forma abbreviata).

⁸ Cfr. *Rapporto della Delegazione del Lavoro britannico. Maggio 1920*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 3-13 (d'ora in poi *Rapporto...*).

⁹ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 3.

¹⁰ I *soggetti di lavoro* evidenziati dalla delegazione laburista sono infatti 6: “1. Persecuzione politica di tutti quelli che non sostengono il regime di Horthy (sic!); 2. Soppressione dell'organizzazione operaia e del diritto di sciopero; 3. Antisemitismo; 4. Massacri, esecuzioni, imprigionamenti, sia in forma legale sia senza procedimento legale; 5. Torture e maltrattamenti ai carcerati; 6. Detenzione per lunghi periodi senza processo”. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 4.

¹¹ *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 3. Sul capo della contro-rivoluzione ungherese cfr. *Horthy de Nagybanya Miklos Nicolas* (sic!), in Bruno Palmiro Boschesi, *Enciclopedia della seconda guerra mondiale*, Milano, Mondadori, 1983, pp. 123-124.

A tale accusa, già molto grave, se ne aggiunge un'altra : si scrive infatti che "(...) il contegno dei rappresentatnti britannici a Budapest, civili e militari, rendeva peggiore la situazione e rafforzava le bande terroriste"¹².

Dopo questo atto di coraggio che denuncia, oltre a quelle ungheresi, le responsabilità inglesi nel *terrore bianco* in Ungheria, si descrivono gli incontri a Budapest con alti esponenti della politica ungherese (fra cui il conte Pál Teleki) ed altri rappresentanti della società magiara, nonché quelli con i testimoni disposti a parlare dei fatti¹³.

Poi, però, lo scritto pare cadere in una certa ingenuità. Infatti, dopo aver parlato della *disponibilità* del governo ungherese a collaborare all'inchiesta, il *Rapporto* ammette che i delegati laburisti non hanno potuto operare fuori Budapest per il catastrofico stato delle ferrovie ungheresi, e che solo due membri della delegazione potevano recarsi a Szolnok per svolgere un complemento di inchiesta¹⁴. Qui i membri del *Labour Party* inviati in Ungheria non sembrano davvero capire che le due cose sono collegate: proprio per la caotica situazione delle ferrovie ungheresi, il governo di Horthy può anche permettersi di *essere disponibile*, poiché comunque la delegazione inglese potrà svolgere solo un'inchiesta limitata e parziale e, quindi, arrecherà ben pochi danni all'immagine internazionale dell'Ungheria.

A tale ingenuità però si rimedia subito dopo, quando si ammette che anche a Budapest non si è potuto visitare il carcere femminile né certe zone dei sobborghi perché direttamente controllate dai militari¹⁵.

Si continua poi di conseguenza poiché si dice che, dopo una visita in carcere ad alcuni ex-Commissari del Popolo, uno di loro, Péter Ágoston, protestava con i delegati laburisti affermando di esser stato arrestato nonostante il salvacondotto fornitogli dall'Alto Commissario inglese a Budapest, generale Reginald Gorton¹⁶.

Di fronte a tale situazione, la reazione dei delegati laburisti è decisa: infatti, dopo una rapida ricostruzione del *caso Ágoston*¹⁷, se si esprime la ferma condanna dell'operato del

¹² *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 3.

¹³ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 3. Sul conte (e non barone, come viene chiamato nello scritto) Teleki cfr. *Taleki Pal* (sic!), in B.P. Boschesi, *Enciclopedia...*, cit., p. 235.

¹⁴ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 4.

¹⁵ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 5.

¹⁶ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 5. Sull'operato del generale Gorton cfr. György Réti, *Rivoluzione e cobtrorivoluzione in Ungheria - Dal punto di vista del colonnello Romanelli*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 12 (che dà un giudizio molto negativo sull'operato dell'ufficiale inglese, che si sarebbe limitato - però con grande distacco - ad unirsi alle proteste del generale americano Bandholz - anche lui membro della Commissione Militare Alleata in Ungheria - per la sistematica rapina dell'Ungheria effettuata dalle truppe romene di occupazione. Ma per una testimoniannza - altrettanto sfavorevole - sull'operato del generale Gorton in Ungheria prima ancora dell'inizio del *terrore bianco* cfr. M. Karolyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 185.

¹⁷ Péter Ágoston era infatti a Vienna quando era caduta la Repubblica dei Consigli; era poi rientrato a Budapest e arrestato; liberato poi per l'intervento di Gorton, era stato di nuovo imprigionato nonostante il salvacondotto fornitogli dal generale inglese, che glielo aveva ritirato del tutto non appena saputo dal governo ubgherese che Ágoston era accusato di *reati comuni*. Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 5-6. Sulle circostanze politiche dell'arresto di Péter Ágoston, avvenuto sotto il governo di István Friedrich (Friedrichs (sic!) nel *Rapporto...*, cit., p. 5) cfr. Francesco Guida, *Ungheria e Italia dalla fine del primo conflitto mondiale al Trattato del Trianon*, in AA.VV.,

governo ungherese – accusato di voler intentare un processo politico contro l'ex-Commissario del Popolo – si richiama l'attenzione di quello inglese sui fatti perché vi è comunque coinvolto un suo emissario¹⁸.

Il *Rapporto* prosegue poi con il resoconto di una delle tante atrocità commesse durante il *terrore bianco* in Ungheria. Infatti, due dei delegati laburisti, giunti a Szolnok, apprendono dal direttore del carcere che il 28 aprile 1919 un ufficiale dell'esercito, giunto alla prigione alle 9 di sera, aveva chiesto la consegna di 19 prigionieri, ufficialmente per interrogarli su un complotto legato al prossimo 1 maggio scoperto nel corso di una spedizione compiuta dai militari una settimana prima. Il direttore del carcere dichiara poi che, consegnati i prigionieri (fra cui tre ebrei) nonostante l'ora tarda, due giorni dopo aveva chiesto la riconsegna di alcuni di loro per il processo ma si era sentito dire che tutti i carcerati erano stati uccisi dopo un tentativo di rivolta contro le guardie¹⁹.

Ovviamente, la delegazione non crede per nulla alla *versione ufficiale* dei fatti e, constatato che l'uccisione dei prigionieri è ufficialmente ammessa così come la loro sepoltura notturna, dichiara che sono stati illegalmente uccisi dai militari²⁰.

Un simile episodio non è purtroppo isolato: infatti, quasi contemporaneamente a quanto prima detto, sempre a Szolnok sono state arrestate alcune persone, che la delegazione laburista afferma di non aver potuto vedere in alcun modo²¹.

Lo scritto continua poi con il racconto di un testimone dei fatti, il dottor Hirsch, che afferma – in presenza di un funzionario governativo ungherese che accompagna gli inglesi – che nessun ebreo poteva ottenere giustizia dopo esser stato aggredito e picchiato. Il dottor Hirsch – che sottolinea uno degli aspetti più cupi del *terrore bianco*, l'*antisemitismo*²², dice di essere fuggito a Budapest per evitare un *pogrom*²³ per poi rientrare nel villaggio di Abony, dove suo genero era stato picchiato e le finestre di casa sua – come quelle di altri ebrei – rotte, senza che gli autori delle violenze fossero minimamente disturbati²⁴.

Venezia, Italia e Ungheria..., cit., p. 89, p. 90, pp. 96-98, p. 102. Ma cfr. noltre J. Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 142; G. Réti, *Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 120; G. Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani...*, ivi, p. 121, p. 135; R. Ruspanti, *Un regno sezya re*, in Id., *Dal Tevere al Danubio*, cit., p. 247; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., p. 339; A. Papo-G. Németh Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, cit., p. 413, p. 420; P. Fornaro, *Ungheria*, cit., p. 63; A. Papo-G. Németh Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., p. 41, pp. 46-48, p. 58. Cfr., infine, Ignác Romsics, *L'époque Horthy (1920-1944)*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans...*, cit., p. 533, p. 534, p. 535. Per una testimonianza sull'operato di István Friedrich cfr. M. Karolyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 185. Sulla figura di Péter Ágoston cfr. F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 89, p. 90, p. 92; G. Réti, *Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Ungheria*, ivi, p. 117, p. 118. Ma su Ágoston cfr. anche Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Gli intellettuali ungheresi e le rivoluzioni del 1918-1919*, ivi, p. 244, p. 246.

¹⁸ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 6. Le responsabilità del generale Gorton appaiono ancora più evidenti poiché in un rapporto del febbraio 1920 aveva negato l'esistenza di un *terrore bianco* in Ungheria. Cfr. in tal senso M. Karolyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 186 nota 7.

¹⁹ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 6-7.

²⁰ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 7.

²¹ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 7.

²² Su questo punto cfr. nota 10.

²³ Nome di origine russa che indicava i massacri di ebrei (A.R.).

²⁴ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 7.

Un altro episodio rievocato nel *Rapporto* rinvia ad un altro aspetto del *terrore bianco* in Ungheria, la *repressione politica*²⁵.

Infatti, dopo aver detto che "Le invasioni di locali sono frequenti"²⁶, il *Rapporto* parla di quella, notturna, il 23 maggio 1919, di una sede del partito socialdemocratico legale²⁷ per rubarvi tutti i documenti in difesa di centinaia di prigionieri. Ma ancora più triste è la conclusione finale della rievocazione dei fatti: infatti, il giornale socialdemocratico legale "Népszava" ha dovuto dare in sordina – per non essere censurato – la notizia della chiusura della sede invasa, ed è fin troppo chiaro che tali *raids* compiuti da militari vogliono proprio impedire la difesa degli imputati con la distruzione delle prove a loro favore e l'intimidazione dei testimoni a loro scarico. Quindi, l'illegalità e il sopruso – tale è la triste conclusione – divengono *metodo legale*, con conseguenze facilmente immaginabili per chi li deve subire²⁸.

Lo stesso tema è al centro della nota successiva, che parla di un bando emesso dal governo ungherese per costringere la gente a fornire informazioni sui membri del partito comunista. Se la notizia stupisce gli autori del testo, poiché ormai la Repubblica dei Consigli è morta e sepolta, essa serve tuttavia ad introdurre un tema nuovo nella problematica trattata, quello delle *sevizie* o, per meglio dire, della *tortura*²⁹.

Su di essa, comunque ritenuta pratica indegna di qualsiasi paese civile, la delegazione laburista tende a fare una precisa distinzione: dalle testimonianze ascoltate appare infatti chiaro che la tortura non è mai stata praticata in carcere da funzionari civili ma solo da membri dell'esercito³⁰. Tale distinzione, anche se non cambia la sostanza delle cose, ha però una certa importanza: significa infatti che, proprio durante il *terrore bianco*, la fisionomia dello Stato ungherese sta mutando per avviarsi ad una dittatura militar-autoritaria senza rispetto per le leggi poiché essa stessa è *la legge*.

Al di là della notazione non priva di interesse, il *Rapporto* si occupa ora della principale organizzazione che pratica la tortura (e l'omicidio) durante il *terrore bianco* in Ungheria, qui denominata con il termine tedesco *Brachialgewalt*, responsabile di atrocità sistematiche. Ma anche stavolta – come già prima – la delegazione laburista pecca di ingenuità, poiché si chiede perché il governo non sciolga tale organizzazione militare e, anzi, afferma che, se controllato dall'autorità civile o addirittura sciolto tale corpo, poi i suoi membri – e anche chi non ne fa parte – molto più difficilmente potrebbero compiere le atrocità di cui li si accusa³¹. Anche stavolta, i socialisti inglesi non sembrano capire che la

²⁵ Su questo punto cfr. nota 10.

²⁶ *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 7.

²⁷ Qui lo scritto allude a quella parte della socialdemocrazia ungherese che non aveva aderito alla Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun (A.R.).

²⁸ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 7-8.

²⁹ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 8. Sul tema della tortura cfr. nota 10.

³⁰ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 9.

³¹ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 9. La *Brachialgewalt* (così chiamata anche in G. Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 125) è identificabile con la *MOVE* (*Associazione per la difesa nazionale ungherese*): su di essa cfr. J. Erös, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 140; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., p. 332; P. Fornaro, *Due aspetti...*, in AA.VV., *Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 46. Id., *Ungheria*, cit., p. 77; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., p. 45.

cosiddetta *autorità civile* in pratica non esiste più, e che il potere, ormai in mano ai militari e ai loro amici, non ha davvero intenzione di far cessare tali atrocità ma, anzi, le organizza per continuare a seminare il panico nel paese.

Ma, subito dopo, si introduce un altro tema, quello del sovraffollamento delle prigioni. In questo caso, sono prese ad esempio le baracche di Nador (Budapest), di cui si denunciano le condizioni di vita dei prigionieri, costretti a stare in 4 in una cella strettissima e senza luce. Inoltre, si dice che i carcerati visti dai delegati inglesi non avevano chiari segni di sevizie (o di tortura): ma tale affermazione, apparentemente ingenua, è poi corretta dalla constatazione che, dal momento in cui i delegati laburisti erano giunti alla cosiddetta *prigione* a quello in cui avevano potuto vedere i reclusi erano passate 5 ore, tempo in cui molte cose *scomode* potevano essere state *sistematiche* per non creare problemi³².

Dopo tale notazione, che mostra fin troppo bene come i delegati inglesi si rendano conto dei *limiti* della loro inchiesta, il *Rapporto* prosegue parlando dei Commissari del Popolo della Repubblica dei Consigli. Dopo aver detto che la maggior parte di loro è a Vienna³³ e che solo i più moderati – o chi vi è stato indotto dagli Alleati – sono tornati a Budapest per crearvi un fantomatico e improbabile governo di coalizione³⁴, il testo torna su un problema già trattato: i documenti per la difesa degli ex-Commissari del Popolo sono stati sequestrati (per non dire *rubati*) dai militari, il che significa che i futuri processati (sempre che costoro siano davvero sottoposti a regolare processo, e che non si tratti del classico *processo-farsa*) non potranno comunque godere di un'adeguata assistenza giuridica³⁵.

E – si nota con acume – l'attuale governo ungherese, che non ha alcuna prova nei confronti degli imputati per crimini di natura politica, cerca allora di *incastrarli* con reati comuni: al di là dell'accusa per gli assassinii di 176 persone, compiuti singolarmente o collettivamente, in mancanza d'altro si accusano gli ex-membri della Repubblica dei Consigli di *emissione di carta moneta*, senza accorgersi che così si cade nel ridicolo e si dimostra solo di essere a corto di accuse contro gli avversari politici e di attaccarsi anche all'inesistente pur di metterli alle corde³⁶.

Poi, il *Rapporto* afferma che il governo militare – e militarista – ungherese non ha potuto ancora accertare i nomi di tutti gli assassinati o giustiziati durante la *Comune* (nel testo, altra denominazione della Repubblica dei Consigli) ma che sta facendo di tutto per raccogliere il materiale su tali atti. Però, in questo caso, i laburisti inglesi scrivono decisamente che è del tutto ingiustificabile chiedere la pena di morte per chi ha solo svolto funzioni di governo, ma non solo questo: infatti, dicono chiaramente che i contro-rivoluzionari ora al potere hanno già altre volte tentato azioni contro il governo della Repubblica dei Consigli, che le ha sempre repressi³⁷.

³² Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 10.

³³ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 10.

³⁴ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 10.

³⁵ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 10-11. Cfr. in proposito nota 27.

³⁶ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 11.

³⁷ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 11. Illuminante in tal senso pare il caso della rivolta degli ufficiali della flottiglia del Danubio e dell'Accademia Militare Ludovica contro il governo di Béla Kun. Per evitare la loro fucilazione, intervenne il capo della Missione Militare Italiana in Ungheria, tenente colonello Guido Romanelli. Cfr. in proposito G. Réti, *Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 115.

Tali passaggi del *Rapporto* sono molto interessanti, poiché pongono il problema del *terrore rosso* durante la Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun, di cui i contro-rivoluzionari si vogliono servire, ampliandone la reale portata, proprio per giustificare il *terrore bianco*. Se è indubbio che esso vi fu, un protagonista e testimone del tempo, credibile perché sincero democratico non certo accusabile di filo-comunismo, il conte Mihály Károlyi, afferma che il *terrore rosso* fu molto limitato (224 morti, più altri 500 uccisi in combattimento), soprattutto se comparato alle vittime del *terrore bianco* (oltre 5000, secondo le stime degli stessi contro-rivoluzionari)³⁸.

Se ogni periodo rivoluzionario conosce eccessi, dovuti alla sua stessa natura, che non sono sempre – come vorrebbe un facile giustificazionismo *a posteriori* – inevitabili³⁹, tuttavia sempre Mihály Károlyi nota che quando, durante la Repubblica dei Consigli, si formò a Budapest un sedicente – e del tutto illegale – *Corpo terroristico del Consiglio rivoluzionario* – meglio noto come *Ragazzi di Lenin* –, guidato dall'ez-marinaio József Czerny, il governo di Béla Kun lo represses senza indugio e inviò i suoi membri a combattere al fronte contro i romeni⁴⁰.

Ancora il conte Károlyi scrive nel suo libro che i *Ragazzi di Lenin*, ormai guidati dall'ex-giornalista Tibor Szamuely – definito forse con troppa enfasi il *Saint-Just della Comune* –, forse l'unico e vero rappresentante del *terrore rosso* in Ungheria, compirono eccessi perché il loro capo vedeva dovunque *borghesi e contro-rivoluzionari*. Va detto però che il governo della Repubblica dei Consigli cercò in ogni modo – stavolta senza riuscirvi – di fermare Szamuely. Ciò pare dimostrare quindi che il *terrore rosso* in Ungheria non era qualcosa di pianificato e preordinato come lo fu invece quel sistema di *illegalità fatta legge* che sarà poi il *terrore bianco*⁴¹.

³⁸ Cfr. M. Károlyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 185. La cifra è confermata in F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 103.

³⁹ Cfr. in proposito nota 36. Sulla rivolta degli ufficiali della Flottiglia del Danubio contro il suo governo, Béla Kun rispose al tenente colonello Guido Romanelli che il suo comportamento verso di loro si sarebbe conformato a quello applicato ai contro-rivoluzionari in altri luoghi (Monaco di Baviera, Finlandia, Ucraina) e, quindi, sarebbe stato ben diverso da quello tenuto da questi ultimi, che in caso di vittoria avrebbero approfittato dell'occasione per massacrare donne, bambini ed ebrei. Cfr. in proposito G. Réti, *Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 115. Al di là dell'evidente retorica delle sue parole, Béla Kun individua uno dei bersagli del futuro *terrore bianco* contro-rivoluzionario: gli ebrei.

⁴⁰ Cfr. M. Károlyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 184, che definisce senza mezzi termini József Czerny un avventuriero. Per una ricostruzione storica di di tale situazione cfr. Stéphane Courtois-Jean-Loius Panné, *Il Comintern in azione*, in AA.VV., *Il libro nero del comunismo. Crimini, terrore, repressione*, Mialno, Mondadori, 2000, p. 257. Si noterà che la versione dei fatti data dai due storici francesi concorda del tutto con quella fornita dalle memorie del conte Károlyi.

⁴¹ Cfr. M. Károlyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 184. Il paragone con Antoine Saint-Just pare piuttosto azzardato, data anche l'ingloriosa fine di Tibor Szamuely, suicidatosi dopo la caduta della Repubblica dei Consigli per non restare vivi nelle mani dei contro-rivoluzionari dopo l'arresto. Sul vero Saint-Just cfr. Georges Lefebvre, *La rivoluzione francese*, Torino, Einaudi, 1959, p. 305, p. 341, pp. 388-389, p. 397, pp. 401-402, p. 404, p. 411, pp. 417-418, pp. 421-422, pp. 426-427, pp. 442-444, p. 453, p. 455, p. 460, pp. 465-468, p. 647, p. 680. Su Tibor Szamuely cfr. F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 94; Zs. L. Nagy, *Gli intellettuali ungheresi...*, ivi, p. 252; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., p. 335; S. Courtois-J.L.

Il *Rapporto* prosegue con un breve quadro storico dei fatti immediatamente precedenti al *terrore bianco*: si rievoca quindi la caduta della Repubblica dei Consigli, l'entrata a Budapest delle truppe romene e i movimenti dell'*Esercito Nazionale* guidato dall'ammiraglio Miklós Horthy⁴².

Si rientra però subito dopo in argomento per affermare che, proprio mentre la Repubblica dei Consigli cadeva, già nell'agosto del 1919 iniziavano i massacri di comunisti. In particolare, sono accusati ufficiali e soldati dell'*Esercito Nazionale* di Horthy e della *Brachialgewalt* (cioè la *MOVE*) che per giunta non tentano neanche di smentire le loro azioni⁴³.

I delegati del *Labour Party* si soffermano però sul massacro di Kecskémet, di cui nessuno degli autori risulta comunque punito, e su quello di Sekszárd, di cui – anche in base ad alcune foto – si dice apertamente che, oltre a 6 persone impiccate, altre 6 – fra cui una donna – (cioè, l'intero *Direttorio* comunista della città) sono state finite a colpi di carabina (e ciò fa pensare ad una precedente tortura delle vittime), anche se tale cifra non esaurisce il numero dei morti, che secondo alcune informazioni sono 36, tutti uccisi in un solo giorno⁴⁴.

Ma lo scritto non si chiude qui, poiché accenna anche all'assassinio del direttore del giornale socialdemocratico “*Népszava*”, Béla Somogyi, sul quale però non si sofferma a

Panné, *Il Comintern in azione*, in AA.VV., *Il libro nero...*, cit., pp. 257-258; F. Pollmann, *Guerre, révolutions...*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans...*, cit., p. 532; H. Bogdan, *Storia dei paesi dell'Est*, cit., p. 215; P. Fornaro, *Ungheria*, cit., p. 49, p. 61; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., p. 38, p. 41. Tutti gli autori concordano con Mihály Károlyi sull'ingloriosa fine di Tibor Szamuely. Un'altra conferma del suo estremismo paranoico è in Aldo Agosti, *Le correnti costitutive del comunismo internazionale*, in AA.VV., *Storia del marxismo*, 3: *Il marxismo nell'età della Terza Internazionale*, 1: *Dalla rivoluzione d'ottobre alla crisi del '29*, Torino, Einaudi, 1980, p. 335. Più in generale, sull'intera esperienza della Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun cfr. F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., pp. 87-95; G. Réti, *Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Ungheria*, ivi, pp. 113-121; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., pp. 334-339; R. Ruspanti, *Un regno senza re*, in Id., *Dal Tevere al Danubio*, cit., pp. 246-247; A. Papo-G. Németh Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, cit., pp. 418-420; S. Courtois-J.L. Panné, *Il Comintern in azione*, in AA.VV., *Il libro nero...*, cit., pp. 256-258; F. Pollmann, *Guerre, révolutions...*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans...*, pp. 528-533; H. Bogdan, *Storia dei paesi dell'Est*, cit., pp. 214-216; P. Fornaro, *Ungheria*, cit., pp. 41-62; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., pp. 36-41. Per la visione dei fatti di un protagonista-testimone del tempo cfr. M. Károlyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, pp. 166-177, pp. 181-185.

⁴² Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 11: su questi avvenimenti cfr. F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., pp. 96-97; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., p. 339; R. Ruspanti, *Un regno senza re*, in Id., *Dal Tevere al Danubio*, cit., pp. 246-247; A. Papo-G. Németh Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, cit., pp. 419-420; F. Pollmann, *Guerre, révolutions...*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans...*, cit., pp. 532-533; H. Bogdan, *Storia dei paesi dell'Est*, cit., p. 215; P. Fornaro, *Ungheria*, cit., pp. 61-62; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., pp. 39-41. Ma per i ricordi di un protagonista-testimone cfr. M. Károlyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., pp. 170-171.

⁴³ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 11. Sulla *MOVE* cfr. nota 31.

⁴⁴ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 11-12.

lungo perché – si dice – il fatto è noto⁴⁵, anche se non si può fare a meno di notare che il governo ha cercato di giustificare l'assassinio affermando che era stato eseguito da *agenti provocatori*, cioè da comunisti travestiti da ufficiali⁴⁶: in realtà, molto probabilmente si tratta di membri di un'altra organizzazione dedita al *terrore bianco*, nel testo denominata *Ungheresi risvegliati* ma il cui nome completo era *Unione degli ungheresi che si risvegliano*, forse istigati a compiere il delitto Somogyi dall'ex-Primo Ministro István Friedrich, da poco estromesso dal potere, che così voleva creare problemi al governo⁴⁷.

Qui si chiude il *Rapporto*, con una presa di posizione che contemporaneamente smaschera gli intrighi interni al governo contro-rivoluzionario e lo inchioda alle sue responsabilità, dirette o indirette che siano, nel *terrore bianco*: infatti, anche se si ammette che tutto ciò è opera di organizzazioni para-militari fuori dal controllo del governo, è altrettanto vero che quest'ultimo non pensa neppure di punire tali delitti ed i loro esecutori. E con ciò lo scritto riscatta tutte le precedenti ingenuità, come si può notare anche dalle sue *Conclusioni*⁴⁸.

Al *Rapporto* segue una lunga serie di testimonianze sui vari aspetti del *terrore bianco*: in Ungheria: e, per mantenere la loro incolumità, i testimoni sono indicati solo con le iniziali di nome e cognome⁴⁹. Non sarà qui possibile esaminarle tutte, e quindi ci si limiterà ad analizzarne alcune, in base alla tipologia di crimini stabilita dallo stesso *Rapporto*⁵⁰: va rilevato però che, dalle testimonianze citate, i delitti sono molto spesso inseparabili l'uno dall'altro perché collegati e intrecciati tra loro.

Un esempio di tali collegamenti è dato dalla testimonianza di Q.R., ormai a Vienna, illegalmente imprigionato. Oltre a ciò, dal suo racconto appaiono l'*antisemitismo* (agli ebrei con lui detenuti non si dà cibo) e le *torture* (al testimone vengono spezzati due denti) subite da lui e dai compagni⁵¹.

⁴⁵ Sull'assassinio del direttore del quotidiano socialdemocratico „Népszava”, Béla Somogyi (e del suo collaboratore Béla Bacsó) cfr. J. Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 160; F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 103; G. Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani...*, ivi, p. 137; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., p. 61; M. Karolyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., p. 186, note 6, 7, sottolinea il fatto che il regime di Horthy sapeva bene chi aveva ucciso i due giornalisti ma si guardava bene dal punirli (ivi, nota 6); Fa inoltre notare che i due rappresentanti inglesi della Commissione Militare Alleata a Budapest, generale Gorton e ammiraglio Troubridge, negarono l'esistenza del *terrore bianco* in Ungheria dove – a loro dire – la vita era sicura come in Inghilterra, ma anche che Troubridge aveva annotato nel suo diario proprio l'assassinio di Béla Somogyi (ivi, nota 7). Sul generale Gorton cfr. nota 16. Sull'ammiraglio Troubridge cfr. M. Karolyi, *Memorie di un patriota*, cit., 186, nota 7.

⁴⁶ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 12.

⁴⁷ Cfr. *Rapporto...*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 12. Sull'*Unione degli ungheresi che si risvegliano* (in sigla ungherese EME) cfr. P. Fornaro, *Due aspetti...*, in AA.VV., *Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 46; Id., *Ungheria*, cit., p. 77. Su István Friedrich cfr. nota 17. Sul suo operato F. Guida, *Ungheria e Italia...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria*, cit., p. 90, scrive che “(...) fu uno dei più attivi controrivoluzionari e di certo il più acceso sostenitore della reazione e del terrore”.

⁴⁸ Sulle *ingenuità* del *Rapporto* cfr. note 14, 31. Per le *Conclusioni* cfr. *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 38-46.

⁴⁹ Cfr. *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 13-46.

⁵⁰ Per la tipologia di crimini del *terrore bianco* cfr. nota 10.

⁵¹ Cfr. Testimonianza di Q.R., in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 15-17.

Ma un quadro più completo della tipologia di crimini evidenziata dal *Rapporto*⁵² appare da una delle poche testimonianze dello scritto che ha per protagonista una donna, *La signora Hamburger*.

La donna ha l'unica colpa di essere la cognata di un ex-Commissario del Popolo della Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun, Jenő Hamburger, come il marito della donna fuggito a Vienna⁵³. Imprigionata forse solo per tale motivo, oltre ad essere percossa con scudisci sia vestita che nuda, è costretta a veder torturati altri uomini – di cui alcuni ebrei –, e anche ad assistere all'umiliazione di uno di loro cui gli ufficiali chiedono di violentarla dopo averlo torturato ed avergli strappato un testicolo. Al di là del chiaro *antisemitismo* che l'episodio rivela, nel resoconto della donna, oltre ai maltrattamenti e alle torture da lei subite, è riscontrabile un altro delitto: la *morte bianca* (cioè ufficialmente non dichiarata) di alcuni suoi compagni di prigionia, certamente assassinati. Se l'episodio è eloquente dell'intreccio di crimini prima delineato, lo è anche per un altro reato, la *persecuzione politica*, perché in fondo la signora Hamburger è stata arrestata in base ad un'imputazione molto generica né meglio specificata, quella di *attività bolscevica*⁵⁴.

Uno spazio ed un'attenzione particolari sono però dati nello scritto del *Labour Party* – né poteva essere altrimenti – alla repressione delle organizzazioni operaie. In questo caso, però, più che di testimonianze di singole persone, il documento riporta informazioni che costituiscono una testimonianza collettiva. Quanto appare dalle singole note (tutte numerate, senza le iniziali dei testimoni, fatta eccezione per quella sul *sindacalista Batta*) è una repressione generalizzata delle organizzazioni operaie, compiuta da membri dell'esercito, che colpisce tutte le associazioni dei lavoratori senza troppo badare al loro colore politico (sono infatti colpite anche quelle cattoliche), che inoltre sono anche regolarmente derubate dei fondi trovati nei loro locali prima devastati⁵⁵. Proprio in questa parte del documento, però, riappare un delitto di cui si era già occupato il *Rapporto*: l'assassinio del direttore del giornale socialdemocratico "Nepszava", Béla Somogyi, e del suo collaboratore Béla Bacsó, riconferma definitiva della liquidazione violenta dell'associazionismo operaio e dell'eliminazione fisica dei loro esponenti a qualsiasi livello⁵⁶.

⁵² Cfr. in tal senso note 10, 50.

⁵³ Su Jenő Hamburger cfr. G. Monsagrati, *I socialisti italiani...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 138, p. 140; A. Papo-G. Nemeth Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, cit., p. 418.

⁵⁴ Per la testimonianza intitolata *La signora Hamburger* cfr. *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 17-21. Per l'imputazione sulla cui base è arrestata cfr. *ivi*, p. 19. Altri esempi di persecuzione politica sono nelle testimonianze di C.D. – *ivi*, pp. 21-22 –, di E.F. – *ivi*, p. 22 –, di G.M. – *ivi*, pp. 22-23 –, di M.N. – *ivi*, pp. 27-30 –, e in quella pubblicata con il titolo *Ebrei di Putnok* – *ivi*, pp. 30-33: in quest'ultimo caso vi si aggiunge l'antisemitismo. Sui massacri di detenuti, avvenuti senza alcun processo, cfr. le testimonianze di A.B. – *ivi*, pp. 13-14 –, di O.P. – *ivi*, p. 15 –, di I.J. – *ivi*, pp. 23-24 –, di M.N. – *ivi*, pp. 27-30: in molti casi, negli stessi resoconti uccisioni senza processo si incrociano con imprigionamenti illegali, maltrattamenti in carcere, torture ed antisemitismo.

⁵⁵ Cfr. in tal senso le testimonianze 15-17, 19, 20-23, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 32-34, pp. 35-38. Quella sul sindacalista Batta – la 18 – è *ivi*, pp. 34-35. Tutte le note sono raccolte sotto il titolo *Sezione organizzazione operaia*.

⁵⁶ Sull'assassinio di Béla Somogyi e di Béla Bacsó cfr. nota 45.

Da tutto ciò, nelle *Conclusioni* del documento del *Labour Party* appare fin troppo chiaro che il *terrore bianco* in Ungheria non è smentibile e che nel paese, nel 1919, la più completa illegalità è divenuta *metodo legale*, il che significa che i laburisti inglesi mostrano, oltre ad un grande coraggio, una notevole onestà intellettuale e politica che si traduce in un monito al governo inglese per far cessare ogni persecuzione politica⁵⁷.

Qui si chiude il documento del *Labour Party* sul *terrore bianco* in Ungheria, ma nelle sue pagine (in particolare nelle *Testimonianze* e nelle *Conclusioni*) ricorre il nome di uno dei suoi più risoluti fautori ed organizzatori, Pál Prónay⁵⁸. La sua figura di ufficiale dell'esercito – prima capitano e poi colonnello – pare essere simbolica sia del *terrore bianco* che dell'intera storia dell'Ungheria dal 1920 al 1944. Infatti, deluso dal regime di Horthy, da lui definito *regno degli impostori*⁵⁹, nell'autunno del 1944 entrò a far parte delle *Croci Frecciate* di Ferenc Szálasi⁶⁰: così, stabilì una *continuità storica* fra il *terrore bianco* del recente passato e il *terrore nero* dell'allora presente⁶¹, che dal primo ereditava il *carattere originale* dell'*antisemitismo*⁶², e segnò nella sua persona il destino di un paese, l'Ungheria, che, forse proprio per non aver mai conosciuto un vero fascismo ma solo una *contro-rivoluzione fatta governo*, passò direttamente dalla reazione al nazismo dopo esser già finita nel baratro – per lei fatale – della seconda guerra mondiale.

⁵⁷ Cfr. *Conclusioni*, in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., pp. 39-46. Il monito al governo inglese è *ivi*, p. 46.

⁵⁸ Cfr. le testimonianze di A.B., in *Il terrore bianco...*, cit., p. 14. di C.D., *ivi*, p. 22, di M.N., p. 29 (due volte) e nelle *Conclusioni*, *ivi*, p. 42, p. 45. Su Pál Prónay cfr. J. Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 136; P. Fornaro, *Due aspetti...*, in AA.VV., *Italia e Ungheria...*, cit., p. 46; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., pp. 42-44, p. 46, p. 49, p. 52.

⁵⁹ Così si esprime Pál Prónay sul regime di Miklós Horthy nel film *Imposztorok* (*Gli impostori*) (1969) di Félix Máriássy, con parole forse non molto lontane dal vero, visti i successivi sviluppi della storia ungherese e di quella personale di Prónay.

⁶⁰ Sulla circostanza cfr. J. Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 160.

⁶¹ Sul regime delle *Croci Frecciate* di Ferenc Szálasi cfr. J. Erős, *Ungheria*, in AA.VV., *Il fascismo in Europa*, cit., p. 160; R. Ruspanti, *Un regno senza re*, in *Id.*, *Dal Tevere al Danubio*, cit., p. 259; L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe*, cit., pp. 385-386; A. Papo-G. Németh Papo, *Storia e cultura dell'Ungheria*, cit., p. 425, p. 428; I. Romsics, *L'époque Horthy(1920-1944)*, in AA.VV., *Mil ans...*, cit., pp. 586-587; E. Collotti, *Fascismo fascismi*, cit., p. 184; H. Bogdan, *Storia dei paesi dell'Est*, cit., p. 323; P. Fornaro, *Ungheria*, cit., pp. 125-127; G. Németh Papo-A. Papo, *L'Ungheria contemporanea*, cit., pp. 74-75.

⁶² Sullo sfrenato antisemitismo delle *Croci Frecciate* (e sulle sue premesse) cfr. Raul Hilberg, *La distruzione degli ebrei d'Europa*, I, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 815-874.

Les communautés juives et leurs activités économiques en Méditerranée

Une réflexion sur le rôle des sociétés juives dans l'économie en Méditerranée

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*« All economies are embedded in societies »*¹

Dans cet exposé, je ne veux parler ni de préjugés, ni d'antisémitisme. C'est pour cette raison que j'ai décidé d'ouvrir surtout des pistes des réflexion au lieu de faire des conclusions. En fait, la question que nous allons nous poser concerne le lien entre société et économie. Les anthropologues économiques interprètent l'économie comme intégrée (*embedded*) dans la société.² Il faut donc regarder une société de plus près pour expliquer et comprendre son système économique. La société que j'aimerais regarder de plus près dans ma communication est la société juive méditerranéenne. Il s'agit plutôt d'un réseau, que d'une société. Un réseau constitué de liens différents, familiaux, religieux, de patronage, qui existent depuis longtemps et qui persistent, malgré les changements et les ruptures de la mondialisation. Le réseau des différentes communautés juives tout autour de la Méditerranée, l'économie étant le moteur de leurs contacts, peut être vu comme un réseaux de migrations transfrontalières, qui existent depuis longtemps mais dont l'apparence change constamment.

Théories et Méthodes

Selon Durkheim, la religion peut être vu comme un phénomène d'essence universelle ayant une fonction sociale. Durkheim voit dans la division du travail un phénomène moins économique que social. Sa fonction première n'est pas de permettre l'accroissement des gains de productivité et des rendements mais de rendre les individus interdépendants et solidaires. Son rôle est, vu par Durkheim, bien plus moral et social qu'économique. Nous allons regarder alors, en nous référant à Durkheim, deux faits sociaux, la religion, ici notamment le judaïsme, et la division du travail dans un réseau des relations.

¹ PLATTNER, Stuart : Introduction. In : Plattner, Stuart (Hg.): *Economic Anthropology*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 1989 : 4.

² PLATTNER, 1989 : 1-20.

Après la religion, il faut regarder l'espace. L'espace concerné ici est la Méditerranée. Un espace qui occupe aussi bien les historiens que les ethnologues. L'Anthropologie de la Méditerranée comprend l'espace méditerranéen comme un « lieu de confrontation non-polémique »³, un espace formant un monde hétérogène, constitué de différents microcosmes reliés entre eux par des traditions de « longue durée »⁴. L'orientation contemporaine de l'Anthropologie de la Méditerranée ne prend plus l'espace méditerranéen ni comme un terrain homogène,⁵ ni comme un espace hétérogène.⁶ Dans l'actuelle et troisième période de l'Anthropologie de la Méditerranée, le bassin méditerranéen est considéré comme un espace de fractionnement, une accumulation de microcosmes.⁷ Les anthropologues se basent surtout sur le travail des historiens anglais Horden et Purcell, dont l'œuvre « *The Corrupting Sea* » a marqué le début de la troisième période, mettant fin aux doutes qui se sont déclenchés suite au postulat de Herzfeld comme quoi la Méditerranée ne serait pas un espace d'entité.⁸

Pour ma collection de données, je me suis servi de sources historiques et de la recherche sur Internet, mais avant tout des méthodes classiques de l'ethnographie, l'observation participante et les interviews. Le milieu social dans lequel j'ai effectué mon enquête est la classe moyenne, des commerçants dans un quartier de migrants à Marseille, une population d'observance religieuse.

Un réseau historique

Nous allons regarder d'abord l'histoire des communautés juives et leurs activités économiques en Méditerranée. L'anthropologue allemand Dieter Halles s'interroge dans un de ses articles sur l'unité méditerranéenne vue par le dispositif des juifs de la Méditerranée et leurs réseaux. Les communautés diasporique, constate Haller, transforment l'espace méditerranéen en réseau. Ici la notion de « diaspora » est importante.

³ ALBERA, Dionigi ; TOZY, Mohammed : *Introduction. Fractures, filiations, contiguïtés*. In : Albera, Dionigi ; Tozy, Mohammed (Ed.) : *La Méditerranée des anthropologues*. Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose. 2005 : 7-45.

⁴ BRAUDEL, Fernand : *La Méditerranée. L'Espace et Histoire*. Flammarion, Manecourt. 1985.

⁵ Comme l'ancienne tradition d'une Anthropologie Méditerranéenne l'avait fait. Les ethnologues de la première période comme DAVIS ou PITT-RIVERS considéraient le bassin méditerranéen comme un espace homogène. Cf. : HORDEN, Peregrine et PURCELL, Nicholas : *The Corrupting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000 : 463.

⁶ Pendant la deuxième période de l'Anthropologie Méditerranéenne, des anthropologues comme HERZFELD ont estimé que le Méditerranéen est un espace d'Hétérogénéité. Cf. : HORDEN, Peregrine et PURCELL, Nicholas : *The Corrupting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000 : 517.

⁷ HALLER, Dieter : *Mittelmeer – Ort der Sehnsucht und der Abgrenzung. Die Einheit des Mittelmeerraums aus ethnologischer Perspektive*. In : *Zeitfragen*. <http://www.nzz.ch/2001/08/11/zf/page-article7FO4E.html>, 12.11.2002, 20:51 : 1-7.

⁸ HORDEN et PURCELL

Le champ de la recherche académique sur la Diaspora est pluriel.⁹ On caractérise l'organisation sociale des groupes migrants décrits sous le nom de diaspora par la notion de « dispositif »¹⁰, pour définir leurs structures spatiales et sociales et pour les distinguer des autres dispositifs migrants. Depuis longtemps, la notion de « diaspora » désignait l'ensemble des juifs qui vivaient hors de la Terre Sainte après la chute du deuxième temple. Depuis le 20^{ème} siècle, la notion désigne également d'autres minorités ethniques qui vivent dispersés, comme les Palestiniens ou les Arméniens.¹¹ Le dispositif diasporique représente un déracinement, l'édification d'une nouvelle patrie, loin de l'ancienne. La définition exacte du dispositif Diaspora reste à discuter : « ...one sees the tips of many icebergs »¹². D'après Tölölian, les communautés diasporiques sont des mouvements transnationaux par excellence.¹³ Le développement technique et électronique a construit de nouvelles formes de voisinage virtuel, des communautés diasporiques modernes, via la production de nouveaux lieux de rencontre et de contact. Des groupes ne sont plus dépendants d'un territoire commun, de passeports et de frontières.¹⁴ L'intégration dans une autre culture, un lieu éloigné de chez soi peut être vu comme un « patrie de plus »¹⁵. Les juifs de la diaspora pouvaient toujours établir une connexion entre leur lieu d'accueil et la Terre Sainte. Souvent on trouve des villes nommées « Jérusalem »¹⁶ avec un nom secondaire. Jérusalem incarne l'identité juive, désignée par le rituel d'adieu du rite de pessah : « L'année prochaine à Jérusalem ». Dieter Haller retrace la diversité de l'espace de la Méditerranée dans la Diaspora méditerranéenne juive. Les communautés juives se trouvent depuis leur dispersion après la chute du deuxième temple en 70 après J.C. dans un réseau culturel qui se définit par des différences locales de chaque unité.¹⁷ Le commerce peut être vu comme un lien de connexion dans les réseaux constitués par des communautés dispersées qui se fondent sur une patrie commune, d'origine mythique, conservée dans l'écriture sainte d'une religion commune.

⁹ CLIFFORD, James: *Diasporas*. In: *Cultural Anthropology*, Arlington, 9(3), 1994: 302. Clifford parle d'un Discours ou « ...one sees the tips of many icebergs. »

¹⁰ ANTEBY-YEMINI, Lisa ; BERTHOMIÈRE, William : *Avant-Propos Di(a)positif : Décrire et comprendre les Diasporas*. In : Anteby-Yemini, Lisa ; Berthomière, William ; Sheffer, Gabriel : *Les Diasporas 2000 ans d'histoire*. Rennes, 2005 : 9-19.

¹¹ Voir. GILROY, Paul: *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation*. London, 1987.

¹² CLIFFORD, James: *Diasporas*. In: *Cultural Anthropology*, Arlington, 9(3), 1994: 302.

¹³ TÖLÖLIAN, Khachig: *The Nation States and its Others*. In *Lieu of a Preface*. *Diaspora* 1(1), 1993: 3-7. In: Clifford, James: *Diasporas*. In *Cultural Anthropology* 9(3), 1994: 303.

¹⁴ Voir. APPADURAI, Arjun: *The production of locality*. In: Fardon, Richard (Hg.): *Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge*. London, 1995: 218f.

¹⁵ Voir. HANNERZ, Ulf: *Cultural Complexity*. New York, 1992: 248.

¹⁶ Selon. VALENSI, Lucette; UDOCOVITCH, Abraham: *The last Arab Jews: the communities of Jerba, Tunisia*. New York, 1984: 16. Ainsi: Vgl. Stillman, Norman: *The language and culture of the Jews of Sefrou, Morocco: an ethnolinguistic study*. Manchester, 1988: 15.

¹⁷ HALLER, Dieter: *Transcending Locality, Creating Identity – A Diasporic Perspective on the Mediterranean: the Jews of Gibraltar*. In: *Anthropological Journal on European Cultures: The Mediterraneans. Transborder Movements and Diasporas*. Münster, Hamburg, Berlin, London, Vol. 9, Nr. 2, 2000: 4ff.

Comme Clifford Geertz le constate dans son célèbre texte sur le « souk », le marché de Sefrou, les juifs dans le Maghreb d'avant la colonisation étaient un groupe singulier.¹⁸ La communauté juive était une labyrinthe d'associations intensément solidaires, qui se différençait de la société musulmane par ses propres organisations, même si sur le marché, leur structure de classes économique était la même que celle des Arabes. Les juifs dans les bazars du Maroc, d'après Geertz, se concentrent sur un petit nombre de métiers d'artisanat, en particulier ceux de tailleur et de cordonnier. Geertz souligne avant tout la circulation d'un grand nombre de juifs entre la ville et la campagne qu'il appelle des juifs « itinérants » : « en liant les économies de la ville et de la campagne et les souks (...) Les Juifs contribuaient à instituer le bazar. »¹⁹ Dans tout le Maghreb précolonial et colonial, le bazar était le lieu de rencontre et de mélange des différents groupes des sociétés, des sociétés qui par ailleurs se caractérisaient par leur distinction bien précise entre différents groupes ethniques et religieux.

Grâce à leur statut de « dhimmi », les juifs dans le Maroc précolonial pouvaient combler un créneau économique.²⁰ Ainsi pour un musulman, il n'était pas possible de négocier avec une femme musulmane qui n'appartenait pas à sa propre famille ; pour un juif, qui ne faisait pas partie du code social de l'honneur et la honte de la société musulmane, il était parfaitement possible d'entrer en contact avec une femme musulmane.

Comme partout au Maghreb, la vie de tous les jours des juifs de Djerba était encadrée dans les frontières ethniques.²¹ Ici les juifs dominaient surtout dans le secteur de l'or, et comme dans les autres parties de l'Afrique du Nord les juifs étaient des commerçants voyageurs.

La séparation des sexes était la même dans la société juive que dans la société musulmane. Le monde des femmes était strictement séparé de celui des hommes. Seuls les hommes juifs se mélangeaient avec des membres de la société musulmane sur le marché.

Les réseaux économiques juifs et musulmans étaient entrelacés entre eux et se complétaient mutuellement. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, les juifs combler ces créneaux économiques en Méditerranée, structurés par leur organisation sociale qui se base sur le fait religieux.

Des approches contemporaines du phénomène migratoire soulignent l'aspect moderne notamment de la transmigration, terme qui désigne la conquête de plusieurs espaces par un certain groupe, basé sur une identification ethnique ou bien religieuse, qui se trouve dans un mouvement durable.²² Différents groupes effectuent alors une négociation permanente de leurs frontières.²³ Les membres des communautés diasporiques juives se retrouvent grâce à

¹⁸ GEERTZ, Clifford : *Le souk de Sefrou. Sur l'économie du bazar*. Éditions Bouchene, 2003 : 118.

¹⁹ GEERTZ, 2003 : 118.

²⁰ Selon DESHEN, 1989: 35.

²¹ Voir: VALENSI; UDOVITCH, 1984: 100ff.

²² TARRIUS, Alain: *Les Fourmis d'Europe*. L'Harmattan, Paris. 1992: 18.

²³ BARTH, Frederic : *Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organization of culture difference*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1969.

leur croyance d'avoir une identité culturelle commune.²⁴ Les liens de ces réseaux diasporiques sillonnent la Méditerranée et ses nœuds de communication sont les lieux où les communautés juives se sont installées dans le passé et dans le présent, la Tunisie aussi bien qu'Israël. Je constate que les sociétés juifs dans la méditerranée se caractérisent depuis leur dispersion dans l'espace comme un groupe en mouvement dans un réseaux transfrontaliers, donc l'économie peut être vu comme un moteur de ce mouvement, ainsi que la religion correspond à la carrosserie. Je présente ensuite mes propres observations pour mieux illustrer m'affirmation.

Mes observations

À quel point la religion peut-elle influencer la constitution d'un groupe, ses structures et son fonctionnement économiques ?

Il faut d'abord supposer que les membres du groupe s'identifient eux-mêmes avec la religion, ce qui était le cas concernant le terrain de ma recherche, Belsunce, quartier populaire dans le centre de Marseille, ville méditerranéenne. Ce « quartier arabe » est un quartier de commerce où la vie de tous les jours est fortement structurée par le fait religieux. Ici les magasins juifs ferment pour le Shabbat, et les magasins musulmans ferment pour la prière du vendredi. Belsunce est un quartier de migrations déjà ancien : avant les Maghrébins, qui sont arrivés dans les années 60-70, les Arméniens et les Italiens sont passés par cet espace de transition, qui fonctionne comme « une porte d'entrée »²⁵ pour les groupes immigrés. Aujourd'hui ce sont de plus en plus de Chinois qui envahissent le quartier et qui forcent surtout les commerçants juifs à partir.

« C'est le fait que nous pouvions librement pratiquer notre religion ici », m'expliquait un de mes informateurs, « les musulmans acceptent que nous fermions le samedi, ils viennent faire les affaires le dimanche. Dans un quartier chrétien, nous serions obligés d'ouvrir pour le Shabbat. Mais les affaires vont de plus en plus mal ici, les Chinois bouffent tout ».

Comment se passent donc les relations commerciales dans le quartier de Belsunce ? On s'y trouve plongé dans l'ambiance d'un « souk » oriental. Les marchandises, des vêtements, tapis et lampes sont exposées dans la rue ; durant le Ramadan, les gens s'habillent en djellaba ; le samedi, on observe les juifs portant la kippa passer à grands pas pour se rendre à la synagogue. La religion structure fortement les rythmes de vie et l'offre de restauration, qui répond à la demande des commerçants. Les cafés et boucheries musulmanes ouvrent la nuit pendant le Ramadan, les restaurants casher ferment pour le Shabbat et pour les fêtes juives. De même, les restaurateurs proposent de la nourriture particulière, comme certains gâteaux, selon les fêtes religieuses. Alain Tarrus, qui a effectué une recherche de longue haleine sur place, parle de deux réseaux : premièrement celui des commerçants arabes qui mettent en circulation les produits pour les plus pauvres, deuxièmement, le réseau

²⁴ HALLER, Dieter : Transcending Locality, Creating Identity- A Diasporic Perspective on the Mediterranean : the Jews of Gibraltar. In : Greverus, Ina-Maria, Römhild, Regina (éd.) : *The Mediterraneans. Transborder Movements and Diaporas*. LIT, Münster. Vol. 9, No. 2, 2000 : 3-31.

²⁵ TARRIUS, 1992.

diasporique des juifs qui, en tant que grossistes, mettent des marchandises à disposition de la société dominante.²⁶

La distribution aussi bien que le choix du secteur dans le quartier se démarque selon les lieux d'origine des commerçants. Les boucheries par exemple sont tenues par des Algériens, les boulangeries par des Tunisiens. Dans la rue du Tapis Vert, 60% sont juifs, dans la rue du Baignoir se rassemble une grande partie des musulmans d'un village du sud de l'Algérie, qui vendent tous des tissus asiatiques. Les juifs sont fortement présents dans les domaines du textile et de la bijouterie, comme leurs ancêtres l'étaient auparavant en Afrique du Nord.²⁷

Regardons de plus près le réseau diasporique juif et ensuite les relations entre les membres des deux réseaux, juifs et musulmans.²⁸

D'abord nous pouvons observer une organisation sociale familiale. Les magasins sont transmis de père en fils, ou bien une famille possède plusieurs magasins dans le quartier. Les relations d'avant la migration jouent un rôle important, aussi bien les relations avec les lieux d'origine que ceux avec les juifs de là-bas qui ont migré eux aussi. Des groupes sociaux n'existent que dans un espace social.²⁹ L'espace social du réseau juif diasporique n'est pas seulement le marché officiel, disons les magasins, mais aussi bien le terrain religieux, par exemple les voyages de pèlerinage en Afrique du Nord aussi bien qu'en Israël, la synagogue comme lieu de rencontre de la communauté. Pour les commerçants, participer au pèlerinage annuel pour la Ghriba à Djerba n'est pas seulement un acte religieux et une activité de loisir, mais également une occasion économique. Chers auditeurs, je vous donne ici l'exemple d'un de mes informateurs de Marseille qui, dans le cadre de sa visite à la Ghriba de Djerba, est parti à Sfax, sa ville natale pour s'occuper de ses affaires et de la maison dont il était propriétaire et qu'il louait là-bas.

Selon Appadurai les technologies modernes ont ajoutés de nouvelles communautés et des voisinages virtuels dans le contexte de la diaspora. La mobilité électronique a produit de nouvelles localités et des réseaux de communautés diasporiques modernes³⁰. L'identification de la communauté juive de la diaspora avec le destin de l'État d'Israël s'est amplifiée grâce à la simplification de l'accès à la Terre Promise. Aujourd'hui comme auparavant, on trouve des lieux occupés par les migrants juifs, qui s'appellent « Jérusalem », comme par exemple Sarcelles dans la banlieue parisienne. Le facteur « Israël » est souvent la seule raison du conflit mentionné entre les juifs et les musulmans à Belsunce ; ce facteur sera éclairé plus tard lors de la discussion des distances.

Malgré tout les entrepreneurs d'Israël ont besoin du commerce international. Les commerçants israéliens originaires d'Afrique du Nord utilisent souvent leur co-religionnaires français de même origine comme intermédiaires pour conclure des affaires avec les musulmans maghrébins.

²⁶ TARRIUS, 1995 : 160.

²⁷ Voir VALENSI et DESHEN.

²⁸ Je laisse de côté le réseau maghrebin arabe, qui est bien décrit chez TARRIUS (1995).

²⁹ SCOTT, John : *Social Network Analysis. A Handbook*. SAGE, London. 2007 : 11.

³⁰ Vgl. APPADURAI, Arjun: The production of locality. In: Fardon, Richard (Hg.): *Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge*. London, 1995: 218f.

La charité joue aussi un rôle important dans la tradition juive.³¹ Le terme de *tsedaqa* est l'équivalent de la charité. Ces racines viennent de la mot *tsedeq*, justice, qui indique une acceptation particulière du terme selon laquelle la charité est une justice. Les pratiques d'obligation du don et son utilisation sont aujourd'hui encore dictées par la Torah, fondées sur une histoire particulière liée à l'exil. La pratique de la charité est fondamentale dans la religion juive et a été renforcée par la condition exilique, par le besoin de survivre en tant que minorité religieuse souvent menacée. Une charité bien mise en valeur peut devenir un facteur de promotion sociale. Par le don, on peut s'acheter du prestige social.

« Maurice³² me racontait comment il avait demandé une aide pour son association pour la culture juive auprès du président de la Synagogue Keter Torah à Belsunce. Il avait visité le président dans sa boutique et celui-ci lui avait aussitôt fait un chèque. Lorsque Maurice est sorti du magasin, il s'est aperçu que le président avait omis d'indiquer une somme. Il retourne alors auprès de lui pour lui demander de mettre une somme. « Tu m'avais dit que tu'as besoin d'argent », répond le commerçant. « Bien sûr, mais... » Maurice ne trouve pas ses mots. « Comment je peux savoir de combien tu as besoin ? Mets ce qu'il te faut » répond le donateur et retourne à son travail. « Cet homme, me confie Maurice à la fin de son histoire, est béni. » L'idéal social s'inscrit dans l'acte de charité. Mais les actes de bonté, tels qu'ils sont désignés dans la Torah, concernent exclusivement les communautés juives.³³

Comment sont alors structurés les relations entre les membres des deux réseaux, juifs et musulmans en France, notamment à Belsunce, Marseille ? La grande majorité des juifs ont quitté leur pays d'origine avec toute leur famille, et ainsi les musulmans, qui ont encore des liens familiaux sur place, constituent souvent une connexion importante pour les commerçants juifs en vue d'effectuer des affaires en Afrique du Nord.

« Ici, c'est forcément un petit état neutre. ... Arabes et Juifs la main dans la main, c'est seulement ici, dans ce quartier. »³⁴

Un bijoutier juif tunisien m'avait raconté l'histoire de son ami (musulman d'Algérie) qui lui avait confié un sac en plastique alors qu'il partait en voyage pour plusieurs mois. À son retour, il a expliqué au commerçant juif qu'il y avait une grande somme d'argent dans le sac en plastique et qu'il savait que le commerçant juif était un homme de confiance. Quelques mois plus tard, le commerçant juif à son tour devait faire un voyage d'affaires en Algérie où il n'était jamais allé auparavant. L'ami algérien lui avait demandé l'heure de son arrivée à Oran, et dès que le commerçant juif avait quitté l'avion, son ami algérien s'était retrouvé à ses côtés, et l'avait accompagné jusqu'à son retour. On peut remarquer une « économie du don »³⁵ d'après Marcel Mauss qui circule entre les deux réseaux (diasporique juif et maghrébin musulman). Le dispositif juif dépend du dispositif musulman

³¹ PODSELYER, Laurence : *La justice plutôt que la charité ?* : 106.

³² Nom changé par l'auteur.

³³ Voir : GOLDBERG, 1996 : 194.

³⁴ Un informant Juif dans : TARRIUS, Alain : *Les fourmis d'Europe. Migrants riches, migrants pauvres et nouvelles villes internationales*. L'Harmattan, Paris. 1992 : 185.

³⁵ MAUSS, Marcel : *Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques*(1925), Quadrige/Presses universitaires de France, 2007.

pour ses mouvements économiques en Afrique du Nord, et le dispositif musulman dépend du dispositif juif pour avancer dans la société d'accueil.³⁶

Mais les relations entre juifs et musulmans se limitent au domaine économique. Comme auparavant en Afrique du Nord, on peut bien se mélanger dans l'espace du marché, mais dans le domaine de la famille on se distingue. La communautarisation est basée sur la tradition et l'affection.³⁷ Les distances qui sont évoquées dans la vie quotidienne à Belsunce par les juifs et les musulmans constituent ainsi les deux communautés différentes. Le fondement des communautés distinctes est l'appartenance religieuse. Conformément à la tradition, la religion élève des barrières étanches. Un exemple sont les mariages mixtes, qui existent très peu dans les milieux religieux, et si oui, en cachette. Le mariage mixte pose toujours des problèmes pour les descendants du couple, car selon la Halakha, « est juive toute personne née de mère juive »,³⁸ tandis que, pour les musulmans c'est le père qui compte. Soit un des partenaires se convertit, soit le couple reste dans la confusion, concernant leurs relations sociales et religieuses.

Concernant la question de genre, nous pouvons observer un changement : bien que la séparation des sexes persiste, il y a des plus en plus de femmes qui travaillent, surtout dans le milieu juif. Les musulmans aussi bien que les juifs cherchent à donner une éducation de grande valeur à leurs filles, équivalente à celle des garçons.

Pendant mes observations dans les magasins juifs, surtout dans les bijouteries, j'ai observé un fait intéressant : les femmes musulmanes fréquentent en préférence les magasins tenus par des hommes juifs, ils se réfèrent ainsi à la pratique ancestrale selon laquelle il était tout à fait possible de négocier avec un homme juif, mais non avec un homme musulman (les juifs n'étaient pas concernés par le code social de l'honneur et de la honte de la société musulmane). Pour les bijoutiers juifs, les musulmanes sont les meilleures clientes, elles achètent et vendent leurs bijoux librement selon leurs besoins. Les affaires avec les juifs offrent une possibilité de s'insérer activement dans la société, les musulmanes trouvent même du travail grâce à leurs relations avec les juifs.

Hors de mes observations dans les magasins juifs, je possède peu de données sur la communauté musulmane à Marseille, mais j'ai remarqué qu'il y a de nombreux hommes musulmans qui sont mariés avec deux femmes, une en France, une dans le « bled », le pays d'origine. Tarrius, qui a effectué sa recherche surtout sur le réseau maghrébin à Marseille, a observé la bigamie surtout chez les Tunisiens qui se marient avec des femmes françaises d'origine algérienne.³⁹ Le « mouvement de mariage »⁴⁰ est selon Tarrius une autre manière de renforcement des liens des commerçants maghrébins sur place. La possibilité de se marier avec plusieurs femmes est ancrée dans la religion musulmane ; la religion, une fois de plus, offre le cadre pour une activité économique.

³⁶ Voir aussi : TARRIUS, Alain : *Économies Souterraines. Le comptoir maghrébin de Marseille*. L'Aube, Paris. 1995 : 111.

³⁷ WEBER, Max: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Mohr, Tübingen. 1972.

³⁸ GOLDBERG, Sylvie Anne : *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique du Judaïsme*. Robert Laffont, Manchecourts. 1993. : 548.

³⁹ TARRIUS, 1995 : 150.

⁴⁰ TARRIUS, 1995 : 151.

Conclusion

Nous pouvons observer, pour les communautés diasporiques juives, l'aspect moderne de la transmigration, la conquête de plusieurs espaces par un groupe. Les sociétés juives se caractérisent depuis leur exil par cet aspect transfrontalier.

La religion joue un rôle important dans la circulation des biens à travers les temps et les espaces, elle dicte avec qui l'on peut se marier et à qui il faut faire la charité pour gagner en prestige social. Jusqu'à ce point, la religion peut influencer la constitution d'un groupe, ses structures et son fonctionnement économiques, elle crée des réseaux d'échange, mais qui peuvent aussi bien se refermer sur eux-mêmes pour faire circuler des biens uniquement dans un réseau bien précis.⁴¹

⁴¹ Pour une discussion plus profonde de cette question voir : SCHLEE, Günther : *Wie Feindbilder entstehen*. München, Beck. 2005.

La Vía Violenta

La actividad de grupos terroristas menores en España

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El terrorismo - ¿por qué? y ¿cómo?

Los actos violentos, que hoy llamamos actos terroristas, han estado presentes siempre en nuestra historia. Ya en las épocas antiguas las masas aplicaban métodos agresivos con los cuales pretendían alcanzar un objetivo similar que hoy los terroristas quieren. Estos actos vivían su "período de gloria" en el siglo XIX, cuando la oleada de atentados – empapada por las ideologías del marxismo, anarquismo u otras convicciones locales – sacudió la mayoría de los países europeos.¹ La modalidad y el sistema de objetivos de los grupos terroristas se iban cambiando a lo largo de la historia, pero en la mayoría de los casos los expertos fueron capaces de hacer distinción entre ellos a base de sus rasgos característicos o metas fijadas por la cúpula del grupo.

Antes de hacer este discernimiento, tenemos que delimitar las coordenadas por las cuales interpretamos la noción "terrorismo". ¿Qué es eso? Para responder a la cuestión, existen tantas definiciones cuantos libros y ensayos se dediquen al tema.

Una explicación corta, simple, pero esencial la nos aporta el ex-presidente israelí, Benjamín Netanyahu; según él el terrorismo es una violencia sistemática y premeditada usada contra los ciudadanos para alcanzar fines políticos mediante el temor producido.² La mayoría de los especialistas utiliza esta misma definición, completada con elementos como "obedece a varias lógicas" y "se nutre de diferentes ideologías".³

Cindy C. Combs, profesora de ciencias políticas en la Universidad de Carolina del Norte, EE.UU, nos suministra una delimitación refinada y minuciosa, pero esta se difiere de las otras en el aspecto de la *teatralidad*; según ella el terrorismo será definido como "la síntesis de guerra y teatro, la dramatización del tipo más proscribido de la violencia – la que perpetran contra víctimas inocentes –, representada ante el público con el fin de crear una

¹ Katalin HASKÓ: "A terrorizmus történeti fejlődése"; en: *Válaszok a terrorizmusra avagy van-e út az afganisztáni „vadászattól” a fenntartható globalizációig* (ed. Tálás Péter), SVKH-CHARTAPRESS, Budapest, 2002 pp. 13-24.

² Benjamin NETANYAHU: *Harc a terrorizmus ellen*; Alexandra, 1996 p. 20.

³ József BENKE: *Fényes Ösvény, Szürke Farkasok, Fekete Szeptember*; Magvető, Budapest, 1989 p. 17.

atmósfera de temor para apoyar sus objetivos políticos”.⁴ Así, no sólo la violencia es un elemento crucial de los actos terroristas, pero lo más importante es que su actividad sea *percibida* por el público, para llamar la atención de millones de personas dentro y fuera del país o región. Para designar el círculo de los víctimas, no es necesario que sean culpables en algo, mejor dicho, es primordial que personalmente no tengan culpa, porque su muerte o herida horrorizarán a todo el mundo y demostrarán que ni siquiera los inocentes pueden eludir las responsabilidades (los atentados premeditados contra personas o políticos concretos forman una excepción).

En las últimas dos décadas ya han salido a la luz publicaciones en torno al fondo psicológico y la psicopatología de los terroristas, pero los resultados de esta rama de ciencias son ajenos al núcleo de interés de este trabajo⁵.

En la perspectiva de la historia mundial podemos identificar seis tipos básicos del terrorismo⁶.

Los grupos nacionalistas quieren conseguir la independencia de su patria y por eso aplican instrumentos violentos; estos grupos insisten en que ellos no son terroristas, sino héroes de la independencia (ej. el vasco *ETA*, el irlandés *IRA* o el kurdo *PKK*).

Los terroristas religiosos pretenden alcanzar los objetivos que piensan ser derivados de los mandamientos divinos. Este tipo de terrorismo se extiende con rapidez y puede atacar a cualquier persona o institución que no sea partidaria de su religión (ej. la red *Al Qaeda*, la islamista sunní palestina *Hamás* o la islamista libanesa *Hezbollah*).

El terrorismo apoyado por el Estado es el brazo armado de la política exterior de algunos países radicales; la toma de rehenes y el secuestro de aviones es su método más frecuente (ej. Libia, Irán, Irak, Sudán pertenecen aquí, pero el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de los Estados Unidos incluye en esta lista a Cuba también).

Los grupos de la izquierda o extrema izquierda toman medidas violentas para destruir el capitalismo y sustituirlo con un sistema socialista o comunista. Ellos muchas veces prescinden de los atentados contra civiles, porque no quieren hacer daño a los oprimidos por el capitalismo; en cambio, suelen secuestrar a magnates industriales o estallar monumentos (ej. las *Brigadas Rojas* de Italia o el grupo *Baader-Meinhof* de Alemania).

Los terroristas de la derecha muchas veces se vinculan a células fascistas o neonazis y aspiran al establecimiento de estados fascistas o a la imposición de una ideología conforme a su convicción (ej. los *Lobos Grises* de Turquía).

Los grupos anarquistas actuaban principalmente hasta los años 1920-30 para derrotar el gobierno imperante, aplicando el método del atentado contra políticos (ej. el asesinato del presidente estadounidense William McKinley por un joven anarquista húngaro en 1901).

⁴ Cindy C. COMBS: “An Idea Whose Time Has Come”; en: *Global Politics in a Changing World* (eds. Richard W. MANSBACH; Edward RHODES); Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston-New York, 2003 pp. 60-62.

⁵ En este tema da un análisis detallada *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (ed. Walter REICH); Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cambridge, 1990.

⁶ A base de: Paul R PILAR: “Terrorism, the United States, and the World Order”; en *Global Politics...* op. cit, pp. 63-67 y Péter Ákos FERWAGNER – Krisztián KOMÁR – Balázs SZÉLINGER: *Terrorista szervezetek lexikona*; Maxim, Szeged, 2003 pp. 16-30.

Según algunos hoy día se percibe la resurrección del anarquismo en las protestas antiglobalistas.

A estos seis tipos se añaden dos más recientes que caracterizan los tiempos modernos: el narcoterrorismo (ej. las *FARC* colombianas, pero el peruano *Sendero Luminoso*, los *Tigres de la Liberación Tamil Eelam* de Sri Lanka, y ETA e IRA también participan en el narcotráfico) y el ciberterrorismo (terrorismo ejercido mediante Internet, del cual los grupos terroristas tradicionales también sacan provecho).

El 11 de septiembre de 2001 marcó una fecha clave en cuanto a la lucha antiterrorista.⁷ Desde el día de los atentados contra las torres gemelas y el Pentágono en los Estados Unidos el combate contra el terrorismo – bajo el liderazgo de Norteamérica – se radicalizó y la literatura especializada en este tema cobró nuevos esfuerzos (particularmente a propósito de las organizaciones terroristas internacionales).

Según Netanyahu la frecuencia de los secuestros de aviones y personas que eran muy habituales en los años 1970-80 se va disminuyendo, porque la evolución ideológica y tecnológica de los grupos favorece a los ataques más crueles y espectaculares. Si el terrorismo – de cualquier tipo que sea – alcanza sus objetivos en algún país, los grupos de ideología semejante de las otras nacionalidades van a contemplar su éxito como ejemplo a seguir. Según el político israelí hay que dejar claro que los terroristas de la sociedad libre son entes carnívoros y dejarles terreno ideológico libre es un crimen contra la humanidad (Netanyahu defiende que los Estados Unidos tiene que asumir el protagonismo en esta lucha internacional)⁸.

Desde el punto de vista español los grupos nacionalistas (o separatistas) y los de la (extrema) izquierda y de la (extrema) derecha son los más importantes. El máximo representante de los separatistas, ETA, no pertenece al objeto de investigación del presente trabajo aunque vamos a mencionar algunas organizaciones separatistas menores. Los grupos de la ultraizquierda y de la ultraderecha internacionales han pasado por varios cambios y alteraciones en las últimas décadas.

Las raíces de los grupos de la nueva izquierda se detectan en el movimiento del llamado *ma-ma-maismo*, la amalgama de las filosofías de los tres “gigantes”: Marx, Marcuse y Mao. Según uno de ellos, Marcuse, tras los crímenes cometidos por la América nixoniana en Vietnam la única posibilidad del capitalismo para sostenerse es recurrir a las formas de opresión interior y exterior; por eso, el socialismo es el único camino viable para emancipar a la gente y la violencia revolucionaria es un instrumento aplicable para eso (o sea, el precursor del terrorismo). Al mismo tiempo, acusa a los partidos comunistas de haber pactado con el sistema opresor y les inhabilita para hacer revolución. A esta ideología se asoció una parte de la juventud de los años 1970-80 con al afán ardiente del cambio.⁹

⁷ Hasta 2001 la “línea divisoria” había sido el desplome de la Unión Soviética que hizo nacer a varios grupos terroristas de izquierda y de derecha en los países ex-soviéticos.

⁸ NETANYAHU; op. cit.; pp. 15-36.

⁹ BENKE; op. cit.; pp. 54-60.

Los grupos de la nueva derecha constituyen unidad más heterogénea. Ellos quieren – como lo formularon en su revista inglesa *Nationalism Today* – “la Europa indisoluble de las patrias, sin tutela imperialista oriental y occidental”¹⁰.

Las tendencias susodichas engendraron sus manifestaciones violentas, el terrorismo. Naturalmente, los grupos terroristas de cada país encierran en sí las peculiaridades que los distingue de los otros núcleos terroristas. La desviación parcial o radical de la vertiente fundamental es posible e imprescindible para poder armonizar las aspiraciones, las alternativas y los recursos que están a su disposición.

Después de examinar los factores más importantes del terrorismo universal, podemos pasar a estudiar el caso concreto español.

El terrorismo español

Cuando hablamos o leemos sobre terrorismo español, generalmente nos referimos a la organización ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*). Podemos aceptar esto como un hecho natural, ya que ETA es una de las organizaciones terroristas más antiguas (o la más antigua) del país; desde los años 1950 hasta hoy han estado presentes en la historia española (y mediante la prensa en todas partes del mundo) y no parece que en el futuro cercano dejen de actuar. Es más, en los últimos meses de 2008, después de un alto el fuego “permanente”, ETA volvió a recurrir a los atentados, tiroteos y cochebombas para asegurar a la sociedad de estar presente en el país con fuerza no menospreciable. Ya en los tiempos de Franco luchaban por la independencia del País Vasco y hoy siguen caminando por este mismo sendero con atentados cada vez más crueles.

Además de ETA, España siempre ha contado con otras organizaciones que también han sido relevantes, o en todo el país o sólo en algunas regiones o Comunidades Autónomas. Muchas de ellas ya se liquidaron, algunas se volvieron a la vida de sus cenizas, otras han permanecido más o menos activas ya desde hace treinta años.

Durante la época de Franco el orden interno, sostenido y vigilado por el ejército, impedía el funcionamiento eficaz de grupos militantes. Las organizaciones políticas actuaban sólo clandestinamente.

Sin embargo, con la llegada del crepúsculo del poder de Francisco Franco nacieron varios grupos del “otro lado” para defender intereses propios, promover un cambio que se adhiera a su propia voluntad y que dificultara la conservación del sistema franquista con respecto al futuro. En realidad, casi todos los grupos terroristas de notable importancia enraizaron en España en los últimos dos o tres años del régimen, aunque la mayoría de ellos se había formado varios años o décadas antes. Esto fue el período cuando las primeras células terroristas surgieron, “como resultado imprevisto de la modernización de la

¹⁰ Ibidem; pp. 66-67.

sociedad española y de la incapacidad del régimen para adaptar su estructura política a las nuevas realidades del país".¹¹

La nueva situación se vinculó a los conflictos de la época como el industrial, estudiantil, eclesiástico y nacionalista y estas contrariedades generales incitaron a algunos círculos (principalmente a estudiantes y a la juventud de los sectores obreros) que actuaran de forma terminante. La acumulación de los problemas concluyó en la creación de grupos terroristas, respaldados de mayor o menor volumen por las capas sociales y políticas relevantes (el grado del apoyo se disminuyó en razón inversa al aumento de la actividad violenta). Si un grupo se aisló de las masas simpatizantes, el distanciamiento provocó la decadencia y la agonía paulatina de los mismos (como vamos a verlo más tarde en el caso del FRAP y los GRAPO)¹².

Estas células tenían una ideología bien definida y actitud básicamente anarquista, como el *Grupo de Acción Revolucionaria Internacionalista (GARI)*, la *Vanguardia Andaluista (VA)* o el *Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación (MIL)*, pero a ellas se añadieron unas nacionalistas, como el *Front d'Alliberament Català (FAC)* y la *Organització de Lluita Armada (OLLA)*¹³.

Franco tenía una ideología bastante clara concerniente al orden social. Los militares, que formaban la columna vertebral del régimen, se mostraban extremadamente sensibles a cada pequeño temblor que llevaba en sí la posibilidad de perturbar el orden y la estabilidad. Tras el asesinato del jefe del gobierno Carrero Blanco (causada por ETA) en 1973 la protección de la unidad, la actitud enérgica y firme contra la violencia subversiva adoptaron una posición central en los mensajes que el Generalísimo dirigía hacia la nación¹⁴. En la defensa de la paz interna cedió el protagonismo a las Fuerzas de Orden Público para que la nación española se sintiera en seguridad.

Los grupos mayores

FRAP

Bajo el régimen de Franco ningún partido político podía ejercer su actividad abiertamente. En esta politiquería clandestina el *Partido Comunista de España (PCE)* fue el portaestandarte. Aunque los movimientos comunistas tendían a aplicar métodos violentos, la rama española no los empleaba desde 1948 y con la política de la reconciliación nacional entraron en el sendero de una táctica más pacífica, pero útil (como la infiltración en organizaciones franquistas ejecutando así sus operaciones desde dentro). El prestigio del partido se iba aumentando entre los núcleos antifranquistas (todavía en ilegalidad), pero el

¹¹ Fernando REINARES: "Sociogénesis y evolución del terrorismo en España" en: *España I.: Sociedad y Política* (ed. Salvador GINER); Espasa-Calpe, S.A. Madrid, 1990 p. 355.

¹² Idem.; pp. 356-357.

¹³ Daniel C. RYAN: *Arms and Blood in the History of European Nations*; Hasken & Co., Boston, 2001 p. 104.

¹⁴ Los mensajes del 30-XII-1973 y 30-XII-1974; citados por el *Pensamiento Político de Franco*, Tomo II. Ediciones del Movimiento, Madrid, 1975; art. 1168-1172 en las pp. 722-725.

paso a la ideología del eurocomunismo democrático no dejó satisfecho a todos los miembros del partido y la oposición interna formó el *Partido Comunista de España (marxista-leninista)*. Este nuevo partido tenía el afán de derrocar el régimen de Franco, deshacerse de los elementos fascistas del país y para realizar estos objetivos no retrocedieron ante ningún instrumento. Además, aspiraron a sentar los cimientos de una república popular y federativa con un tono ultraizquierdista, arrojar las raíces del imperialismo yanqui del país y fundar un ejército popular.¹⁵ Para cumplir con la tarea, había que generar una organización que ejecutara los quehaceres radicales del PCE (ml); esta decisión desembocó en la creación del *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP)* en una Conferencia Nacional celebrada en París en el noviembre de 1973. Los puntos básicos del funcionamiento de la organización quedaron fijados entonces, a base de los propósitos siguientes:

- Derrocar la dictadura fascista y expulsar al imperialismo yanqui mediante la lucha revolucionaria.
- Establecimiento de una República Popular y Federativa que garantice las libertades democráticas y los derechos para las minorías nacionales.
- Nacionalización de los bienes monopolísticos y confiscación de los bienes de la oligarquía.
- Profunda reforma agraria sobre la base de la confiscación de los grandes latifundios.
- Liquidación de los restos del imperialismo español.
- Fundación de un ejército al servicio del pueblo.¹⁶

La verdadera lucha violenta del FRAP comenzó en 1975 (atentados contra guardias civiles) por la cual infligieron penas de muerte contra varios miembros del grupo. Aunque las pruebas contra los miembros no fueron decisivamente irrefutables, las penas fueron confirmadas y ejecutadas. Por influencia de la agitación del PCE (ml) se inició una oleada de protesta internacional contra los métodos dictatoriales y fascistas de Franco, pero esa – debido a la actitud y comportamiento intransigente del gobierno del dictador agonizante – no tuvo efecto en el proceso jurídico¹⁷. La ejecución de sus militantes supuso un gran estremecimiento tanto para el FRAP como para el PCE (ml). Se hizo claro que su existencia ya no fue sostenible entre aquellas circunstancias, el FRAP se aisló de su apoyo social y emprendió su lenta agonía (paralelamente con la de Francisco Franco). Pero la actividad del FRAP llevó consigo una disposición del sistema franquista que estampó su huella en el funcionamiento y penabilidad de los grupos terroristas subsiguientes: el 27 de agosto de 1975 (un mes antes de la ejecución de los militantes) el gobierno de Carlos Arias Navarro

¹⁵ REINARES; op. cit.; pp. 366-367.

¹⁶ Carlos HERMIDA REVILLAS: “La oposición revolucionaria al franquismo” en: *Historia y Comunicación Social*, No. 2 de 1997. p. 299.

¹⁷ Ricardo de la CIERVA: *Franco. La Historia*; Fénix, 2000 pp. 1010-1014.

aprobó un decreto-ley “que preveía la pena de muerte para los implicados en delitos de terrorismo”.¹⁸

GRAPO

A pesar del grave fracaso, la extrema izquierda no abandonó el combate y apareció en la paleta la *Organización de Marxistas Leninistas Españoles (OMLE)* – fundada en 1968 en Bruselas – para revivificar las antiguas ideologías que una vez habían caracterizado al Partido Comunista de España (fundamentándose en las tesis maoistas frente a las soviéticas). Los miembros eran pocos, pero intrépidos. Adoptaron el nombre *Partido Comunista de España (reconstituido)*. Después de adquirir el apoyo de los antiguos comunistas no descartaron la violencia como un método posible, incluso establecieron una ala del partido a la que designaron como tarea principal responder violentamente a los abusos y represiones del tardofranquismo.¹⁹ En 1975, justo antes de la muerte de Franco, esta ala se denominó *Grupos Revolucionarios Antifascistas Primero de Octubre (GRAPO)*. Este grupo, al que algunos consideran como la secuela del FRAP, ya desde los comienzos representa una actitud enemistosa contra la presencia estadounidense en el país; a lo largo de su historia los GRAPO llevaron a cabo varios atentados contra bases militares locales de los Estados Unidos.

Para ser miembro de los GRAPO fue imprescindible proceder de una familia proletaria de una zona donde el sufrimiento socio-económico ya había llegado a un nivel insoportable. Pensaban que la única salida de esta situación desesperante fue implantar un comunismo radical. Los líderes del grupo habían observado y analizado la actividad de ETA y llegaron a la conclusión que esa vía violenta podría “traer el fruto”. Los rasgos característicos de su modo de vivir y actuar fueron el extremado sectarismo y el pequeño número de los miembros (doscientos activistas, como máximo). Puesto que su posición económica no les hizo posible comprar las armas necesarias, las consiguieron de una manera sorprendente, simple, y tal vez, irónica: las robaron de las fuerzas armadas de orden público. El robo se hizo una costumbre arraigada de los GRAPO: el ataque contra bancos y el robo de grandes sumas de dinero significó – y sigue significando – la fuente básica de su “autoabastecimiento”. A pesar del hecho de que algunas personas fallecieron en los atentados, los GRAPO siempre tenían en el foco de su actividad que los crímenes requisieran el menor número posible de víctimas²⁰.

Con la aparición de los GRAPO la lucha del PCE(r) se radicalizó. Tras la muerte de algunos manifestantes en un choque con la policía en 1976, el PCE (r) anunció el establecimiento de un *Ejército Rojo*, constituido por la segunda generación de los GRAPO, y comenzó una serie de atentados con explosivos (por ejemplo, para “conmemorar” el aniversario de la Guerra Civil de 1936, el julio de 1976 estallaron 60 bombas en varios sitios contra instituciones fascistas²¹).

¹⁸ José María JOVER ZAMORA – Guadalupe GÓMEZ-FERRER – Juan Pablo FUSI AIZPURUA, : *España: Sociedad, Política y Civilización (siglos XIX-XX)*; Debate, S.A., Madrid, 2002 p. 795.

¹⁹ REINARES; op. cit.; p. 369.

²⁰ Javier TUSELL: *La transición Española a la Democracia*; Historia 16, Madrid, 1993 pp. 66-67.

²¹ “Terrorismo y democracia” en: *El País*, 31 de octubre de 1978.

Los acontecimientos se desencadenaron a finales del año 1976. Unos militantes de los GRAPO, solamente algunos días antes del referéndum para la Ley de la Reforma Política, secuestraron al presidente del Consejo de Estado, Antonio María de Oriol y Urquijo (confidente loyal del rey Juan Carlos). Además, en el enero de 1977 hicieron lo mismo con el presidente del Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar, general Villaescusa.²² Con el secuestro de los dos personajes prominentes tenían la intención de realizar un cambio de rehenes: prometieron que dejarían salir a sus rehenes a condición de que las autoridades pusieran en libertad sus correligionarios capturados. Este truco no cuajó: los medios de comunicación (bajo influencia estatal) atribuyeron el secuestro a la extrema derecha y los GRAPO – sin que la población supiera la verdad – no tuvo otro remedio que permanecer inactivo hasta que las autoridades liberaron a los dos hombres²³. El número de atentados se aumentó durante los años subsiguientes, pero los GRAPO – como antes el FRAP – iban perdiendo el círculo protector de la sociedad. Su verdadero “izquierdismo” desapareció, actuaban sólo para conseguir dinero y les acusaron de ser manipulados por la ultraderecha, por algún servicio de inteligencia extranjero o por el estado español mismo (esta confusión puede explicar que algunas fuentes – predominantemente estadounidenses – refieren a los GRAPO como a una organización de “origen dudosa”, o sea, se cuestiona su vinculación a la parte izquierda de la política²⁴).

A pesar de los constantes fracasos, los GRAPO seguían actuando (aunque según algunos historiadores españoles desde los años 1980 ya no podemos hablar de los GRAPO unitarios). Los atentados no se terminaron, los cometieron comandos móviles esporádicos del grupo. En los años 80 llevaron a cabo numerosas detenciones contra ellos, pero eso no les obstaculizó en comenzar la recaudación de “impuestos revolucionarios”; sólo en el año de 1984 más de cien hombres de negocio habían de pagar este impuesto y los que negaron el pago, tenían que “pagar” de otra manera (por ejemplo, hirieron gravemente el presidente de la Empresa de la Radio Nacional en La Coruña por no querer saldar su deuda²⁵). Opinaron que su actividad tenía vigencia en la época socialista también, ya que el gobierno de Felipe González mostraba (según ellos) ideas que eran más bien fascistas que comunistas (antes habían acusado también a Santiago Carrillo, fundador del PCE (ml) del delito de traición, porque Carrillo tenía relaciones dudosas con el gobierno de Adolfo Suárez). Como un comunicado emitido en 1991 dijo: “... para la clase de los obreros, para todos oprimidos por el estado fascista español” y definieron a sí mismos como un grupo de resistencia antifascista en guerra contra el gobierno socio-fascista del país²⁶.

En los años 1990 seguían los atentados contra hombres de negocio, instituciones, edificios importantes (como la explosión de un artefacto en la oficina del PSOE en Barcelona), los secuestros por rescate y también las detenciones de los miembros por parte de la policía. En el pasado cercano, en 2000 estallaron una bomba en la sede madrileña del Partido Popular y en el centro barcelonés del diario *El Mundo*. En 2001 y 2003 la fuerza del

²² RYAN; op. cit.; p. 112.

²³ TUSELL; op. cit.; p. 67.

²⁴ Por ejemplo: Christopher J. ROSS: *Contemporary Spain: A handbook*, Arnold, 2002.

²⁵ FERWAGNER; op. cit.; p. 324.

²⁶ Andrew SILKE: *Research of terrorism: Trends, Achievements & Failures*; Frank Cass, 2004 p. 152.

grupo se debilitó con la detención de algunas personas claves por acciones bajo comando franco-español²⁷.

Aunque algunos historiadores españoles y extranjeros ya “enterraron” a los GRAPO, no podemos hablar de la liquidación total de esta organización. La policía atribuye a ellos unos atracos de banco y tiroteos y de vez en cuando algunos comunicados salen a la luz que aseguran al pueblo de la existencia y sobrevivencia del grupo y advierten al gobierno contemporáneo de un peligro inminente. Los diarios dan noticia con frecuencia sobre la detención de miembros del grupo. Para el extranjero el peligro se muestra real y vigente, ya que algunas guías llaman la atención de los turistas a la amenaza de este “pequeño grupo marxista”²⁸. Es un hecho interesante que el PCE (r) – ilegalizado en el octubre de 2003 – en un comunicado de octubre de 2005, al márgen de acusar a los países extranjeros y al gobierno español de gestionar una política hipócrita, se mostró indignado por el hecho de que en los procesos judiciales los personajes competentes siempre relacionaron los GRAPO con el PCE (r)²⁹. Esto muestra que un giro se ha efectuado en la política del Partido Comunista de España (reconstituido): aunque todavía asumen la ideología antigua radical, ya quieren distanciarse de los actos de las reminiscencias de los GRAPO.

En general, podemos comprobar que al lado de ETA los GRAPO formaron el grupo terrorista más importante en la historia de España, principalmente en los años 1970. Esta afirmación puede ser adminiculada por una estadística que muestra el número de los víctimas del terrorismo en el período 1968-1983:

Número total de muertos: 558 (367 en el período de la democracia) Responsable:

ETA:	75,33%
GRAPO:	11,69%
Grupos de la extrema derecha:	7,01%
Grupos de la extrema izquierda e internacionales:	5,94% ³⁰

Los grupos menores

En el período de la transición democrática no sólo la política de la extrema izquierda reaccionó de manera violenta. Surgieron pequeños grupos militantes – tanto en la izquierda como en la derecha – que defendían los intereses de una minoría, pero pensaban que actuaban en nombre de la mayoría del pueblo español.

Entre 1975-1980 una serie de grupúsculos de la extrema derecha comenzaron su actividad, principalmente para defender los valores del régimen franquista y para asegurarse de la conservación de los resultados de mérito del antiguo régimen en las nuevas décadas. Estos grupos incluían la *Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista (AAA)*, *Antiterrorismo ETA (ATE)*, *Grupos Armados Españoles (GAE)*, *Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey*, *Batallón*

²⁷ FERWAGNER; op. cit.; pp. 325-326 y *First of October Antifascist Resistance Group* en: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/01_oct.htm (28 de enero de 2009).

²⁸ Darwin PORTER – Danforth PRINCE: *Frommer's Spain 2004 (guide)*; Frommers, 2003; p. 53.

²⁹ “¿Pero los Grapo no habían desaparecido?” en: *20 minutos*, 9 de junio de 2006.

³⁰ Alfred STEPAN: *Arguing Comparative Politics*; Oxford University Press 2001; p. 148.

Vasco Español (BVE) y otros de menor resonancia, como los *Comandos Antimarxistas*. Como uno de los exmiembros de un grupo semejante lo expuso: “estos sólo son siglas, nombres que van saliendo y que se van utilizando conforme se necesita”.³¹ Los miembros procedían principalmente de las líneas de grupos fascistas o neofascistas, y también del partido *Fuerza Nueva*. Tenían el propósito de destabilizar el proceso democrático de la transición, alabando las ideas de honor, patriotismo y unidad nacional y representaban una hostilidad aguda hacia el pluralismo, el marxismo, el liberalismo y el semitismo. La mayoría de estos grupos terroristas después de cinco o seis años – al ver que no recibían el apoyo necesario por parte del pueblo y que no disponían de los instrumentos básicos necesarios – dejaron de cometer atentados, su actividad se redujó notablemente. Sin embargo, algunos de ellos hicieron eco considerable.

Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey

Este grupo de la extrema derecha se formó para la reconstitución del estado fascista, es fiel a los valores fascistas clásicos y sigue actuando esporádicamente hoy día también. Cuestionan la legitimidad del rey Juan Carlos, no reconocen el derecho de la existencia de un estado liberal en tierras españolas. Según algunos, el grupo Cristo Rey recibe apoyo ideológico y financiero no sólo de los partidos neofascistas de países extranjeros, sino de las filas de la policía y del ejército español también, pero esta suposición puede ser refutada por la ineficacia de sus acciones (generalmente secuestros de personas semi-importantes).³²

MPAIAC

El *Movimiento para la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Archipiélago Canario* no pertenece a las pandillas de la ultraderecha, sino a los grupos que ambicionan el separatismo de alguna región, en este caso, el de las Islas Canarias. Tiene una historia bastante larga, su constitución se data al año 1964. Durante diez años actuaban pacíficamente (a través de folletos y programas de radio), pero en 1975 declararon la lucha armada contra España con artefactos. Su funcionamiento causó la muerte de una sola persona a lo largo de su historia. A finales de los años 1970 renunciaron a la violencia y guardaron silencio hasta 2003, cuando algunos miembros originales y fundadores proclamaron la reconstitución de la organización. Hoy sus actividades se restringen al terreno político y probablemente no volverán a coger armas³³. Nunca fue un movimiento unificado, porque la lucha interna entre los miembros no lo dejó desarrollarse; este desacuerdo constante provocó la emigración de sus jefes a países extranjeros. Por su relativa debilidad podían actuar sólo bajo la protección de Argelia³⁴ y posiblemente se debe a este incertidumbre que sus acciones no exigían muchas víctimas.

³¹ *Terrorismo tardofranquista* en: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorismo_tardofranquista (28 de enero de 2009).

³² *Folletos de Liberación Nacional*, No. 2. Madrid, 2007. pp. 17-19.

³³ *Idem*; pp. 19-20.

³⁴ Fernando REINARES: “Democratización y terrorismo en el caso español”; en: *La transición democrática española* (eds.: Jose Felix TEZANOS – Ramon COTARELO – Andres de BLAS); Sistema, Madrid, 1989 p. 623.

Terra Lliure (Tierra Libre)

Esta organización de la extrema izquierda separatista catalana se formó en 1978-79 con el fin de constituir un estado marxista en la Cataluña y Valencia unida³⁵, pero llegó a ser famosa sólo en 1981, cuando en un partido de fútbol en Barcelona se manifestó en el marco de la campaña *Somos una Nación*. Ya en los primeros años sucedieron choques con la policía que desembocó en la muerte de varios miembros del grupo. Con las acciones (secuestro de políticos y profesores egregios) querían lograr la simpatía del pueblo catalán y conseguir una posición firme en la paleta política de Cataluña, pero se fueron “demasiado lejos” con los atentados y actos crueles (ataque contra la Televisión Nacional, la policía española, hombres de negocio franceses y españoles, secuestro de hijos de políticos, etc.). En los años 1980 la policía capturó a varios de sus militantes que condujo a la disolución parcial del grupo y la renuncia a la lucha armada. En 1995 las autoridades excarceló a la mayoría de sus miembros, cuya reinserción en la sociedad fue – y sigue siendo – apoyada por el partido catalán Esquerra Republicana Catalán.³⁶ En el caso de Terra Lliure fue sorprendente el hecho de que podía actuar con gran eficacia y causó el fallecimiento de varias personas, a pesar de que el número total de sus miembros activos nunca fue muy alto. Es un elemento interesante que este grupo a veces imitó paso a paso a las acciones de ETA, adueñándose de la ideología básica del grupo vasco.³⁷

EGPGC

El *Exército Guerrilleiro do Pobo Galego Ceibe* es el grupo terrorista nacionalista gallego, formado con el objetivo de conseguir la independencia de Galicia. No nos disponemos de mucha información sobre esta organización, porque inició su actividad solamente a finales de los años 1980 y la reacción policíaca fue inmediata y eficaz, debilitando sus fuerzas de manera considerable. En la actualidad cometen pequeños crímenes en su comunidad autónoma pero ni el estado, ni los gallegos atribuyen mucha importancia a ellos³⁸.

GAL

En la etapa socialista (desde 1982) de España el terrorismo tomó grandes proporciones (especialmente ETA) y para el gobierno ya estaba claro que los métodos antiterroristas clásicos (redadas, persecuciones, detenciones preventivas, etc.) no cumplían la tarea suficientemente. Esto fue el momento cuando el gobierno (según algunos el mismísimo jefe del gobierno, Felipe González) optó por crear un grupo armado que utilizaría instrumentos no siempre legales para acabar con la oleada del terrorismo. Desde la tortura hasta los delitos económicos los *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* aplicaron cualquier método, principalmente contra activistas y simpatizantes de ETA. Los secuestros y las técnicas

³⁵ FERWAGNER, op. cit.; p. 362

³⁶ RYAN; op. cit.; p. 117 y *Historia del comando Terra Lliure* en: <http://linea36.wordpress.com/2007/12/30/historia-del-comando-terra-lliure/> (28 de enero de 2009).

³⁷ REINARES (1989); op. cit; pp. 623-624.

³⁸ Ibidem.

ambiguas no se granjearon el placer del pueblo y la situación se hizo incluso peor cuando el primer ministro González y el ministro de gobernación se vieron involucrados en el escándalo (la oposición política les acusó de ser los jefes superiores de los GAL). Aunque oficialmente nunca podían relacionar a estos políticos con el grupo terrorista, este asunto fue uno de los muchos factores que condujeron a la pérdida de las elecciones de 1996.³⁹ (tampoco mejoró en las probabilidades del PSOE que – según un artículo de 1994 del diario *El Mundo* – el director general de la Guardia Civil, junto con otros altos cargos del Ministerio de Gobernación, “habían cobrado sobresueldos a costa de los fondos reservados para la lucha antiterrorista”⁴⁰) Sea lo que sea la verdad, es cierto que las operaciones de los GAL siempre tenían una connotación de colaboración internacional hispano-francesa y que en la financiación de los actos terroristas participaron mercenarios que pertenecían a la policía estatal española.

La existencia de los GAL inspiró a algunas entidades políticas que justifiquen sus propios actos violentos con los de los GAL. El PCE (r), por ejemplo, en su comunicado de 2005 ya citado se refiere al PSOE como “el brazo político de los GAL (siglas del terrorismo de Estado bajo los gobiernos de Felipe González)”⁴¹. Parece que este supuesto terrorismo estatal sirve como punto de referencia para las organizaciones terroristas con el fin de demostrar que sus métodos no son peores que los del estado.

Como hemos visto, la mayoría de estos grupos arriba mencionados ya no actúa en España o sólo en ciertas regiones. Con la excepción de ETA España ya no cuenta con células terroristas autóctonas considerables (aunque algunas, como los GRAPO ya “han prometido” que regresarán a la vida pública en el futuro cercano).

Sin embargo, al lado de los grupos con una ideología de ultraizquierda, ultraderecha y nacionalista ya aparecieron los que ejercen sus actividades bajo la égida de cooperación internacional. Según estimaciones entre once y quince grupos radicales islamistas actuaban en España a comienzos del siglo XXI.. Este número ha de ser reevaluado bajo la luz del atentado en 11 de marzo de 2004 (explosión de varias bombas en Madrid, perpetrada por el *Grupo Islámico Combatiente Marroquí (GICM)*, relacionado al Al-Qaeda) que mató a 191 personas. España reaccionó con una serie de detenciones y la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional sigue con una notable participación española.

³⁹ *Folletos...* op. cit. pp. 20-23.

⁴⁰ Citado por ZAMORA...; op. cit.; p. 829.

⁴¹ *Folletos...* op. cit. p. 23.

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Chapters from the economic policy of monarchic Libya

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Introduction

Nowadays, if Libya is the topic any conversation, 4-5 thoughts can be associated with the country in our mind at first. The first one is maybe the most important one as well: it is the „de facto leader” of the State Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi¹, who has been representing the continuity and “himself” in the “green republic” for nearly forty years. He is said to have had close relationship with the Arab terrorists in the Middle East in the 70s and 80s supporting them and giving them opportunity to have military training in the bare Libyan desert. In this way he became the enemy of the United States of America very soon, which was proved by the American military bombing on Tripoli in 1986.²

The second fact which is known about Libya is the Lockerbie attempt being connected with Libyan secret agencies. Libyan citizens are supposed to have committed it. Furthermore, it is obvious that Libya can be linked with oil and this country is in connection with the Bulgarian nurses’ case.

Finally, the relationship between the United States of America and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya seems to be better than earlier. Even Gaddafi is becoming the ally of the United States of America, although he was „the Mad Dog of the Middle East”.³

¹ Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi (Arabic: *مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ قُدَّافَةَ*, *Mu‘ammar al-Qaḍāfi*) (born 7 June, 1942) also known as Colonel Gaddafi has been the de facto leader of Libya since a 1969 coup. Although Gaddafi has held no public office or title since 1979, he is accorded the honorifics "Guide of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" or "Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution" in government statements and the official press. In February 2009, upon being elected chairman of the 53-nation African Union in Ethiopia.

² On April 15, 1986, Ronald Reagan ordered major bombing raids, dubbed Operation El Dorado Canyon, against Tripoli and Benghazi killing 45 Libyan military and government personnel as well as 15 civilians.

³ In 2006 the United States of America opened its embassy again in Tripoli after several visits and negotiations.

Several aspects of the economy and society during the colonial era

The previous Libyan history is usually lost in the mists of time. Only few people know that the territory didn't have the status of independent State before 1951 and the territory with the name "Libya" was artificially established in the early 1930s of the Italian colonization.

The territory with colonial dependence had the same function for the Italian as Algeria for France from 1911. The only difference was that Libya has never become such an essential part of Italy as Algeria of France.⁴ At the beginning of the century the public opinion was also for the occupying the coastal area opposite "the boots". It was an obvious view that Libya might be an excellent market for the Italian products and it would mean the solution to the problem of overpopulation in Italy. Finally it could be a "vegetable garden" for supplying Italy. The expectations over Libya were too high and optimistic that time.

The cruel and sometimes bloody pacification lasting for over twenty years had its results in early 30s. The three, previously independent provinces were united under the name "Libya".⁵ It is worth emphasizing, because before the Italian colonization the provinces were never united. Tripolitania had close connections with Maghreb in the field of economy and commerce, Cyrenaica had the same actions with Egypt and Machrek. Fezzan found its account in Black Africa. But from 1934 new chronology began.

During the first period Italo Balbo⁶, who was well-known in both the Italian public life and army, had the post of governor-general in Libya. The colonization policy hall-marked with his name made lots of Italian families head for the desert, whose responsibility was to transform the barren, unproductive territory into the "busy and crowded" beach of Italy. Rome intended to make 300.000 people settle down in Libya over twenty-five years. So as to achieve the goal the government gave all the support and incentives in economy and society. The government organized the transportations and the settlement of families. One morning in October 1938 20.000 settlers arrived in Libya with only one convoy.

The Italian state thought that the agriculture would mean the great, prosperous possibilities in long run. The original inhabitants lost the best areas very soon, which were located at the coast, later they were settled by the Italians. The great Italian landowners were forced to hire Italian workforce on their lands. Besides the state established farms, agricultural plantations, villages as well.

The experts dealing with settlement had certain detailed plans for the newcomers what, how much and how to produce. The simplest solution was growing vegetables and fruit, but a great amount of capital was invested in breeding animals. From the beginning of the 30s great plantations of grapes, fig, olive and lemon were created. The state gave support in order to make the farms profitable, to drill the wells to buy machines and transport the

⁴ There were several attempts in the 1930s to absorb the Libyan territory into Italy, but it wasn't successful because of the outbreak of World War II.

⁵ The parts pacified by Italians had common public administration and the name „Libya" was given to it recalling the glorious „Roman period".

⁶ Italo Balbo (5 June 1896 – 28 June 1940) was an Italian Blackshirt (Camicie Nere, or CCNN) leader, Marshal of the Air Force (Maresciallo dell'Aria), Governor-General of Libya, Commander-in-Chief of Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI), and the "heir apparent" to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

products. The Italian companies collected the crops and took them to the European markets.⁷ It is worth mentioning that in 1938 Italy arranged and organized 90% of the foreign trade of Libya.

The Italians didn't invest any money in establishing great industrial plants during the colonial period, they expanded and developed the operating structure. The producing plants were mainly situated in the bigger, coastal towns making it easier how to find skill workforce and how to solve the problem of transportation. Especially the food industry and the construct industry started to develop from the beginning of the 30s, but on the whole general productivity was going on in the industry.

There were essential investments in the infrastructure. The Italian government focused on developing the railway, the roads, public utilities and parts. It was time when the great coastal route was constructed – in 1937 the so-called Litoranea – the basis of which can contribute to the present traffic in the best way linking Tunisia with Egypt. It is also true that building of the road had serious military function for Italy. Furthermore, the Italian banks were eager to offer credits with favourable conditions to the people starting a new life and they wanted to increase their capital from the Arab original inhabitants.

Benito Mussolini visited the possessions in the northern part of Africa several times and he was satisfied with Italian expansion. It as an interesting fact that a Hungarian count was also the member of the Italian delegation in 1937 and had the opportunity to observe the Italian dictator having the title of "Sword of the Islam" expressing to the Africans with Musulman religion how important the residents' life is for him.⁸

The outbreak of World War II and the opening of northern African frontline plugged Mussolini plans including the political, economic elite's plans about the colonization system. As Italy was involved in the war and Italian, German and English troops fought in North Africa, the area began to decline again and sank into its immobility experienced earlier, before the 20th century. The nomadic animal breeding and the handicraft were more important than the developing colonial agriculture and industry. The economy of the provinces turned inside again as in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica the English military public administration was in force and in Fezzan the French one had the main role.

Several milestones meant the turning point for Libya such as the end of the World War II in 1945, the peace treaty with Italy in 1947 and the decision of the United Nations in 1949 on the independence of the three Libyan provinces and the union in one Kingdom. The main reflection of the change was the declaration of independence at the end of 1951.⁹

⁷ Herkommer Julius: *Libyen von Italien kolonisiert*. Freiburg, 1941.

⁸ MOL K63 OLASZORSZÁG 216. csomó 23/41. Líbia 1939.

⁹ Asal Sami M.: *Die Entstehung Libyens, als souveräner Staat*. Berlin, 1965. and Khadduri M.: *Modern Libya. A Study in Political Development*. Baltimore, 1963.

The first years of the period of United Kingdom of Libya and the introduction of the supporting policy

The new leader of the country – Idris I¹⁰ – had to face several problems at the same time. To make it clear for everybody, the United Kingdom of Libya seemed to be one of the poorest and most incapable of living countries in the world in 1950–1951. It was an example for the economist then and even now how a country can be established without the vital economic sources. There were no raw materials for the industry in the country. The inproductive agriculture was in serious trouble due to the low-quality ground and the lack of water. They exported the components of guns, lorries and airplanes left in the desert after the battles of the world war. Plus income was guaranteed by the export of “esparto grass”¹¹, the price of which was very high on the international market in the early 50s. 90% of the population were illiterate, uneducated and they were on the edge of the society. They could hardly get by. They had their income mainly from the above mentioned agriculture, nomadic animal breeding and handcraft. Their average annual income was 30–40\$.

In the beginning small amount of capital was available for the developments. The economists could see only limited possibilities of expansion and they were pessimistic how to carry out the projects. All in all, the main objective was to develop the agriculture and the animal breeding provided it could help the population to get by and guarantee same export as well. However the Libyan leaders had to be aware of the fact very soon that it was impossible to improve anything without having financial sources and they needed foreign support to maintain the Kingdom and boost the industry.

The financial aid came from different directions into the country from 1951. One of the most quoted and the most controversial agreement so far was the friendly and federal contract with Great Britain in July 1953. It gave exclusive and continuous rights to London so as to have military troops in Libya. The countervalue was only important for Tripoli as England paid annually 2,8 million \$ to Libyan developing organisations and 7.7 million \$ to correct the deficit from 1953/1954 to 1957/1958. The agreement was modified in 1958. Although England paid less, but the agreed 9.1 million dollars increased the income to the budget every year.¹²

Later the support of the United States of America “arrived”. The base of the support was considered the military and economic agreement made in September 1954. Washington had

¹⁰ Idris I, (Arabic: *إدريس الأول*) born Sayyid Muhammad Idris bin Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Senussi, (March 12, 1889 – May 25, 1983) was the only King of Libya, reigning from 1951 to 1969 and the Chief of the Senussi Muslim order. The Senussi or Sanussi refers to a Muslim political-religious order in Libya and Sudan founded in Mecca in 1837 by the Grand Senussi, Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali as-Senussi. Senussi was concerned with both the decline of Islamic thought and spirituality and the weakening of Muslim political integrity. He was influenced by the Wahhabi Movement, to which he added teachings from various Sufi orders.

¹¹ Esparto, or esparto grass, also known as “halfah grass” or “needle grass”, *Macrochloa tenacissima* and *Stipa tenacissima*, is a perennial grass grown in northwest Africa and southern Spain employed for crafts.

¹² Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Her Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Libya, Treaty Series No.3. (1954). H.M.S.O. London, CMD. 9043 (in English and Arabic).

also rights in Libya to occupy and use certain territories for military reasons including Wheelus Air Field¹³ near the capital. In return Tripoli was supplied first with 7 million \$ support and from 1954/1955 to 1959/1960 they transferred 4 million \$ yearly. The support was decreased to 1 million dollars in 1960 with the modification of the agreement, but it was in force for the period of eleven years. The Libyan government intended to spend the American financial support on the special developing programmes, but because of the increasing expenditure it was used to balance to the deficit in most cases. It belongs to the historical truth as well that in the second part of the 1950s the supports by the United States of America were greater than the amount agreed in the contract.¹⁴

We must also be aware of the fact that from the US's point of view Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, from Great Britain's point of view Churchill, Eden and MacMillan transferred the money not only for the sake of the Libyan leader, there were several other events which influenced them: the cold war was getting intense, the Mediterranean had great appreciation, the fact that Great Britain gradual lost its power in Asia being forced to leave Palestine in 1948 and Egypt in 1952. The United States of America had several bases in the Mediterranean. It included an air base in Libya, where the pilot were able to make preparations for their later action in Vietnam. The Soviet Union made an attempt to give economic support several times being aware of the special situation in Libya but it was rejected all the time on the part of Libya.¹⁵ Besides the two main support-suppliers, France, Italy, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan also gave aid.¹⁶

¹³ Wheelus Air Base was originally built by the Italian Air Force in 1923 and known as Mellaha Air Base. Mellaha was used by the German Luftwaffe during the Battle of North Africa. The US Army Air Force began using Mellaha as a base in January 1943. It was renamed Wheelus Army Air Field (AAF) on 17 May 1945 in honor of USAAF Lt Richard Wheelus who had died earlier that year in a plane crash in Iran. With the crowning of His Majesty King of Libya Mohammed Idris Al-Sanusi I in 1951, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)-based fighter-bomber units also began using Wheelus AB and its nearby El Watia Gunnery Range for gunnery and bombing training. A further agreement between the United States and Libya, signed in 1954, granted the U.S. the use of Wheelus and its gunnery range until December 1971.

¹⁴ Mutual Defense Assistance: Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and Libya, U.S. Department of State Publication 5743 (in English and Arabic). Economic Assistance to Libya: Agreement between the United States of America and Libya, U.S. Department of State Publication 5740 (in English and Arabic).

¹⁵ The Soviet Union had interest in the Libyan territories after the peace treaty with Italy. In the beginning they tried to get the rights of guardianship over the territories, but their efforts failed. Later several attempts were made to plant their feet firmly in Libya. Asal Sami M.: *Die Entstehung Libyens, als souveräner Staat*. Berlin, 1965.; Scott L. Bills: *The Libyan Arena. The United States, Britain and the Council of Foreign Ministers 1945-1948*. The Kent State University Press, Kent/London, 1995. and (FO371 Libya) in The National Archives London.

¹⁶ Houghton D. Hobart (Author(s) of Review): *The Economic Development of Libya. Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of Libya*. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960. p. 48.

Distribution and use of the aid

The money distribution was carried out by two organisations. The Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency (LPDSA) distributed the money coming from Great Britain and the other countries. This organisation started its operations in 1952. They worked out studies, programmes and plans how to spend the money and how it could be carried through so as to contribute to the development of the Libyan economy and society. Great emphasis was put on the improvement of transportation and public utilities. In this way the new port in Tripoli was built, the roadnetwork was renovated in Fezzan, the water and electricity supply in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was developed and the modernization of the international airports in Tripoli and Benghazi can also be associated with this programme. That made it public that several educational, professional training programmes were available. As a result of this, nurses, teachers, office workers were trained. The financial, economic aid had to be used for purchasing agricultural products such as barley and wheat in several cases, because the Libyan average crop production fell behind which led to famine in the country.

The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission (LARC), set up in 1955, coordinated the money transferred from the United States of America. They had studies and plans as well and they were closely connected with the embassy of the United States in Tripoli. Washington formed two organisations to handle the money. The first one is the United States Operation Missions in Libya (USOM), which dealt with technological help, the second one is the Libyan-American Joint Services (LAJS), which worked in the field of agriculture, natural resources, medical care and education.

The development of the electricity supply in Tripoli, the construction of modern telecommunication networks, including the Libyan radio and television. The capitalization of the National Bank of Libya and the National Agricultural Bank can be related to the Americans. Approximately 25% of the money was spent on the improvements in education and health care. The first university was open thanks to the American help in 1955.

The United Nations took on the greatest role in forming the Kingdom from 1949 to 1951. The leaders were aware of the fact that the Kingdom would need foreign aid even from the beginning. The world organization participated in boosting the economy even from 1951 and they gave priority to the technological help. Their programmes were united by the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission and the programmes were carried out by specialised organizations (FAO, ILO, WHO, UNESCO). The aid donated by the United Nations were connected with English and American programmes in several cases. Even more, the world organization supplied the Libyan young people with scholarship so that they could continue their studies abroad.¹⁷

In June 1956 the Libyan Development Council was established by the Libyan leadership to coordinate the economic developments. This organization didn't have any authority to distribute the aid, they were able to give advice and make proposals what to spend the money on. They also made studies about conditions in the Libyan economics.

¹⁷ Higgins Benjamin: *The Economic and Social Development of Libya*. United Nations, New York, 1953. pp. 167-170.

In the above mentioned organisations in most cases the English and American government had an interest, in spite of the fact that in written form and according to law it was the Libyan leaders on the highest position who had the rights of decision-making. The representatives of the governments, the special diplomats of England, the United States and the United Nations, the experts were present in the board of directors. Their opinion was essential several times, their thoughts had more importance than the Libyan politicians'.

In 1957 the Libyan-American Joint Service was attacked in the journal "Tarabulus Al-Gharb", "the incompetent, prodigal and biased employees, workers were criticized".¹⁸ Besides from the late 50s lots of Libyan politicians and intellectuals abandoned the government's exaggerated policy towards the western countries. As a matter of fact the Arab nationalism awakening in Libya and the prejudice against the "Western world" coming from the previous feelings were hidden the background of the articles criticising Great Britain and the United States. After 1956 Nasser, the Egyptian president warned King Idris and his government to liquidate the English and American military bases on the territory of the country, because it would mean a real danger in the case of attack on Egypt or the Middle East. That time it was out of the question, as the rent for the military bases and the support connected with it could make the state system operate and the economy was able to develop on the other hand, the ruler could be in safety in the shade of the base.¹⁹

Essential changes began in the Libyan economic policy from the late 50s and the early 60s. In 1960 the Council of Ministers made decision on the complete liquidation of the Libyan American Joint Services and the state machinery continued to carry out the tasks. The contract with the foreign employees was cancelled, expressing their gratitude for their work. Anybody who wanted to do could go on working in the Libyan organizations, but only few people did so. The complete control over developments was carried through from March 1961, when all the offices being responsible for developments with foreign interest were liquidated.

The Libyan Development Council, which was reformed and had a wide sphere of authority took on tasks of the organisations. This Council had only Libyan members after 1961 and they set a great goals such as improving the living standard, increasing the national income, and growth of productivity of natural resources. The operation of Council was reflected in the rate savings and the investment of work for the sake of the nation.

There was only one reason that the Kingdom had courage to confront the experts who did their best on the behalf of the Libyan nation, but in many cases they took into consideration the interest of their own state. The reason is the crude oil. It can be illustrated that Libya refused the financial aid donated by the United Nations in 1962 and later Libya needed only technical and technological aids. Even more they made bilateral contracts with Western Europe and socialist countries. These contracts gave greater freedom for the young kingdom and they could be reconciled with the national sovereignty.

¹⁸ *The Politics of the Kingdom of Libya in Historical Perspective. A Dissertation.* Submitted by Hayford Elizabeth R., Tufts University, November 1970. p. 441.

¹⁹ The revolution in Irak also made the ruler worried in 1958. It is mentioned in several sources that after the revolution the English troops paid more attention to the ruler's safety.

Epilogue

All in all. Positive attitude must be formed to the aids and its policy, although several contradiction can be noticable. The underdeveloped social structure and economy, the shortage of money in the country didn't predict great prospects for Libya in 1951. The situation was gradually improved in the Kingdom several years later due to the transfer of aids, the continue activity of the United Nations, the great number of the experts and the foreign military bases.

There were investments in the field of industry, agriculture and services. The infrastructure was developing. The rate of illiterate population and unemployed decreased. The statistics of mortality could show a more favourable tendency.

The "golden era" came into the Libyan economy in 1958. Although it was also suspected during the Italian colonial period that crude oil could be found in the desert, but real results were in the area only after the World War II, and finally the "black gold" rushed up.

The outputs was beyond all the expectations. Parallely, the income flew into the budget. The balance of foreign trade had continuously deficit in the 50s, but it had surplus in 1964 and the budget was also balanced for the first time.

The new financial sources gave the chance to the ruler and the government to work out own development programme by 1963, the financial founds of which could be provided by 70% of actual income from oil in the future.

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Lebanese Christians and Shifts in Political Power: from Taif Accords to the Second Lebanon War

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"Lebanese history is a history of differences which is close to the coexistence among the Lebanese confessions. The problem of Lebanon is that it is the scene where all the regional and international intelligence services meet and where there are attempts to implement international projects in the conflicts among countries [...]" (Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah)¹

The Taif Agreement also known as "National Reconciliation Accord," or "Document of National Accord" was an agreement reached to provide "the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon". Negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia, it was designed to end the decades-long Lebanese civil war, politically accommodate the demographic shift to a Muslim majority, reassert Lebanese authority in South Lebanon (then occupied by Israel), and legitimize the Syrian occupation. It was signed on October 22, 1989 and ratified on November 4, 1989.²

The aim of this essay is to study the shifts of political relations between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, focusing on those that have been taken place since the end of the civil strife. Special attention is going to be paid to the circumstances among which an alliance was forged between the Michel Aoun led Free Patriotic Movement and the Shiite Hezbollah. New elements of Hezbollah's discourse that lately elevates pan-Arabism over the bonds of Islam, and shifts in the public opinion of Lebanese Christian as mirrored by polls and surveys are going to be studied as well.

The Christian Community

The present Lebanese Constitution officially acknowledges 18 religious groups. After the Islamic conquest, the Aramaic-speaking original Christian inhabitants were joined by

¹ Shiite Ayatollah in Lebanon allegedly related to Hezbollah: *Interview with Hizballah's Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah* by Manuela Paraipan, available at: <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24569-lebanon>.

² Krayem, Hassan: *The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement*, in *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays*, Paul Salem (ed.). Beirut; American University Press, 1997, pp. 411–435. Available at: <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html>.

other Christian and Shiite communities from Syria and Iraq. At the beginning of the eighth century, the disciples and followers of fourth-century St. Maroun formed the autonomous community of the Maronites. During the Crusades, around 1180, they had established relations with the Papal State and later, in 1215, keeping their own hierarchy, liturgy and holidays they joined the Catholic Church. The second largest Greek Orthodox community of the Middle East may be found in Lebanon, and there is a significant number of Greek Catholics also known as Melkites, who accepted the supremacy of the Pope in 1724.³ Today, it is estimated that the Christian population makes up about 39% of the total population.

The Shiites (twelvers) settled down mainly in the areas east of Sidon, in the south-Lebanese highlands of Jabal al-Aamil, and in the Beqaa Valley around Baalbek.⁴ In the eighteenth century, the Maronites started to move gradually from the northern highlands towards the south, while the Sunnites started to settle mainly in the coastal towns. According to travellers of the time, these communities lived in peace with each other.⁵ In modern times Armenians came after World War I, and the Palestinian refugees arrived in several waves starting in 1948.⁶

Today Maronites are scattered around the Lebanese countryside but with heavy concentrations on Mount Lebanon and in (East) Beirut. Some of them see themselves as descendants of the Phoenicians/Canaanites and tend to deny Lebanon's Arab heritage. Greek Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, and some Maronites are likely to focus on the Greek inheritance of the region from the days of the Byzantine Empire. Other Christians even claim partial descent from Crusaders.

As early as in the 12th century French crusaders established close relations with the Maronite community. From the moment they arrived, the Crusaders had spontaneous and immediate help from the Maronites who, in turn, benefited from their particular protection and privilege. Louis IX, King of France (Saint Louis) went so far as to declare that the Maronites were part of the French nation. The various regimes which succeeded the monarchy of St. Louis and of Louis XIV all maintained in law, and in fact, the ancient privilege of France in the protection of the missionaries and Christian communities of the Orient.⁷

Understandably, in 1920 the Maronite Patriarch, Elias Hoayek wholeheartedly supported the creation of Greater Lebanon under French tutelage. Between the two world

³ Hourani, Albert: *Political Society in Lebanon*, Papers on Lebanon I, Centre for Lebanese Studies, published jointly with Emile Boustani Seminar at MIT, p. 6.

⁴ Hitti, Philip K.: *Lebanon in History*, Macmillan and C. O. LTD, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1957, pp. 244–65.

⁵ See: Volney C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie*, pp. ii., 31, 57, 68.; Frederick J. Bliss: *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine*, New York 1912, pp. 318–319.; cf. Isaac Riley: *Syrian Home Life*, New York, 1874, p. 181.; N. Bouron: *Les Druzes: histoire du Liban et de la montagne haouranaise*, Paris 1930, pp. 299, 315. in: Hitti: *op. cit.* p. 407.

⁶ Hourani: *op. cit.* p. 4.

⁷ Risterhueber, René: *Les Traditions françaises au Liban*, Paris, 1925, pp. 42ff.; Salibi, Kamal S.: *The Maronites of Lebanon under Frankish and Mamluk Rule (1099–1516)*, Arabica, IV, 1957, 288.

wars the political institutions of the country were dominated by Maronite politicians, most of whom had served in the office of the French high commissioner.⁸

The policy of the Maronite Church was based on two principles. Its leaders wanted to maintain the autonomy they had as a protected minority in the Ottoman sense of the *millet* system,⁹ and also wished to exercise political hegemony based on their slightly superior numbers contradicting to Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution.¹⁰ This aspiration to hegemony slowly but surely gave rise to a growing reaction among other religious communities. When the number of Maronites in Lebanon fell significantly, the new – Muslim – majority started to require a redistribution of power shares and resources based on their increasing numbers. Demographic changes can be considered as the final reason for the antagonism between the various communities and the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon. This question has not been resolved until the present day.

The Maronite patriarch even nowadays continues to exercise the role of final authority among Christian politicians and thus to exercise a decisive, yet informal, veto power in Lebanese politics.¹¹ It means that the religious factor is decisive in shaping the political identity of the Maronites.

Can patron–client relationship explain the situation of Christians in Lebanon?

In Lebanon political ties and alliances are grown out of an archaic social structure that has survived in each community. However, due to the shock of the civil strife the so-called patron–client system started to lose its prevailing position and recently gave rise to new, purely political formations in each side.

According to Samir Khalaf, the social history of Lebanon is but the pursuit of a functioning patron–client system by different groups of interest in each confessional community. In this framework clients are guaranteed their security and welfare, while the

⁸ Hourani: *op. cit.* p.10.

⁹ In this sense *millet* means legally protected religious community with reference to non-Muslim minorities (*dhimmi*) holding the same status throughout the empire. See: Ursinus, M.O.H: *Millet* in: *Encyclopedia of Islam*. Some Muslim historians argue that the millet system of Ottoman Islamic law can be considered an early example of pre-modern religious pluralism, since millet communities possessed separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves (in cases not involving any Muslim) with fairly little interference from the Ottoman government. See: Sachedina, A.A.: *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism*, OUP, 2001. Today the millet system is still used at varying degrees in some dominantly Muslim countries which maintain the principle of separate personal courts and/or laws for every recognized religious community and reserved seats in the parliament.

¹⁰ All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and equally are bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction. See: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/le000000_html.

¹¹ Muqraby, Muhammad: An Islamic rule of law for Lebanon? *The Daily Star* (Beirut), 15 October 2008, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=96785.

patrons are assured political and consequently economic power.¹² The social structures of religious enclaves share certain characteristics; in every denomination there were major noble families which had been carrying out the public administrative duties of a certain area for centuries. Their main responsibilities were law enforcement and tax collection.¹³ At the same time, they protected farmers from the excessive exploitation by the establishment.

As a result of the integration of the prominent urban and rural families into the bureaucracy, the feudal nature of the patron–client system gained an official colour; talented lawyers and civil servants may well have aspired to a political career under the Ottoman and later French control. Descendants of the excelling families during these times have provided the Lebanese political elite ever since.¹⁴ These landowners are called *zu'ama'* (Sg. *za'im*) in Arabic, which best translates as patrons. We must not forget however, that the *zu'ama'* had communities of different religious composition living under their control,¹⁵ thus “patron–client relationship” in itself is unable to explain why these communities are divided on religious bases and why their identity remained religious for many centuries up to now.

A confessionalist system

The confessionalist system is considered as the heir to the Ottoman *millet* system, in which peoples belonging to monotheist (*dhimmi*) denominations were guaranteed legal, and limited administrative autonomy according to their religion. This concerns both Christians and Jews.

Between 1920 and 1945, governance was based on the agreement of the leaders of the different religions and communities. This period is known as the establishment and consolidation of the confessionalist system, in which administrative functions and the proportional representation were distributed according to the denominational division data of the 1932 census.¹⁶ As a result, the Christian population with a mere 55% majority gained a superior position. In this structure, patrons are connected to their clients who are politically and economically subordinate and committed to them. The *zu'ama'* set up parties and charity organisations; however, apart from securing their own power, they do not have a comprehensive strategy. To disguise this lack, these patrons try to appear as religiously devoted local patriots.¹⁷

Between 1947 and 1972, one third of parliamentary mandates were in the hands of 26 families, and one fourth of the representatives elected in 1960 were given their positions by

¹² Khalaf, Samir: Changing Forms of Political Patronage in Lebanon in: *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner, John Waterbury, Duckworth, 1977, p. 187.

¹³ Picard, Elizabeth: *Za'im, zu'ama'* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

¹⁴ Khalaf: *op. cit.* pp. 193–194.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 189–192.

¹⁶ Krayem: *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Johnson, Michael: Political bosses and their gangs: *Zu'ama'* and qabadayat in the Sunni Muslim quarters of Beirut, in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. *op. cit.* pp. 208–214.

inheritance. For decades even ministerial positions were held by clan leaders. During the civil war of 1975–1990, numerous militia leaders came from their ranks.¹⁸

Lebanon has no civil code for personal matters; each sect has its own set of personal status laws that include such matters as engagement, marriage and dowry, annulment of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. These laws are obligatory for the citizens, whether one is a practicing member of the sect or not. The confessional system of personal-status laws strengthens the role of communal religious leaders and hampers the growth of nationalistic or secular ideas in Lebanon.¹⁹

Confessionalism turned Lebanon into a “country of associated minorities”²⁰, imposing a threefold burden on the people up to the present day: it inhibits the formation of a common sense of identity, preserves the inequality of development, and as proven by the history of the civil war, it leaves the country defenceless at the mercy of foreign interests. This situation proved to be fatal.²¹

Deepening rifts in pre-war Lebanon

Upon returning from a trip to the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Pierre Gemayel inspired by the discipline of the Nazis, formed his own extreme right movement in Lebanon – the Phalange Party. Named after the Spanish dictator Franco’s party, the Phalangists (known as the *Kataeb* in Arabic) – backed by the French and the U.S. – remained Lebanon’s most powerful political party until the onset of the civil war in 1975.

Social development in the first decades of the Lebanese Republic had proven to be extremely unbalanced in the different regions, for it was characterized by an unequal distribution of national income and misuse of benefits and funds.²² The central government regarded the regions annexed to what was Mount Lebanon in 1920 as marginal parts of Lebanon. The economic situation in peripheral Lebanon differed sharply from that around Beirut. Along the northern, southern and eastern borders poverty zones had formed, with a continuous migration to the suburbs of Beirut. The land was divided among a small elite, and working conditions on the large estates were harsh. The centralization of government in Beirut also worsened the conditions of the rural areas, pushing many Lebanese to crowded cities. Consequently the community-based segregation deepened, poverty belts grew around the metropolitan centres inhabited by the privileged – mainly Sunnite and Christian – families.²³

Beirut and its suburbs became politically and socially explosive when people from the impoverished periphery migrated to the city and came in contact with the affluent city

¹⁸ Khalaf: *op. cit.* pp. 197–199.

¹⁹ Library of Congress Country Studies, available at: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+lb0048\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+lb0048)).

²⁰ Chiha, Michel: Un pays de minoritiés associées, *Politique Intérieure*, Beirut, 1964, p. 232.

²¹ Daher, Massoud: *The Socio-Economic Changes and the Civil War in Lebanon 1943-1990*, VRF Series No. 201, Institute of Developing Economies, 1992, p. 4.

²² *Ibid.* p. 4.

²³ Library of Congress Country Studies, *op. cit.*

dwellers. The situation was further worsened by the settlement of the approximately 150,000 Palestinian refugees and the anti-Israel fights of their armed groups.²⁴

The Palestinian issue

Palestinians were settled in refugee camps near Beirut, but their integration was not enhanced in any way since granting the Lebanese citizenship to refugees – whose majority was Sunnite Muslim – would have changed the denominational division of the country significantly. After the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, the camps were gradually turned into military training bases, and from 1968, they launched attacks on Israel from south Lebanon, obviously calling for countermeasures. The situation had also divided the Lebanese people into two opposing sides: the Christians, whose majority wished the Palestinians to be controlled, and into the Muslims, whose solidarity with the Palestinians forced them to support their cause.²⁵

The rapid expansion in Palestinian military influence in Lebanon speeded up after the PLO's expel from Jordan due to a military confrontation they had with the Jordanian Army in 1970 (Black September). PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat fuelled sectarian tensions among many Lebanese and provided an excuse for the organization of armed private militias by turning West Beirut into his headquarters whereas there was no official Lebanese political power to check the Palestinian activities.²⁶

The civil war and its effect on the Christian community

In the spring of 1975, a general breakdown of law and order followed the series of conflicts that had erupted between the PLO and the Christian Phalange. In the meanwhile the national government was rapidly losing its credibility and consequently could not correspond to the need to maintain order and ensure its functioning. When in June, 1976 – as a result of the continuous clashes – collapse of the government became a matter of hours, the Syrian Army entered the country, with the support and consent of the big powers led by the United States, and swiftly ended the fight. Its occupation of Lebanon was welcomed by the Maronite Christian leaders.

In 1978, the Israeli Army launched 'Operation Litani' and Major Saad Haddad, commander of a Christian militia called South Lebanon Army (SLA) took command of a garrison besieged by the PLO by travelling via Israeli-held territory. Israel in close cooperation with Major Haddad's force, established a "security belt" in South Lebanon to

²⁴ Daher: *op. cit.* pp. 105–106.

²⁵ Sankari, Jamal: *Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shiite Leader*, Saqi, London, 2005. pp. 148–149.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

protect Israel. This zone constituted 10% of Lebanon's territory and its custodian, the SLA was financed, equipped and controlled by Israel.²⁷

The largest of the Christian militias was borne of the Phalange Party and, after subduing by force the rival Tigers militia led by Camille Chamoun, came to be known in the late 1970s as the "Lebanese Forces" (LF). The LF was also trained, armed and financed by Israel. In 1982 the Israelis had invaded Lebanon in an alliance with Bashir Gemayel, the commander of the Lebanese Forces militia, son of the founder of the Phalange Pierre Gemayel. He was assassinated a few days after he had been made president as an Israeli ally. In revenge for Bashir's death, Lebanese Forces militiamen carried out a massacre in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, killing hundreds of mostly Palestinian civilians, relatives of the militiamen who had been evacuated from Beirut two weeks earlier.

The Phalange movement began to fall apart when, after Bashir's assassination, Amin, his much less talented and less charismatic brother was elected president with full Israeli and American support.

The Syrian army, the Israeli forces, and the American and European peacekeepers all came at the invitation of leading Maronite political or militia leaders in the different phases of the civil strife, but in all three cases the result was not what Christians expected.

Amid this turmoil, the dominant Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia created a state-within-a-state, while advocating a "federal" system of government that would preserve Christian autonomy. Its leaders were ready to accept the formation of a Christian mini-state under Israeli tutelage.

In the late 1980s, loyalties split between the LF and the Army, led by Gen. Michel Aoun. Amin Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as acting prime minister in September 1988. As the war came to a close, Amin Gemayel fled to France, and the Lebanese Government split. The former president was accused of robbing the treasury of its money before he departed, which consequently caused a massive devaluation in the Lebanese pound.²⁸

Taif Accords

Christians lost both militarily and politically during the civil war. The official end of the strife, the Taif Accords in November 1989 left the confessionalist system untouched. However, it stated that the abolition of political sectarianism constitutes a basic national goal, which is to be achieved according to a gradual scheme. Due to the demographic changes, it adjusted the Christian-Muslim parliamentary representation from the previous 6:5 ratio to 50-50 per cent.²⁹ The president remained a Maronite, the Prime Minister a

²⁷ Cobban, Helena: "The Growth of Shi'i Power in Lebanon and Its Implications for the Future", in J. R. I. Cole, N. R. Keddie: *Shiism and Social Protest*. Yale University Press, New Haven & London 1986., pp. 137-155.

²⁸ Rubeiz, Ghassan: *Christian Politics in Lebanon*, available at: <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24569-lebanon>.

²⁹ In 1920, it was generally assumed that the ratio of Christians to Muslims among the population of Lebanon was 55:45. The population census of 1932 failed to conclusively validate this ratio, and was never repeated. In 1958 it was slightly modified to a 6:5 ratio. In 1991, that ratio was updated to 50:50. See: <http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/taif.htm>.

Sunnite, and the president of Parliament a Shiite. The new confessional formula was based on reducing the prerogatives of the President of the Republic and transferring the executive authority to the Council of Ministers as a collegial body.³⁰

However, the Christian community's post-Taif decline had less to do with the reduced political influence than with its own inability to forge a united front that would agree at least on the basic questions of sovereignty and democracy. Post-Taif presidents were formally elected by parliament, but in practice installed by Syria, since they were leading Christian figures from the security sector.

Constituencies

Political manoeuvres can not be interpreted without an insight into the Lebanese electoral system. In the confessionalist structure, most parties declare their religious affiliations. There are 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament, split at 64 seats for Muslims and Christians. Both Sunnis and Shiites have 27 seats each, with 8 for Druze and 2 for Alawites on the Muslim side. Maronites provide the largest parliamentary bloc with 34 seats on the Christian side, with the other 30 seats split between the rest of the Christian sects.

The religious composition of the representatives of a given constituency reflects the ratio of its denominational composition. Electors vote for lists of an unlimited number of candidates drawn up by the parties, which enter into an alliance with each other and represent denominational setup within a given constituency. Thus, in a constituency with 2 Sunnite and 1 Maronite candidates, the 2 Sunnite and 1 Maronite candidates with the most votes get elected to Parliament. The Maronite candidate with the second most votes does not get a mandate even if he won more votes than the number one Sunnite candidate. In general, electors may choose between two lists in one constituency.

Lists are drawn up locally, and possible candidates are determined by the political veterans (today's patrons) known as *aqtaab* (Sg. *qutb*). They sponsor the campaigns of the candidates, who in return represent their interests. The constituencies still operate according to the structure set up in 1960. Namely, Lebanon was divided into five big provinces³¹ (*muhaafaza*), with a total of 26 constituencies (*qadaa*). Electors may vote for a given list, however, they may also choose candidates from all the lists available; that is to say, they can set up a list of their own choice.

It is essential for the candidates that they win the support of people belonging to other denominations than their own, since parties of the same denominations also compete against each other. Most candidates face a multiconfessional electorate, and many must contest districts in which their sect is not a majority. Those who win the handful of Sunni seats in predominantly Shiite south Lebanon, for example, are effectively beholden to

³⁰ Krayem: *op. cit.*

³¹ Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, and Beqaa.

Shiite politicians, while the Sunni vote is decisive in electing Christian and Shiite deputies of Beirut.³²

Demography³³

Since 1932 there has not been any official census in Lebanon. The consequent "debate over the exact numbers sustains acute perceptions of deprivation among both Shiites and Sunnis, thereby providing seedbed for external exploitation and internal radicalization."³⁴ By 1988, according to an assessment the percentage of Shiites in Lebanon had risen to 32%, while the number of Maronites had decreased to 17%.³⁵ However, estimations are far from authoritative. Although Muslim fertility rates are much higher, estimations do not consider infant and child mortality. Since voter registration records, known as "check lists" (*law'a'ih ash-shatb*), only include adults aged 21 or older and they do not take account of the disproportionate Muslim youth.³⁶ A study by Youssef Douwayhi, based on birth records (*sijillat an-nufus*) since 1905, estimates Shiite and Sunni demographic weight to be virtually equal (29.05% and 29.06%).³⁷ Although this method includes Lebanese under the age of 21, it also fails to exclude Lebanese citizens who have emigrated. According to this study, all Christians presently make up a mere 23.3% of Lebanese under the age of 20.³⁸

Perhaps the main reason why calls for a revision of Taif remain muted is that Lebanese Christians are split between the Sunni-led March 14 coalition and the Shiite opposition, and both sides know that raising the issue of political-demographic incongruity would upset their allies. Ironically, then, any initiative for an overhaul of Taif would have to be initiated by leaders of the Christian community – the very confession destined to lose the most from such a reform.³⁹ With rival Christian leaders struggling for the loyalty of their community, however, they cannot afford to be seen as chipping away at the last remnants of Christian privileges in the system.⁴⁰

³² Farha, Mark: *Demography and Democracy in Lebanon*, available at: <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24382-lebanon>.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Majed Halawi, *A Lebanon Defined: Musa Al-Sadr and the Shi'a Community*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 50. Halawi estimates the number of Shiites at 1,325,499 out of a population of 4,044,784 in 1988.

³⁶ According to Duwayhi's investigation of the birth records, of those under the age of 20, only 23.31% are Christian, and the remainder, i.e. 76.59%, Muslims. See: *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 16 November 2006.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Young, Michael: *Lebanon's Pact: Prelude to a Postmortem*, *The Daily Star* (Beirut), 19 December 2007, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=87562

⁴⁰ Farha also mentions that "...obvious political implications can prejudice the accuracy and interpretation of statistical data. Case in point is the CIA, which has abruptly revised its own demographic estimates. In its 2004 edition, the CIA World Factbook had reported that Muslims and

Christian political streams⁴¹

While the Shiites have today closed ranks behind Hezbollah and the Sunnis mostly support the Hariri family, Lebanese Christians – secular and multi-denominational – have never been uniform in their politics. Presently four groupings can be distinguished in the Christian leadership.

Pro-Syrian Christians are the smallest in number. Some of them consider the Syrian Alawite leadership a natural ally of Christians in the face of Islamisation. Others are ideological proponents of Lebanese–Syrian unity. In 1932, Antoun Saadah established the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), a movement that dedicated to achieve Lebanon's absorption into Greater Syria. Saadah rejected both language and religion as defining characteristics of a nation, and instead argued that nations develop through the common development of a people inhabiting a specific geographical region. He claimed that Syria was historically, culturally, and geographically distinct from the rest of the Arab world, and stressed that "Syrianism" transcended religious distinctions. His ideas had a solid following among the Greek Orthodox, the second largest Christian community in Lebanon (and the largest in Syria).⁴² Saadah viewed secularization and social nationalism the only way to transform traditional society into a dynamic and progressive one. He also opposed colonization that broke up Greater Syria into sub nations declaring that (Greater or Historical) Syria is a single entity and belongs exclusively to the Syrians.

Leftish ideology has always meant an ideological refuge for the region's Christians from Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism. The Lebanese branch of Syria's Baath Party also has a sizable Christian membership.

"Westocratic" Christians is a diverse category of mostly traditional politicians, businessmen who advocate a strong relationship with the West for cultural, economic, and political reasons. They became largely marginalized during the 1990s and formed an umbrella group known as the Qurnet Shehwan Gathering during the final years of the Syrian occupation. The Phalange Party, led by former President Amin Gemayel, and the National Liberal Party (NLP), led by Dany Chamoun are now closely aligned to this camp.

The **Christian nationalist** trend is represented by the Lebanese Forces (LF). Originally an outgrowth of the Phalange militia, the LF became more narrowly sectarian in the 1980s under the leadership of Samir Geagea. The LF leadership has been convinced that Christians cannot reconcile their differences with Muslims under a common national identity, and that Lebanon should be a federal state with autonomous sectarian enclaves. They are convinced that a strong relationship with the West – particularly Washington – is central to their political aspirations.

Christians constitute 70% and 30% of the population, respectively. Amid an intensified Israeli–American push to disarm Hezbollah, these numbers were conspicuously adjusted in the 2005 edition to reflect a highly improbable, precipitous decrease in the overall Muslim population to 59.7%, while the Christian population rose a sudden 9%." See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/le.html>, last accessed March 3, 2006. *CIA: The World Factbook: Lebanon*, CIA World Fact Book, 2006.

⁴¹ Rubeiz: *op. cit.*

⁴² <http://www.ssnp.org/new/ssnp/en/ssnp.htm>

The **Secular nationalist** trend is embodied in Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). The FPM, like Hezbollah, is ideologically opposed to political sectarianism, federalism, and other formulas that privilege primordial ties. Aoun aims to reform Lebanon's corrupt and feeble government institutions, thus departing from the narrow pursuit of sectarian and clan-based interests and thinks in national terms. The FPM was by far the most popular Christian political force at the time of Syria's withdrawal in 2005.

Aoun's personal popularity stems largely from his failed but widely supported revolt against the Syrians in 1989–1990 and from the role of the FPM played as leading opposition to the Syrian occupation after his exile. The Aounists led boycotts of elections (1992, 1996, 2000), while 'Westocrats' played according to the rules set by Syria. Neither side really got what they wanted, succeeding only in deepening the rifts of the Christian community.

The FPM won a large majority of Christian votes running against the Hariri led "March 14 Coalition" in the 2005 elections, and with 14 seats became the largest Christian party in the new parliament.

Michel Aoun⁴³

During the course of his military career, Aoun earned a reputation for honesty, integrity, and sectarian impartiality that was unrivalled at that time. As Lebanon slipped into civil war in the mid-1970 and the army fractured along sectarian lines, Aoun's devotion to the central government remained unshaken. In the early 1980's he was head of the "Defence Brigade" of the Lebanese army, a unit stationed along the "Green Line" separating East and West Beirut which engaged in sporadic fighting with Syrian military forces. During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Aoun was the only Christian officer who commanded his troops to block Israeli forces advancing on the presidential palace. No other Christian officer attempted to confront the invading army. In late 1982, Aoun was assigned the task of forming and commanding a new multiconfessional unit, the 8th Brigade. In 1984 he was appointed commander of the Lebanese Army.

In the fall of 1988, Syria and the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia brought about a political crisis by preventing parliament members in areas under their control to convene and elect a new president. However, fifteen minutes before the expiration of his term, on September 22, 1988, the outgoing President, Amin Gemayel, dismissed the civilian administration of Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss and appointed a six-member interim military government. Backed by Syria, al-Hoss declared his dismissal invalid. Thus there was no president, but two governments emerged – one civilian and mainly Muslim in West Beirut, headed by al-Hoss, the other, military and mainly Christian, in East Beirut, led by Michel Aoun acting as Prime Minister.⁴⁴

⁴³ Gambill, Gary C.: Dossier: Michel Aoun, *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 3. No. 1. January 2001, available at http://www.meib.org/articles/0101_ld1.htm.

⁴⁴ Gemayel's move violated the National Pact of 1943. He argued, however, that as the National Pact also reserved the *presidency* for a Maronite Christian, and as the Prime Minister assumes the powers and duties of the President in the event of a vacancy, it would be proper to fill that office temporarily

Aoun responded to provocations from the LF militia by ordering the 15,000 Lebanese army troops under his command to seize the port of Beirut and other economically vital facilities. This was the first time that government authority had been restored to a militia-controlled area since the beginning of the civil war in 1975. The fact that Aoun chose to target the main militia of his own Maronite community evoked expressions of surprise and satisfaction from Lebanese Muslims, whose victimization at the hands of the LF had never before elicited state intervention.

Next, Aoun enforced a maritime blockade of illegal ports run by Syrian-allied Druze and Shiite militias in West Beirut. When the Syrians responded by shelling civilian areas of East Beirut, Aoun declared war on the Syrian army on March 14, 1989.

The Taif Accord signed later that year stipulated constitutional changes, which, according to Aoun, required the democratic consent of the Lebanese people. He also denounced the Accord for not appointing a real date for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese flocked to the presidential palace in late December 1989 to form a "human shield" in Aoun's support. The presence of thousands of Shiite and Sunni Muslim Lebanese at these demonstrations illustrated the multi-confessional appeal of Lebanon's first popular nationalist movement. Sunni religious leaders in West Beirut sent a "Muslim Solidarity Delegation," led by Sheykh Hasan Najjar, who gave numerous rousing speeches during the demonstrations.

In return for the Syrian support to the United States in the 1st Gulf War, the U.S. granted Syria's interests in Lebanon. Despite the enormous destruction, popular support for Aoun's war against the Syrian military skyrocketed. On October 13, 1990 with American permission, Syrian forces attacked the presidential palace and Aoun was pressed to leave Lebanon with the help of the French Ambassador.

The post-Taif era

The two Hariri governments (1992–98; 2000–2004) built alliance with the new segments of the bourgeoisie most of whom had lived outside the country during the war years. These persons came into power with their own program of reconstruction and development. This program was independent of the internal traditional and sectarian militia forces, but was subservient to regional and international ones.

The Hariri faction did not establish a new political culture nor produce a clear, definitive political program. Many institutions acted independently of any auditing or review by either government or parliament. Hariri controlled the basic financial and economic decision-making processes through his command of the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Central Bank, and the Finance Ministry. In turn, the old militia forces controlled other resources and played an important political role in the cabinet and the parliament.⁴⁵ Apart from the two Christian leaders Aoun in exile and Geagea in

with a Maronite. It has already happened in 1952, when General Fouad Chehab, a Christian, was appointed as prime minister of a transition government following the resignation of President Beshara El-Khoury.

⁴⁵ Krayem: *op.cit.*

prison, warlords and politicians who built high positions for themselves during the second phase of the war, such as Hobeiq, Berri, and Jumblatt also got their share. The Council of South Lebanon was tied to the Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, the Fund for the Return of the Displaced and Refugees was tied to the Minister of the Refugees Walid Jumblatt.⁴⁶

This state of affairs was, in effect, subsidized by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iranian funding enabled Hezbollah to build a vast network of social welfare institutions that compensated for the ravaging impact of Harirism on poor Shiites, while much larger inflows of Saudi money into the Lebanese economy allowed Hariri to compensate for the ravaging impact of Hezbollah's war on his efforts to attract international investment. The shaky equilibrium was safeguarded by the Syrian army.⁴⁷

Western attitudes started to change when the Syrian government under President Bashar Assad did not back the 2003 invasion of Iraq launched by President George W. Bush. This signalled a new round of confrontation between the U.S. and Syria. The first battle in this confrontation was Lebanon. Bush signed into law on December 12, 2003, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. When in November 2004 the term of the Lebanese president, Emile Lahoud, was to expire, he, like many of his predecessors, was considered an ally of Damascus. Lahoud wished to have a second term in office, although re-election was explicitly forbidden by Article 49 of the Constitution. The United States and France, which had cast a blind eye on the term extension of Elias Harawi, were now opposed the Lahoud's extension.⁴⁸

The Hariri assassination and its aftermath

Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated in February 2005, in a car bombing in Beirut. Blaming Syria, many Lebanese flocked to the streets on March 14 organised by the ruling coalition, prompting the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. On the other hand Sheykh Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General of the Hezbollah called for huge peaceful demonstrations to express "appreciation" to the Syrians for their support of the continued existence of Hezbollah's militia, and opposition to any peace with Israel. The biggest of these demonstrations was held on March 8. Since then Hezbollah has been considered the leader of the March 8 or pro-Syrian movement in Lebanese politics.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Haugbølle, Sune: *Collective memory of the civil war in Lebanon*, available at: <http://www.111101.net/Writings/Cat/Thesis/>.

⁴⁷ Gambill, Gary C.: Hezbollah and the Political Ecology of Postwar Lebanon, *Mideast Monitor*, Vol. 1. No. 3., September-October 2006, available at: http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_1.htm

⁴⁸ Mugraby: *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ However, Syria did not always have a smooth relation with Hezbollah, since Damascus wanted to hinder any shift in the shaky Lebanese equilibrium. President Assad's decision to call a halt to President Emile Lahoud's anti-corruption campaign (which had indicted several Haririst officials) and Hariri's return to office in 2000 after a two-year hiatus clearly signified that the core economic rules of the game in Lebanon were untouchable, while his refusal to permit Hezbollah to run against Amal

Neither the opposition nor the so-called majority is religiously homogenous, the overwhelming majority of the Shiites stand in the opposition, while the majority of Sunnis and Druze stand in the "majority" camp, but the Christians are split in almost two halves.

The Forces of March 14, winners of the elections in 2005, essentially made up of the Sunnite *Current of the Future* of Saad Hariri, son of the assassinated Prime Minister, the Druze *Progressive Socialist Party* of Walid Jumblatt, the Christian *Lebanese Forces* of Samir Geagea, and of the *Movement of the Democratic Left*, a split from the Lebanese Communist Party, have all supported the Western political offensive in Lebanon. They demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and also argued in favour of the disarmament of the Lebanese Resistance (i.e. Hezbollah) in the south, thus indirectly satisfying Israeli demands.

The Hezbollah-led Coalition of March 8, which finds most of its social base in the Shiite community, but is also supported by pro-Syrian forces of the Sunni and Christian communities, re-affirmed the Arab dimension of Lebanon and the need to preserve the political line opposed to American-Israeli interests in the region. For them it also meant accepting Hezbollah's strategic partnership with Iran and Syria. Together with the Free Patriotic Movement they formed the opposition after the 2005 elections.

Aoun returned from France to find the "Westocrats" and the Christian nationalists lined up with Saad Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in a coalition designed in part to spoil his ambitions in the May/June 2005 parliamentary elections, so – although the FPM took part in the March 14 anti-Syria demonstration, he found his natural ally in the March 8 Front. He teamed up with pro-Syrian Christians and defeated March 14 Front in some districts where Christians are in majority. Some saw this as indicating a belief that pro- and anti-Syrian positions are no longer relevant, now that Syrian troops have left Lebanon.

Although the 2005 Lebanese General Elections were won by the March 14 Front led by Saad Hariri, the coalition did not have the desired majority. Most Sunni and Druze leaders did not want to see any strong Christian politician among the decision-makers, but the governing coalition still needed Hezbollah's electoral support, to stem the advance of Aoun's FPM and win control of parliament. Hezbollah agreed but with assurances that major decisions would be made only with the unanimous support of the cabinet. However, in the next two years, it continued to oppose firmly the March 14 coalition's corruption and repressive economic policy, and eventually left government.

Following the demonstrations, the Syrian troops completely withdrew from Lebanon on April 27, 2005. With Syria gone, Aoun has focused on fighting corruption and the tradition of clan-based politics – aims that resonate with many Lebanese. In view of Aoun's provocative rhetoric about investigating the abuses of the past 15 years, none of the other power brokers wanted him in government. The FPM formed a united opposition front with the Hezbollah-led Shiite bloc (and with pro-Syrian politicians), jointly calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his cabinet. Although the common enemy forged the alliance of the FPM and Hezbollah, they had always shared certain domestic reform principles. Aoun supports the idea that domestic reform must precede disarmament, thus would be possible the integration of Hezbollah's militia into the defence structure of

in the Fall 2000 elections indicated that Nasrallah would not be allowed to convert his skyrocketing popularity into greater political power. Gambill: *op. cit.*

the country. In his scenario Aoun himself could act as an agent trusted by Shiites to realize this process.

Besides governmental corruption, the uncertain future of Lebanon's nearly 400,000 Palestinian refugees is another issue that greatly concerns both Christians and Shiites fearing foreign-made (i.e. Saudi–American–Israeli) plans for their naturalization.

The fact that the Hariris have cultivated close ties with radical Sunni Islamists in Lebanon also worries both Shiites and Christians.⁵⁰

Most Christians also fear Saudi domination of Lebanon and the paralysis of the state as a result of the constant power abuse. Prime Minister Siniora's economic reform program called for greater gasoline and value-added taxes that heavily burden the poor, while leaving one of the world's most regressive income tax scales in place, and conspicuously neglecting obvious remedies to extensive corruption (e.g. independent regulatory bodies). Voting rights of expatriate Lebanese is also a key issue to both communities, since Christians in the Americas and Shiites in West Africa are the biggest Lebanese expatriate communities.

Aounists, like Hezbollah leaders claim that the inclination to invite foreign diplomatic, political, and military intervention in pursuit for domestic advantages is the root of the country's weakness.

Memorandum of Understanding between Pro-Syrian Christians and Shiites

In February 2006, Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General, Hasan Nasrallah signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a broad range of social, economic, and political reforms that aimed to erode Haririst political power. Most Christians were supportive of the FPM's efforts to build bridges to Hezbollah. According to a survey by the Beirut Center for Research and Information 77% of them approved of the February 2006 Memorandum.⁵¹

In November 2006, Hezbollah, the FPM, and the Amal Movement jointly demanded the establishment of a "national unity government", with early elections and one third of the Cabinet seats. When negotiations with the ruling coalition failed, five Cabinet Ministers from Hezbollah and Amal resigned their positions.

The Memorandum of Understanding stresses the necessity of prioritizing national interests by national dialogue on "all issues that have a national character and require general consensus". Hezbollah and FPM advocate a consensual democracy "in which the citizen becomes a value in and of himself". According to the opposition, adoption of a

⁵⁰ During the 2005 parliamentary election campaign, Hariri paid the bail for four Sunni jihadists who had been arrested in September 2004 for plotting to bomb the Ukrainian and Italian embassies in Lebanon and sent Siniora to personally attend a celebration where they were welcomed after their release. [*Al-Safir* (Beirut), 18 June 2005] One of the first acts of Lebanon's new parliament was the passage of an amnesty law freeing over two dozen suspected Sunni Islamist terrorists (seven had been detained for plotting to bomb the Ukrainian and Italian embassies in September 2004; twenty-six of the detainees were captured in 1999 during a brief, but bloody, Sunni Islamist uprising that left 40 people dead). Gambill: *op. cit.*

⁵¹ *Al-Diyar*, (Beirut), 11 February 2006.

modern electoral law would mean limiting the influence of money and sectarian extremism in politics. Hezbollah and FPM stress the importance of re-building the state by setting up fair and impartial courts, respecting constitutional institutions, sheltering them from political influence, and preventing their paralysis. Financial and administrative controls have to be activated together with judicial investigations concerning the misuse of public funds. It is essential to enact laws to combat corruption, together with the execution of a comprehensive administrative reform that makes competence the only decisive factor at assigning tasks and responsibilities. Deadlines have to be set to tackle these problems.

The next section urges full cooperation from all the forces and parties that participated in the war to uncover the fate of the missing and the locations of mass graves. Separate chapters deal with Lebanon's relations with all neighbouring countries, requiring urgent actions to enable Lebanese Citizens' return from both Israel and Syria.

The Memorandum condemns political assassinations of any kind, and states that investigations have to be executed without any compromise. It stresses the inevitability of a comprehensive security plan that places security agencies above all political influence. Consequently urges setting up a joint parliamentary-security committee charged with monitoring the process.

As far as Lebanese-Palestinian relations are concerned, Palestinians have to respect the authority of the Lebanese state and comply with its laws. Lebanon, in return, reaffirm solidarity with their cause, and its authorities provide means to improve social conditions in the refugee camps. A legitimate body has to represent Palestinian people in their relations with Lebanon, and the security situation inside the camps has to be organized.

FPM supported the idea that Hezbollah's arms are to be considered by objectively defining conditions that would eliminate the reasons and justifications for keeping these weapons, such as liberating the Shebaa Farms from the Israeli occupation, liberating Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails and the formulation of a national defence strategy.⁵²

Christian views

While many Christians have worries about Hezbollah's militant Islamist ideology and its refusal to respect the authority of the state, most of them see Sunni fundamentalism in Lebanon as a far more dangerous internal threat than Hezbollah, particularly after the unclarified uprising of Fatah al-Islam in the summer of 2007. Despite their reservations about Hezbollah, in 2007 43% of Maronites believed that its weapons "are necessary to face Israel until the liberation of Shebaa Farms and the detainees".⁵³

The main concern of Christians is not that Hezbollah will directly harm them (there has been little Shiite-Christian violence in Lebanon's history) or that they will try to Islamicize Lebanon, but that their fight will jeopardize the country's prosperity. Peace and political stability are essential for the growth of Lebanon's service-based economy, and necessary for the vital Western and Arab gulf investment in Lebanon. A government which formally

⁵² The full text can be read at: http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/full_english_te.php.

⁵³ Opinion Poll, Information International, *The Monthly*, December 2007, No. 65.

accepts Hezbollah's "resistance" sooner or later runs the risk of setting back the country's economic recovery and alienating the international public and policy makers.

Many Christians who normally refuse any form of Islamic fundamentalism, however saw no alternative to a political compromise and reform process that give Shiites (or at least the Hezbollah) greater voice in government.⁵⁴

Before and after 2006

The 2006 Lebanon War was a 33-day military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel. The principal parties were Hezbollah and the Israeli military. The war began on July 12, 2006, with an abduction of IDF soldiers by Hezbollah for a prisoners' swap to secure the release of Lebanese citizens convicted of terrorist acts and incarcerated in Israel.

Before the war the Christian public was more divided concerning the arms of Hezbollah and mostly favoured a western political pressure on the organization. As can be expected Muslims and Christians had differing views about the threat of Islamic extremism and the possibilities of a two-state solution in Palestine.

In 2004, among 600 Lebanese adults asked about the disarmament of Hezbollah, 18% of the Christians supported unconditional disarmament, 17% said yes on condition that peace exists in the region; 51% said yes, provided that Hezbollah also agrees, and 8% opposed. 53% of the Christians welcomed more U.S. pressure on Syria to disarm Hezbollah, and 29% of them opposed to such foreign intervention.⁵⁵ In 2005 nearly 72% of Christians had a favourable view of the U.S. and 60% of them supported the U.S. anti-terrorism policies. The same survey showed that 53% of the Christians and 4% of the Muslims believe that Islamic extremism poses a great threat.⁵⁶ In 2003 75% of Muslims and 50% of Christians agreed with the statement "the rights and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care of as long as the state of Israel exists."⁵⁷

After and during the 33-day war Lebanese Christians showed a considerable growth in support of Hezbollah's resistance activities parallel with a radical decline in their judgement concerning the stance of the United States. However, in sharp contrast with the Shiite population, they remained considerably loyal to the Siniora government.

There were four major surveys of Lebanese public opinion, which were conducted by local and international polling firms during and after the war in 2006 between Israel and the Hezbollah movement.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Rubeiz: *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Source: Zogby International / Information International / The Arab American Institute, available at: <http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/6914>.

⁵⁶ Pew Global Attitudes survey in May 2005, see: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/41/lebanons-muslims-relatively-secular-and-pro-christian>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ The four polls by the Beirut Center for Research and Information (BCRI), the French research firm Ipsos, Information International, and the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan, are generally regarded as statistically sound, but their use of suggestive wording, different

Between 24 and 26 July 2006, the Beirut Center for Research and Information queried 800 citizens regarding the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah earlier that month; its military operations against Israel, and the American position on the crisis. Respondents were also asked to assess the performance of the Lebanese government as far as its diplomatic and relief efforts are concerned. According to this survey, 54.7% of the Christians supported "the resistance's move to capture the two Israeli soldiers for a prisoners' swap", and 80.3% of them supported "the confrontations carried out by the resistance against the Israeli aggression against Lebanon". This support was based on a conviction that Israel and the U.S. had already prepared their plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559 by force, regardless of Hezbollah's military actions.⁵⁹ Moreover, the results show that the majority of Lebanese believed that the only way to liberate Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons is through a prisoner swap of captured Israeli soldiers as was the case in 2000.

Strikingly, despite of their growing support for Hezbollah, 44.7% of the Christians thought that "Israel will defeat the resistance", and 57.8% thought "that the United States and Israel will succeed in imposing their conditions to reach a cease-fire". This time 85% of the Christians refused the idea that "the United States plays the role of the honest mediator in this war", and 87.1% of them refused that "the U.S. adopted a positive stand regarding Lebanon in this war" in contrast with the 38% who expressed firm support for the U.S. role in Lebanon in January.⁶⁰ When asked about the efficiency of the government 43% of the Christians "believed that the Lebanese government's political and diplomatic movement is enough to face the assault", and 61.9% believed that "the government assumed its responsibility to relieve the displaced".

In the Ipsos Survey 600 adult Lebanese citizens were asked between 11 and 17 August 2006 about the demilitarization of Hezbollah.⁶¹ This time 23% of Lebanese Christians believed that Hezbollah "should keep its weapons" even after the conflict. The question was phrased in a way to elicit preferences about the desired state of Hezbollah's militia – and only a very strong supporter of Hezbollah agreed that it should keep its weapons under any and all post-war scenarios. Answering no to this question did not either imply support for its unconditional disarmament. It is important to note that many Lebanese have ambivalent attitude in this question, saying that even if they are not comfortable with the idea of an armed militia, they still believe that specific circumstances require it.

In a poll by Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 1200 adult Lebanese citizens were surveyed after the 33-day war in 2006, and even among the Christians 19% said that "Hezbollah came out as the winner against Israel".⁶²

estimates of Lebanon's sectarian demography, and different contexts (i.e. during or after the war) render the findings somewhat inexact. Nevertheless, they reveal important insights into how the Lebanese public perceived the conflict. See: http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_6.htm.

⁵⁹ The full text of UN Resolution 1559 can be read at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶⁰ Source: BCRI, See: *Al-Safir*, (Beirut), 31 January 2006.

⁶¹ *L'Orient Le Jour*, (Beirut), 28 August 2006.

⁶² "CSS poll shows 84% of Lebanese agree war attempt to impose Middle East order", *The Jordan Times* (Amman), 12 October 2006.

In August 2007, a by-election took place in Metn, a predominantly Maronite district. Amin Gemayel was running to take the seat previously occupied by his recently assassinated son. Support for the Gemayel family was so strong here that in 2005 the FPM did not even challenge a seat in the district. In the by-election, however, the FPM candidate, Camile Khoury, an unknown physician, narrowly defeated the ex-president. Gemayel, backed up by the U.S., lost to Aoun's candidate, whose party had already been allied to Hezbollah. This fact can be considered a clear sign that the Gemayel clan had lost its leading role in the Christian community. The "best candidate" for president according to 45% of all respondents to a poll in August 2006, was Michel Aoun. Consequently Aoun would have easily won a *direct* election for president, as he could count on the overwhelming majority of Shiites, at least half of Christians, and perhaps a fourth of Sunnis and Druze to vote for him.⁶³

Lebanese Muslim views⁶⁴

Given the confessionalist political structure and the 15- year civil war in Lebanon the findings that Lebanese Muslims are relatively secular and pro-Christian can be surprising.

Data from the Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in May 2005 shows that Lebanese Muslims are considerably more secular in their outlook than Muslims in other countries.

Although Lebanese Muslims consider religion an important part of their lives, they place less emphasis on their faith than Muslims do elsewhere. Just over half (54%) said religion was very important in their life, compared to 69% in Turkey, 86% in Jordan, and more than 90% in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Morocco.

Muslims in Lebanon say they think of themselves first as Muslims (30%) in equal numbers as they identify primarily as Lebanese (30%). Elsewhere, even in Turkey, majorities identify more strongly with Islam than with their nationality.

Among Lebanese Muslims only 47% wanted to see Islam play a major role in the world in contrast with 84% in Morocco and 73% in Jordan.

Despite their relatively secular worldview, Lebanese Muslims are among the most supportive considering military acts in the name of Islam. In 2007, 34% said suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians could be justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. However, taken the 72% who approved such actions in 2002, the tendency shows a considerable decrease.⁶⁵ However, only 4% of Lebanese have confidence in Osama bin Laden, which is the lowest level of support in the six predominantly Muslim countries surveyed.

⁶³ "Poll respondents give high marks to Nasrallah, Berri, Aoun," *The Daily Star* (Beirut), 7 September 2006, available at: <http://www.inbaa.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=14970>.

⁶⁴ <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=813>

⁶⁵ <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=257>

Political versus religious sectarianism

Despite widespread sectarian violence during the 1975–1990 civil war, today Lebanese Muslims and Christians generally have positive attitudes towards one another. Fully 86% of Muslims have a favourable opinion of Christians, which is the highest rating among Muslim countries. At the same time, 82% of Christians have a positive view of Muslims.⁶⁶

Today both the March 8 and the March 14 Fronts include Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and Druzes. The prime minister does not represent the Sunni line in the religious form, and the House speaker does not represent the Shiite religious line. It proves that the tensions stem from political, not from religious sectarianism. For Khaled Hadade, general secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party, "Hezbollah has two faces: a positive face which is the resistance and another face which is that of its religious and Islamic confessional affiliation. If today the Hezbollah is defeated, it would be the resistance of Hezbollah which is defeated."⁶⁷

Hezbollah's changing discourse

The post-Taif history of Hezbollah during which it has become a significant parliamentary party and achieved the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, shows the capacity of the movement to connect the building of a strong military resistance with the development of broad political alliances that transcends the logic of political and confessional polarisation.

In the Middle East social issues are the concern of Islamic movements and religious foundations (waqf) only. Experts on Hezbollah like Judith Palmer Harik and Nizar Hamzeh, note that the movement's provision for basic social services, law courts, and schools provide services on a low-cost basis to all Lebanese who need them; whether Muslim or Christian.⁶⁸ Many Christian parents send their children to schools run by Hezbollah, especially in south Lebanon, where those are considered to provide the best education available. Harik notes that Hezbollah's commitment to, and success in, providing these services on a permanent basis is unique among the political parties in Lebanon and as a consequence, Hezbollah gained considerable loyalty and respect.⁶⁹

The fault line that became apparent after the death of Rafiq al-Hariri does not only regard the country's sovereignty, the weapons of the resistance and the role of Syria. It is much broader and includes the social question as well. The confrontation between the Forces of the March 14, which are anti-Syrian and pro-Western, and the March 8 allied to Hezbollah, also implied a social cleavage which has always existed. According to Ali Fayyed who is in charge of the Consultative Centre for Study and Research in Hezbollah,

⁶⁶ <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/41/lebanons-muslims-relatively-secular-and-pro-christian>

⁶⁷ Qualander, Nicolas: "The Savage Anomaly" of the Islamic Movement, available at: <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1169>.

⁶⁸ Cobban, Helena: Hizbullah's New Face, *Boston Review*, April–May 2005, available at: <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.2/cobban.html>.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

"The world of business, no matter from what community, hostile in principle to any state that is strong and redistributes wealth. [...] We want a state which takes the side of the poor, against the multi-nationals, against the international economic institutions, against the logic of unlimited productivity and capitalist accumulation."⁷⁰ Hezbollah is the only Islamic movement which has taken part in the World Social Forums since 2003, and translated into Arabic the documents of the WSF together with the writings of Latin American liberation theology. It has gained good reputation for having high morals and integrity, refusing any form of bribery and corruption.

The attitude and personal charisma of Nasrallah is also a significant factor. Many Lebanese remember how he refused to be treated differently from any other bereaved parent when his 18-year-old son was killed fighting the IDF in south Lebanon in 1997. Contrary to Israeli speculations that they might be able to extract a high "price" for the return of Hadi Nasrallah's body, Nasrallah praised the sacrifice that *all* the Lebanese, "including our Christian brothers", were making in defence of the homeland. Nasrallah also introduced an extensive reorientation of Hezbollah's propaganda from religious to nationalist discourse, which characterizes its battle against Israel as a national liberation struggle, not a holy war.

Issa Goraib, editor of the Lebanese daily *Le Orient Le Jour*, claimed that Hezbollah's guerrillas today are of different character than before, since they have managed to conduct a very modern and efficient resistance against the Israeli occupation during the past years. "There is a lot of admiration for them among the village people [in the south], both among the Christians and Muslims", emphasized Goraib.⁷¹

The popularity of Hezbollah is also attributable to the fact that during the civil war it battled the Amal militia for control of Shiite areas and vigorously attacked Israel's Lebanese proxies but, unlike other wartime militias, it never engaged in sectarian bloodletting. The inter-denominational attitude of the organisation is well represented in the following remark of Kassem Oleik, the head of the Holy Reconstruction Organ "We do not discriminate between helping Muslims or Christians in the resisting society. If a mosque is hurt and a church is hurt we start rebuilding the church. We want to obstruct the enemy from entering through this hole [...] because then the enemy won't be able to divide us... [This] is a kind of strategy of ours."⁷²

The 33-day war in 2006 evoked a broad political and social front in support of the resistance by all sects and communities of the Lebanese society. As the Lebanese historian and economist Georges Corm has stressed, "the patriotic and nationalist discourse of this Lebanese resistance should in the long term influence the different Islamist rhetorical discourses, taking them away from their delirious aspect and bringing them into the different national, local, and pan-Arab realities."⁷³ A good example of this new rhetoric was the address by Hassan Nasrallah on 30 November 2006, two weeks after that five Cabinet

⁷⁰ Qualander, *op.cit.*

⁷¹ Wärm, Mats: *Staying the Course: the "Lebanonization" of Hizbullah*, available at: <http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/warm2/contents.html>.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Georges Corm interviewed by Youssef Ait Akdim, *Tel Quel online*, September 24, 2006.

Ministers of Hezbollah and Amal had left their positions due to the failed government policies.

Nasrallah in his speech called on people from "different regions, thoughts, beliefs, religions, ideologies and different traditions" to take part in "the formation of a national unity government". If they "want to preserve Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, and prevent the country from falling under any foreign tutelage", people have "to [...] cooperate in addressing the suffocating social and economic crisis, address the political crises ..., and give [Lebanese movements and groups] real participation in the country's administration." According to Nasrallah it is the only way "to deal with various crises and face existing challenges local, regional and international".

The Secretary General of the Hezbollah stressed the necessity of integration, solidarity and cooperation "of all the Lebanese from various regions, currents, arenas, ideas, beliefs, religions and backgrounds as well as the various popular movements, to a civilized peaceful public action". Nasrallah called Beirut "the capital of Lebanon, whose heart is big enough to encompass all of Lebanon and all the Lebanese [...] the capital of Pan-Arabism and Arabs, whose heart is large enough to contain [...] all the issues of our *umma* (i.e. the entire Muslim community), which embraces its folks, sons and loved ones, who will come from all Lebanese regions".⁷⁴ Even as a rhetorical device, stressing the Arab identity over the bonds of Islam, is surprising from a Muslim religious leader.

On December 1, political protests started in opposition to the government. Finally, on May 7 2008, the 18-month long political crisis spiralled out of control, when the worst internal violence erupted since the 15-year civil war ended in 1990. Tensions escalated after the government had voted to outlaw Hezbollah's communications network and sack the Hezbollah-allied head of security. In return Hezbollah and its opposition allies took over key areas of Lebanon held by the government. At the end, rival Lebanese leaders reached consensus in Doha on May 21 2008, to end the political anarchy. On the basis of the Doha Agreement, Hezbollah was granted veto power in the parliament, national unity government was formed in which the opposition controls eleven of thirty seats.

A nationwide poll by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee (LOAC) was conducted in April, 2008⁷⁵, which was partly repeated in July after the Doha Agreement.⁷⁶ As the findings show, clashes stalled and decreased the growing confidence in the opposition. Although the popularity of Aoun and Nasrallah considerably declined, in July they were still the leading figures of their respective communities. Christian respondents were the most divided when it came to leadership choices. While in April 30% of Christians named Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun as their top choice; in July it was only 24% and the popularity of Samir Geagea rose from 19% to 22%. Only 4% had a preference for the Phalange Party President Amin Gemayel. In July, both Nasrallah and Gemayel received 6% by Christian voters; and 4% named Marada chief Suleiman Franjeh as their top choice.

While in April, 32% of Christian respondents believed that national defence should be jointly assumed by government forces and the Resistance, in July this ratio fell to 19%

⁷⁴ The full text was available at: <http://www.maqawama.org>.

⁷⁵ <http://www.lebaneseopinion.org/upload/poll4.pdf>

⁷⁶ <http://www.lebaneseopinion.org/recentpolls.html#4>

among Christians. That time 79% of the Christians thought it should be the privilege of the government and 2% left this task to the Resistance alone.

The Doha Agreement kept in office Fouad Siniora as Prime Minister. When satisfaction with Siniora's appointment was polled, respondents were given the choice of four responses ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied". Shiites and Christian responses comprised most of the answers for the "very dissatisfied" category with 59% and 29% respectively. This result is quite surprising considering the basically loyalist attitude of the Christians even during the 2006 war.

To the question concerning the political party that best represents one's point of view 50% of the Shiites named Hezbollah, 29% of Sunnites chose Hariri's Future Movement, but 29% of Christians could not name any such movement or leader.

Divisions within the Christian – and especially in the Maronite – community kept worsening in the following months and led to clashes in September 2008 between Suleiman Franjeh's Marada Movement and the Lebanese Forces (LF), leaving two men dead. Franjeh, is allied to Hezbollah, while LF is led by former rightwing warlord Samir Geagea, who belongs to the Western-backed alliance led by Hariri.

CONCLUSION

It is worth noting here that, since 1943, political confessionalism has been considered as a temporary arrangement that should be obliterated as soon as possible, but it has continued to predominate. In Lebanon, transforming the provisional decisions into permanent ones has become a tradition, reaffirmed most recently with the Taif Agreement.⁷⁷

Post war years witnessed a shift in the mentality of many Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. Confessionalist structures are still at work, but there are people in each community who, in political matters, do not seem to think according to exclusively religious principles. According to a survey in 2004, 46.9% of the Lebanese people set up their own list during the election. The same poll showed that 25.3% of respondents consider a candidate's political affiliation to be their main voting criteria, 18.8% consider the candidate's political platform, while only 12% consider the sect in the first place.⁷⁸ Furthermore, in 2005 the proportion of Lebanese who privileged their national identity over their confessional identity was 34%, which is considerably high for a confession-based society.⁷⁹ As Mark Farha notes "The most underrepresented constituency in Lebanon is not the Shiites, Sunnis, or Christians, but the considerable number of Lebanese who do not identify primarily with the sect or creed into which they are born."⁸⁰

The question emerges over again: can Lebanon become a safe home to all its communities and thus "give birth" to the Lebanese nation with a government that represents its particular national interests? A credible solution could be what Muhammad Mughabiy

⁷⁷ Krayem: *op. cit.*

⁷⁸ Source: Information International in *I-Monthly*, Beirut, Issue No. 26, August 2004, p. 4.

⁷⁹ Jawad Adra: Corruption: The Lebanese Syndrome: Maintaining the System, Depleting the Resources, in *I-Monthly*, (Beirut) 25 October 2005, p. 4.

⁸⁰ Farha: *op. cit.*

suggests "The real and effective protection for the Maronites is the same as real and effective protection for all the religious communities of Lebanon, and lies mainly in the recognition of the equality of all Lebanese based on human rights and the protection of the civil rule of law. This alternative is still open but it may vanish before long."⁸¹

The existing division and dejection in the Christian community prompts many intellectuals to examine the causes, and to suggest solutions. One of them is Nasri Salhab, a sociologist, who in his book *The Maronite Question* subtitled *al-Asbab al-Ta'rikhiya li-l-Ihbat al-Maruni* (The Historical Roots of the Maronite Disenchantment) called for the Maronites to revise the past. If the Maronites took a critical look at themselves, Salhab wrote, they would see that the Phalangist ideology, built on the conviction of the superiority of the Christians, brought forth only destruction of both their community as well as the whole country. Consequently they have lost the moral guidance of Christianity and closed themselves off in a defensive and degenerate sectarianism.⁸²

Support for the FPM and the strengthening of Hezbollah after the 2006 war show a definite move towards putting together a cross-communal political coalition, however as the events in May 2006 showed, not all forces give consent to such a solution. Whether Sunnis and Nationalist Christians still have the resources to impede Hezbollah from accessing power will be decisive for Lebanon's future.

⁸¹ Mugraby: *op. cit.*

⁸² Salhab, Nasri: *al-Masa'la al-Maruniya*, Beirut: Bisan 2000, p. 11. ff.

Des vents de l'Europe au Statut avancé : la politique européenne du Maroc

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Introduction

Dans une célèbre définition de la place du Maroc dans son environnement géopolitique, Hassan II avait dit : « le Maroc ressemble à un arbre dont les racines nourricières plongent profondément dans la terre d'Afrique et qui respire grâce à son feuillage bruisant aux vents de l'Europe ». ¹ L'Europe représente, à la fois, le partenaire économique et politique principal et indispensable pour le Maroc tant au niveau des échanges qu'au niveau des aides au développement. ² Ainsi, 62 % de ses exportations vont dans des pays européens contre 3% pour les États-Unis.

En conséquence, la diplomatie marocaine agit activement dans les quatre instances euro-méditerranéennes :

- l'Accord d'association ;
- le Processus de Barcelone ;
- Le Forum Méditerranéen ;
- Le Dialogue 5+5.

Ces instances présentent des intérêts économiques certes, mais se fondent sur des dimensions politiques et culturelles tout autant cruciales et nécessaires pour la réussite du projet euro-méditerranéen. Du point de vue européen, la priorité est la sécurité ; les Européens craignent, effectivement, un développement de l'islamisme au sud de la Méditerranée et son impact sur leurs intérêts au Maghreb. ³ La montée de l'islamisme reste à la tête des motivations qui ont poussé l'Europe à accélérer le processus de Barcelone. ⁴

En offrant au Maroc le statut avancé, le 13 octobre 2008, une première en ce sens que l'UE n'a accordé un tel statut à aucun pays extra-européen. Cela a été compris par le Maroc

¹ Lambroschini, Charles, « Mohammed V le libérateur, Hassan II l'unificateur, Mohammed VI le modernisateur », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 17-11-2005.

² Le Premier Ministre Jettou au Conseil de gouvernement : « l'Europe, choix stratégique du Maroc », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 26-06-2003.

³ Molina García, María José, *España - Marruecos (1996-2002): un Modelo de Política Exterior para el Magreb*, Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2003, p. 96.

⁴ Lamoulou, Olf, « L'enjeu de l'islamisme au cœur du processus de Barcelone », *Critique internationale*, N° 18, janvier 2003, pp. 129-130.

comme une reconnaissance des performances du Maroc en matière de démocratie, de droits de l'homme et en matière économique. Certains dossiers ont avancé, comme celui des droits l'Homme, le renforcement du rôle de la femme, le lancement d'un vaste programme de lutte contre la précarité et la marginalisation, la libéralisation du paysage audiovisuel et le lancement de grands chantiers économiques. L'UE a estimé que le Maroc est aussi le pays « qui a fait beaucoup d'efforts, notamment en matière de réformes économiques, des droits de l'homme et de gouvernance ».⁵ La Commissaire européenne des relations extérieures et de la politique de voisinage, Mme Benita Ferrero Waldner, déclara que le Statut avancé marque « notre appréciation pour les réformes qui ont été engagées et pour la bonne coopération bilatérale ». Elle a ajouté que le Maroc est considéré aujourd'hui comme « le pays de notre voisinage avec lequel l'Union européenne a les relations les plus étroites et les plus denses ».⁶ En effet, l'UE a publié une 'feuille de route' qui permettrait, dans les années à venir, au Maroc d'approfondir ses relations avec l'UE et d'atteindre des niveaux élevés d'intégration à l'UE, sans devenir membre.⁷

Selon H. Alami, l'islam est au centre de la question ; il est perçu comme un paramètre d'évaluation de la capacité institutionnelle du Maroc à ménager non seulement des conflits politiques internes, mais aussi sa politique étrangère. Dans tous les accords euro-méditerranéens, dit-elle, la menace islamiste occupe implicitement une place centrale. La question religieuse est particulièrement sensible parce qu'en Europe elle est liée à des questions comme le voile, les mosquées, les cimetières et autres manifestations de la présence musulmane.⁸ Cependant, le terrorisme reste la question la plus sérieuse dans les rapports de l'Europe à l'islam. À cet égard, le Maroc se propose en bon exemple de la gestion de l'islam.

Encore récemment, un nombre de spécialistes des relations euro-marocaines, a rappelé que l'UE s'est concentrée sur ce qui peut être considéré les problèmes de « soft security » tel le terrorisme, l'immigration, le trafic illégal ou le crime organisé. Ils ont attiré l'attention sur la ligne que l'UE poursuit en matière de sécurité multilatérale, qui doit reconnaître la nécessité de traiter ces questions qui sont connectées avec un problème plus grand, celui de l'islam politique.⁹

Par la quête d'un partenariat privilégié, le Maroc espère renforcer ses liens économiques avec l'UE et bénéficier d'une augmentation massive des investissements. Son économie nécessite une implication plus directe de l'Europe. Politiquement, la question du Sahara est aussi vitale. Si la France soutient le Maroc officiellement, l'Espagne joue l'équilibre qui

⁵ « Statut avancé. Une reconnaissance des performances du Maroc à l'échelle internationale », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 14-10-2008.

⁶ *Idem*.

⁷ Eduard Soler i Lecha, Laia Mestres, « El estatuto avanzado de Marruecos: No perdamos la oportunidad », *Opinión*, CIDOB, 22-10-2008.

⁸ Alami, Houria, « Integration, Security and Migration », in Henriques, M. C. (Ed), *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean*, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2006, p. 73.

⁹ Cavatorta, F., Chari, R. S., Kritzing, S., Arana, A. G., « EU External Policy-Making and the Case of Morocco: 'Realistically' Dealing with Authoritarianism? », *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 13, N° 3, 2008, p. 368.

pourrait basculer de l'autre côté selon le parti au pouvoir à Madrid.¹⁰ En contrepartie, du fait de sa position et de son poids, le Maroc est une valeur sûre de sécurité pour l'Europe. Sa gestion de l'islamisme radical et ses réformes démocratiques le rendent un acteur incontournable pour tout projet dans la Méditerranée occidentale.

A un niveau informel, une forte communauté marocaine immigrée en Europe favorise une intervention dans la gestion de l'islam. Les transferts des « Marocains résidents à l'Étranger » constituent une source primordiale de devises étrangères pour le pays.

1. Le projet euro-méditerranéen dans la conception marocaine

Le projet euro-méditerranéen demeure avant tout une question géopolitique impliquant essentiellement la sécurité au niveau du Maghreb et de la Méditerranée occidentale. La dimension économique mise en exergue par le processus de Barcelone ne doit pas voiler les deux autres volets du processus : le volet politique et le volet culturel. D'ailleurs, la construction d'une « zone de prospérité partagée » ne peut se réaliser sans des avancées simultanées sur ces deux volets. En témoigne la naissance, elle-même, de ce processus en 1995 dans un environnement de négociations au Moyen-Orient, de crise algérienne et de crainte de l'islamisme radical au Maghreb.¹¹

Le volet « politique et sécurité » a pour objectif la définition d'un « espace commun de paix et de stabilité ». Cela implique la nécessité de prévenir les conflits dans la région, notamment d'assurer le maintien des régimes actuels en place face à la montée de l'islamisme et à l'accumulation des facteurs d'effondrement des États dans la région du Maghreb.

Quant au volet « social, culturel et humain », il vise à « développer les ressources humaines et à favoriser la compréhension entre les cultures et les échanges entre les sociétés civiles ». ¹² Un tel optimisme est dû au fait que l'idée du dialogue des civilisations préserverait encore une part de crédibilité chez les acteurs, au nord comme au sud de la Méditerranée.

Le lien entre l'économie et la géopolitique est une donnée centrale dans l'approche européenne du Maroc. L'organisation du forum « Le Maroc 2030 : environnement stratégique et économique » à Rabat rappelle ce fait. Intervenant à l'ouverture de la deuxième session de ce forum sur « l'économie mondiale », le Haut commissaire au Plan, Ahmed Lahlimi a estimé que l'option de l'Euro-Méditerranée s'impose de même qu'un régionalisme ouvert commandé par notre géographie, notre histoire et nos valeurs culturelles et spirituelles.¹³

¹⁰ Willis, Michael, Messari, Nizar, « Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe », *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, N° 2, 2003, pp.162-163.

¹¹ *Idem*, p. 161.

¹² Balta, Paul, « Le projet culturel euro-méditerranéen : Intentions et réalités », *Confluences Méditerranée*, N° 21, Printemps 1997, p. 21.

¹³ « Le Royaume entre mondialisation et groupements régionaux : Forum à Rabat sous le Haut patronage de S.M. le roi », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 22-04-2005.

La politique européenne du Maroc semble suivre trois grandes directions fondamentales :

- d'abord, promouvoir les « idées » marocaines sur la coopération euro-méditerranéenne. Cela consiste à instituer des structures paritaires pour accroître l'implication des partenaires sud-méditerranéens dans le processus de Barcelone, à éviter une sur-bureaucratization du processus et assurer une plus grande fluidité dans la circulation de l'information, organiser un partenariat euro-méditerranéen à géométrie variable selon les pays intéressés et les thèmes concernés, mettre en place un réseau d'agences nationales de promotion des investissements, renforcer les mécanismes de reconversion de la dette en investissements publics ou privés et créer une banque euro-méditerranéenne de développement et d'investissement ;

- ensuite, œuvrer pour la mise en place du projet européen de l'élargissement de l'UE selon une logique de cercles concentriques, à un « cercle de pays amis » respectueux des mêmes normes économiques et démocratiques. Romano Prodi et Chris Patten se sont prononcés en faveur d'un tel élargissement. Cette proposition permettrait au Maroc de s'intégrer à terme dans l'Europe en bénéficiant de tous les avantages de l'adhésion à l'exception de la participation aux institutions de l'Union ;

- enfin, mener les mêmes réformes que celles sur lesquelles se sont engagés les pays de l'Europe de l'Est qui ont rejoint l'Union en 2004 (instauration d'une économie de marché viable et capable de supporter la concurrence des autres pays membres de l'UE, réorientation des échanges vers l'UE, réforme de l'environnement légal et réglementaire, renforcement de la protection en matière de droits de propriété industrielle et intellectuelle, institution de procédures transparentes de passation de marchés publics...).¹⁴

1.1. Le volet sécuritaire

Par ailleurs, le Maroc est engagé activement dans le Forum Méditerranéen, né en 1994 d'une initiative franco-égyptienne, regroupant 11 pays (Algérie, Égypte, Espagne, France, Grèce, Italie, Malte, Maroc, Portugal, Tunisie, Turquie). Ce forum a pour vocation de favoriser les échanges de vues entre les pays riverains de la Méditerranée. Il sert à rapprocher les positions de ses participants avant les réunions dans le cadre élargi à 27 du partenariat euro-méditerranéen engagé à Barcelone.

A l'initiative du roi du Maroc, le Forum méditerranéen a tenu une session extraordinaire les 25 et 26 octobre 2001 à Agadir. Cette réunion constitua la première réunion de haut niveau entre pays méditerranéens arabes et européens depuis les événements du 11 septembre dans un contexte international de grande tension et de fortes incertitudes. Elle intervient à la veille de la conférence ministérielle euro-méditerranéenne qui a eu lieu les 5 et 6 novembre 2001 à Bruxelles. Les délibérations ont porté notamment sur l'impact de la crise sur la sécurité en Méditerranée, ainsi que ses effets économiques et socioculturels sur les pays de la région. Dans ce contexte, la nécessité de promouvoir et d'approfondir le dialogue entre cultures a été relevée. De même, les ministres ont affiché une détermination à

¹⁴ Benmoussa, Mohammed, « Une stratégie européenne pour la diplomatie marocaine », *L'Economiste*, N° 1617, 7-10-2003.

« entreprendre des mesures appropriées dans le cadre d'une stratégie volontariste en vue d'atténuer l'impact de la crise actuelle et de renforcer la coopération dans la région ». ¹⁵

A la suite de sa rencontre avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres du Forum méditerranéen, le roi Mohammed VI a souligné :

« L'importance d'un dialogue permanent, structuré et stratégique entre les pays de la Méditerranée, est aujourd'hui plus nécessaire que jamais, l'instauration d'un véritable dialogue des cultures s'avère primordiale pour une meilleure prise en compte de la dimension humaine du partenariat euro-méditerranéen et une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre les peuples des deux rives de la Méditerranée ». ¹⁶

Il a invité les pays européens :

« À assurer le respect de la dignité et des droits des communautés arabes et musulmanes installées en Europe, qui sont malheureusement les premières exposées aux conséquences d'un amalgame dangereux ». ¹⁷

Dans le même contexte et quelques semaines après, le ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération, M. Mohammed Benaïssa s'est rendu à la 9^e conférence ministérielle de l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE), à Bucarest où il a prononcé une allocution. Le ministre s'est déclaré pour une lutte sans merci contre le terrorisme, tout en appelant « à faire preuve de discernement et de sagesse et à éviter les amalgames, surtout avec l'Islam, religion de paix et de coexistence ». ¹⁸ Dans la lutte sans merci que nous, a-t-il ajouté, en tant que communauté internationale, entendons mener contre le terrorisme, nous devrions « faire preuve de discernement, de sagesse et de circonspection. Cette lutte ne saurait, sous aucun prétexte, procéder de quelques amalgames que ce soit et surtout pas avec l'Islam, religion de paix, de compassion et de coexistence. De même, elle ne devrait pas porter atteinte aux libertés collectives et individuelles, que les terroristes cherchent précisément à miner ». ¹⁹

En parallèle, le Maroc mène une politique active de lutte contre l'islamisme radical et s'associe, dans ce cadre, aux actions sécuritaires européennes. Le 5 décembre 2003, le roi Mohammed VI participe à l'ouverture du premier sommet du forum 5+5 (Portugal, Espagne, France, Italie, Malte, Mauritanie, Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie et Liban) à Tunis, où il a « affirmé que pour gagner le pari de l'édification de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), il est impératif de dépasser les obstacles qui se dressent devant cet objectif, à travers un règlement pacifique négocié, consensuel et définitif du conflit artificiel créé autour de l'intégrité territoriale du Maroc ». ²⁰

¹⁵ « S.M. le Roi reçoit les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres du Forum méditerranéen », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 26-10-2001.

¹⁶ *Idem.*

¹⁷ *Idem.*

¹⁸ « M. Benaïssa à la réunion de Bucarest sur la sécurité : le terrorisme, un ennemi commun », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 04-12-2001.

¹⁹ *Idem.*

²⁰ Sehim, Mustapha, « Après le sommet des 'cinq + cinq' de Tunis : L'appel de Tunis », *Maroc Hebdo International*, N° 584, 12-12-2003, p. 16.

Le roi Mohammed VI a adopté la thèse qui considère le problème du Sahara occidental comme étant un problème de terrorisme et qui dès lors s'inscrit dans le cadre de la lutte anti-terroriste.²¹

Le GICM, Groupe islamique Combattant Marocain, a compliqué cette lutte. Le juge espagnol Juan del Olmo, magistrat de l'Audience nationale, en Espagne, qui enquête sur les attentats du 11 mars 2004 à Madrid, impute ces attentats au GICM, une organisation qu'on suppose être liée à « Al-Qaïda », également soupçonnée des attentats-suicides de Casablanca qui ont fait 45 morts dont 12 kamikazes, le 16 mai 2003.²² Selon les actes d'accusation rendus publics lors des procès, plusieurs centaines d'intégristes marocains, aujourd'hui sous les verrous, seraient affiliés au GICM.²³ Le juge Del Olmo confirme cette tendance et évoque l'existence de deux grands réseaux dans l'enquête sur le 11 mars. Le premier a participé directement à l'exécution des attentats alors que le second a facilité la fuite des responsables des attaques. Les deux réseaux étaient liés au GICM « considéré comme la référence suprême du mouvement salafiste et *jihâdiste* dans notre pays », souligne le magistrat qui a procédé à l'inculpation de 29 des 116 personnes accusées de participation dans ces attaques terroristes.²⁴

La lutte anti-terroriste a permis au Maroc de se réconcilier avec l'Espagne après la crise autour de l'îlot Leila (Persil). Les attentats de Casablanca le 16 mai 2003 et ceux de Madrid le 11 mars 2004 ont poussé les deux pays à se rapprocher sur plusieurs dossiers, notamment le dossier sur le terrorisme et l'immigration clandestine.²⁵ Selon B. L. Garcia, le 11 septembre a renforcé la peur de la crise économique et l'inquiétude sécuritaire du côté espagnol ; cette peur, dit-il, s'appuie sur l'idée que l'islam est une religion à risque.²⁶ Sendagorta, lui, parle du duel autour du Maroc entre l'Europe et al-Qaïda non seulement en raison de sa position stratégique à la porte du Gibraltar mais également à cause de la diaspora marocaine en Europe. Pour l'Espagne en particulier, la proximité géographique et l'immigration marocaine justifient cet intérêt porté au Maroc. D'autant plus que le défi de

²¹ Sehim, Mustapha, « Après le sommet des 'cinq + cinq' de Tunis : L'appel de Tunis », p. 16.

²² Nassir, Chifaa, « La main du Groupe islamique marocain », *Maroc Hebdo International*, N° 694, 14-04-2006, p. 11.

²³ L'ampleur du manque d'informations sur ce groupe a été indiquée par le rapport juridique espagnol sur les attaques du 11 mars à Madrid, qui reconnaît que la structure du GICM est pratiquement inconnue. Alonso, Rogelio, Rey, Marcos García, « The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco », *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, N° 4, 2007, p. 583.

²⁴ Nassir, Chifaa, « La main du Groupe islamique marocain », *Maroc Hebdo International*, N° 694, 14-04-2006, p. 11.

²⁵ Jorge Dezcallar, ambassadeur espagnol au Maroc entre 1997 et 2001 et qui a dirigé plus tard le Service des Renseignements de l'Espagne entre 2001 et 2004, croit qu'al-Qaïda n'était pas directement responsable des attentats à Casablanca ni à Madrid. Alonso, Rogelio, Rey, Marcos García, *op. cit.*, p. 583. Les « pipesistes » (les adeptes de Daniel Pipes) écrivent sans citer aucune source (à part Pipes) que « Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) have, with little hindrance, used Britain as a base for coordinating attacks against American, European, and North African targets ». Voir : Nomikos, John M., Burweila, Aya, « Another Frontier to Fight : International Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa », *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 22, N° 1, 2009, p. 54.

²⁶ Lopez Garcia, Bernabé, « Les relations hispano-marocaines », in Leveau, R., Mohsen-Finan, K. (Eds), *Le Maghreb après le 11 septembre*, pp. 110-111.

démocratisation au Maroc est inséparable de l'islamisme. Ce qui le pousse à considérer que la question clef est d'assurer que la participation politique des islamistes soit une contribution à la construction du système démocratique et non à sa destruction.²⁷

D'autre part, la stabilisation des relations entre le Maroc et l'Espagne pourrait tenir beaucoup à la manière dont les deux pays vont gérer la question de Ceuta et Melilla ; les Espagnols sont conscients que les habitants musulmans de Ceuta forment un secteur de population qui s'identifie parfaitement avec la ville et intensément impliqué dans la vie sociale et cela est contradictoire avec tout soutien à la violence jihadiste. Mais cela n'annule pas le risque du terrorisme à Ceuta, par exemple, qui n'a pas besoin de beaucoup de moyens humains et financiers pour mener une forme de violence collective.²⁸

En revanche, le profit que les deux pays pourraient tirer de la proximité serait la construction d'un tunnel qui connecte les deux continents. Après une période d'étude du projet (2004-2007), l'Espagne a introduit le projet qui coûterait de 4 à 5 milliards d'euros dans son plan stratégique d'infrastructures du transport approuvé par le conseil des ministres en juillet 2006.²⁹

Cela dépend largement de l'aboutissement de la démocratisation du Maroc (ce qui n'est pas du tout chose acquise). Ángel Pérez explore les possibilités cette option : quand le Maroc se convertira en un Etat démocratique et moderne il sera inévitable d'initier un accord. Tenant compte du fait que le Maroc est loin de cet état de choses, il paraît logique de penser qu'une telle situation devrait améliorer les relations mutuelles mais aussi l'animosité marocaine envers les deux villes. Car une chose est certaine, la souveraineté ne dépend pas du régime politique en place.³⁰

1.2. Le volet culturel

L'intégration culturelle des Marocains en Europe est un des éléments problématiques des relations euro-marocaines. Le Maroc recommande l'apprentissage de la langue et de la culture des pays hôtes et propose d'une manière vague la promotion du dialogue entre les cultures.³¹ Ceci lui permet d'intervenir dans les affaires culturelles des MRE mais aussi de consolider sa réputation dans le dialogue de cultures.

²⁷ Sendagorta, Fidel, « Jihad in Europe : The Wider Context », *Survival*, Vol. 47, N° 3, 2005, pp. 70-71.

²⁸ Luis de la Corte Ibáñez, « Actividad yihadista en Ceuta : antecedentes y vulnerabilidades », Documentos de Trabajo (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos), N° 28, 2007, p. 10.

²⁹ De la Encina Ortega, Salvador, « El túnel del Estrecho : perspectivas para las relaciones España-Marruecos » in del Valle Gálvez, J. A., Baeza, J. V., Torrejón Rodríguez, J. D., (Eds), *España y Marruecos en el centenario de la Conferencia de Algeciras*, Madrid, Dykinson, 2008, p. 151.

³⁰ Pérez, Ángel, *Ceuta y Melilla en el marco de las relaciones Hispano-Marroquíes*, Real Instituto Elcano Papers, N° 89, 2004, p. 5.

³¹ Alami, Houria, « Integration, Security and Migration » in Henriques, M. C. (Ed), *ibid.*, p. 72.

1.2.1 L'IMAGE DU ROI REFORMATEUR

L'intérêt principal du Maroc dans sa politique européenne et dans son volet culturel et social en particulier, est d'offrir l'image d'un pays en voie de réformes. Déjà le roi Hassan II avait su entretenir l'image d'un souverain moderne, ouvert et pro-européen durant ses 38 ans de règne. Toutefois, il avait souvent à se défendre d'être un tortionnaire, notamment face aux associations des droits de l'homme et à la presse européenne.

Le roi Mohammed VI, n'ayant pas un passé « sanguinaire », affiche dès les premiers mois de son règne une volonté de réformer la société marocaine et adopte le titre de « réformateur ». Il récolte les fruits de ses premiers efforts le 22 décembre 1999 lorsqu'il obtint le prix de Grenade 1999 dans sa modalité d'honneur décerné par le groupe de stations Radio SER à Grenade.

Les deux premières années de son règne furent marquées par des réformes touchant le statut de la femme. Le 28 octobre 1999, le Maroc et l'UNESCO signent à Paris un protocole d'accord pour la création d'une chaire d'université sur la femme et ses droits au royaume. Le 12 mars 2000, le Maroc organise à Rabat une marche nationale des femmes sous le slogan : « nous nous partageons la terre, partageons ses biens » dans le cadre de la marche mondiale des femmes 2000. En même temps, l'institution nationale pour la protection de la famille marocaine organise à Casablanca, avec la participation de plusieurs associations féminines, une imposante manifestation contre le projet du plan d'action national pour l'intégration de la femme dans le développement, sous le thème : « les femmes sont les sœurs de l'homme ». Les 20-22 janvier 2001, la ville de Marrakech abrite le premier Sommet des Premières Dames d'Afrique sous le haut patronage du roi Mohammed VI et la présidence effective de la princesse Lalla Meryem. Le 21 mai 2001, le roi Mohammed VI préside au palais royal de Marrakech la séance d'ouverture de la Conférence ministérielle arabo-africaine des finances qui se tient en préparation au Sommet mondial de l'enfance. Après cet élan, la cadence ralentit sans abandonner la ligne. Ainsi, les 28-30 juin 2003, Marrakech abrite le Sommet mondial de la femme avec ces 700 participantes, considéré être le Davos féminin.³²

Cependant, le geste qui a mis en exergue l'image de « réformateur » du nouveau roi fut la réforme de la Mudawwana annoncée dans son discours au Parlement le 10 octobre 2003. Les réactions des chefs d'État et de gouvernements et organisations internationales témoignent de l'intérêt que les pays européens, notamment, portent à l'évolution des réformes au Maroc. M. Jacques Chirac, à titre d'exemple, déclara que « ce nouveau code traduit la volonté du royaume vers la démocratie, l'État de droit et l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme dans le respect des traditions culturelles et religieuses du royaume » et « Je ne voudrais pas abuser du terme de révolution. Mais c'est une évolution considérable et déterminée qui, une fois de plus, apporte le témoignage de la volonté du royaume, du roi et du peuple marocain d'aller vers la démocratie, les droits de l'homme, l'État de droit et l'égalité homme-femme ».³³

³² Benmbarek, Najlae, « Fin du 13^e Sommet mondial des femmes tenu à Marrakech : Un Davos au féminin », *Maroc Hebdo International*, N° 565, 4-07-2003, p. 12.

³³ « M. Chirac à propos du projet de Code de la Famille : Une évolution considérable », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 11-10-2003.

Du point de vue européen, le Maroc semble être un cas intéressant, parmi les partenaires méditerranéens du sud, en matière de réformes économiques accompagnées de réformes politiques.³⁴ Il mène une politique de changement dans la continuité qui est la préférence de l'UE d'après ce que montre l'étude des projets de promotion de la démocratie financés par l'UE au Maroc.³⁵

À titre d'exemple, l'Espagne reçoit positivement cette image ; les Espagnols évitent de critiquer Mohammed VI et montrent une confiance absolue dans la volonté inlassable du nouveau roi à démocratiser son pays et à promouvoir la justice sociale.³⁶

1.2.2 L'ALLIANCE DES CIVILISATIONS

L'image d'un pays qui réalise des réformes, modéré dans sa politique étrangère et influent dans le monde arabe a permis à Rabat de constituer un capital symbolique qui la propulse sur la scène dans toutes les initiatives diplomatiques euro-méditerranéennes. L'Alliance des Civilisations, une initiative du Premier Ministre espagnol, J. R. Zapatero, en est un exemple. Cette initiative qui aspire à « promouvoir le respect mutuel pour les croyances et les traditions religieuses et à réaffirmer l'interdépendance croissante de l'humanité dans tous les domaines, de l'environnement à la santé, du développement économique et social à la paix et à la sécurité »,³⁷ a été officiellement lancée par le secrétaire général de l'ONU, Kofi Annan le 14 juillet 2005. Ceci intéresse largement la diplomatie marocaine. Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU a choisi le Conseiller du roi Mohammed VI, André Azoulay pour faire partie du comité des sages, aux côtés, de 18 autres personnalités, entre autres, Federico Mayor Zaragoza, Mohammed Khatami et Desmond Tutu. M. Azoulay commentait sa désignation en déclarant que :

« Le fait d'avoir été choisi par M. Kofi Annan pour faire partie de ce Comité est un hommage aux valeurs que mon pays a toujours défendues et qui ont été celles de l'ouverture, de l'écoute et de la modernité basée sur la synthèse des civilisations et non pas sur la rupture des civilisations. Il s'agit d'un hommage à la politique mise en oeuvre par le roi Mohammed VI qui, depuis le départ, a mis en relief et en perspective le choix de société qui est le nôtre, le choix de société dans notre relation avec le reste du monde et le choix de société que nous voulons consolider au Maroc à travers la démocratie et toutes les valeurs qui sont fondatrices de notre personnalité et notre identité marocaine ».³⁸

³⁴ Settari, Jamila Houfaïdi, « Humans Rights and Democracy in the European Legal Order : the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership », in Panebianco, Stefania (Ed), *New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 137.

³⁵ Junemann, Annette, *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11 : International, Regional, and Domestic Dynamics*, London, Frank Cass, 2004, p. 79.

³⁶ *Idem*, p. 100.

³⁷ Nechnach, Intissar, « Une Alliance pour rapprocher les civilisations : André Azoulay a été choisi pour siéger au Comité des sages », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 04-09-2005.

³⁸ *Idem*.

Le même A. Azoulay est président délégué de la fondation « Trois Cultures de la Méditerranée », constituée le 8 mars 1999 et qui est devenue, en quelques années, un référent international de dialogue interculturel. Cette fondation est née à l'initiative du gouvernement andalou et du Royaume du Maroc qui envisagent en 1998 de créer un forum pour promouvoir la rencontre entre les peuples de la Méditerranée. La proposition obtint un accueil international très favorable et elle fut secondée par le Centre Pères pour la Paix, l'Autorité palestinienne et par d'autres personnalités et institutions d'Israël et de la région euro-méditerranéenne engagées dans les processus de dialogue et de paix.³⁹

Devenu l'ambassadeur du dialogue interculturel, le conseiller du roi Mohammed VI participe le 12 décembre 2005 au « Forum de Paris », présidé par Albert Mallet,⁴⁰ consacré au défi de l'Euro-Méditerranée. André Azoulay revient à Paris en septembre 2006 pour assister au « Colloque international de Paris » organisé par l'Union « Pan-Europe » France. Il y déclare que : « c'est en Méditerranée que l'Europe retrouvera les fondements d'un leadership ». S'exprimant dans le cadre de la session consacrée à « L'Europe, une puissance en partage », le conseiller du roi ajouta qu'on ne pouvait pas dissocier le grand dessein stratégique de l'Euro-Méditerranée de la prise en compte des causes « à la fois légitimes et prioritaires » fondatrices d'un « consensus profondément enraciné dans l'Arc des Nations qui va de la Mauritanie à l'Égypte ». Auparavant, M. Azoulay avait souligné les acquis et les déficits, dix ans après Barcelone, estimant que « le bilan était certes contrasté, mais que l'on était loin du jeu à somme nulle que certains analystes privilégient ». S'agissant des acquis, le conseiller de S.M. le Roi mentionna l'émergence d'une identité euro-méditerranéenne et la volonté de doter cet espace en devenir d'un cadre institutionnel avancé et novateur. Pour illustrer son propos, M. Azoulay conclut en développant les différentes facettes du projet de société mis en œuvre par le roi Mohammed VI, où « politique, économie et social » sont tirés par « la cohérence d'une vision globale, réaliste et lucide sur le court terme et particulièrement ambitieuse sur la durée ».⁴¹

Le conseil de l'Europe constitue un autre partenaire européen du dialogue interculturel. À travers le Fonds européen pour la jeunesse (FEJ), le conseil de l'Europe et le Maroc se sont prononcés « en faveur du renforcement du dialogue interculturel pour lutter contre les extrémismes et le rejet de l'autre, à travers notamment, l'organisation d'un stage de formation en langue et culture arabes ».⁴² Un stage d'une durée de quatre semaines fut abrité par le Maroc. Cette première initiative, pour un pays arabe, s'inscrit, selon, la ministre chargée des Marocains résidant à l'Étranger, « dans le cadre d'une 'vision globale' visant à lutter contre l'extrémisme et le rejet de l'autre à travers la promotion du dialogue interculturel ».⁴³

³⁹ *Idem.*

⁴⁰ Albert Mallet, Président de l'association Euro-Méditerranée Science, Développement et Paix, est né au Maroc. Juif d'origine marocaine, de son vrai nom Elmaleh. Un homme de relations publiques comme André Azoulay. Wade, Adam, « Albert Mallet : trente ans après », *Aujourd'hui le Maroc*, N° 1087, 7-2-2006.

⁴¹ « André Azoulay au Colloque international de Paris », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 08-04-2006.

⁴² « Le Conseil de l'Europe et le Maroc veulent renforcer le dialogue interculturel », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 05-04-2006.

⁴³ *Idem.*

Dans le même registre, le roi du Maroc et le roi des Belges ont patronné le Congrès des Imams et des Rabbins pour la Paix qui s'est tenu à Bruxelles en janvier 2005. La rencontre s'est donné pour objectif de mettre au point un plan d'action immédiat et efficace. Les 49 recommandations d'action faites par les participants se sont organisées autour de trois volets : éducation, relecture éclairée des Écritures saintes et engagement politique et social des leaders religieux. Le deuxième Congrès s'est tenu à Séville du 19 au 22 mars 2006, rassemblant plus de 120 imams et rabbins en présence de 80 spécialistes et personnalités chrétiennes, sous le haut patronage du roi d'Espagne Juan Carlos I et du roi du Maroc Mohammed VI. André Azoulay, conseiller de S.M. le Roi et Ahmed Taoufiq, ministre des Habous et des Affaires islamiques y ont pris part.⁴⁴

Le Maroc doit entretenir sa réputation constamment, comme en Hollande après l'assassinat, le 2 novembre 2004, du cinéaste Théo Van Gogh par un Marocain, Mohammed Bouyeri (qu'on présente comme membre d'une cellule terroriste appelée Hofstad Network).⁴⁵ Le Maroc s'est activé pour le projet « Treize siècles de cohabitation judéo-musulmane au Maroc », en septembre 2005 à Amsterdam, célébrant un ensemble d'activités autour de la communauté juive marocaine et du dialogue judéo-musulman.⁴⁶ Les « retrouvailles » entre les deux communautés marocaines, musulmane et juive, ponctuées d'une série de contacts et débats autour de la tradition marocaine et de ses valeurs de respect et de tolérance, furent co-organisées par la Fédération mondiale des Juifs marocains (FMJM) et le Collectif associatif de l'Alliance mondiale des organisations des Marocains à l'étranger (AMOME). Les diverses activités qui ont ponctué cette manifestation ont été marquées par la présence d'une délégation conduite par André Azoulay.⁴⁷

2. L'islam consulaire

L'islam européen s'est constitué une identité propre et aspire à « l'indépendance » vis-à-vis des États d'origine. Dans la situation actuelle, l'organisation de l'islam en Europe représente un intérêt politique majeur pour les pays d'origine des immigrés, surtout pour le Maroc qui poursuit une politique d'ingérence dans les affaires de la communauté marocaine à l'étranger pour des raisons économiques et politiques précises. D'abord, cette communauté est une source de devise étrangère, de survie de nombre de zones rurales marocaines et de tourisme massif. Ensuite, et avec la confrontation entre le régime et les islamistes, l'enjeu sécuritaire pousse le régime à « avoir un œil » sur les Marocains résidant à l'étranger. L'objectif est d'éviter que les islamistes puissent créer un climat d'opposition, profitant de l'appui financier et logistique des communautés immigrées. Enfin, avec l'importance que la question de l'organisation de l'islam en Europe a prise, le Maroc se

⁴⁴ « Le Congrès mondial des imams et rabbins pour la paix en conclave à Séville », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 09-03-2006.

⁴⁵ Roshandel, Jalil, *Jihad and International Security*, Gordonsville, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 35.

⁴⁶ Alaoui, Khadija, « La cohabitation judéo-musulmane du Maroc célébrée à Amsterdam », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 20-09-2005.

⁴⁷ « Musulmans et juifs marocains de Hollande se retrouvent à La Haye », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 24-09-2005.

mobilise et adopte une « stratégie gouvernementale » qui stipule la mobilisation des « Marocains résidant à l'étranger » dans la défense des causes nationales (cela concerne essentiellement le Sahara).

L'auto-organisation des Marocains en Europe suivant leur village d'origine maintient les liens tribaux, renforcés par les nouveaux immigrés venus de même origine. Dans ce cadre on peut parler d'une identité ethno-religieuse où la marocanité et l'islam sont liés par des liens invisibles d'allégeance à la communauté ; liens entre les individus et leur « famille » et entre les « familles » et leur clan au pays. Ces liens se voient clairement lors de la mobilisation politique ou en cas de tensions graves. L'encadrement religieux entérine ces liens familiaux et tribaux par la mise en place de structures traditionnelles comme les mosquées ou les associations islamiques.

En effet, l'aspect économique de l'immigration est lié à l'allégeance. Pour maintenir l'importante participation financière des Marocains résidant à l'étranger, il faut les fidéliser en créant des attaches culturelles et religieuses autour des liens familiaux et tribaux solides. L'allégeance fut maintenue au début par l'entretien du mythe du retour. Ce mythe fut remplacé, ensuite, par le mythe de la diaspora patriote.

L'encadrement culturel et religieux des Marocains résidant à l'étranger a acquis un caractère stratégique clairement défini par le gouvernement marocain en août 2003 lorsque l'ex-Premier ministre, M. Driss Jettou, a présidé, à Rabat, une réunion consacrée à l'examen d'une « stratégie gouvernementale visant l'encadrement des Marocains résidant à l'étranger (MRE) dans les domaines éducatif, culturel et religieux ».⁴⁸ Intervenant lors de cette rencontre, M. Jettou a souligné « l'importance cruciale que revêt l'encadrement des MRE à tous les niveaux et a également incité les différents départements concernés à conjuguer leurs efforts en vue d'entreprendre des actions concertées et coordonnées aux niveaux national et international visant à améliorer l'encadrement de cette catégorie de citoyens ».⁴⁹

De son côté, Mme Nouzha Chekrouni, ex-ministre déléguée chargée des Marocains résidant à l'étranger, a fait un exposé dans lequel elle a tracé les grandes lignes de la stratégie qui vise à encourager l'intégration et la cohabitation dans les sociétés d'accueil tout en préservant l'identité nationale marocaine dans ses dimensions musulmane, arabe et amazighe. La stratégie gouvernementale vise également à mobiliser les MRE dans la défense des causes nationales et à créer les conditions favorables pour faciliter la participation de la communauté à la vie publique.⁵⁰

Ce dernier chantier concernant l'implication des MRE dans les « causes » nationales marocaines, est relativement récent. On assiste depuis seulement quelques années à des manifestations pour la « marocanité » du Sahara dans plusieurs pays européens.

Pour faire des immigrés marocains une carte de négociation, il faut d'abord que ces immigrés soient suffisamment présents dans les affaires politiques des pays européens. Pour l'instant, leur poids n'est pas significatif quoique les élections des organes

⁴⁸ « Réunion sur l'encadrement culturel et religieux des Marocains résidant à l'Étranger », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 28-08-2003.

⁴⁹ *Idem.*

⁵⁰ *Idem.*

représentatifs des musulmans dévoilent l'importance de la compétition politique entre les pays d'origine.

Les dernières élections du CFCM, en 2005, ont enregistré une victoire de la Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF), ils ont, ainsi, obtenu 19 sièges. Notons que la FNMF fut créée par des Français convertis, soutenus à la fois par le Maroc, l'Arabie Saoudite et la Ligue islamique mondiale.

D'après Mohammed Bechari, « malgré la faiblesse des moyens matériels, nous nous sommes hissés au niveau des grandes fédérations. 500 associations font partie ou soutiennent la FNMF. Nous ne sommes absents que dans trois régions sur les 25 régions du CFCM. Il s'agit des DOM-TOM, de la Basse-Normandie et du Poitou Charente. L'Islam militant de France d'obédience marocaine est important par son implantation, ses vecteurs de diffusion, par la discipline de ses adhérents et leur attachement à leur pays d'origine ».⁵¹ Si les résultats confirment que les Français et résidents d'origine marocaine sont, certes, parmi les plus pratiquants des musulmans de France, ils démontrent surtout qu'ils ont « une implantation associative homogène sur l'ensemble du territoire français », rappelle encore Hervé Terrel. En outre, la structure de la FNMF, très souple, permet aux patrons de mosquées et autres imams indépendants de garder leur autonomie. En effet, la FNMF s'appuie sur un réseau traditionnel d'allégeances qui lie d'anciens amicalistes, quelquefois reconvertis en « patrons » de mosquées, des leaders tablighi et des indépendants.⁵²

À ce niveau également les choses profitent aux Marocains. « En 1993, l'exécutif de l'UOIF change et une nouvelle équipe, principalement marocaine, encore en place aujourd'hui, prend les commandes. Lhaj Thami Brèze devient président et Fouad Alaoui secrétaire général. La plupart des responsables ont obtenu la nationalité française. Lhaj Thami Brèze a été naturalisé en 2005. »⁵³ Brèze et Alaoui, anciens étudiants marocains de Bordeaux, obtiennent les rênes de l'UOIF en 1992. Le conseil administratif de l'UOIF est informellement nommé « l'axe marocain » pour contrebalancer la mosquée de Paris, dominée par l'Algérie.⁵⁴

Il est vrai que l'UOIF entend incarner un islam de France, face à la Mosquée de Paris, financée par le gouvernement algérien et la Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF), liée au Maroc, mais les enjeux de l'appartenance nationale a favorisé la « marocanisation » de l'organisation. Elle n'est pas la première force de l'islam en France, mais elle est sans doute la mieux structurée.⁵⁵

L'islam de France d'obédience marocaine s'est montré « important par son implantation, ses vecteurs de diffusion, par la discipline de ses adhérents et leur attachement à leur pays d'origine ».⁵⁶ Ce n'est donc pas le fait que « les Français et

⁵¹ Douichi, Karim, « Islam de France : le Maroc a réussi à renverser la situation », *La Vie économique*, 20-01-2005.

⁵² *Idem.*

⁵³ Ternisien, Xavier, « UOIF, un réseau en quête de reconnaissance qui a pris ses distances avec Sarkozy », *Le Monde*, 21-06-2006.

⁵⁴ Laurence, Jonathan, *Integrating Islam : Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2005, p. 105.

⁵⁵ *Idem.*

⁵⁶ « Comment le Maroc contrôle l'islam de France ? », *Le Journal Hebdomadaire*, N° 185, 4-12-2004.

résidents d'origine marocaine sont parmi les plus pratiquants des musulmans de France »⁵⁷ qui explique ce succès. En plus du réseau associatif homogène répandu sur l'ensemble du territoire français, 40 % des imams de France viennent du Maroc et la FNMF bénéficie largement du soutien des représentations consulaires en France qui n'ont pas hésité à faire sa promotion.⁵⁸ Par conséquent, « le réflexe national » a été largement suivi et le vote des Marocains résidents en France a été massif.⁵⁹ Le 1^{er} juillet 2003, la FNMF a obtenu la présidence des commissions en charge des imams, de la viande halal (la taxe rapporte près de 80 millions d'euros chaque année), de l'enseignement et des affaires juridiques. Seule la commission « audiovisuelle » (l'émission religieuse diffusée sur la chaîne du service public français *France 2*) sera confiée à la Mosquée de Paris. L'UOIF prendra en charge l'aumônerie, c'est-à-dire le contrôle du discours religieux dans les prisons de France. En somme, toutes les activités génératrices de revenus sont confiées au camp marocain.⁶⁰

Dans l'état actuel de la gestion de l'islam caractérisée par une approche politique et un communautarisme consacré, l'islam marocain semble être le plus apte à en tirer profit. Le discours modéré de la FNMF et sa capacité organisationnelle profite de l'« ethnicisation » de l'islam et de la volonté de contrôler par les autorités françaises.

2.1. *L'islam populaire*

Depuis deux décennies, un accord bilatéral liant le Maroc et la France permet au Code de statut personnel marocain de s'étendre aux Français d'origine marocaine et aux ressortissants marocains en France.

Il semble que l'ampleur de la réforme de la Mudawwana réponde à cette exigence française. En retour, l'État français paraît remercier le pouvoir marocain en confiant l'essentiel des attributions du Conseil du culte français nouvellement créé à la Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF), groupe d'associations proches du Maroc, associations qui eurent d'ailleurs le plus grand nombre de sièges au Conseil à l'issue des élections.

L'islam populaire rassemble des classes sociales ouvrières sans revendications politiques ni culturelles. Cet islam « populaire » le définit S. Allievi comme « l'islam qui a des choses à dire à propos de la manière de vivre sa vie dans une société non-musulmane et

⁵⁷ *Idem*. Une étude qui compare les représentations de la citoyenneté entre Marocains et Turcs en Belgique révèle que pour les Marocains les trois composantes principales de l'identité nationale sont : l'islam, la langue arabe et les fêtes populaires alors que pour les Turcs il s'agit du drapeau turc, de la langue turque et de l'islam. Voir : Phalet, Karen, Swygedouw, Marc, « Les représentations sociales de la citoyenneté et de la nationalité : une comparaison entre immigrés Turcs et Marocains et Belges peu scolarisés à Bruxelles », *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée*, Vol. 8, N° 1, 2001, pp. 123-125.

⁵⁸ « Comment le Maroc contrôle l'islam de France ? », *Le Journal Hebdomadaire*, N° 185, 4-12-2004.

⁵⁹ *Idem*.

⁶⁰ *Idem*.

les défis spécifiques posés par cette société». ⁶¹ Il peut, éventuellement, inclure des éléments confrériques sans s'attacher à un ordre ou prendre une forme d'intérêt savant pour le soufisme. Les immigrés marocains en Hollande, comme le rapporte P. Mandaville, visitent les tombeaux des saints lors de leurs vacances en été au Maroc pour obtenir la *baraka*. ⁶²

Le Maroc, pour sa part, favorise l'attachement à l'islam populaire pour autant que l'individu ait le « strict minimum » de culture arabe, soit un niveau pour lui inculquer le désir de « préserver » ses liens sociaux et économiques avec le pays. Pour les partis politiques français et européens, la question est liée à l'immigration. Le besoin des pays européens de main-d'œuvre ouvrière conditionne leur approche qui tend à « préserver » cette « masse » de la prise des décisions politiques. La création du CFCM est une alternative qui la maintient dans ce statut.

L'islam populaire pourrait continuer à dominer l'islam européen parce qu'il est la seule formule qui paraisse capable de concilier l'islam et l'Europe. Deux facteurs font sa réussite ; d'abord, sa spontanéité, mélange de croyances, d'appartenance ethnique et de mémoire historique. Ensuite, son adéquation avec la condition sociale de la majorité des musulmans en Europe. Sa méfiance à l'endroit du discours islamiste due à son « élitisme » et à son caractère rigoureux, ajoutée à sa réputation dans le monde qui l'associe au terrorisme, le rend plus apte à accepter l'entente entre l'Europe et le Maroc autour d'une politique musulmane. Face à la stratégie de la lutte anti-terroriste, qui marquera pour longtemps l'approche européenne de l'islam, le Maroc se présente comme un interlocuteur crédible et expérimenté. Sa politique musulmane à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur, ainsi que ses ressources islamiques l'impliquent dans les organismes de musulmans ailleurs qu'en France. C'est le cas de l'Espagne et plus récemment de l'Italie.

L'activisme marocain dans l'islam de France est à remarquer aussi dans les relations entre les Marocains et la Ligue islamique mondiale. Bien que la Ligue pourvoie au financement des mosquées, cela ne lui donne pas une influence directe, idéologique ou autre, sur les musulmans de France. Primo, parce que la Ligue ne possède pas les mécanismes sociaux qui permettent le développement et l'entretien d'un corps social loyal. Secundo, l'islam de France est essentiellement un islam populaire dans lequel se reconnaît la majorité des musulmans de France. Les divergences entre la Ligue et les Marocains pourraient de ce fait être réels. L'exemple en est la mosquée d'Evry, à la construction de laquelle la Ligue a participé, et qui est en procès contre son recteur, Khalil Merroun, considéré comme le relais quasi officiel du Maroc. Ali Berka, qui dirige la mosquée de Mantes-la-Jolie, a su, lui aussi, négocier son indépendance vis-à-vis de son principal mentor, la Ligue islamique mondiale. Le nouveau paysage de l'Islam de France l'atteste : la sensibilité marocaine, déclinée dans tous ses modes d'expression, traditionnelle, *tablighi*,

⁶¹ Mandaville, Peter G., « Towards a Critical Islam : European Muslims and the Changing Boundaries of Transnational Religious Discourse », in Allievi, Stefano (Ed), *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe*, Leiden, Brill, 2002, p. 134.

⁶² Mandaville, Peter G., *Transnational Muslim Politics : Reimagining the Umma*, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 148.

soufi ou islamiste moderniste, en apparence éclatée et farouchement indépendante, arrive largement en tête dans tous les cas de figure.⁶³

L'islam pacifique que le Maroc tente de prêcher en Europe se heurte à la condition sociale des jeunes musulmans issus de l'immigration ; car ces jeunes mobilisent la culture musulmane pour s'affirmer et l'identité sert de stratégie de confrontation face à la provocation.⁶⁴ Donc, c'est une stratégie de défense sociale qui vise en dernière instance l'intégration sociale et non le retrait ; une intégration sociale signifie une intégration culturelle aussi.

2.2. Les objectifs de l'ingérence marocaine dans l'islam européen

Les tentatives du Maroc qui visent à maintenir la marocanité de ses immigrés en Europe ne s'expliquent pas par une préoccupation culturelle ; en insistant sur les traits qui distinguent les MRE, il y a des objectifs politiques et économiques concrets. Sans aller jusqu'à faire une comparaison, il est utile d'évoquer ici l'attitude de la résidence générale pendant le Protectorat au Maroc vis-à-vis de l'immigration des Marocains à l'époque, qui considérait que chaque marocain qui quitte c'est un fusil de moins contre la présence européenne au Maroc et c'est aussi une bouche de moins à nourrir. De plus, l'argent envoyé par les immigrés sert à pacifier ceux qui restent.⁶⁵

2.2.1 LES OBJECTIFS POLITIQUES

Le volet politique de l'intégration des Marocains concerne essentiellement la question du Sahara. Une cérémonie organisée dans la région sahraouie de Guelmim-Smara réitère « le rôle important des MRE dans la défense de la marocanité du Sahara et l'affirmation de la position du royaume sur cette question ». ⁶⁶ De nombreuses manifestations organisées en France, en Espagne et en Allemagne pour la marocanité du Sahara pourraient ajouter un facteur civil aux cartes de la pression utilisées par le Maroc.

M. Bechari revendique clairement le statut de défenseur de la marocanité du Sahara :

« De notre côté, nous sommes plus sensibles à ce qui se passe en dehors de la France et plus particulièrement en Palestine. Et pour nous, en tant que Marocains, nous avons toujours été sensibles à la question du Sahara marocain. Nos revendications se situeront désormais à ces deux niveaux. C'est dire que la communauté musulmane de France est de plus en plus consciente de son présent et de son avenir et cherche à s'affirmer ». ⁶⁷

⁶³ Douichi, Karim, « Islam de France : le Maroc a réussi à renverser la situation », *La Vie Economique*, 20-01-2005.

⁶⁴ Alami, Houria, « Integration, Security and Migration » in Henriques, M. C. (Ed), *op. cit.* p. 73.

⁶⁵ Brand, Laurie A., *Citizens Abroad : Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 46.

⁶⁶ « Engagement des MRE pour la défense de la marocanité du Sahara », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 13-08-2003.

⁶⁷ Ridouane, Khadija, « L'Islam de France s'organise », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 3-03-2002.

Martinello et Boucetta confirment ce constat dans le cas belge où ils notent que les acteurs politiques belgo-marocains sont assez actifs sur le dossier de la marocanité du Sahara.⁶⁸

Une telle mobilisation se comprend dans le cadre de l'aide des associations civiles en Espagne pour le Polisario ; ce serait évidemment difficile d'imaginer des associations qui militent pour le Maroc. Les initiatives prises par ces associations vexent souvent le Maroc comme le Referendum simulé en novembre 2001 à Séville.⁶⁹

L'entente entre le Maroc et la France dans la manière de gérer la présence musulmane s'est articulée autour d'un objectif sécuritaire et politique qui fait que les deux pays veulent contrôler le phénomène islamiste. Le moyen qui semble convenir pour atteindre cet objectif est d'autoriser des instances officielles musulmanes pourvu qu'elles soient sous contrôle.

En outre, M. Bechari évoque l'enjeu du vote « musulman ». Il affirme qu'il en est « personnellement témoin en sa qualité de président de la Fédération nationale des musulmans de France depuis 1993. Pratiquement tous les chefs des partis politiques, de l'extrême droite à l'extrême gauche, ont donc essayé d'être en contact permanent avec cette communauté. On a vu des grands ministres et des grosses pointures des partis politiques perdre leurs mairies. En tête, Jacques Lang qui n'a pu recueillir que 28 voix à la ville de Blois. Dans cette ville, il faut préciser qu'il y a plus de 2.500 électeurs marocains. Ce qui représente un poids indéniable. Cela veut dire que la communauté musulmane aujourd'hui donne le tampon du gouvernement ».⁷⁰

Quel est l'enjeu de l'ingérence des pays d'origine dans l'organisation institutionnelle de l'islam ? Pour M. Bechari, « il est évident, par ailleurs, et tout à fait normal que les pays d'origine veuillent garder un certain 'contrôle' sur leurs communautés respectives. Cela devient anormal, lorsque ces pays interviennent par une diplomatie flagrante pour gérer un islam désigné comme intégriste ».⁷¹

La rivalité entre Rabat et Alger touche l'organisation de l'islam de France aussi. De cette manière, au lendemain du 15 avril 2003, « les résultats des élections surprennent tout le monde. C'est un échec cuisant pour la Grande mosquée de Paris qui n'obtient que 5 élus sur 41 membres. La FNMF remporte la mise avec 18 sièges au conseil d'administration. L'UOIF, dirigée par deux Marocains, obtient quant à elle 16 sièges ». Selon Hervé Terrel, spécialiste de l'Islam en France, « la FNMF a largement bénéficié du soutien des représentations consulaires marocaines en France, qui n'ont pas hésité à faire sa promotion. Les Marocains sont aussi les plus disciplinés, par le biais de ces représentations diplomatiques, 'le réflexe national' a été largement suivi et le vote des Marocains résidents en France a été massif ».⁷²

⁶⁸ Bousetta, Hassan, Martiniello, Marco, « Les pratiques transnationales des immigrés chinois et marocains de Belgique », *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, Vol. 24, N° 2, 2008, p. 61.

⁶⁹ Junemann, Annette, *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11 : International, Regional, and Domestic Dynamics*, p. 96.

⁷⁰ Ridouane, Khadija, « L'Islam de France s'organise », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 3-03-2002.

⁷¹ *Idem*.

⁷² Douichi, Karim, « Islam de France : le Maroc a réussi à renverser la situation », *La Vie économique*, 20-01-2005.

Si l'Algérie tente de renforcer son lobby dans le CFCM, pour contrer le poids marocain, certainement cet organe ne servira pas les intérêts de la communauté musulmane en France ; elle sera question alors de faire allégeance à son pays d'origine.⁷³

Les vague de tension sécuritaire, résultat de l'après-11 septembre, a touché, quelque peu, cette image, notamment aux Pays-Bas où le commissaire européen Frits Bolkestein avait même, lors d'un débat télévisé sur la troisième chaîne publique néerlandaise, sommé le « Roi du Maroc de se prononcer contre l'extrémisme musulman » et de montrer clairement que son pays « ne veut pas être un exportateur d'assassins ». La réponse du ministre délégué aux Affaires étrangères Taïeb Fassi Fihri n'en sera pas moins paradoxale : « le commissaire européen devrait plutôt » s'interroger sur les raisons d'un développement, dans son pays, d'un islamisme radical, étranger à la culture et aux valeurs du Maroc.⁷⁴

Empêcher l'islamisme radical ou l'islamisme « oriental » de prendre contrôle sur l'islam de France est un enjeu sécuritaire d'abord et politique aussi. Le Maroc n'hésite pas à permettre aux partis islamistes marocains modérés d'investir l'islam européen. En revanche, le pays entretient une coopération policière active avec les pays européens concernés par les groupuscules terroristes. L'islam de « bon père de famille » ou l'islam modéré marocain veut se poser en modèle pour l'islam en France. L'islam *tablighi* et salafiste, bien qu'il existe, manque d'assise sociale. L'islam s'organise en fait autour de deux dimensions fortement liées : la dimension ethnique et la dimension sociale, ce qui fait justement la force de l'islam marocain. La dimension ethnique assure un réseau d'allégeances entre la communauté et le pays d'origine. Ainsi, le transnationalisme est un champ de réactivation de l'allégeance au pays d'origine, un comportement encouragé, voire suscité par l'État marocain.⁷⁵ La dimension sociale fournit le corps, à travers la famille, représentant l'appartenance ethnique. Les deux instances principales de l'islam en France, la Mosquée de Paris (GMP, proche de l'Algérie) et la FNMF (proche du Maroc) « s'inquiètent de l'affrontement entre l'islam traditionnel et l'islam politique et internationaliste qu'incarne la mouvance des Frères musulmans ». Aussi, pour contrer l'hégémonie de l'Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) lors des élections au Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) et sa progression parmi leurs ressortissants, les chancelleries établissent-elles une entente et un front commun contre l'UOIF.⁷⁶

Le cas de l'Espagne témoigne de la manière dont le Maroc s'intéresse aux opportunités de l'organisation de l'islam à ce niveau. La communauté de Musulmans hispanophones dans le monde est forte de près de 12 millions de fidèles alors que le collectif des Marocains en Espagne représente 85 % du total des Musulmans vivant dans ce pays. En plus des 260.000 musulmans espagnols, 230.000 musulmans immigrés résident en Espagne. De ce fait, il y a un clivage entre les Musulmans marocains et les Musulmans espagnols qui eux sont regroupés dans la Commission islamique d'Espagne, organe créé en 1991 par le

⁷³ Brand, Laurie A., *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁷⁴ Alami, Younès et Graciet, Catherine, « L'échec de l'Islam marocain en France », *Le Journal Hebdomadaire*, N°185, 4-12-2004.

⁷⁵ Lacroix, T., Sall, L., Salzbrunn, M., « Marocains et Sénégalais de France : permanences et évolution des relations transnationales », *Revue européenne des migrations*, Vol. 24, N°2, 2008, p. 39.

⁷⁶ « Islam de France »: Comment Alger et Rabat s'impliquent dans la bataille", *Le Figaro*, 15-02-2005.

gouvernement espagnol qui en a fait son interlocuteur officiel. Le nouveau gouvernement socialiste espagnol a accepté par d'étudier la proposition d'un syndicat hispano-marocain de créer un Conseil islamique représentatif pour combattre l'emprise des imams radicaux en Espagne. L'idée est de Mostapha El Mrabet, président de l'Association des travailleurs immigrés marocains. Il a proposé la création d'un organe représentatif des Musulmans espagnols qui s'inspirerait du Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM). L'Atime, association laïque, prône « un islam démocratique, transparent et représentatif, pour que le financement des mosquées, qu'il vienne de l'État ou d'autres pays, soit contrôlé ». Selon El Mrabet, depuis les attentats du 11 mars à Madrid attribués à des islamistes radicaux, « on a constaté une certaine perte de confiance envers les Marocains. La création d'un organe transparent de l'Islam espagnol est nécessaire pour récupérer cette confiance ».⁷⁷ Il y a même une exacerbation des « passions et des peurs de 'los Moros' ». En raison de « la politique étrangère d'Aznar et de l'islamisme radical, les Espagnols se sentaient pris dans le clash des fondamentalismes et les journaux espagnols ont publié des cartes de l'Espagne en vert ».⁷⁸

Des dirigeants musulmans se sont opposés à la proposition d'Atime, notamment l'espagnol Mansour Escudero (Fédération des entités religieuses islamistes) et le madrilène d'origine syrienne Riay Tatary (Union des communautés islamiques). Ils ont qualifié cette proposition « d'attentiste ».⁷⁹

La reconnaissance de l'islam en Espagne représente un aspect géopolitique spécifique au cas espagnol ; en 1939, Franco et son régime conservateur et catholique acceptèrent de reconnaître l'islam en Espagne et même de le promouvoir : il récompensait ainsi l'armée africaniste composée des soldats marocains qui l'avaient porté au pouvoir.⁸⁰

De plus, la religion constitue un élément crucial dans la formation des deux États (le Maroc et l'Espagne) ; une éthique guerrière forte, une responsabilité locale entretenue pour maintenir l'orthodoxie religieuse et un usage de ces concepts dans les débuts de la formation de l'État moderne.⁸¹

Les MRE, pour leur part, revendiquent le droit de participer à la vie politique marocaine et ne veulent pas être considérés comme de « simples pourvoyeurs de devises ». Un des aspects de ces revendications est la représentativité parlementaire des Marocains de l'étranger. Une expérience du début des années 80 au cours de laquelle cinq circonscriptions de l'étranger étaient représentées au Parlement n'a pas été très concluante.⁸²

En Belgique la communauté marocaine souffre de la division entre les régions francophone et flamande et les élections de l'Exécutif des Musulmans de la Belgique ne

⁷⁷ Moulay, Mustapha, « En vue de restaurer la confiance : prochaine création d'un Conseil espagnol du culte musulman », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 08-04-2004.

⁷⁸ Aidi, D. Hishaam, « The Interference of al-Andalus. Spain, Islam, and the West », *Social Text* 87, Vol. 24, N° 2, 2006, p. 81.

⁷⁹ Moulay, Mustapha, « En vue de restaurer la confiance », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 08-04-2004.

⁸⁰ Albet-Mas, Abel, « Three Gods, Two Shores, One Space : Religious Justifications for Tolerance and Confrontation between Spain and Colonial Morocco during the Franco Era », *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11, N° 4, p. 581.

⁸¹ *Idem.*, p. 599.

⁸² « Les MRE s'interrogent sur leur double appartenance », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 25-04-2003.

mobilisent pas les Marocains ;⁸³ la mobilisation marocaine en Espagne et en France s'explique par le fait que ces deux pays sont d'une importance stratégique décisive pour la politique étrangère marocaine alors que la Belgique, la Hollande et l'Italie ne le sont pas malgré la présence d'une forte communauté marocaine.

2.2.1 LES OBJECTIFS ECONOMIQUES

Selon Nouzha Chekrouni, il est nécessaire de faire des Marocains résidant à l'étranger (MRE) des partenaires et de les intégrer dans tous les programmes élaborés par l'État. À cet égard, « la création des Centres régionaux d'investissement (CRI), constitue un partenaire essentiel dans le processus de développement et un cadre ayant pour objectif la simplification des procédures administratives au profit des investisseurs marocains et étrangers ».⁸⁴

Chaque année, la diaspora marocaine génère plus de 20 milliards de dirhams en transferts de devises dans le royaume. Le Maroc est ainsi considéré comme l'un des premiers pays à recevoir les plus forts apports financiers de sa communauté expatriée. Les fonds des MRE qui représentent, à l'instar de plusieurs pays, la deuxième source de revenus extérieurs exercent ainsi d'emblée un « rôle stabilisateur » en cas de conjoncture économique défavorable.⁸⁵ Leur avantage est de taille, puisque ces transferts sont beaucoup plus stables que les capitaux privés. Les transferts des MRE ont ainsi enregistré une augmentation de 9,5 % par rapport à la même période de 2002 et de 55 % en comparaison avec la moyenne des recettes réalisées à fin janvier entre 1998 et 2002.⁸⁶

Pour avoir accès à un rôle politique en Europe, l'islam européen semble être le seul moyen disponible pour le sultan mais pour cela il doit, évidemment, élargir sa conception de la souveraineté pour y inclure les immigrés et leurs descendants.⁸⁷ La question de l'ingérence nous ramène à la conception de la souveraineté « islamique » revendiquée par le sultan ; si la souveraineté dans la conception européenne s'applique à une population qui réside sur un territoire, le Maroc continue à considérer les MRE des sujets de Sa Majesté, et donc sous sa souveraineté et lui doivent la loyauté.⁸⁸ Le sultan doit alors au fur et à mesure que les problèmes économiques et politiques s'aggravent, réaffirmer l'importance de l'acte d'allégeance qui lie les Marocains à leur roi et la marocanité des immigrés.⁸⁹

⁸³ Zemni, Sami, « Islam between Jihadi Threats and Islamist Insecurities? Evidence from Belgium and Morocco », *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 11, N° 2, 2006, p. 248.

⁸⁴ « Mme Nouzha Chekrouni à la TVM : Faire des MRE une partie intégrante des programmes de l'État », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 21-08-2003.

⁸⁵ « Marocains résidant à l'étranger : plus de 20 milliards de Dh transférés annuellement », *Le Matin du Sahara*, 15-04-2003.

⁸⁶ *Idem.*

⁸⁷ *Idem.*

⁸⁸ Brand, Laurie A., *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁸⁹ *Idem.*, p. 220.

Conclusion

Le Maroc compte bien préserver ces liens qui génèrent plus de 4 milliards d'euros, selon certaines estimations, chaque année au pays. Pour fidéliser les transferts, il faut entretenir des liens traditionnels et religieux avec l'immigration marocaine. Les relations avec l'Europe dépassent le cadre de l'immigration à un stade de dépendance à plusieurs niveaux. D'où l'intérêt du Maroc à maintenir « sa réputation » de pays stable et rentable pour les investisseurs européens. Toutefois, la question de l'immigration continue à moduler, de plus de plus, les rapports entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, surtout dans l'environnement de sécurité actuel.

Dans ses rapports avec l'Europe, Rabat veille essentiellement à sa réputation. Elle s'efforce de montrer l'image d'un modèle de cohabitation entre l'islam et la démocratie, à travers l'adoption des réformes du champ religieux et du statut de la femme. Ce volet culturel est accompagné d'une politique de la porte ouverte en économie et d'une coopération sécuritaire active contre l'islamisme radical. Son objectif est de s'assurer du soutien économique et politique des puissances européennes. Si Hassan II adoptait une attitude paternaliste envers l'islamisme modéré pour équilibrer sa politique pro-occidentale, Mohammed VI oriente ses efforts vers un engagement direct dans la guerre contre l'islamisme radical et une politique active de l'islam consulaire. La « promotion » de la démocratie et du dialogue interreligieux est devenue la marque du Maroc sur la scène européenne. Cela consacre son statut d'« allié majeur » de l'OTAN en Afrique du Nord.



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