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traditional life and history in Somalia, conflicts and new situation in Somalia, reconstruction and development of Somalia, terrorism and potentials in Somalia

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KÜLKERESKEDELMI KAR
NEMZETKÖZI TANULMÁNYOK SZAK
Levelező tagozat
Nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok szakirány

CONFLICT, RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION IN SOMALIA

<div align="right">

Készítette: Crowley Alíz Anna
Budapest, 2013

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1 Introduction

In recent decades, Somalia has earned the reputation of being one the most dangerous and most violent places on Earth. According to the 2012 Failed States Index, Somalia ranks first, due to: "*widespread lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime and well-publicised pirate attacks against foreign vessels*" (Hanna 2012). Amidst civil war and protracted conflict, Somalia has remained one of the poorest countries in the world, exposed to frequent drought, famine, humanitarian and social crises. By the start of the 21st Century, the country had become an approximation of apocalypse on Earth.

In 2012, following more than twenty years of turmoil, the country once again attempted to embark on a path of reconciliation and reconstruction.

With the involvement of the international community the first federal government of the country was elected as of 20 August 2012, based on a national constitution having been enacted a few weeks before the elections. The country and its residents, as well as thousands of returning Somali expatriates and refugees *"for the first time in more than two decades, spoke of new hopes, optimism and confidence, as well as strong faith in the new developments in the country"* (UN Security Council 2013).

However, it is yet to be seen whether that current optimism will be able to realize the goal of re-integrating Somalia into the international community of states, as a legitimate and fully functioning member.

2 Objectives and Research Method

The Thesis attempts to explore the background of more than two decades of civil war in Somalia. It also endeavours to evaluate the currently ongoing reconciliation process and to outline the current challenges and prospects for reconstruction of the country.

As Somalia cannot be understood as a conflict detached from its surrounding region, an introduction to the conflict-prone Horn of Africa region will be presented. For the purpose of this analysis the Horn of Africa region will be presented not only on the basis of geographical definition but also via the application of the Regional Security Complex Theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Its characteristics will be presented including its population, cultural diversity, history and political standing. An overview of selected economic indicators of the region will additionally be provided, to give further insight into the region. Following an outline of the general characteristics, the key conflicts of the region will be presented, encompassing their driving forces, nature and commonalities. Conflicts in the Horn of Africa tend to be multi-layered, which means that: *"in the regional conflict system, internal conflicts are externalized and external conflicts are internalized going beyond the interstate level to the regional level"* (Gebrewold 2009, 179). Due to this complexity, an understanding of the nature of the conflicts is necessary to get a full perspective on the Somali situation. To support this reasoning, the causes of conflict in the region will be briefly presented.

The Thesis will provide a general introduction to Somalia as a nation. The pillars of its culture will be presented, along with a brief overview of its history. A chronology of the Somali conflict will be provided, focusing on

the main events and on the attempts at reconciliation, as well as the factors that hindered the achievement of such for more than two decades. It will also discuss the process that led to the inauguration of the first federal government of the country in 2012.

This will be followed by an overview of the implications of such a deep and enduring conflict on the political, economic and social standing of the country, along with the country's security problems – both internally and in relation to the wide world.

An overview will be given on the political, economic and social challenges that the federal government of Somalia is facing at the present time. Thereafter, the prospects for reconstruction will be investigated and analysed, before the conclusion of the Thesis will be drawn about the future potential for Somalia to function as a full member of the international community.

The research method of the Thesis focuses on literature review on the topic in the disciplines of history, political science, conflict studies and international security policy. Statistical data and economic indicators are also widely used in order to reflect on the current economic and social circumstances in the Horn of Africa and specifically in Somalia.

3 Understanding the Horn of Africa

In order to understand the civil war and conflict in Somalia and to be able to outline the challenges and prospect for reconstruction in the country, it is essential to understand the region where Somalia is located, i.e. the Horn of Africa. This section of the Thesis will outline characteristics of the Horn of Africa region including its geographical location, the diversity of its population and a brief history of the political and economic standing of the region. A summary on the causes of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa will be provided, too, with the aim of understanding the dynamics of the region.

3.1 Definition of the Horn of Africa and the Scope of Research

In order to define the scope of research, the Thesis applies geographical definitions and the Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory of Buzan and Wæver, as follows.

The Horn of Africa Region (HAR) is not defined in a unified manner in academic publications. Most often the region is identified in a manner that suits the scope of the given researcher's interests. The definitions shown in Table 1 are ones that are encountered regularly.

No.	Definition Type	Definition	Source	Advantages	Disadvantages
1	Narrow	"A region of North-East Africa, comprising Somalia and adjacent territories".	Collins Dictionary (Collins Dictionary)	Focuses on the key research area of this Thesis, i.e. Somalia.	Does not include important countries that affect the conflict in Somalia.
2	Medium	"A region of eastern Africa. It is the easternmost extension of African land and (…) it is defined as the region that is home to the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia".	Encyclopedia Britannica (Encyclopedia Britannica)	In addition to Somalia, this definition focuses on the countries that influence the Somali situation the most.	-
3	Wide	"The greater Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan [Sudan and South Sudan as of 2011], and Uganda".	Council on Foreign Relations (Lyons 2006)	It includes the key influencers of the conflict in Somalia and other countries that are affected by the conflict to a lesser extent.	Potentially too diffuse a scope to provide focused analysis. At the present time Sudan does not affect or influence the Somali conflict.

Table 1: Definitions of the Horn of Africa

For the purpose of the present Thesis, the medium definition is the most suitable. This is due to the fact that it encompasses the countries which have directly and largely influenced and shaped the long-lasting conflict in Somalia.

Neither the narrow definition, nor the wide, define the HAR sufficiently for the purposes of this Thesis. The narrow definition omits important political players shaping the dynamics of relations in this region, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea. The broad definition includes countries and sub-regions which definitely contribute to the general volatility of the Horn of Africa; but do not necessarily affect the political situation of Somalia, in a direct fashion. This statement is particularly valid in case of Sudan and South Sudan.

Therefore, in this Thesis the HAR's definition is confined to a region encompassing: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Map 1: The Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) (NYSTROM)

The Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory of Buzan and Wæver provides a suitable theoretical framework for analysis of international conflicts, including the conflict in Somalia, due to its orientation toward regional-level conflict.

According to the RSC theory, the international security structure of the post-Cold War world order consists three layers. These being:

1   There is one superpower i.e. the United States (U.S.).
2   There are four great powers including the European Union (EU), Japan, China and Russia, which act at the systemic level.
3   There are regional powers, which act within their respective regional level.

Buzan and Wæver suggest that the regional level of analysis is the most suitable one to analyse international conflict and security. They define the RSC as: "*a set of units*[1] *whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another*" (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 44). They further indicate that: "*regional security complex is defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence*" (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 45). The reason for the suitability of the regional level of analysis is "*because threats in these sectors travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, distance clearly plays a role in producing regional security complexes*" (Buzan and Wæver 2003, xvi).

According to Buzan and Wæver, the Horn of Africa RSC included Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia as of 2003, at the time of the publication of the RSC theory. Nonetheless, the two authors acknowledged that "*local security dynamics [blur] one into another in a more or less seamless web*" (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 233). This acknowledgement implies that the authors regard the RSCs as being subject to highly complicated relations and that they will be changeable in nature, over time.

In spite of Buzan and Wæver's indication, this Thesis will omit Sudan and South Sudan as being part of the Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex. Both internal and external factors give these countries a focus that gravitates them away from being elements of the defined Regional Security Complex. These include:

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[1] Unit in this context may refer to a country or sub-region, depending on the circumstance.

1 *"The Sudanese civil war spills over the boundaries with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, pulling the region into Central Africa"* (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 243).

2 Sudan is currently occupied with its domestic affairs, including the conflict and humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region as well as with the separation of the Republic of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan. In addition, *"Sudan (…) is barely affected by the developments in Somalia, and, in turn, barely tries to influence the situation in Somalia"* (Hettyey 2012, 5).

The Thesis wishes to combine the geographical approach and the Regional Security Complex theory to define the Horn of Africa region and RSC. The reason for this is the fact that the geographical location and conditions of any given country heavily influences whether it is part of a given RSC or not. Nonetheless, geography is not the sole determinant of a country being part of an RSC. Based on the above reasoning, the Horn of Africa region and Security Complex in this Thesis includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Additionally, there are secondary players in the region, who do not constitute part of the Horn of Africa region and Security Complex but are affected by the conflict in Somalia. These include Kenya and Uganda (which certain broad definitions include in the Horn of Africa), Burundi and Yemen. (Their role in the conflict will be briefly discussed in Section 5.4).

3.2 Location and Geography of the Horn of Africa[2]

The Horn of Africa is the largest peninsula of Africa, located in the East of the continent bordered by the Red Sea to the east and the northeast; and the Gulf of Aden in the north. The peninsula covers approximately 2,000,000 km^2 (772,200 mi^2) and is home to the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Geographically, Ethiopia has a high central plateau. The Great Rift Valley splits the plateau diagonally, which then gradually slopes to the lowlands toward the west and toward the southeast from the central

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[2] Data in this section originate from The Encyclopedia of Earth (The Encyclopedia of Earth).

mountain range. A number of rivers cross the plateau, notably the Blue Nile, the Juba and the Shabelle Rivers.

The lowlands in the Horn of Africa consist of semi-arid and arid plains despite their close proximity to the equator. The tropical monsoon winds present in the region provide West and Central Ethiopia and the south of Eritrea with seasonal heavy rains. Djibouti and Somalia experience relatively low precipitation all year round.

Temperatures in the Horn of Africa tend to be fairly mild on the plateau. The weather is tropical monsoon in certain areas in Ethiopia and Eritrea and very hot in the lowlands. The coastal areas of Somalia and Djibouti typically belong to the hottest regions on Earth but temperatures tend to gradually decrease as elevation increases toward Eritrea and the Simien Mountains in Ethiopia. The land, which lies in close proximity to the rivers of the region and which is exposed to the monsoon rains, tends to be fertile; however the region has gone through land degradation processes due to deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion and desertification. These processes result in frequent droughts and famines, in particular in the lowlands of Ethiopia and Somalia (The Encyclopedia of Earth).

3.3 Population and Cultural Diversity in the Horn of Africa[3]

The Horn of Africa is home to approximately 100 million people, who live in four different countries and belong to various ethnic groups. The peoples of the region speak different languages, follow various religions and lead different lifestyles. However, the majority of the population belongs to either the Semitic or to the Cushitic ethnic and language groups and they tend to lead a rural, agricultural lifestyle. The peoples of the Horn of Africa either follow the Christian or the Islamic faith, but minorities are adherent to Animism and other ancient religious traditions.

Ethiopia is by far the largest country on the Horn of Africa, with population of 93.8 million. The Oromo and the Amhara ethnic groups make up approximately 60% of the population; however there are 77 ethnic groups residing in Ethiopia, which all possess distinct cultures and languages (e.g. Somalis, Tigray-Tigrinya, Sidama, Guragie, Welaita, Hadiya, Afar, Gamo, Gedeo, etc.). The Somali region of Ethiopia is home to 5.1 million ethnic

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[3] Data in this section originate from the CIA Factbook, unless stated otherwise (CIA).

Somalis, which is approximately half of the population of Somalia (Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2011, 21). Official languages of the country include Amharic, Arabic and English. Tigrinya and Oromigna are official, regional languages. In practice, ethnic minorities tend to use their own languages. The majority of the population, i.e. approximately 62.8% follow the Christian faith (43.5% being Ethiopian Orthodox, 18.6% following protestant denominations and 0.7% being Catholic) while approximately 33.9% follow the Islamic faith and only a fraction of the population follow Animism and other ancient religious traditions (3.3%). The population is very young and the growth rate is more than 3% per annum with fertility rate of 5.9. Life expectancy is 56.56 years on average as per estimates as of 2012. 17% of the population lives in urban areas; therefore the majority of the population leads a rural, agricultural lifestyle. Literacy rate is 35% (CIA, Ethiopia).

Eritrea's population is approximately 6.23 million, which belong to nine distinct ethnic groups. The Tigray-Tigrinya makes up 55% of the population while the second largest ethnic group, the Tigre account for 35% of the population. The remaining ethnic groups are small and recognized as ethnic minorities by the government (i.e. Saho, Kunama, Rashaida, Bilen, Afar, Beni Amir, Nera). The official languages of the country are Tigrinya and Arabic, although the different ethnic groups tend to use their own Semitic or Cushitic languages. The majority of the population is Muslim (69%) while the remainder of the population (31%) follows various denominations of the Christian faith including Coptic, Roman Catholic and Protestant (Populstat, Eritrea). The population is very young, as more than 40% is below 15 years of age. The growth rate of the population is 2.4% per annum, with a fertility rate of 4.3. Average life expectancy is 62.86 years of age. Approximately 22% of the population lives in urban areas. The urban population is understood to be growing at approximately 5% per annum. The literacy rate is 67.8% according to data as of 2010 (CIA, Eritrea).

Somalia has a population of 10.25 million according to 2013 estimates. The majority of the population makes up ethnic Somalis (85%), but Somalia is home of several small ethnic groups, including Bantus, Arabs, Indians and Pakistanis. The official language of Somalia is Somali, which is spoken by the entire population, albeit in different dialects. The country's official religion is Islam with 99.8% of the population being adherent to the Islamic faith while the remaining 0.2% of the population follow the Christian faith and other religions (Populstat, Somalia). The population is young with 44.7% being under 14 years of age. The population growth rate is 1.59% per

annum. Fertility rate is 6.26 on average. Life expectancy on average is 50.8 years of age. Literacy rate is 37.8%. Urbanization correlates with the literacy rate, being 37% with an annual growth rate of 4.1% (CIA, Somalia).

Djibouti is the smallest country in the Horn of Africa. Its population is 792,198. Approximately 66% live in the capital city, with urbanisation growing at an annual rate of 1.8%. The majority of the population is ethnic Somali (60%). The Afar constitutes a major ethnic group, too, with 35%, while the remaining 5% of the population include Ethiopians, Arabs, French and Italian. Roughly fifteen thousand Western expatriates reside in Djibouti, including a relatively large French community. The official languages of the country are Arabic and French but Somali and Afar are widely spoken, too. Almost the entire native population is adherent to the Islamic faith, i.e. 94% while 6% is adherent to Christianity. The country is relatively young, with 35% of the population being younger than 14 years of age. The growth rate of the population is 2.2%, with fertility rate of 2.63. Life expectancy is 61 years of age at birth, on average. Literacy rate is 67.9% on average (CIA, Djibouti).

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the religious breakdown and the population and average age of the societies of the Horn of Africa:

Figure 1: Religious breakdown in the societies of the Horn of Africa

Figure 2: Population and average age in the societies of the Horn of Africa

3.4 Brief History and Current Political Standing of the Horn of Africa[4]

Africa is well known to be the "Cradle of Humankind" (BBC). The first human skeletons from approximately 3.4 million years ago were found in East Africa, in Hadar, in today's Ethiopia (Department of Anthropology, et. al.). East Africa is therefore a significant crucible in the history of humanity. East Africa is also thought to be the region where the ancient Land of Punt was located, in the 25th Century BC. The Horn of Africa was home to a number of ancient empires including the D'mt in the 8th and the 7th Century BC and later the Aksumite Kingdom, which existed approximately between 100–940 AD. The Aksumite Kingdom stretched from current Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan to western Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia on the Arabian Peninsula. It was a rich trading and economic centre facilitating trade between Ancient Rome and India, with a modern, multicultural society. At that time, Somalia played an important role in the region as a flourishing merchant state supplying the rest of the ancient world with aromatic spices, myrrh and frankincense (Encyclopedia Britannica).

Upon the rise of Islam, the new religion spread across the Arabian Peninsula and gradually it appeared in the Horn of Africa. The Christian Aksumite Kingdom's decline was caused by the spread of Islam and the associated isolation of the empire. Also, a cultural decline and a massive climate change contributed to its diminishing. Mogadishu, Berbera and other city-states in Somalia converted to Islam. One of the Somali city-states, the Kingdom of Ifat, attacked the Kingdom of Shewa, an autonomous kingdom within the Abyssinian Empire in 1270 (Encyclopedia Britannica). This

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[4] The primary data in this sub-section is taken from Gascoigne (Gascoigne). Where other sources are used these are cited separately.

important event in the history of the Horn of Africa serves as the root of Ethiopian and Somali antagonism. In the sixteenth century the Abyssinian Empire established ties with Portugal. The Portuguese supported Abyssinia in combating the attacks of Somali sultanates, which were supported by the Ottoman Empire. It is a remarkable fact that this was the fist proxy war in history, fought in the Horn of Africa. In spite of the poor relations and constant tensions between Abyssinia and Somalia, the Somali merchant sultanates flourished during the Middle Ages.

Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the *"Scramble for Africa"* (Meredith 2006, 1) commenced. Western colonial powers divided Africa among themselves, traded certain territories with each other, invaded certain regions and established a new system of rule on the continent. The Horn of Africa came within the span of the attention of Western powers. Accordingly, Italy seized control over Eritrea in 1890 and in 1896 Eritrea became a province of Italian East Africa along with Italian Somaliland. After several years of Abyssinian resistance, Italy attempted to form a protectorate over Abyssinia, which led to the First Italo-Abyssinian War from 1895 to 1896. The war ended with the defeat of the Italians, thus, Abyssinia managed to maintain its independence.

Present-day Djibouti was governed by Somali and Afar sultanates up until the colonial era, when local authorities entered into treaty relationships with France. At the outset of the 20th Century, France established administration in the region. The French later established a protectorate and renamed the region to French Somaliland. Similarly, the British entered into treaties with the Warsangali Sultanate in the northern territories of Somalia and later established a protectorate, naming it to British Somaliland. Large territories in the Horn of Africa thereby became the colonies of Western powers in the 20th Century.

The Second World War contributed to the re-arrangement of colonizing powers in the Horn of Africa. In Eritrea the Italian rule ended in 1941 when Italy entered the Second World War, as the Commonwealth expelled the Italians and took over administration of the region. The British received a mandate from the United Nations to administer the region until 1951, when a federation was formed between Eritrea and Abyssinia. Eritrea's thirty-year struggle started when Abyssinia imposed its authority on the region, which ultimately led to Eritrea's independence in 1993. In 1998, a border dispute escalated to a war between the two countries.

Abyssinia was governed by Emperor Haile Selassie I in the early 20th Century, who managed to repress the Italian colonial aspirations up to 1935

when the Italians occupied the country. Following Italy's entry into the Second World War, in 1941, Abyssinian troops with the assistance of the British Empire expelled the Italian occupying forces from the country. Haile Selassie I remained in power until 1974, when a military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power and established a Marxism-oriented proto-communist state of Ethiopia. In 1977, Somali troops attacked Ethiopian territories in the Ogaden and thus the Ethio-Somali war broke out, which ended with Somali defeat in 1978. Later, Mengistu's communist regime was overthrown in 1991 and the first democratic government was elected in 1995.

Italian Somaliland came under British administration in 1941, when a trusteeship – Trust Territory of Somalia – was established under United Nations mandate. In 1960, the territory became independent. It unified with former British Somaliland under the name of the Somali Republic.

British Somaliland was occupied by Italy and was part of Italian East Africa between 1940 and 1941. In 1941, the British resumed control over the territories. In 1960, the protectorate became independent as the State of Somaliland. Shortly afterwards, it united with the Trust Territory of Somalia and formed a union with former Italian Somaliland. The united territories were renamed to the Somali Republic. In 1991, the British Somaliland territories formed a self-declared sovereign state, thereby stepping out of the Somali Republic. The *de facto* sovereign Republic of Somaliland is not recognized internationally.

French Somaliland ceased to be a French colony in 1946 and became an overseas territory of France following a referendum in 1958. The territory remained under French influence, as opposed to joining Somalia, due to vote rigging taking place on a massive scale during the referendum. In 1977 it received its independence and was renamed to Djibouti (Gascoigne).

3.5 Economic Standing of the Horn of Africa[5]

The Horn of Africa region is in pronounced poverty. All four countries of the region face substantial economic problems.

Djibouti is a small, largely urban country, where two-third of the population lives in Djibouti City. Climatic conditions are not in favour of the

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[5] Data in this section originate from the CIA Factbook (CIA), unless stated otherwise.

pastoralist lifestyle in this region, though one-third of the population still leads a nomadic lifestyle. The economy heavily relies upon its strategic location as a port and refuelling station and due to these assets the country reflects a generally higher level of development than its neighbours. Its estimated GDP per capita in 2011 was USD 2,600, making it the wealthiest country in the Horn of Africa. Its GDP growth was 4.5%. Nonetheless, the unemployment was very high, approximately 59% in 2011 and 42% of the population lived below the poverty threshold (CIA, Djibouti).

Ethiopia's economy heavily relies on agriculture. In 2011, agriculture made up 46.6% of the annual GDP and was responsible for 85% of employment in the country. In recent years the international community has provided substantial aid to Ethiopia and foreign direct investment into the textile; commercial agriculture and manufacturing sectors. In 2011, GDP per capita reached USD 1,100 and the GDP growth was 7.5%. Nonetheless, 29.2% of the population lived below the poverty line and inflation reached 33% (CIA, Ethiopia).

Eritrea is a small, desperately poor country, where the central government maintains restrictive economic policies. A large proportion of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and the country is heavily reliant on the remittances of the Eritrean diaspora living in the developed world. In 2011, GDP per capita was USD 700. As a positive trend, GDP growth was estimated to reach 8.7% in the same year. However, 50% of the population lived below the poverty line and inflation amounted to 20% (CIA, Eritrea).

The war-torn Somalia maintained its formal economic systems up to the collapse of the country in 1991, following which the economy was largely functioning based on informal systems. Livestock trading and subsistence agriculture supported the population to a great extent. It is a remarkable fact that a relatively sophisticated wireless telecommunications industry was in place in Somalia during the civil war, contributing to its economy. Economic activity was also fuelled by remittances sent to Somalia by the Somali diaspora, e.g. in a total amount of USD 1.6 billion in 2011. Per capita GDP was estimated to amount to USD 600 in 2011. GDP growth was estimated to be 2.6% in 2011 (CIA, Somalia). While its reconstruction has been ongoing, the economy still functions largely on an informal basis. Formalisation of the economy is expected to occur only when robust political processes have been established.

The per capita GDP ranking is 147 in case of Djibouti, 179 in case of Ethiopia, 190 in case of Eritrea and 192 in case of Somalia out of 195 examined countries globally. Associated qualities, e.g. life expectancy,

literacy rate and urbanisation are very low compared with developed countries in the world. The entire region scores at a very low level on human development indices contained within the United Nations Human Development Report of 2012, (i.e. Djibouti at 164th, Ethiopia at 173rd, Eritrea at 181st ranking out of 186 ranks allocated globally, while Somalia was not categorised (UNDP)).

3.6 Conflict in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has always been prone to regional power clashes, ethnic, tribal and territorial conflicts. In the 20th Century, the region expressed a number of oppressive regimes. The colonial history and more recent foreign spheres of interest have contributed to a general volatility and instability in the region. Ancient antagonisms were exacerbated by the influence of outside powers.

The recent political situation in the Horn of Africa has been volatile and marked by hostilities, primarily caused by the protracted civil war in Somalia, the impacts of the recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as the border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti. The Somali–Ethiopian tensions, rooted in ancient antagonisms as well as in the more recent Ogaden war in 1977 and 1978, are still pronounced. Governments exercise a hostile attitude toward each other and often sponsor insurgent and anti-governmental forces in one another's territories, aiming to destabilize their adversaries. The ideologically driven, often fundamentalist and separatist political groups fighting against central and regional governments as well as against one another contribute to a general imbalance in the region.

According to the Conflict Barometer of 2011 (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2011, 30–32), there are numerous ongoing conflicts in the region of the Horn of Africa. As of 2011, there were twelve ongoing conflicts, out of which two were inter-state and ten were internal, mostly within Somalia and within Ethiopia. However, it should be noted that due to the porous nature of borders in the region and the spanning of ethnic populations across nation states presents challenges in the delineation of interstate and intra-state conflicts.

Table 2 shows the ongoing conflicts in the region (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2011, 30–32).

Name of Conflict	Conflicting Parties	Conflict Items	Start	Intensity
Ethiopia-Eritrea	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	Territory	1998	2
Eritrea-Djibouti	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	Territory	2008	2
Ethiopia	Government vs. various opposition groups, i.e. Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia (Medrek), Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), Oromo People's Congress (OPC), Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ), Ethiopian Peace and Democratic Party (ENDP)	National power	2005	2
Ethiopia	Government vs. Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)	Secession	1973	3
Ethiopia	Government vs. Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Secession, resources	1984	3
Ethiopia	Government vs. Tigray People Democratic Movement (TPDM)	Sub-national predominance	2002	1
Ethiopia	Oromo vs. Somali Ethnic Groups	Sub-national predominance, resources	2005	1
Somalia	Government vs. al-Shabaab	Ideology, national power	2006	5
Somalia	Autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	Territory, sub-national predominance	1998	3
Somalia	Government vs. autonomous government of Puntland	Autonomy	1998	1

Name of Conflict	Conflicting Parties	Conflict Items	Start	Intensity
Somalia	Regional government of Somaliland vs. Khatumo State of Somalia (SSC)	Sub-national predominance	2009	3
Somalia	Government vs. regional government of Somaliland	Secession	1991	3

*Levels of Intensity: 5=war; 4=severe crisis; 3=crisis; 2=manifest conflict; 1=conflict.
Table 2: Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

The above list of conflicts shows that inter-state conflicts are less frequent compared to the abundance of intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. However, the inter-state conflicts, in particular the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has been decisive in shaping the political situation in the Horn of Africa, due to massive spillover effects into other inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the region.

A major inter-state war took place between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, which "*still holds a central position and has a serious implication to the conflicts running in the Horn of Africa. One of these conflicts is the Eritrea-Djibouti conflict*" (Bereketeab 2011), which led to a number of deaths in 2008.

After the proclamation of independence in Eritrea in 1993, a violent conflict broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between 1998 and 2000, over territorial matters. The war concluded with the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2000, one of the stipulations of which was the establishing of an Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The EEBC was authorized to demarcate the boundary between the two countries based upon colonial-era agreements and international law and its decision was to be final and binding on both parties. The decision on the border was announced in 2002 and was safeguarded by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.). Also, a peacekeeping force, i.e. the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), was deployed in the region. However, the decision of the EEBC has never been implemented, due to Ethiopia's rejection of the outcome. The unresolved conflict has been ongoing ever since.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean situation *"contributed to the rearrangement of the regional pattern of coalition of forces plunging the region into turmoil and insecurity"* (Bereketeab 2011). The two governments engaged in supporting insurgent forces against each other's governments. Both governments regularly accused each other of hosting, financing, arming and training opposition groups active in the other's country. Ethiopia alleged that Eritrea sponsored the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF); the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia as well as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia, amongst others. Eritrea accused the Ethiopian government of financing and hosting individual anti-government groups against the Eritrean government in Ethiopia as well as sponsoring the alliance of these opposition groups with the aim of overthrowing the government in Asmara. The conflict is ongoing at the present time, although visible violence between the parties has more recently subsided. The tensions between the two countries spilled over to regional opposition and separatist movements. These tensions are evident not only in Ethiopia and Eritrea, but in Djibouti and Somalia, too.

Due to unclear borderlines between Eritrea and Djibouti, small-scale border skirmishes took place between the two countries several times in the 1990s. In 2008 a major conflict broke out, which resulted in 35 fatalities and dozens of casualties. The reasons triggering the conflict were very complicated. Notably, Eritrea dispatched troops to the border between the two countries, while Djibouti accused Eritrea of occupying its territory. However, *"a few factors, linked with the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict probably contributed to the fact that Eritrea amassed army to its borders with Djibouti"* (Bereketeab 2011). These factors included the amassing of the Eritrean opposition groups in Addis Ababa, where they openly pledged to overthrow the government in Asmara. Further, Ethiopia relocated and stationed a sizeable number of troops on the triple border with Djibouti and Eritrea, in order to secure its route to the port of Djibouti. This communicated an imminent risk of an Ethiopian invasion, as far as the Eritrean government was concerned. Eritrea suggested that the stationing of its troops at the border was to avoid such an outcome. Consequently, Djibouti referred the case to the Arab League (AL), the AU and the UN. However, the post-conflict fact finding missions of the UN and the EU faced difficulties determining the exact border, due to several reasons including different colonial maps suggesting various borders between the two countries. It was difficult to establish a clearly demarcated borderline between the two countries. The government of Qatar assisted the

reconciliation process by providing mediation, which was more or less successful. Despite this success, there is still some latent conflict in evidence on the border between Djibouti and Eritrea, at the present time.

There is a significant amount of intra-state conflict in the Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia the most notable ongoing secessionist movement is led by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF uses guerrilla techniques to attack security forces in the Oromiya region. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has also conducted several operations against the government, resulting in large numbers of fatalities and casualties. The OLF and the OLA joined forces in 2011 to attack government troops. The OLF was accused of planning a terrorist attack at the AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2011. Consequently, the government designated the organisation as a terrorist group. In 2011, there were a number of other secessionist movements and anti-governmental organisations active in Ethiopia, which fought against the government, e.g. the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF); Tigray People Democratic Movement (TPDM); Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM); Oromo People's Congress (OPC); Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) and the Ethiopian Peace and Democratic Party (ENDP). Some of the movements fought between themselves, e.g. the Oromo and the Somali ethnic groups, thereby complicating the political situation yet further.

Somalia was in a protracted conflict and civil war through to 2012, up to the election of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Currently, the central FGS is in conflict with the self-proclaimed separatist nation of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland. Somaliland is in conflict with Puntland over territorial issues. Further, another separatist movement, the Khatumo State of Somalia (SSC), which proclaimed itself an autonomous region of the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn provinces in 2012, is in conflict with both Somaliland and Puntland over territorial matters.

In Southern Somalia various opposition groups have fought against government forces on the basis of ideologically driven nation-building aspirations over a number of years. It is widely believed that Ethiopia and Eritrea sponsored various interest groups of contradictory ideologies in the past, thereby exacerbating the conflict in Somalia and fighting a proxy war against each other in the territory of Somalia, causing devastating consequences in the country.

The most violent insurgent group in Somalia is the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen ("al-Shabaab"), which is still active and fights against the FGS at the present time. The African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM), (under the auspices of the AU and sponsored by the international community) backed transitional governments of Somalia in the past and currently supports the FGS. AMISOM and Somali government forces have achieved major successes against al-Shabaab to date.

The contribution of certain neighbouring countries' personnel to AMISOM, in particular Uganda; Kenya and Burundi, prompted sporadic, indiscriminate and violent attacks and threats against these countries. It is widely understood that the attacks were carried out by al-Shabaab, which is linked to the global terrorist organisation, al-Qaeda. The group was designated as a terrorist group in 2001 by the governments of the U.S. and several Western nations thereafter. As such, al-Shabaab is a target under the so-called global "War on Terror"[6]. (Henceforth this term will be used throughout the report without further reference to its origin or to disputes concerning its perceived legitimacy).

The dynamics of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are complicated and the conflicts are composed of multiple layers. The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict not only destabilized the two countries concerned, but showed long-lasting spillover effects into Djibouti and to a larger extent to Somalia, which had fought its own civil war since 1991. The fight against Somali insurgent forces by Ethiopia and subsequently by AMISOM, backed by Kenya, Uganda and Burundi, created further spill-over impacts into the region outside of the RSC of the Horn of Africa, contributing to the destabilization of the entire East Africa region. The pursuit of al-Shabaab, as part of the "War on Terror", further gave a global dimension to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Also, due to al-Shabaab's connections to Yemen, the Arab country located across the Gulf of Aden is also heavily affected by the conflict in Somalia. (This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4).

3.7 Causes of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

There are a number of underlying motives and rationales behind the widespread conflict in the region. The internal and external causes of conflict

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[6] Definition of the War on Terror: "*An international military campaign launched in 2001 with the U.S. and UK invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001. It is a global military, political, legal and ideological struggle employed against organisations designated as terrorist and regimes that were accused of having a connection to terrorists or presented as posing a threat to the U.S. and its allies in general*" (US Legal).

are analysed below. However, it must be noted that "*it is difficult (…) to make a clear distinction between external involvement and internal problems*" (Vadala 2003, 630).

External historic factors are partly responsible for the general instability of the region of the Horn of Africa. The complexity of the situation and the dynamics in the region are also the result of internal problems, most notably territorial issues, the matter of marginalisation of pastoralists as well as ethnic and tribal conflicts (as described under point 2 below). The causes of conflicts can therefore be categorised as follows:

1 **External influences:** Colonial imperialism, the participation of superpowers in regional conflicts and thereby amplification of regional conflicts into proxy wars, post-Cold War political developments and most recently, the "War on Terror" launched by the U.S. all had an effect on creating highly complex political dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

a **Colonial Imperialism:** The Horn of Africa has a strategically significant geopolitical location. As history shows, Western powers recognized the importance of the location of the region. The imperialist aspirations of Western powers divided regions and put artificial boundaries in place. These boundaries disregarded ancient sheikdoms and the disposition of a large segment of the population toward leading nomadic lifestyles, without established borders between tribal territories. Some of the colonial era boundaries divided peoples belonging to the same ethnic groups and tribes. Woodward noted that "*the boundaries in the Horn of Africa could be said to be rather reflections of imperial rivalries than a genuine pattern of population settlement along geographical or ethnic lines*" (Woodward 1996, 13). In the case of Somalia, the different colonizers created different administrative systems, i.e. British, French and Italian. In this way the colonising powers contributed to the fragmentation of the country and hindered the nation building process in this region. This may be a contributor to certain tensions, which present themselves as border disputes and ethnic conflicts today.

b   The Cold War Era: During the Cold War, the superpowers exerted their interests in the Horn of Africa. According to Bereket, *"it was with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1867 that the area started to have commercial significance internationally"* (Bereket 1980, 1–2). The links to the Middle East through the Horn of Africa increased as the access to oil became important commercially to the Western world. The United States first established a strategic relationship with Ethiopia. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union (SU) also entered the political arena in the Horn of Africa, by establishing relations with Somalia. The developments in Ethiopia in 1974, where a Marxism-oriented proto-communist regime came to power, changed the political dynamics in the region. In 1977, when Somalia invaded the Ogaden in Ethiopia the SU intervened and rescued Ethiopia from military defeat, turning its back on Somalia. Certainly this development led to the fact that the United States terminated its relations with Ethiopia and later turned toward Somalia. Thus, the superpowers simply changed positions in the Horn of Africa. The rivalry between the two superpowers was reflected clearly. Their participation, their exercising of interest spheres and military intervention largely contributed to creating and amplifying instability in the region.

c   The Post-Cold War Era: Following the Cold War, the support of superpowers was withdrawn from the Horn of Africa. Somalia collapsed in 1991. In the same year, the Marxism-oriented proto-communist regime in Ethiopia was destroyed. Eritrea's secessionist aspirations succeeded in 1993. The defeat of communism in Ethiopia contributed to the depreciation of the interest of the United States in the region. Instead of maintaining positions in the Horn of Africa, the United States focused its attention on the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and 1991. Following its military success in the Middle East, it returned to Somalia in 1993, on behalf of the United Nations in a peace building capacity and in pursuit of humanitarian objectives. The intervention, nevertheless, ended up in a catastrophic failure in 1993, known as the *"Black Hawk Down"* incident (Meredith 2006, 494). The United States withdrew from the region, leaving behind a country which had descended into one of the

most violent civil wars on Earth. The United States only returned to the region when its global-scale "War on Terror" was launched in 2001. As the strategic partner of Ethiopia, it again intervened in the conflicts of the region, in the name of counterterrorism initiatives.

2 **Internal problems:** Internal problems of the Horn of Africa cover several types of conflict derived from territoriality; the marginalisation of pastoralists; and ethnic / tribal conflict.

    a **Territoriality:** Vadala suggests that: "*in general, territoriality is believed to have been at the core of inter-state conflicts*" (Vadala 2003, 630). In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, being the largest country, has the longest borders and a history of engaging in border disputes. Notably, two important inter-state wars were the result of Ethiopian border conflicts, including the war with Somalia between 1977 and 1978 in the Ogaden and the war with Eritrea in 1998. In addition to these two main wars derived from border conflicts, a boundary dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2008 was also a destabilisation factor in the region.

    b **Marginalisation of Pastoralists:** Many tribes populating the Horn of Africa were traditionally nomadic pastoralists. The peoples living among harsh conditions in this region developed the pastoralist lifestyle to secure their existence. According to Jibrell, "*their livelihood mainly depends on herding livestock, good rains and pasture*" (Jibrell 2011). Pastoralists traditionally moved around the vast arid areas of the Horn of Africa, always in the direction of where the climatic conditions were more favourable. They had to adopt this lifestyle to survive in a harsh environment, prone to recurrent drought and famine. The boundaries laid down by colonizers and later by independent governments in the region were thus not compatible with the nomadic lifestyle of the peoples of the region. Hence, the boundaries were not respected by these communities, which led to conflict between the pastoralist nomads and the colonial authorities. In spite of colonial efforts, the nomadic communities "*had neither the intention of creating a state of*

their own nor of imposing themselves on states created by others" (Vadala 2003, 631). Conflict also frequently erupted among different pastoralist communities for the most favourable lands, as well as among pastoralists and settled communities who over time had chosen a more modern, agricultural lifestyle in line with colonialist preferences in the relatively scarce fertile territories of the region. The lifestyle of the nomads being incompatible with the desires of the modern, state-building authorities led to their marginalisation and to the exacerbation of the conflict rooted in pastoralist lifestyle.

c **Ethnic/Tribal Conflict:** "*Ethnic conflict may be defined as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups over resources, identity, borders or against oppression*" (Reatile Shale 2004, 2). Such conflict has been prevalent in the Horn of Africa since ancient times. Ethnic conflict in this region tends to be largely related to territorial conflicts. The territorial conflicts are sometimes interrelated with the conflicts associated with the nomadic, pastoralist lifestyle. For example, various civil wars were fought in Ethiopia between the Amhara, the Tigray-Tigrinya and the Oromo ethnic groups for territorial reasons. Similar conflicts tend to erupt between and among tribes, clans and sub-clans. This latter type of conflict is very characteristic in the clan-based society of Somalia. Sometimes certain ethnic groups are in conflict with a single clan, not the entirety of another ethnicity, e.g. the Ishaak clan of the Somali ethnic group and the Afar ethic group in Djibouti.

The changing political dynamics in the Horn of Africa since the colonial era, the patronage politics of superpowers during the Cold War era and the most recent involvement of the U.S. in the region in the name of the "War on Terror" have all contributed to and amplified political instability in the region. The malevolent attitudes of neighbouring governments toward one another, and the contrarian interest spheres of various political groups within the region also create constant volatility in an already conflict-prone region due to territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts and problems driven by the nomadic, tribal, pastoralist lifestyle of the indigenous peoples.

The imbalance (both externally and internally driven) is further exacerbated by economic factors including massive poverty and

environmental disasters. The presence of ideological and religious fundamentalism, which is both a cause and a consequence of political and economic problems, further deepens the crisis. The end result is a civilian population that is caught up in a protracted crisis in the Horn of Africa, having to endure significant hardship as a consequence.

4 Understanding Somalia

In order to grasp the span and reach of the long lasting conflict and highly complex political situation in Somalia, it is essential to understand the current characteristics of Somalia including its economic and social indicators. These features of the country are primarily the result of the protracted conflict, but also serve as an exacerbating impact on the tensions.

It is equally essential to understand the deeply embedded, customary social systems in the country, along with the traditional lifestyle, culture and religion of Somalia. These are the pillars of Somalia, some of which inherently include factors that serve as driving forces behind the conflict.

It is indispensable to have an understanding of the country's history, as it provides insights into how the conflict erupted, evolved and became ingrained in this country in the last two decades.

4.1 Characteristics of Somalia[7]

Somalia is the easternmost state on the Horn of Africa, bordering Ethiopia in the west, Kenya in the southwest and Djibouti in the north. It presents a sea border to the Gulf of Aden as well as to the Indian Ocean in the east.

Somalia is divided into seven main autonomous regions, including Somaliland; Puntland; Galmudug; Awdalland; Himan & Heeb; Kahtumo State and Azania/Jubaland. In 1991, Somaliland in the north self-proclaimed itself as a *de-facto* state. However, it is unrecognized as an independent state by the international community[8]. Instead, its official recognition is only as an

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[7] The data referenced in this sub-section has been taken from the CIA Factbook (CIA), unless otherwise cited.
[8] Somaliland presents itself as: a national government, separated from the rest of Somalia. It regards its formal links with Somalia to have been severed in 1991, and its independence was confirmed via a popular referendum in 2001. However, Somaliland's independence is not internationally recognised, despite it being argued

autonomous region within Somalia. Puntland, the second most important autonomous region of Somalia lies south of Somaliland. In 2012, the Khatumo State self-proclaimed itself on the territories of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn provinces which are disputed between Somaliland and Puntland. Awdalland is located north of Somaliland, in the northern tip of Somalia, while the rest of the regions are located in the Southern part of Somalia. Officially, the country is divided into 18 administrative regions, subdivided into districts.

Map 2 shows the main regions of Somaliland, Puntland (including the disputed area between the two regions) as well as the southern territories of Somalia.

Map 2: Somalia, including Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia (BBC 2013a)

As was discussed in Section 3.3, the population of Somalia is approximately 10 million, based on estimates as the last census took place in the country in 1975. The population is largely ethnic Somali. Minorities also live in the country, including Bantus as well as peoples of Arabic descent, and a very small group of Indians and Pakistanis.

It is worth noting that all the neighbouring countries accommodate large numbers of ethnic Somali populations, as shown in Table 3.

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to provide the most effective and democratic system of government in Somalia, according to Chatham House (Chatham House 2012, 5). The international community will not recognise Somaliland until the AU or Somalia does so. The AU fears that recognising Somaliland would set a precedent for independence aspirations "*in Cabinda in Angola, in Casamance in Senegal, and in Western Sahara on the Moroccan border*" (BBC Africa HYS 2011).

Country	Ethnic Somali Population (million)
Ethiopia	5.1
Kenya	2.3
Djibouti	0.464

Table 3: Ethnic Somali population in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti[9]

In light of the fact that the total population of Somalia is just above 10 million, it is remarkable that the neighbouring countries provide home to close to 8 million ethnic Somalis.

The vast majority of Somalis follow the Islamic faith. The Somalis are Sunni Muslims, who primarily belong to the Shaf'i sect. There is a very small Christian community in the country (Encyclopedia of the Nations). Traditionally, Islamic leaders only involved themselves in politics as it pertained to the settled clans. Among the nomadic clans, religious leaders were traditionally not an integral part of political leadership. In the 1950s and 1960s, political roles undertaken by religious leaders gradually diminished and a trend of secularisation became apparent. Following the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, the first radical Islamist groups were formed in the country. At the present time Somalia is officially a moderate Islamic state, which fights against fundamentalist groups.

The Somalis largely maintain a nomadic, pastoralist lifestyle. According to Jibrell, "*pastoral communities make up around 60 per cent of the Somali population*" (Jibrell 2011). The remainder of the population leads a settled lifestyle and focuses on agricultural activities on very limited arable land. They make a living by undertaking traditional professional occupations. Urbanisation keeps increasing due to environmental and extreme climatic challenges that the rural population is exposed to, including recurring droughts and floods. Accordingly, urbanisation reached 37% in 2010 and it is estimated to increase by 4.1% per annum until 2015 (CIA, Somalia).

As was referred to in Section 3.3, according to 2012 estimates, the population is very young; with the median age in the country being 17.8 years. Estimated life expectancy at birth is 50.8 years on average, with male life expectancy at birth being 48.86 years and female life expectancy at birth

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[9] Data of Table 3 originate from the following sources: Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2011, 21; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2009 and CIA Factbook, Djibouti section.

being 52.8 years. This data means that the Somalis have the seventh shortest lives in the world, in a comparison of 222 countries and territories globally, as of 2012. In 2001, literacy rate was very low as only 37.8% of the total population was literate. 49.7% of the literate population was male and only 25.8% was female (CIA, Somalia). *"Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI) value, (…), is strikingly low at 0.285 out of an ideal of 1. If internationally comparable data were available, Somalia would probably rank among the lowest in the world"* (UNDP 2012).

Economic activity in Somalia is largely based on an informal economy due to the protracted conflict in the country over the last two decades. Economic activity is mostly based on agriculture and livestock herding, including camels, cattle, goats and sheep by nomadic pastoralists. Livestock generally accounts for approximately 40% of the informal GDP and 50% of export revenue. Industry in the country is negligible. In addition to livestock, fish; charcoal and bananas are the key export products of Somalia, while sugar; sorghum; corn; qat and industrial goods constitute principal import items. The service sector is important with key areas of telecommunications and money transfer services being relatively sophisticated. The per capita GDP was estimated to be USD 600 in 2010 with an estimated growth rate of 2.6% (CIA, Somalia).

The above data shows that the country is in desperate poverty. Large proportion of the population relies on subsistence agriculture and livestock herding as well as remittances from expatriate Somalis. The structure of the economy is very basic and only serves the population with a simple lifestyle, experienced mostly under or very close to the poverty threshold. Nonetheless, entrepreneurial activity in urban centres ensures that certain modern services, e.g. telecommunication and money transfer are available in Somalia.   However, these services are oriented toward maintaining a connection with the Somali diaspora globally, rather than being reliable bellwethers of internal economic activity.

4.2 The Pillars of the Somali Culture

According to Gundel and Dharbaxo: *"the general description of the Somali traditional structures can analytically be divided into three core elements: (i) their traditional social structure: the segmentary lineage system or clan structure; (ii) their customary laws: the Xeer; and (iii) their traditional authorities or juridico-political structure"* (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 7).

The clan structure is one of the central elements of Somali lifestyle and culture. It is a rather embedded social system in the country, which evolved many centuries ago and it still serves as the basis of the Somali social fabric.

4.2.1 The Traditional Segmentary Lineage System

The social system of the nomadic, pastoralist population of Somalia is based on a kinship structure of patrilineal lineage type, which is known as a clan. "*Genealogies define the belonging of kinsmen to certain clans, according to the ancestor from whom they stem. The social contract defines the terms of the collective unity within and between the agnatic[10] clans*" (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 7). The collective unity of the clans also means that the clan is responsible for its members as well as the actions of clan members. The clans have different sub-categories as "*the segmentary lineage system can be differentiated into categories of clan family, sub-clan, primary lineage and mag-paying group as divisions of varying size*" (Lewis 1961, 4).

The most important elements of the lineage system is the clan family, the clan and the so-called *mag*-paying group:

1 **Clan Family:** The clan family is the umbrella term for a collective of clans. The genealogy of the clan family is not strictly defined and "*can count up to 30 generations to a common ancestor*" (Lewis 1961, 4). The clan family is always divided to clans.

2 **Clan:** The clan owns a distinct identity, which is based on the shared patrilineal descent of clan members, which may go back up to 20 generations. The clan acts as a social and political unit and tends to hold territorial rights based on their traditional and seasonal movements in line with the clan's nomadic and pastoralist lifestyle, if such is applicable to the given clan. Further, "*the clan is often led by a clan-head, but remains without centralised administration or government*" (Lewis 1961, 5). The clan is further divided into smaller groups, i.e. sub-clans and primary lineages and ultimately to *mag*-paying groups.

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[10] The world "agnatic" stems from "agnate", the definition of which is as follows: „*(i) a relative whose kinship is traceable exclusively through males; (ii) a paternal kinsman*" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary).

3 ***Mag*-Paying Group:** *Mag*[11] in Somali means blood-compensation, which is technically a financial compensation payable to the heirs of a victim of homicide and other crimes. Within a clan, "*the most basic and functional lineage unit is the mag-paying group*" (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 8) consisting of a few lineages only. The shared genealogy of these groups tends to reach back 4 to 8 generations and the group consists of a few hundred to a few thousand men, who are able to pay the *mag*. It is compulsory for the members of the *mag*-paying group to honour their commitment to this group, in return for which the individual members are protected by this group. This group is "*the most important level of social organisation for each individual*" (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 8) in Somalia.

Ethnic Somalis make up to 85% of the population in Somalia. The society is organised along the lines of the traditional segmentary lineage system. This population is perceived as relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity, culture and language. However, this homogenously perceived population is divided into two major groups. "*The majority of the population is composed of the ethnic nomadic-pastoralist Somalis, who speak Af-Maxaa-tiri (…). The other large group is composed of the mainly sedentary agro-pastoralist people, residing in the inter-riverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern Somalia. (…). They speak Af-Maay-tiri, which is quite distinct from Af-Maxaa-tiri*" (Yoshimura (ed.) 2009, 11).

The nomadic-pastoralist Somalis, who speak the Af-Maxaa-tiri dialect of the Somali language "*are united by a common mythological perception of direct lineal descent from the forefather Samaal and the household of the prophet Mohammed's Qurayshi clan, and specifically his cousin, Aqiil Bin Abi-Talib*" (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 5). This belief is generally widespread among the clan families of the Darood, Hawiya, Dir and Ishaak. However, the Ishaak is often perceived as part of the Dir. All of these clan families can be divided into several major and smaller groups from clans down to the *mag*-paying group.

The agro-pastoralist Somalis define themselves by a different identity. They commonly believe that they originate from the Somali forefather Saab. They belong to the Rahanweyn clan family, which encompasses two major

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[11] *Mag* in Somali is the equivalent of *Diya* (ضــياء) in Arabic. *Diya* is often used in the literature in the Somali context. In case of quotations, I have used the phrase preferred by the quoted source, therefore both phrases are used in this Thesis.

sub-clans, the Mirifle and the Digil. The clan structure of the Rahanweyn is unique in the sense that *"the segmentation at the larger units of the clan is one of the important features that make the Rahanweyn social organisation different. Their clans are composed of 4–7 jilib[12] that pays diya together. Hence the diya-paying group structure of the Rahanweyn is different as they pay diya collectively at a much higher level in their lineage structure than the pastoralists do"* (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, 30). This is due to the fact that this clan family tends to lead a settled agricultural lifestyle, as opposed to the nomadic-pastoralist lifestyle of the other clans. For this reason, their identity largely depends on the location, where they live as opposed to solely on the clan they belong to.

The size of the clan families as well as the smaller categories within the clan families is important, as size equates to strength. Accordingly, the Darood, who make up 20% of the population, are a powerful clan in Somalia. They are present in the northern territories as well as in South-Central Somalia. A Darood sub-clan constitutes almost the entire population of Puntland, while other sub-clans of the Darood are heavily represented in Somaliland. The Darood also inhabit South-Central Somalia, as well as the Gedo region. They are also heavily represented in the Somali population of Ethiopia and Kenya. The Hawiya populate the central and southern territories of Somalia, including the capital city, Mogadishu. 25% percent of the population of Somalia belong to the Hawiya. The Dir mostly live in Somaliland as well as in South-Central Somalia and they constitute 7% of the population. Nonetheless, the Ishaak, who are sometimes regarded as part of the Dir, is a much larger group, who make up 22% of the population. Together, the Dir and the Ishaak are very strong, constituting 29% of the population. The Rahanweyn groups, who populate the territories between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in the southern territories of the country make 20% of the population (University of Texas Libraries, 2002).

The remaining 6% of the population belong to minorities, who are sometimes referred to as a separate clan, particularly by Somalis. This is due to the fact that Somalis prefer everyone having a clan affiliation, as it is the generally accepted structure of the society.

Map 3 shows the distribution of the major clans in Somalia as well as the Somali-populated territories of neighbouring Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

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[12] The definition of *Jilib* is as follows: *"The basic independent jural unit"* in a Somali clan (I. I. Ahmed 1999, 113–127).

Colour Code	Ethic Group	Percentage of Population
	Hawiya	25%
	Darood	20%
	Dir	7%
	Rahanweyn-Mirifle	17%
	Rahanweyn-Digil	3%
	Ishaak	22%
No Colour	Other Ethnic Groups and Minorities	6%

Map 3: Somalia's clan families and major sub-clans (University of Texas Libraries 2002)

Minority groups are relatively diverse. One of the major minority groups is the Sab, who act traditionally as community bondsmen of the nomadic clans. They establish relations to a Somali clan through a patron. They are not allowed to marry Somali women, own land and livestock, maintain business ventures and participate in politics. Customarily they practice designated professions including construction and handicrafts. They speak their own language. They are divided into different groups, who live in the north and along the coastal territories around Mogadishu, Bossasso, Borama and Burco.

The Bantus constitute another important minority group. They tend to make a living through agriculture in the southern areas of Somalia. They speak the Bantu language. Somali clans aim to marginalise them due to them being different to ethnic Somalis in their appearance.

The third major minority group includes peoples of Arabic descent, who live along the coast of the country and are divided into small groups including the Benadiri, Barawani, Bajuni and Jaaji.

The Sheikhal is a non-ethnic minority, which covers of lineages of special, inherited religious status. The Sheikhal trace their descent to Sheikh Faqi Omar, a traveller, who visited all parts of Somalia and married various women throughout the country. At the present time they belong to the

Hawiya as they sought association with this strong Somali clan in the early 1990s.

The Asharaf is a similar minority, who currently belong to different clans. They regard themselves as descendants of prophet Mohammed's daughter, Fatima. They are teachers of Islam and maintain a special, religious status; therefore they tend to enjoy the protection of major clan families (Yoshimura (ed.) 2009, 14–20).

The above detailed segmentary lineage system is not robust. It is rather fluid and it is exposed to changes over time due to evolutionary tendencies, e.g. population changes and clan-based rivalry. Groups within clan families tend to unite or split due to these factors. A group may divide into two or more smaller groups, if each sub-group becomes capable of paying *mag* on behalf of its members. Groups within clan families may also unite if political circumstances or a decline in population require them to do so to secure their survival. In both cases the split or the united groups seek a new genealogical reference point as it is always important to trace a common ancestor in both the newly formed and in the newly united group.

The territorial distribution of the clans also changes over time. A large proportion of the clans lead a nomadic-pastoralist lifestyle. Weather conditions and environmental reasons prompt these groups to move over time, to secure suitable pastures. This lifestyle inherently creates rivalry among clans for the best available pasture. Conflicts erupt for territory (which manifest themselves in territorial disputes, as discussed in Section 3.7, 2 a), both between groups belonging to the same clan family and between clan families. Consequently, control over territory keeps changing, which creates rather fluid and porous borderlines among territories controlled by various groups.

4.2.2 Customary Laws

The Somali society is controlled and regulated by an ancient legal system, called *Xeer*, which had its origins in the pre-Islamic period. However, as Islam became the dominant religious system in the country, *Xeer* evolved and adopted elements of Islamic law. It is a traditional, orally-maintained legal system.

Traditionally, clans and sub-clans concluded agreements with each other, in which they stipulated the punishments to be imposed for committing certain crimes by their members. *Xeer* is the legal system, which is in place

to ensure that these agreements are honoured. Elders of each clan and sub-clan serve as judges. The system relies on the integrity of the elders, their mediating skills and their knowledge of *Xeer* agreements, and rulings in past cases. An elder is appointed based on hereditary reasons, knowledge, skill and reputation.

In case of a dispute between clans or sub-clans, elders of a neutral clan may mediate. In case of a crime committed by members of a given clan or sub-clan against another clan or sub-clan member, a trial takes place, where elders of both parties participate in equal number. The elders discuss the case and rule on the payable amount of *mag* based on *Xeer*. The victim's *mag*-paying group may be entitled to the *mag*, which has to be paid either in money, camels or livestock by the *mag*-paying group of the offender. Sometimes the circumstances of the case influence the ruling and the associated amount of *mag* to be paid. The objective of *Xeer* is to achieve stability and peace between conflicting clans and sub-clans.

Xeer is, at times, harsh and strict in its application. The system dis-advantages certain groups including women, small sub-clans, small lineages and minorities. According to the custom, the rights of individuals may also be sacrificed to create stability within the communities. "*While the Xeer is simultaneously a force for justice and social cohesion, it may also conflict with both international human rights standards and Islamic Sharia[13] law*" (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006, iii). Nonetheless, the Somali people respect *Xeer* and perceive it as a driving force for communities being held together (Lombard 2005).

4.2.3 Traditional Authorities

The role of the elders in traditional Somali society cannot be underestimated. Elders serve their communities by regulating the usage of scarce, shared resources, e.g. pastures and water. They also act as legislators and judges as well as points of liaison between the group they represent and other clans, sub-clans, lineages and *mag*-paying groups. They are the decision makers in all important matters. They aspire to achieve consensus and are attentive to

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[13] The definition of *Sharia* is as follows: "*Islamic law, the code of law derived from the Koran and from the teachings and example of Mohammed*" (Princeton University).

the greater good for the community, as opposed to attending to individual interests.

Elders may be of different levels, depending on the size of the group they represent. The elder of a clan family is more influential than the elder of a clan or a sub-clan. The highest level elders representing clans tend to have judicial roles, while the lower level elders representing *mag*-paying groups focus on keeping track "*of the whereabouts of their family members so that in case a group is obliged to pay blood compensation, they can find their members in order to have them pay their share*" (Yoshimura (ed.) 2009, 10).

4.3 Brief History of Somalia

Somalia has a long and diverse history, which can only be briefly discussed in this Thesis. Three major periods will be discussed below: (i) from the classical period to the end of the colonial era[14]; (ii) from the independence through the outbreak of the civil war and the collapse of the country[15]; and (iii) the recent history up to the present time[16].

4.3.1 From the Classical Era to the End of the Colonial Period

There is archaeological evidence that the land of modern-day Somalia was first inhabited in the Palaeolithic period. Artefacts, ruined cities, city walls and remains of pyramids suggest that a sophisticated civilisation was present in this land during ancient times. Several city-states flourished in the classical period, maintaining trade relationships with the Roman Empire, Phoenicia, Ptolemaic Egypt and Parthian Persia, amongst others.

In the Middle Ages, by way of international trade, Islam spread to Somalia from the Arabian Peninsula. Berbera and other port cities were exposed to Islamic influence and Mogadishu became a primary city of

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[14] The Classical Period is generally perceived to begin with the earliest-recorded Greek poetry of Homer (8th–7th Century BC), while the end of the colonial era in Somalia is taken to be 1960.

[15] Independence in Somalia was proclaimed in 1960, while the country collapsed in 1995.

[16] I discuss the recent historical events starting from 1998, when the first regions proclaimed their autonomy in pursuit of peace in the country. In my view, this is the start of the recent history of Somalia.

Islam. Several Somali cities established themselves as important trading centres, dominated by Muslim merchants.

One of these city-states, the Kingdom of Ifat located in the north of present-day Somalia, attacked the Kingdom of Shewa, an autonomous kingdom within the Christian Abyssinian Empire in 1270 (Gascoigne). This was an important war, as it became the first major episode of Abyssinian and Somali rivalry and associated wars between the Abyssinian Solomonic Empire and the Somali Kingdom of Ifat and later, the Adal Sultanate. Later, a notable episode of Abyssinian-Somali antagonism occurred during in the 16th Century, when Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi of the Adal Sultanate invaded Abyssinia with Ottoman support. Abyssinia requested the intervention of the Portuguese to stop the Muslim invasion. The fellow Christian Portuguese sent troops to Massawa in 1541. Following a long war, in 1543 the Portuguese and Ethiopian army jointly defeated the Somalis.

In parallel, the Ajuuraan Sultanate flourished as a merchant state in the lower Shabelle region of Somalia. The Ajuuraan Sultanate fought against both the Oromo and the Portuguese. In the 1580s, an expedition of the coastal city-states of Somalia and the Ottoman Empire attacked Portuguese colonies in South-East Africa. The Portuguese managed to overcome the attacks and gained control over several coastal cities in Somalia. Partially due to the Portuguese control, the Ajuuraan Sultanate disintegrated in the 17th Century. Later, successor states were established in this region, including the powerful Geledi Sultanate (Somalia in Context).

In the 19th Century, the European powers started the "*Scramble for Africa*" (as defined in section 3.4), The British entered into treaty relationships with various sultanates in the northern region of Somalia, in particular with the Warsangali Sultanate and established a protectorate over the territories that they renamed to British Somaliland in 1888. The aim of the British was to "*secure a supply market, check the traffic in slaves, and to exclude the interference of foreign powers*" (Samatar 1989). In particular, the supply chain to British-Indian troops stationed in Aden was ensured from the port cities of British Somaliland. In parallel with the colonialist appearance of the British in Somalia, Mohamed Abdullah Hassan established the Somali Sunni Islamic State, (aka Dervish State). The Dervish State fought against both Abyssinia over the Ogaden and led a resistance movement against Western colonial powers, in particularly the British. It carried out four successful offensives against the British, but ultimately suffered a massive defeat when the British deployed aerial bombardment against the Dervish army in 1920. Subsequently, the territories of the Dervish State became a

British protectorate (Somalia in Context). At around the same time of establishing control and later colonising British Somaliland, the British gained control over the territory of East Africa, stretching from the Indian Ocean toward Uganda and the Great Rift Valley. In 1920, the British established the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in order to administer the territories (Gascoigne). This colony included a region, the Northern Frontier District, which was largely inhabited by ethnic Somali communities.

In order to mitigate the risk of the expansion of British dominance in the region, the French entered into treaty relationships with governing Somali and Afar sultans in the Obock Region. In 1896, the French colonised these territories under the name of French Somaliland (Somalia in Context).

Italy entered into similar pacts with the Sultanate of Hobyo and the Majertain Sultanate in 1888 to ensure its access to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Italy colonised Eritrea in 1890 and also had colonial aspirations in Abyssinia, which were resisted by the emperor of Abyssinia, Menelik II. Consequently, in 1895 the first Italo–Ethiopian War broke out, with Abyssinia being supported by Russia and France. In 1896, during the Battle of Adwa, Italy suffered a devastating defeat by Menelik II. Britain sought the neutrality of Abyssinia and therefore concluded border agreements with the emperor with regards to the largely Somali-inhibited Ogaden region, which thereby became a protectorate of Abyssinia. At that time, the Haud region remained under British protection.

Later, in 1936, Italy again attempted to colonise Abyssinia by invading the country. The Abyssinian Emperor, Haile Selassie I fought against Italian occupation. Arising from this the Second Italo-Abyssinian War broke out. Additionally, Italy occupied British Somaliland in 1940, which became part of Italian East Africa. However, as the Italians entered the Second World War in 1940, the British launched the British East Africa Campaign against Italy. British forces regained control over British Somaliland, while joint Abyssinian and British forces liberated Abyssinia. Following the acknowledgement of Abyssinian sovereignty, the British gained control over the Ogaden, Eritrea and the former Italian Somaliland. Thereafter, the British sought to establish Greater Somalia (Gascoigne). *"In 1946, Ernest Bevin, then British Foreign Secretary, proposed that "British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, should be combined together as trust territory, so that the nomads could lead their frugal existence"* (Resolve Ogaden Coalition). His proposal was not accepted and a large part of the Ogaden, which had a very sizeable Somali population, was transferred to Abyssinia in 1948. The Haud still remained under British control, up until

1954, when the British withdrew their military presence from the area. Following this, the Haud was ceded to Abyssinia, and became a highly disputed border territory between Abyssinia and Somalia (Gascoigne).

Following the Italian defeat in the region, the former Italian Somaliland fell under British administration too, until 1949. Afterwards, it became a United Nations trusteeship as the Trust Territory of Somalia, under Italian administration. In 1960, Italian Somaliland achieved independence as the State of Somalia, which then united with the Trust Territory of Somalia. The unification of the State of Somalia and the Trust Territory of Somalia took place in 1960 and the independent Republic of Somalia was established. At that time, the British declared their objective that all Somali communities would be unified. Nonetheless, in 1963, when Kenya gained independence from the British, the largely Somali-inhibited Northern Frontier District was granted to Kenya instead of Somalia. In parallel, French Somaliland became an overseas territory of France following a referendum in 1958, as opposed to becoming part of the Somali Republic. This was in line with the preferences of the resident Afar ethnic group and the resident French community. In 1967 a second referendum was held. At that time the resident Somali community voted for independence with the final objective being unification with Somalia. However, due to massive vote rigging, the territory remained under the influence of France for further 10 years. In 1977 it became independent as the Republic of Djibouti and the Greater Somalia dream of the resident Somali community evaporated.

4.3.2 From Independence to the Collapse of the Country[17]

Independence for the Republic of Somalia was proclaimed on 1 July 1960 with Aden Abdullah Osman Daar and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke appointed as the first President and first Prime Minister, respectively.

The country "*embarked on independence with a strong sense of national identity*" (Meredith 2006, 464). The dream of Greater Somalia appeared on the Somali flag of a five-point white star emblem on light blue background, representing the five segments of the Somali nation. At independence, three of these segments were outside of the country as ethnic Somali territories remained with French Somaliland and were granted to Ethiopia (the Ogaden and the Haud) and Kenya (the Northern Frontier District). Thus, "*it*

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[17] This section is largely based on Meredith (Meredith 2006).

remained the overriding ambition of Somali nationalists to establish a "Greater Somalia", reuniting Somali communities in the "lost lands" (Meredith 2006, 465). In line with this desire, the Somali government refused to acknowledge the assigned borders, in particular the Somali-Ethiopian and the Somali-Kenyan borders. It did not recognise Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden and the Haud and Kenyan sovereignty over the Northern Frontier District.

In the 1960s, the Somali government began supporting insurgent forces in the Ogaden and in the Northern Frontier District. Consequently, several border conflicts occurred. In parallel, the Somali government entered into negotiations with the United States, West Germany and Italy about the establishment of an army. As Western powers were only willing to arm and train a small army capable of maintaining internal security, the Somalis took advantage of an offer from the SU of helping to establish an army of 10,000 men and a small air force, in 1963 (Meredith 2006, 466). In the same year, the Shifta War broke out, in which ethnic Somalis of the Northern Frontier District fought for secession from Kenya and unification with Somalia.

At the 1967 national elections Shermarke defeated Daar and became the second President of the country. He appointed Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal as Prime Minister. The change in leadership helped to settle the conflict in the Northern Frontier District due to Egal's disposition of disarming rebel groups and creating peace in Somalia. Accordingly, the Shifta War ended in 1967, when the newly appointed Somali Prime Minister, Egal, signed the Arusha Memorandum about an official ceasefire between the two countries.

In 1969, President Shermarke was assassinated and a military coup d'état took place on 21 October 1969. Other than the assassination, it proved to be a bloodless coup. Major General Mohammed Siyad Barre (widely known as "Comrade Siyad") seized power. Siyad proclaimed the Somali Democratic Republic a Marxist state and launched a large-scale nationalisation campaign. He strengthened ties with the Arab world, (ultimately joining the Arab League in 1974). At the same time, Siyad invited a large number of Soviet political and military advisors to Somalia. Also, the SU provided massive military aid to the country. Somalia therefore *"acquired an army of 37,000 men, heavy artillery and a modern air force equipped with jet fighters"* (Meredith 2006, 467). This was the result of the SU taking a strategic interest in the country and regarding Somalia as a base to spread communist ideology from, into the wider region.

In 1976, Siyad established the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), the ideology of which was based on scientific socialism and Islamic

principles. This was an attempt to reconcile politics with religion by adapting Marxist principles to the local culture. Siyad's dictatorship was based upon the supremacy of the party while the traditional principles of clan-based loyalty were abandoned. The regime became increasingly brutal over time.

In the meantime, in Ethiopia, a Marxist-communist takeover took place in 1974 and Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power. In 1976, Ethiopia signed a military assistance agreement with the SU and broke ties with its former ally, the United States. The Marxist-communist takeover faced with widespread resistance throughout the country and the country fell into turmoil. Siyad recognised a window of opportunity when the Ethiopian army was occupied with internal matters and attempted to annex the Ogaden to Somalia. By the end of the year, the Somali army controlled almost the entire region, including strategic cities such as the regional capital, Jijiga. However, after the siege of Harar, the SU intervened on the side of Ethiopia. A large number of Soviet and Cuban troops were deployed in the Ogaden, which ultimately resulted in the crushing defeat of Somalia in 1978.

Following the defeat in the Ogaden, officers from the Majertain clan of the Darood attempted to overthrow Siyad. The attempted coup was crushed, but several organisers fled to Ethiopia, where they established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and launched a guerrilla war against the regime. A northern group, organised by the Ishaak in former British Somaliland, the Somali National Movement (SNM), also embarked on a resistance movement. In response, Siyad introduced harsh military measures and stirred up clan rivalry. He supported pro-government clans with money and arms, in particular his own sub-clan, the Marehan of the Darood. He assigned key government positions to his fellow sub-clan members (Meredith 2006, 467).

As the SU betrayed Somalia, Siyad expelled the Russians from the country and sought support from the United States. The United States then formed a partnership with Somalia and provided military assistance to the country, which enabled Somalia to establish the largest army in the Horn of Africa. "*During the 1980s, the United States provided USD 800 million worth of aid, one quarter of it in military assistance, gaining in return military access to ports and airfields. Italy contributed USD 1 billion, half of it in military supplies. (…) Foreign aid became the main prop of Siyad's regime, used to ensure that his cronies and clan allies were rewarded and enriched*" (Meredith 2006, 468).

In 1988, Siyad concluded an agreement with Ethiopia in which he agreed with Mengistu that both governments would refrain from supporting the

opposition of one another. Siyad's pact with the archenemy was regarded as a betrayal of the country by many Somalis. Consequently, insurgents gained massive support from the population. The SNM laid siege to the regional capital, Harageisha in the north. Siyad responded with aerial bombardment, which resulted in the murder of large numbers of the civilian population. Estimations suggest that 50,000 people died in Harageisha and 650,000 fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti (Healy 2010). Nonetheless, the insurgent forces remained active in the region.

As the Cold War was approaching to its end, the U.S. lost interest in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, support of Siyad's regime started to gradually decrease. The U.S. suspended military aid in 1988. In 1989, economic aid was terminated, too. The lack of Western support resulted in Siyad's power diminishing. The country started to disintegrate into regions controlled by clans and warlords. "*Ogadenis of the Darood formed the Somali Patriotic Movement. The Hawiya, inhabiting central regions of the country including Mogadishu, formed the United Somali Congress (USC). The army splintered into rival factions. Banditry, extortion and lawlessness became commonplace*" (Meredith 2006, 469).

Due to these developments, Siyad lost control over the country by 1990, except for Mogadishu. However, the capital city was threatened, too, by one of Siyad's opponents, General Muhammed Farah "Aideed", the military leader of the USC. In January of 1991, Siyad was driven out of Mogadishu by Aideed's forces. Following this, the USC's political leader, Ali Mahdi Mohammed of the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiya proclaimed himself as the head of the new government of Somalia. Aideed, the military leader of the USC did not allow this, which led to an armed conflict between the two wings of the USC. As a result of this armed rivalry within the USC, Mogadishu was turned into a battlefield.

In parallel, the SNM in the northwest proclaimed the independence of Somaliland and its separation from Somalia, within its 1960 borders. In the south, Siyad and Aideed engaged in a battle for the region of the Rahanweyn clan. Although, Siyad attempted to regain control over Mogadishu on two occasions, he was defeated by Aideed's militia. Ultimately he was forced to flee the country in 1992, leaving behind a complete collapse in Somalia. *Four months of fighting in Mogadishu alone (…) killed an estimated 25 thousand people, 1.5 million people fled the country and at least 2 million were internally displaced.* "*In the midst of drought, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, asset stripping, 'clan-cleansing' and the*

disruption of food supplies caused a famine in which an estimated 250,000 died" (Healy 2010).

In 1992, a ceasefire between Aideed and Mahdi in Mogadishu presented an opportunity for the United Nations to intervene in Somalia. On 24 April 1992, the UN established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), under the direction of an Algerian diplomat, Mohamed Sahnoun. After months of negotiations, Aideed agreed to the deployment of ceasefire monitors and a security force of 500 Pakistani troops. In the meantime, militias were fighting for control over the country, collecting ransom for relief supplies, looting property and humanitarian aid including food supplies. Shanoun attempted to establish dialogue among militia leaders and encouraged reconciliation among clans. Nonetheless, his efforts did not result in success, due to the lack of resources and support from UN headquarters. The famine produced more and more victims and by the end of 1992, it was estimated that 300,000 people had died from war and famine in Somalia. Shanoun became very critical of the UN and was abruptly dismissed for "*making high-profile complaints*" (Meredith 2006, 474).

Following Shanoun's dismissal, international aid agencies started to call for military intervention in Somalia. At this point, a hard-line strategy was preferred by UN leadership. Ismat Kittani, an Iraqi diplomat who represented the UN's preferred strategy in Somalia, was appointed to run UNOSOM. The U.S. was ready to support this strategy by offering military intervention in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in Somalia. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorised a UN force (UNITAF) to secure Somalia for humanitarian operations. UNITAF was lead by the United States, with them providing 28,000 troops, which were later augmented by further 17,000 personnel from over 20 countries. The mission was given the name "*Operation Restore Hope*" (United Nations 1997). The first troops of Operation Restore Hope arrived in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. Somalis welcomed the arrival of the UN troops and trusted that order would be shortly restored to the streets of Mogadishu. However, in line with a "*zero casualties*" (Meredith 2006, 477) objective there was no attempt to disarm the militias. This led to Somalis believe that "*Operation Restore Hope was little more than a cynical deal between the U.S. and the warlords to allow the U.S. to withdraw with minimum difficulty once relief supplies were assured*" (Meredith 2006, 477).

Nevertheless, UNITAF lasted for five months and it managed to establish relative peace in Mogadishu. Further, its presence created an opportunity for political negotiations, the result of which was the signing of a ceasefire

agreement by various warlords and clans in 1993. The agreement included provisions for complete disarmament and empowerment of the UN to take action against non-compliant militias. *"UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, (…) a secure environment had not yet been established and incidents of violence continued. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organised civilian police and no disciplined national army"* (United Nations 1997).

After the completion of the mission, UNOSOM II was launched. It was given the mandate to *"take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. (…) UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order"* (United Nations 1996). It was a more ambitions initiative than the first UNOSOM mission and it was expected to establish a new government, police force and legal system and aimed to rebuild the economy. In order to achieve this, a new multinational mission was established including 28,000 peacekeeping troops and approximately 3,000 civilian personnel from 23 countries.

When UNOSOM II was launched on 4 May 1993, *"Aideed became increasingly convinced that its mandate was directed principally at his own militia rather than any other"* (Meredith 2006, 479). He then launched propaganda against the UN on his radio station called Radio Aideed. On 5 June 1993, Pakistani troops attempted to carry out an audit on one of Aideed's weapons caches, which happened to house Radio Aideed. Aideed's militia believed that the purpose of the audit was to shut down the radio station and consequently attacked the Pakistani troops. The attack was followed by aggression against a patrol and a food distribution centre. The attacks resulted in the death of 26 peacekeepers (Meredith 2006, 479–480).

The incident prompted a declaration of war on Aideed. For four months, battles were fought between UNOSOM troops and Aideed's militias on the streets of Mogadishu. UNOSOM troops used combat aircraft and heavy artillery to destroy the weapons of the militias. Radio Aideed was duly destroyed and a massive manhunt commenced for Aideed. This was followed by a major attack on a gathering of Aideed's associates including clan elders. U.S. marines attacked the site of the gathering with helicopters equipped with missiles and cannons, murdering everyone in the building. The operation was regarded as a major stain upon the UN's reputation.

As Aideed was not present in the high profile gathering, the manhunt continued. However, raids remained unsuccessful in finding Aideed. On 3 October, based on intelligence form a Somali informer, 160 special forces were deployed in Aideed's territory. The troops were faced with enormous resistance on the streets. Consequently, they lost several helicopters, 18 soldiers died and 73 troops were seriously injured. The operation that had been due to last for an hour turned into a 15-hour anguish, which resulted in a catastrophic defeat for the U.S. army (Meredith 2006, 482–483), albeit the Somali losses were even more devastating.

On 6 October 1993, President Clinton terminated the involvement of the U.S. in Somalia and the decision was made that all U.S. forces must be withdrawn by 31 March 1994. In line with the American withdrawal, other participating governments also decided on the pullout from Somalia. UNOSOM II collapsed and all international forces left Somalia by March, 1995[18] (Meredith 2006, 484).

4.3.3 Recent History

Following the departure of UNOSOM II the civil war stagnated. Local political processes gradually resumed. Some clans returned to their traditional institutions including the authority of elders and *Xeer*, and attempted to end violence in their territories. "*The most successful and sustained of these processes took place in the secessionist Somaliland state. Elsewhere, the Rahanweyn clans of Bay and Bakool region created a Governing Council to administer their regions*" (Healy 2010). These attempts to create local governance structures set a precedent in the country. "*In 1998 Puntland Federal State of Somalia was established in the northeast as an autonomously governed region*" (Healy 2010). In the same year, Jubaland also proclaimed independence. *In 1999 the Rahanweyn Resistance*

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[18] The catastrophic failure in Somalia resulted in a significant change in U.S. foreign policy. The Clinton administration set strict conditions on U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. Notably, it tied U.S. involvement to vital national interests and all such missions were required to have defined size, scope and duration. Further, U.S. involvement was tied to there being an existing ceasefire among all parties in conflict, sufficient political will behind the mission and a clear exit strategy. The failure in Somalia led to further catastrophes in the region including the non-interference into the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the delayed deployment of U.S. miliary support in the Balkans in 1995.

Army (RRA), with Ethiopian backing, won control of Bay and Bakool regions and also established an administration" (Healy 2010). In Mogadishu, governing institutions were set up including the council of elders and *Sharia* courts, which created relative calm in the capital. This was accompanied by limited economic development, fuelled by remittances from the Somali diaspora and trade. Successful business ventures were set up by local entrepreneurs, e.g. money transfer systems and telecommunications services to facilitate the Somali diaspora's remittances into the country. Islamic charities provided aid and funding to business ventures, which contributed to the spread of Islamic institutions and movements, too.

As Western governments withdrew from Somalia, regional powers involved themselves and attempted to broker various peace agreements. Ethiopia was one of these powers, the intentions of which were driven by its own security concerns and economic interests. In terms of regional security, Al Itihad Al Islamiya[19], an armed Islamist group in Somalia was of a particular concern to Ethiopia due to its regional aspirations. In 1997, Ethiopia destroyed Al Itihad camps by force. In the same year, Ethiopia attempted to mediate among Somali factions in Sodere. This failed attempt was followed by further mediation efforts by Egypt, Libya, Yemen and the Arab League. Nonetheless, the attempts remained unsuccessful and the regional tensions in the Horn of Africa contributed to the maintenance of instability in Somalia. *"After 1998 the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea gave a new impetus to the destabilisation of Somalia. Eritrea supported Somali factions opposed to those aligned with Ethiopia, introducing a new element of proxy war to an already crowded arena"* (Healy 2010) (as described in detail in Section 3.6).

As mediation by third parties did not lead to any substantial result, Ethiopia tried to handle the Somali situation with a new approach by advocating for the so-called Building-Block Strategy (IRIN 1999). In line with the example of separatist Somaliland and autonomous Puntland and Jubaland, Ethiopia promoted support for small, regional entities as a first step. In the longer term, Ethiopia envisaged a federation or a confederation of these small authorities. This approach served Ethiopian interests well, as

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[19] The organisation, headquartered in Kismayo in Somalia, was active between 1994 and 2006. Amongst other ventures, it carried out operations in the Ogaden, in Ethiopia; in Kenya and in Tanzania. It was designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States in 2001 due to ties to al-Qaeda. In 2006, it was dissolved and its leaders joined other insurgent groups in Somalia or moved to Yemen.

the country preferred a contained and calm situation in its direct neighbourhood, while maintaining a weak Somalia.

Arab countries opposed the Ethiopian idea and advocated for a national reconciliation process and the formation of a national government. Not only outside regional powers, but Somalis remained divided on the best way to tackle the conflict. As such, the Hawiya leaders supported the idea of the central state while the Darood endorsed the establishment of a secular federal state.

In 1999, Djibouti presented itself as mediator, which led to the Somalia National Peace Conference, hosted in Arta in 2000. The conference, which became known as the Arta Process achieved the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG), which gained both international and national backing. Further, the Arta Process introduced a proportional representation system in the conference as well as in the TNG, which was based on the "4.5 formula", (so named because it involved the four major clans [the 4.x] i.e. Darood, Hawiya, Dir/Ishaak and Rahanweyn being allocated an equal number of seats in the TNG, while minorities and women were allocated half [the x.5] of the seats granted to a major clan). The formula was in effect a power sharing arrangement (Healy 2010). The TNG, with the leadership of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, was the first legitimate government of the country since the collapse of the Somalia. The TNG was supported by the UN and the Arab League. Nonetheless, as the concept was not in line with the desires of Ethiopia, it withheld backing for the TNG.

At the outset, the TNG was a vehicle filled with optimism. Nonetheless, it soon proved to be a concentration of power in the hands of the Hawiya clan and it became associated with corruption. Ethiopian efforts of supporting an opposition group, called the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) also weakened the TNG. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and the subsequent declaring of a "War on Terror," by the George W. Bush administration, Somalia ended up at the centre of Western attention, due to suspicions of it providing a safe haven to terrorists associated with al-Qaeda. Distrust in the TNG increased as intelligence revealed its ties to militant Islamists.

In 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) became involved in the situation, in its capacity as a mediator. The organisation attempted to align the objectives of the TNG with those of the SRRC during a two-year long reconciliation process hosted by Kenya. As a result, the TNG was replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 (Healy 2010). The proposition of the TFG was materially

different to that of the TNG. It sought a federalist future for Somalia and was dominated by the Darood. Further, the TFG enjoyed the backing of Ethiopia. The elected President of the TFG was Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed from the Darood clan, who appointed Ali Mohamad Ghedi from the Hawiya clan as Prime Minister of the TFG. As such, the TFG represented a clan-spanning coalition.

In the meantime, several Islamic groups came on the scene in Somalia, ranging from traditional religious organisations to strict and extremist movements. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged from the group of individual *Sharia* courts and entered the political arena as a major rival power of the TFG. The ICU enjoyed backing from Eritrea and foreign Islamist groups. In response to the growing influence of the ICU, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) was formed in Mogadishu, by warlords, businessmen and TFG ministers. The ICU clashed with the ARPCT several times over the first half of 2006 in Mogadishu, which led to the ICU's victory and assumption of power in the capital city (Hettyey 2008, 99). Subsequently, the ICU captured Jowhar, Balad and Hobyo and the autonomous region of Galmudug. Later in 2006 the ICU managed to gain control over Harardhere and Kismayo, which meant that in effect, the organisation took control over the central and southern territories of Somalia.

At this stage, the ICU won considerable support from the pubic due to creating relative security and order in Mogadishu. The ICU reopened the international airport and seaport of Mogadishu and proceeded to offer basic services in the capital city (Hettyey 2008, 99). Also, the ICU ousted the pirates from Hobyo and Harardhere as piracy became widespread off the coast of the country. The organisation thereby attempted to restore order in the country and proposed an alternative governance system to the TFG.

The Arab League attempted to mediate between the TFG and the ICU. However, "*during the negotiations the ICU was building up their military strength and threatening the TFG*" (Aideed 2007, 2). Therefore, a war between the parties became unavoidable. The TFG invited Ethiopian troops to provide military backing to the government. Heavy fighting erupted between the ICU and the TFG, supported by Ethiopian forces.

As a result, the ICU lost Baidoa, Bandiradley and Beledweyne. Shortly afterwards, the leadership of the ICU capitulated in Jowhar and withdrew from Mogadishu. By the end of 2006 Ethiopian and TFG troops regained control of Jilib. Thereafter the ICU abandoned Kismayo and Galmudug was re-conquered. In the meantime, the U.S. deployed an air presence and killed

al-Qaida members embedded within the ICU. This happened in parallel with imposing a naval blockade and a border patrol between Kenya and Somalia by Kenyan and U.S. forces. Some of the leadership of ICU escaped to Eritrea, where they established the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Healy 2010). At the same time, ICU militiamen went into hiding and divided into factions.

In January 2007 the TFG established its seat of government at Villa Somalia in Mogadishu. In February, the UN-authorised 8000-man strong AMISOM peacekeeping mission, initially provided by the Ugandan army, was deployed to Somalia to protect the TFG, with a six-month mandate[20] (AMISOM). The Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi resigned over disputes with the President, with him being replaced by Nur Hassan Hussein.

In parallel, factions of ICU troops reorganised themselves and formed the so-called Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM) (aka Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen or shortly al-Shabaab). Al-Shabaab embarked on the route of indiscriminate, guerrilla style insurgency from 2007 onwards. Al-Shabaab radicalized recruits and pledged *jihad*[21] against the TFG, Ethiopia and AMISOM peacekeepers. Al-Shabaab was alleged to have received substantial support from Eritrea, Djibouti, Iran Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even from the Hezbollah in Lebanon (Stanford University 2012). Al-Shabaab initially gained support from some of the population, especially in southern Somalia as the group provided charity and a promise to restore order. It managed to gradually expand its control by capturing Kismayo. Subsequently it gained control over southern Somalia, except for Mogadishu, in 2008. In parallel, the group carried out bomb attacks in Bosaso in Puntland and Harageisha in Somaliland. In 2008, the open antagonism between al-Shabaab and the Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ), a moderate, Sufi Islamic group, emerged as al-Shabaab destroyed ancient Sufi monuments and thereby attacked ASWJ.

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[20] The mandate of AMISOM was extended up to the present time. The forces were also upscaled to 17,731 troops in the first quarter of 2013 (AMISOM).
[21] *Jihad* (جهاد) is an Arabic word. The definition of *jihad* is as follows: „*The literal meaning of jihad is struggle or effort. Muslims use the word jihad to describe three different kinds of struggle: (i) a believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible; (ii) the struggle to build a good Muslim society; (iii) holy war: the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary*" (BBC 2009). In the current context, interpretation of *jihad* as a holy war is applicable.

As al-Shabaab was in the process of expansion, peace talks were started between the TFG and the ARS's moderate wing in Djibouti, mediated by the UN. The peace conference was significant as the parties agreed on an 11-point peace agreement. Notably, the parties consented to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia as of 25 January 2009. The parties also gave their consent to the deployment of an international stabilisation force from the UN. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed resigned "*paving the way for the creation of a new TFG under the presidency of the former Chair of the ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed*" (Healy 2010). The agreement enabled the formation of a moderate, Islamic interim government in Somalia backed by most of the national powers and the international community, under the leadership of the moderate former ICU leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Hettyey 2012, 16). The President appointed Oman Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as Prime Minister.

Despite the points of progress the radical wing of the ARS refused to agree with the TFG and pledged a continued insurgency against the government. Three smaller successor factions of the ICU – Jabhatul Islamiya, Muaskar Ras Kamboni and Muaskar Anole – are known to have joined the radical wing of ARS in an endeavour to overthrow the TFG. They formed Hizbul Islam (HI), a radical Islamist group and continued the fight against the TFG. However, an internal power struggle took place within the group, which ultimately resulted in part of HI surrendering to the TFG, while another part of it engaged in armed conflict with al-Shabaab over the control of Kismayo. Ultimately the remainder of HI allied with al-Shabaab (Hettyey 2012, 72).

Al-Shabaab in the meantime declared war on Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and captured Baidoa. Allied HI and al-Shabaab forces launched attacks on Mogadishu, which resulted in the group taking over sizeable territories in the capital city. In parallel, al-Shabaab carried out bombing attacks in Beledweyne, as well as against military bases of AMISOM. In the controlled territories, al-Shabaab imposed an extremely strict regime on the population in line with the strictest interpretation of Islam, basing its rule on fear and repression. Further, the group declared *jihad* on all Israeli interests in Africa and carried out suicide attacks in Mogadishu killing three ministers of the TFG and a large number of civilians (Stanford University 2012).

In 2010, insurgency by al-Shabaab continued and the group declared that it was extensively connected to al-Qaeda. The TFG entered into agreement with ASWJ, which pledged to provide its military troops to the fight against al-Shabaab in exchange for political participation in the TFG. In the

meantime, al-Shabaab carried out car bomb attacks on TFG ministers and government officials. It further carried out bomb attacks in Kampala, killing 74 people, as an open attack against Uganda, for providing troops for AMISOM (Stanford University 2012). Consequently, the AU expanded AMISOM's mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement with authorisation from the UN. This was followed by attacks carried out by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, killing several hundred civilians. In late 2010, after a decisive defeat of HI troops in Hiiraan by the government and its allies, HI's main factions merged with al-Shabaab.

At the same time, TFG's Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke resigned due to a dispute with the President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed over the constitution of the country. After his resignation, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" was appointed as Prime Minister. He downsized the Cabinet and named new Cabinet members. Additionally he enacted administrative reforms. During this period the government and allied forces managed to secure control over the majority of Mogadishu and AMISOM was expanded.

In 2011 al-Shabaab started to gradually lose to allied governmental, ASWJ and AMISOM troops territories in Galguduud and Gedo regions. The group also lost a number of high-ranking officials in the fight and its funding and resources started to dwindle.

In the meantime, the original tenure of the TFG was approaching an end. Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" resigned as of 19 June, 2011 as part of the provisions of the Kampala Accord, i.e. an agreement about the postponing of the presidential elections for one year and thereby extending the tenure of the TFG (All Africa 2012). Shortly after the promulgation of the Kampala Accord, the UN declared famine in Somalia (United Nations News Centre 2011). The newly appointed Prime Minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali set up a national committee for the handling of the severe drought hitting Somalia. He also announced the set-up of special forces, which were tasked with securing aid and relief shipments to the famine-hit areas in the country. Al-Shabaab banned several relief agencies from operating in the areas it controlled. AMISOM interfered and scaled up its activities in the areas hit by draught and famine.

In August of that year, Mogadishu was re-conquered by TFG and AMISOM forces, following which an ideological split took place within the leadership of al-Shabaab. In October, a joint operation of Somali government troops and Kenyan military, Operation Linda Nchi, commenced in the Juba Valley following the kidnap and murder of aid workers and

tourists in Kenya by al-Shabaab (Hettyey 2012, 20). With encouragement from IGAD, Ethiopia deployed troops to assist Operation Linda Nchi. In the meantime, Eritrea was accused of supplying arms to al-Shabaab. Although Eritrea dismissed the charges, it was condemned by the UN, which was followed by the imposition of severe sanctions on the country. Later that year, TFG forces, with Ethiopian military assistance, regained control over Beledweyne.

2012 commenced with fights in the outskirts of Mogadishu, which were re-captured by AMISOM forces. The Kenyan forces of Operation Linda Nchi were integrated into AMISOM on 22 February 2012 (AMISOM). In parallel, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali devised the "Roadmap for the End of Transition", a political process leading to the establishment of permanent democratic institutions in Somalia upon expiry of the mandate of the TFG. The political arrangements preparing the transition were discussed and accepted in Garowe by the TFG, the Transitional Federal Parliament, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug, ASWJ and the Civil Society (UNPOS 2011). It was agreed that a new 225-member bicameral parliament would be elected[22]. It was confirmed that 30% of the seats would be reserved for women[23]; the President would be elected and the Prime Minister would be appointed by the President, who would name his Cabinet. Over the summer the constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia was drafted and approved. The FGS received recognition from the UN, the AU and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

While the preliminary arrangements of the transition to the new governance model took place, the U.S. launched several drone attacks[24] on al-Shabaab and killed a number of its leaders. Subsequently, the ideological split within the group grew and a sizeable number of its troops fled to Yemen. Ethiopian forces captured Baidoa. In the spring, grenade attacks

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[22] The formation of the upper house is currently pending. It will include 54 senators upon establishment.

[23] The 30% participation of women did not materialise. Approximately 30 female parlamentarians were elected by clan elders, which constiute 15% of the Somali Federal Parliament (Abdi 2012).

[24] Drone attacks are carried out by UAVs, which is an acronym for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, commonly known as a drone. The UAV "*is an aircraft with no pilot on board. UAVs can be remote controlled aircraft (e.g. flown by a pilot at a ground control station) or can fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans or more complex dynamic automation systems*" (The UAV).

were carried out by an al-Shabaab member in Nairobi, which killed several people in the Kenyan capital (Stanford University 2012).

As per the "Roadmap for the End of Transition", the tenure of the TFG ended as of 20 August 2012 and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established (Mosley 2012, 3). The presidential elections were held on 10 September, when the 225 Members of Parliament were selected by 135 traditional elders and vetted by a Technical Selection Committee (United Nations SC 2013, 1). The Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President in a reasonably transparent and fair election process held for the first time on Somali soil following the two decades of conflict in the country. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud named Abdi Farah Shirdon as the Prime Minister of Somalia in October 2012, following a consultative process. Abdi Farah Shirdon thereafter named the 10-member Cabinet including two female ministers along with 5 state ministers and 20 deputy ministers in November 2012. The Cabinet proposed an action plan to tackle the challenges of the reconstruction of the country. In line with the action plan, the President outlined a "*six-pillar policy framework*" (United Nations SC 2013, 1) which included the following elements:

1   Stabilisation;
2   Peace building and reconciliation;
3   Economic recovery;
4   Collaborative international relations;
5   The delivery of services to the people;
6   Unity and integrity of the country.

The Parliament approved its own rules of procedure and a four-year strategic plan. The Cabinet issued its "*programme of work, which is focused on strengthening security sector institutions, reinforcing governance structures, promoting national reconciliation, building good-neighbourly relations and consolidating socioeconomic infrastructure*" (United Nations SC 2013, 2). Furthermore, "*it also established 15 parliamentary committees with elected chairpersons, vice-chairpersons and secretaries*" and "*the Parliament has identified eleven projects aimed at enhancing its capacity, including the establishment of a functional Secretariat. It has outlined its legislative agenda, which has been shared with the Government*" (African Union 2013). The FGS also took measures to establish functioning institutions of good governance. Accordingly, it reorganised the leadership and management of financial authorities including the Central Bank, the

Office of the Accountant-General and the Office of the Auditor-General. In line with these measures, the government tightened the control over public revenue and public expenditure to improve accountability and ensure transparency. In addition to developing nationwide programmes and objectives, the FGS launched an initiative for the establishment of regional and local administrations for all liberated territories in Somalia. In line with this initiative, the FGS proposed to deploy local members of the parliament in their own constituencies who would be responsible for setting up interim administrations in the future. The 90-day interim administrations would subsequently be replaced with locally elected organisations (United Nations SC 2013, 2). The government also planned to organise a Reconciliation Conference that would provide an opportunity for all the elders, clan leaders and intellectuals from six regions of south and central Somalia to agree on the best approach to create permanent administrations in the most volatile areas of the country (African Union 2013). With regards to Juba and Gedo regions, IGAD's Joint Committee on the Grand Stabilisation Plan for South-Central Somalia organised a meeting in Addis Ababa to enhance coordination and proposed a plan for the Kismayo interim administration to form a new administration, which was declined by the Somalia government. However, its revised form was later accepted. The Committee also proposed the integration of the Ras Kamboni Brigade into the SNSF (African Union 2013). The FGS also started talks with the government of Somaliland, which remained firm in its intention regarding independence from the Federal Republic of Somalia.

While the political process of reconciliation started to take place, HI and al-Shabaab divided again due to ideological differences. While al-Shabaab remained in complete opposition to the central government, HI announced that it welcomed the election of the Federal Government of Somalia but opposed the presence of AMISOM troops in the country.

The FGS deemed AMISOM's continued presence and participation necessary to resolve the conflict. By November, 2012 AMISOM had increased its presence to 17,709 troops, based on UN and AU mandates. Troop contingents were provided from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti. In addition to military personnel, police officers were deployed throughout the country, with officers provided by Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. By early 2013, the number of troops serving in AMISOM reached 17,731, which is the full capacity approved by the UN and AU (United Nations SC 2013, 7).

In late 2012, government forces and AMISOM seized control over Afgoye, Afmadow, Balad, Lanta Buuro, Merca and Miido. Subsequently, the last major al-Shabaab stronghold, Kismayo was also recaptured. This was followed by combating al-Shabaab in Wanla Weyn and Jowhar. 2013 commenced with AMISOM troops pushing toward the last remaining territories controlled by the insurgents in the Gedo region (The Africa Report 2012). By early 2013, al-Shabaab has been ousted from major cities but retained control over small towns and regions in South and Central Somalia (BBC 2013c).

On the political front, the FGS undertook considerable measures to establish good relations with neighbouring countries and to strengthen the country's bilateral and multilateral relations internationally. Accordingly, Somalia established diplomatic ties with foreign countries including the United States. The FGS opened diplomatic missions in 31 countries globally and at the UN. In addition to the European Union, Australia, Belgium, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Libya, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Yemen opened embassies in Mogadishu (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 2013).

Due to the political developments in Somalia, in early 2013 the UN Security Council partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia, which had been imposed in 1992. According to the decision of the UN Security Council, light arms can be legally sold to the FGS for a period of one year, with the aim of assisting the FGS with the fight against Islamist insurgent militias, in particular al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, heavy weaponry including surface-to-air missiles, large-calibre guns, howitzers and cannons remain banned from Somalia (BBC 2013c). The UN Security Council also extended the mandate of the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia for one additional year as of March 2013 (United Nations SC 2013, 1). These measures were deemed necessary by the international community as al-Shabaab remains a potential threat to the security of the country. It is currently headquartered in the northern territories of Somalia, in the Golis Mountains of Puntland (The Telegraph 2013).

As of April 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also recognised the FGS. The recognition of the FGS by the IMF is very significant as this move will offer the chance to Somalia to benefit from technical support and policy advice from the IMF (BBC 2013b).

5 Ramifications and Resolution of the Conflict in Somalia

The African Union Commission (AUC) "*noted with satisfaction the remarkable progress made in the quest for peace, security and reconciliation in the country*" and "*it underlined the need for the international community to remain actively engaged and to extend greater support to Somalia on the basis of the priorities defined by the Somali government*" (African Union 2012, 1). The AUC in its aforementioned statement summarised the essence of the scale and importance of the political achievement in Somalia that took place with the election of the FGS. It also offered appreciation of the programme and objectives of the government in the statement. Nonetheless, it remained realistic and cautious and did not become overly optimistic about the country's future potential. It implied that without massive international support and participation the Somali state may fail again in future.

As the AUC's statement suggests, upon its election, the FGS enjoyed steady support from the international community, from the majority of the local population of Somalia and from the Somali diaspora. The political sentiment was and remained optimistic in the country since the elections. The FGS started its challenging journey toward completing the re-liberation efforts with regards to the entire territory of Somalia. Nonetheless, there are still many smaller territories, towns and villages controlled by al-Shabaab as of 2013 and there is much work still to do in order to liberate the entire country from its militias. Al-Shabaab continues to serve as a substantially destabilizing presence on the entire country.

The FGS launched reconstruction and development programmes and began to tackle the humanitarian challenges and human rights issues in the country. These programmes have the potential for success provided that the country's internal security situation will be robustly controlled in the near future. So far the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) enjoy significant support from AMISOM and the Somali government enjoys military support from neighbouring countries too. It also enjoys substantial financial and moral assistance from the international community.

5.1 Current Security Situation in Somalia

The overall security situation in Somalia is still very fragile in spite of the fact that AMISOM and SNSF have an ongoing focus on liberating

oppressed areas from insurgent forces, as well as on further securing the government-controlled areas. By early 2013, AMSIOM has reached its full authorized capacity by the deployment of 17,731 troops after the deployment of the Djiboutian contingent to replace a battalion from Kenya and by the commencement of the deployment of a contingent from Sierra Leone as of March, 2013 (All Sanaag 2013). AMISOM is an international mission, which is financed by the UN and its agencies, the European Commission, the Arab League and the governments of the U.S., UK, Japan, Sweden, Italy and China. Further, it is supported by NATO, IGAD and by African governments, which offer military support and contribute troops to the mission. Health support is provided by the World Health Organisation and the Islamic Relief Services as well as local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (The African Union Commission 2008).

As the country is not yet fully controlled by government forces, the internal security situation in Somalia is not homogenous. Currently, the security situation is different in Mogadishu, in south and central Somalia, in Puntland and Galmuduug as well as in Somaliland. The security situation of these areas will be reviewed with regards to the first six months of the tenure of the FGS from 20 August 2012 to 20 February 2013 in the current section.

Since the inauguration of the FGS, securing Mogadishu from the insurgent threat of al-Shabaab has been of the highest priority. Both AMISOM and SNSF troops have been deployed in Mogadishu with the aim of creating safety and security in the capital city. In spite of these efforts, the security situation remained unstable in the capital. Erratic and indiscriminate attacks by al-Shabaab occurred in the city several times during the first six months of the tenure of the new government. Al-Shabaab also organised targeted assassinations and hand grenade attacks as well as suicide missions in the capital city on several occasions. In particular, al-Shabaab targeted politicians, journalists and civilians who were employed by the administration of the FGS, and their attacks resulted in substantial civilian casualties and caused considerable collateral damage. In order to eradicate the constant threat of terrorist attacks, AMISOM established police units (AMISOM Formed Police Units or FPUs) together with the Somalia Police Force (SPF) and launched a 24-hour patrol service in Mogadishu. FPUs also provide close protection details for VIPs protection to AMISOM personnel and assume responsibility for the protection of public functions. FPUs also provided training to local police officers.

In line with the recent re-capturing of Afgoye, Afmadow, Balad, Lanta Buuro, Merca, Miido and Kismayo by Somali national forces and AMISOM

troops, al-Shabaab lost ground in south and central Somalia. Recapturing Kismayo was a major achievement as it resulted in al-Shabaab loosing its revenue stream from seaport taxation, custom duties and smuggling through the port of the city and a crucial supply route of the militia was thereby cut. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of al-Shabaab resulted in the creation of a political vacuum in Kismayo and the revival of complex clan-based confrontations affecting the entire Jubaland. Further, al-Shabaab regularly used guerilla and terrorist attacks in Kismayo, Afgoye and Merca against government and allied military forces as well as against the civilian population. In southern Somalia al-Shabaab issued threats and warnings against aid workers and international NGOs. Indiscriminate attacks by al-Shabaab occurred in Baidoa regularly, too. In January 2013 French military forces launched a rescue operation with the aim of freeing a French hostage from al-Shabaab captors. The operation failed and resulted in the death of two French soldiers, eight Somali civilians and seventeen militia members. Jowhar, the former headquarters of al-Shabaab, which was also taken over by government and AMISOM forces following the inauguration of the FGS, suffered relatively few attacks from the Islamist militia due to the fact that the local population contributed to the seizure of the city from al-Shabaab. Consequently, the security situation became relatively stable in Jowhar. Nonetheless, Hiiraan and Beledweyne in the inland areas of central Somalia were subject to weekly attacks from al-Shabaab. The security presence in Galguduud was higher, where al-Shabaab kept a low profile. However the city was subject to fighting among factions of ASWJ, which disrupted the relatively high standard of security in the city. AMISOM and the SNSF with the support of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) continue to operate in the region with the aim of cutting the transit route of al-Shabaab to Puntland and to prevent fighting between ASWJ factions as well as to avoid the creation of a power vacuum (African Union 2012).

Puntland and Galmudug were subject to several attacks from al-Shabaab in late 2012 and early 2013. Puntland's military forces organised several raids to stop the expansion of al-Shabaab in the territories of the two autonomous states and captured several terrorists associated with al-Shabaab in 2013, in the Golis Mountains (Raad Raac News Online 2013). The internal security in Puntland and Galmudug was also compromised due to the criminal activities of undisciplined government troops who were stationed in these regions to assist with the fight against the insurgents.

The Somali government committed itself to maintaining dialogue with the secessionist Somaliland with the aim for unity with the separatist entity.

Nonetheless, the security situation in Somaliland has weakened since the inauguration of the FGS. The reason for the diminishing of security in the separatist entity is only partially linked to the political developments in Somalia. Some of the causes of security problems are internal as it is linked to local mayoral elections and materializes in protests organised by the local population in Somaliland (Sabahi Online 2013). Nonetheless, there has been speculation that al-Shabaab have infiltrated Somaliland which is the direct consequence of the efforts of the FGS to eradicate the insurgents from south and central Somalia. It is reported that foreign nationals face an imminent risk of "*kidnapping for financial or political gain, motivated by criminality or terrorism*" (Black 2013) potentially performed by the al-Shabaab militia. In addition to local incidents and to the threat of foreign nationals, the main factor of destabilization in Somaliland remains the dispute over the Sool, Sanag and Cayn provinces. They jointly declared themselves as an autonomous state in 2012 as Khatumo State (as described in Section 3.6). In the disputed provinces several ambushes, shootings and grenade attacks have occurred recently and the tensions between Khatumo State and Somaliland and Khatumo State and Puntland remain high.

As the above overview shows, Somalia's internal security situation is fragile for several reasons. There are smaller scale fights amongst clans and militia factions as well as political antagonisms between various territories. These conflicts are localized and are of relatively small scale, which do not materially endanger the ongoing reconciliation process in the country. The main security threat to the country is from al-Shabaab. The Islamist militia has lost ground and power in several regions of the country and due to joint AMISOM and SNSF operations it has been significantly weakened at the present time. Nonetheless, the organisation continues to pose a serious risk to the security of the country by way of terrorist attacks with improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations and suicide missions. The organisation has infiltrated several local communities in rural areas of Somalia and still controls small towns and villages in south and central Somalia as well as rural, mountainous areas in Puntland. Also, al-Shabaab maintains access to weapons and other supplies through the seaports of Baraawe, Ceel Dheer, Cadale and Haradhere in the central and southern areas of Somalia. Further, al-Shabaab uses the strategy of exploiting clan differences in rural areas and it holds enough power to extort businesses, establish roadblocks to ensure funding for its operations. There is evidence that the organisation has also infiltrated Somaliland thereby threatening its internal security (Goth 2013).

Further, a major security concern regarding al-Shabaab is the fact that it has proven support from 400 foreign fighters primarily from Afghanistan and Pakistan, who are responsible for the dissemination of *jihadist* ideology as well as for providing mentorship to new recruits. Intelligence shows that al-Shabaab recently reached out to rural populations and established links to small extremist groups. Further, the organisation is still successful in its recruitment efforts from rural Somalia and from neighbouring countries, in particular Kenya, for missions to be undertaken in Somalia (Meleagrou-Hitchens 2012).

5.2 Reconstruction and Development of the Country[25]

The priority of the FGS is to achieve and maintain internal security and stability in the country before economic reconstruction and development can take place. Internal security is key for all facets of economic reconstruction.

In addition to the continued efforts to create internal security, the FGS took steps toward the reconstruction of key financial institutions and authorities in the country including the Central Bank, the Office of the Accountant-General and the Office of the Auditor-General. The government also made steps to ensure that the rule of law prevails in Somalia. However, the country as yet "*lacks contract law, corporate law, the concept of limited liability and other key pillars of commercial law*" (Horn Portal 2013). Enacting a modern legal system in terms of business law is essential to attract foreign investment and commercial ventures, while it would be preferable to maintain the traditional *Xeer* and *Sharia*-based civil code in the countryside, in line with its legal heritage. (The traditional legal system of the country is discussed in Section in 4.2.2).

In addition to a suitable legal environment, the establishment of an efficient and transparent taxation system is fundamental to restoring a functioning economy in Somalia. As part of this it is necessary to put in place an efficient tax collection system, which is essential to fund the government's reconstruction programme in the country. The current practices of imposing and collecting tax must be stopped as it is still the case that "*in southern Somalia, taxes are often levied by local warlords or clan*

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[25] This sub-section includes reference to data for Somaliland. Although Somaliland wishes to pursue a future separate from Somalia, relevant inferences may potentially be drawn from its data, due to the shared history and the common ethnicity of the two locations.

leaders and used to pay militiamen. Some factions in the south have made attempts to manage various cities, in some cases using collected funds to restore schools and hospitals. Elsewhere, collection of taxes and duties is more like extortion by armed groups in the areas that they control" (UK Home Office 2007, 14). In December, 2012, the Somali Finance Ministry announced that "*tax collection by the government will begin in 2013 in all regions of the country*". In line with this objective "*the government will first establish tax collection laws*" and will "*implement the tax collection plan*". In parallel, it was also announced that the government had "*outlawed illegal tax collection by other persons or entities aside from the Finance Ministry*" (AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring 2012). This measure is expected to decrease the dependency of the country on foreign aid.

The establishment of a functioning monetary system is also a major task ahead for the government. The current practice, according to which "*in Somalia at least two forms of Somali shilling circulate*" (UK Home Office 2007, 14), is not viable for a functioning economy. It is also of utmost importance to establish a banking system in the country, which is capable of lending money to both business ventures and individuals, thereby fuelling the economy. Access to financial services and credit may trigger higher level of economic activity in the country.

It is also imperative for the FGS to handle "*the thorny issue of land and property rights in Somalia*" (Cassanelli 2010). The government must commit itself to adjudicating rightful property claims with regards to property nationalised and expropriated during the regime of Siyad Barre. Also, many Somali people lost land, property and assets to armed militias during the 20 years of conflict in the country. As many people could never recover their possessions, it would be appropriate if the FGS established a land claims tribunal that had the authority to investigate such claims. This is a serious matter to tackle. If it remains unresolved, it may substantially hinder economic development as rightful property owners may never return to their land or property but are instead forced into poverty. Further, such matters trigger and exacerbate antagonism among the peoples of Somalia, potentially leading to clan clashes in future.

Once the legal and regulatory framework is in place, the currency reform is accomplished and the land and property situation is clarified in the country, the next major step for the FGS is to rebuild the critical national infrastructure of the country. This is also a prerequisite for economic development. According to the Rehabilitation Development Plan of Somalia, "*a wide range of infrastructure developments were identified as*

critical to the country's growth and employment creation, covering roads, ports, airports, energy, water supply and sanitation" (UNDP IIC 2012).

Rehabilitation of existing transport infrastructure is of the highest priority, as it is key in the facilitation of domestic and international trade. While Somaliland and Puntland have road authorities, the south and central region of the country does not have any. Currently there are three functioning major ports in Somalia including Mogadishu, Bosasso and Berbera, while Kismayo has a smaller port. Priorities for refurbishment and expansion of these ports have to be set and it is necessary to develop secondary ports and local jetties to boost the fishing industry and to improve sea-based transportation links. In particular, the Berbera port is subject to refurbishment and expansion including the development of a free zone, the installation of a container terminal, dredging and the acquisition of marine, safety and security systems and navigation equipment to serve large-scale international traffic. According to an estimation by the World Bank, the investment cost is approximately USD 20 million for the Berbera port and similar amounts can be assumed for the refurbishment of other ports in the country. It is a priority to refurbish the international airport in Mogadishu as well as smaller airports and airfields in the country including runway improvements, construction and renovation of terminal buildings and improvement of security and safety systems. The estimated investment cost for improvement of civil aviation in Somaliland alone is about USD 45 million, according to the World Bank (UNDP IIC 2012).

Existing power supply systems in Somalia are scarce and fragmented. In some urban areas, private companies supply electricity, while rural households rely on charcoal. There is a need to re-establish power generation and distribution systems as well as to promote renewable energy sources instead of using charcoal. Investment is necessary in the expansion of power generation capacity, in the establishment of a power grid and in the expansion of the power distribution system. Existing power generation capacities must be consolidated and alternative energy sources must be promoted to limit environmental pressure on the country. Investment in onshore and offshore wind energy as well as in ocean tidal and wave power along the Somali coast may be lucrative business opportunities for the country. Furthermore, there is an enormous potential for the generation of solar energy in the country. There are available estimates from the World Bank for the investment cost of the development of the energy sector in Somaliland, which is approximately USD 40 million (UNDP IIC 2012).

According to the World Bank, "*more than 70% of the Somali population was without access to improved water sources in 2000*" (UNDP IIC 2012). Further, in rural areas, domestic water needs are met primarily by rivers or wells, which are often contaminated. It is essential to "*increase environmentally sustainable and equitable access to safe and affordable water and sanitation facilities, and to develop services to satisfy basic domestic needs*" (UNDP IIC 2012). In order to improve clean water and sanitation conditions, existing waste collection systems must be refurbished, sanitation issues must be resolved, water retention structures must be built and low-cost water supply systems must be installed. As of 2012, "*only 30 percent of Somalia's population has access to improved drinking water sources and only 23 percent has access to improved sanitation facilities*" (NCADC 2012). The target is to "*halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation*" (United Nations 2008). According to the Five Year Development Plan of Somaliland, upgrading the clean water and sanitation facilities would require USD 50 million estimated investment in total (UNDP IIC 2012).

The European Union committed to finance urban water and health infrastructure in Somaliland and Puntland up to EUR 25 million. The grant is to be used for water supply infrastructure in Harageisha, Burao, Erigavo, Tog Wajaale and Puntland (Uytterhaeghe 2012). In addition, a range of individual foreign governments pledged grants and aid to Somalia to back the efforts of the FGS and pursued cooperation with regards to developing projects in the country. The FGS can also investigate the potential access to international development funds from the IMF and the World Bank.

Funding of infrastructure and other projects may be sourced from grants from the international community and government agencies. Also, the World Bank envisages that infrastructure in Somalia may be funded through Public-Private-Partnerships as this structure would "*optimize sustainable financial and operational management*" (UNDP IIC 2012) for a Somali infrastructure programme while ensuring that the project would meet value-for-money criteria along with strict construction standards. Through infrastructure development, with the involvement of both the public and private sectors, equitable economic growth could be ensured across Somalia.

It is also imperative to involve the Somali diaspora in the reconstruction process by way of "*attracting valuable contributions of money, skills and professional expertise from members of the diaspora*" (Cassanelli 2010). Somalia may be able to contribute to its own development. The diaspora may have the potential to create a new dynamic in the economic

reconstruction process of the country by serving as catalysts for developments. This is particularly valid for the young generation of expatriate Somalis, who were brought up in developed countries, studied or trained abroad, have modern technical and necessary language skills and who have business connections outside Somalia. The diaspora may therefore be a driving force behind the reconstruction and economic development of the country.

The United Nations also backs the Somali government in its reconstruction and development efforts, in addition to its political and reconciliation process. The UN has developed strategic programmes to develop the education, health and the social service sectors all over the country. The UN has also established a monitoring framework to track development, as well as the efforts on the eradication of poverty with the aim of approaching the targets set by the Millennium Development Goals[26]. In addition, the UN funded community programmes in the fields of youth involvement and child feeding in Mogadishu and organised livelihood initiatives[27] to ensure household assets and food security for the population of the country.

5.3 Humanitarian Challenges and Human Rights Issues in Somalia

In 2011, a severe draught in Somalia resulted in "*the first officially-declared famine in Africa so far this century, at a time when famine has been eradicated everywhere else*" (Oxfam). The famine resulted in soaring death

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[26] Definition of the Millenium Development Goas (MDGs) is as follows: „*In September 2000, leaders from 189 nations agreed on a vision for the future: a world with less poverty, hunger and disease, greater survival prospects for mothers and their infants, better educated children, equal opportunities for women, and a healthier environment; a world in which developed and developing countries worked in partnership for the betterment of all. This vision took the shape of eight Millennium Development Goals, which provide a framework for development planning for countries around the world, and time-bound targets by which progress can be measured.The eight MDGs range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015*" (OECD 2007).

[27] The term "organised livelihood initiatives" is often used in the humanitarian field, referring to initiatives launched in impoverished regions to support local peoples with teaching of skills in need, providing vocational training, providing assistance in establishing small businesses and creating jobs.

rates. The death toll amounted to tens of thousands. Those who survived the famine had to endure desperate journeys across the deserts in the country before they arrived in feeding centres in Mogadishu and refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. The famine later resulted in a cholera epidemic sweeping through the country and measles preying upon a malnourished and immune-suppressed population (Gettleman 2011). By early 2012, the famine had been eased by emergency food supplies and donations sent by international aid agencies and governments, which led to the outcome that the United Nations could announce the end of the severe crisis by February 2012. Nonetheless, the country remained in need of food aid and a complex humanitarian emergency still prevails. Acute malnutrition is still widespread, in particular in the southern and central areas of Somalia. Even though, the famine was downgraded to an emergency situation in 2012 in terms of food security, "*an estimated 2.12 million people (…) remain in a food security crisis*" in Somalia (Reliefweb - FEWS Net 2012). Accordingly, the malnutrition rates exceed 20% in parts of Somalia (Reliefweb 2012).

According to the data of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are currently some 1.4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia, as of February 2013 (UNHCR Somalia). Table 4 shows the regional breakdown of IDPs in Somalia as of February 2013.

Region	Number of IDPs	Region	Number of IDPs
Awdal	8,000	Hiiraan	51,000
Woqooyi Galbeed	45,000	Shabelle Dhexe	51,000
Togdheer	26,000	Banadir	184,000
Sanaag	1,000	Bakool	24,000
Sool	5,000	Bay	40,000
Bari	49,000	Shabelle Hoose	496,000
Nugaal	10,000	Gedo	77,000
Mudug	84,000	Juba Dhexe	27,000
Galgaduud	149,000	Juba Hoose	31,000

Table 4: Breakdown of Somali IDPs according to region as of February 2013

The regions of Shabelle Hoose and Banadir in south and eastern Somalia and Galgaduud in central Somalia are the most affected by IDPs in the country.

Furthermore, there are 3.8 million Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance and livelihood support, out of which 2.1 million require life-saving aid within the boundaries of Somalia (UN OCHA 2012, 1). In addition to food insecurity, the continued fight against the insurgents and the political tensions in the southern and central parts of the country still result in internal displacement in areas subject to operations conducted by AMISOM and SNSF. Environmental reasons are also responsible for temporary displacement, which has recently affected the relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland, too due to seasonal floods.

Additionally, according to the estimations of UNHCR, more than 1 million Somalis live in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, largely in dire circumstances and in need of humanitarian intervention. Table 5 shows the breakdown of Somali refugees abroad as of February 2013.

Host Country	Number of Refugees
Djibouti	18,463
Eritrea	3,571
Ethiopia	231,327
Kenya	510,191
Host Country	**Number of Refugees**
Tanzania	2,790
Uganda	28,501
Yemen	228,121
Total:	**1,022,964**

Table 5: Somali refugees in neighbouring countries as of February 2013

As the security situation in the country improves, IDPs show ever-growing interest in returning to their places of origin. According to estimates, 100,000 IDP households may have the opportunity to return to their area of origins in 2013 (UNHCR Somalia).

In line with the successful fight against al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia, humanitarian agencies and organisations including the World

Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) managed to provide services to 1 million children. Children in Baidoa, Merca, Xudur, Afmadow and Kismayo received immunization interventions. The WHO established and strengthened health facilities. Additionally, education programmes were launched for 90,000 children in newly re-captured areas. The World Food Programme (WFP) had distributed supplies to 1.5 million people by the end of 2012. In Kismayo, feeding programmes were initiated by the WFP. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) vaccinated livestock and distributed fertilizers and seeds to farmers in Bay and Shabelle regions. In south and central Somalia, landmine risk awareness education was also offered to 127,000 people.

In addition to the individual initiatives and programmes of NGOs, a three-year Humanitarian Appeal for Somalia was launched in December 2012. *"The 2013–2015 humanitarian strategy targets immediate humanitarian needs of the Somali people and aims to enhance resilience and ultimately address the protracted nature of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The appeal for 2013 is $1.3 billion for 369 humanitarian projects targeting 3.8 million Somalis in need. The strategy will be implemented by 177 national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies operating in Somalia"* (Noor and Russo 2012). The strategy and the funds are expected to address complex humanitarian needs in the country and it is expected that humanitarian agencies will scale up their presence in the country, in line with the improvement of the security situation.

In addition to humanitarian initiatives, the country's socioeconomic recovery and development was also in focus from 2012 onwards. In Puntland and Somaliland, capacity building initiatives were launched. The initiatives included educational and social projects including monitoring of poverty eradication, nutrition, youth employment and re-integration of child combatants to the society. Initiatives on the provision of basic services, infant and child feeding programmes and livelihood initiatives were launched and employment strategies were formulated.

The international community has been offering substantial support to Somalia since 2000. In every year, the country received very generous grants and aid from individual governments. The year 2011 was exceptional and exemplary as the serious famine prompted the international community to offer USD 1.3 billion in humanitarian aid to Somalia (Financial Tracking Service 2011). In 2012, the continuing humanitarian need and the favourable

political developments mobilised the international community again. In 2012 approximately USD 860 million was offered to Somalia to tackle poverty, humanitarian crisis and reconstruction efforts (Financial Tracking Service 2012). In the first quarter of 2013 the European Commission and the governments of the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Denmark and Finland disbursed USD 92 million for humanitarian efforts (Financial Tracking Service 2013). Furthermore, by the recognition of the FGS, the government of the United States indicated that the country is "*opening the door to increased U.S. and international economic help. The formal U.S. recognition of the new government paves the way for new flows of assistance both from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other U.S. agencies as well as from international actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*" (Quinn 2013). The support of the U.S. is expected to trigger further contributions to the Somali cause from the international community of nations and NGOs, in line with the progress on stabilisation and reconstruction of the country.

The human rights situation in Somalia is problematic. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are common. There is evidence that journalists and civilians who reported on criminal incidents committed by rouge SNSF officers, and individuals who participated in protests, were subject to indiscriminate and unlawful arrests. Also, former al-Shabaab fighters, who deserted the ranks of the militia, were imprisoned without trial. Frequently military courts ruled in cases where the military did not have jurisdiction. This resulted in civilians being sentenced to imprisonment that included life sentences. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) assisted Somali authorities with capacity building of the military and civilian justice systems. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) opened a new facility in the prison of Bosaso as well as a prison academy, custodial headquarters and a new building for the Ministry of Justice in Garowe. UNPOS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided assistance in the definition of a military justice system in south and central Somalia with the view of separating courts martial from the civilian judiciary in the most volatile areas of Somalia. UNDP provided assistance in the training of legal professionals and supported the setting up of legal aid offices to provide legal assistance to IDPs. With the assistance of UNDP, case management systems were introduced in Garowe and Harageisha, which resulted in increased efficiency in trials. Judicial staff was trained and appointed for the courts of Garowe and Harageisha (United Nations SC 2013, 8).

Sexual and gender-based violence[28] is a major concern in Somalia. Due to "*increased insecurity, weak rule of law, lack of humanitarian access and frequent natural hazards*" (UN OCHA), there is an increased risk of sexual violence among vulnerable communities in the country, e.g. IDPs and minorities. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) established a Gender-based Violence Working Group in Somalia in 2007, which assists with preventing and tackling cases of gender-based violence in the country. According to UN statistics, "*around 1,700 women were raped between January and November last year [2012] in camps for internally displaced people around Mogadishu*" (Al Jazeera 2013). Estimates suggest that the number of unreported cases may be very high. According to cases that were investigated, perpetrators included rouge SNSF officers, militiamen and armed civilians. The phenomenon received substantial international attention in early 2013 when a rape victim and a journalist were imprisoned based on a trial that was perceived as politically motivated by human rights activists. Following the enormous media attention given to the case, the "*leaders of the five-month-old government in Somalia have said that authorities will do more to protect victims of rape in the Horn of African nation*" (Al Jazeera 2013).

Child protection is another pressing human rights issue in Somalia. According to UNICEF, during the first 4 months of the tenure of the FGS, 1,506 cases of child abuse were reported including cases of murder, maiming, forced recruitments to the ranks of militia, incidents of sexual violence and rape, incidents of abductions, attacks on schools, an attack on a hospital and incidents of denial of humanitarian access (UNICEF). Al-Shabaab was behind many of the cases, but rouge officers of the SNSF were also accused of sexual violence committed against underage girls, in particular.

The FGS committed itself to the creation of action plans for the termination of child abuse. UNICEF worked with the FGS as well as with AMISOM forces to disengage child soldiers serving in the ranks of armed militias. UNICEF organised a rehabilitation programme for former child soldiers and in late 2012. The first batch of seven former child soldiers

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[28] Gender-based violence encompasses a wide range of human rights violations ranging from rape, domestic violence, sexual assault and harassment, trafficking of women, girls and boys and harmful traditional practices including female genital mutilation/cutting, early marriage and bride inheritance, which may affect women, men or children (UN OCHA).

started the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Many more await such an intervention.

The humanitarian and human rights situation in Somalia is very challenging. The more than two decades of conflict and civil war left behind a very complex humanitarian and human rights situation which needs to be tackled at multiple levels. The humanitarian landscape is complex as many international organisations, NGOs and aid agencies are keen on assisting the humanitarian and human rights challenges of the country. Governments of the international community finance such initiatives and provide aid for the country. UNPOS has been present in the country since 1995 and is responsible for advancing the reconciliation process and for promoting peace in the country. In addition, it is responsible for the coordination of the activities of 17 UN agencies that are engaged in Somalia. In addition, several independent humanitarian agencies and human rights activists are present in Somalia including the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the National Democratic Institute, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps and CARE as well as Islamic humanitarian agencies including the Red Crescent Society, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid, amongst others. Their coordinated effort is needed to ease the complex humanitarian and human rights challenges that are widespread in the country. However, their effort can only be fruitful if the FGS is committed to resolve the situation and the international community is ready to fund their initiatives.

5.4 International Security Situation in the Wake of the Somali Conflict

Two decades of conflict in Somalia exacerbated instability in the Horn of Africa. As the previous chapters indicated, Somalia is part of the Horn of Africa regional security complex, along with Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. (Section 3.1 describes the RSC theory).

This Thesis proposes an RSC Influence Model to determine which above mentioned countries influence and impact the conflict. Accordingly, the Thesis will focus on the analysis of the Somali conflict with the view that the primary influencers of the conflict are Ethiopia and Eritrea. Djibouti, the final member of the Horn of Africa region and RSC participates as an impacted country due to several factors to be presented in the following sections. As a secondary line of analysis, the Thesis will investigate the role of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Yemen in the Somali conflict, too.

Figure 3: The RSC Influence Model

According to the above-described RSC Influence Model, the security situation of Eritrea and Ethiopia, as primary influencing parties, will be analyzed. The analysis will also look into the regional conflicts in the Ogaden and in the Haud, which were attributable to historic reasons and to the fact that significant numbers of ethnic Somalis settled in these disputed territories and fought for autonomy and separation (as detailed in Section 3.6). Also, the security situation of Djibouti will be investigated in the first layer of the analysis due to its location in the Horn of Africa region and its participation in the Horn of Africa RSC.

As a second layer of analysis, the security situation of Kenya, Uganda and Burundi will be presented. These countries are not part of the Horn of Africa RSC, but their security situation is heavily impacted by the Somali conflict primarily due to their participation in AMISOM. These countries provide the majority of military troops of AMISOM. Consequently, Uganda and Kenya suffered multiple attacks from the al-Shabaab militia while Burundi was threatened by the organisation on several occasions. In addition, Kenya is affected by the conflict due to its former leading role in Operation Linda Nchi (as discussed in Section 4.3.3) following the attack on aid workers and tourists in the territory of Kenya, by al-Shabaab. Furthermore, Kenya is heavily affected by the conflict due to the sizeable Somali ethnic group living in its Northern Frontier District, the Somali diaspora that established itself in Nairobi, and the hundreds of thousands of Somali

refugees who found shelter in the country's refugee camps. Finally, the security situation of Burundi and Yemen will be looked into, as the least affected parties in the conflict.

The regional and international security situation is heavily affected by the notorious piracy off the coast of Somalia. Since 1989 Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of ships, held crews for ransom, murdered sailors and kidnapped tourists. Their activities have not only disrupted international trade routes but cost millions of dollars to shipping corporations and to the global economy. As piracy caused major harm to the international community and the global economy, it became one of the major challenges to international security. The phenomenon and the impacts of piracy on international security therefore will be also outlined briefly.

The conflict in Somalia also contributes to a global terrorist threat due to the fact that its main insurgent force acts as a franchise of al-Qaeda, striving to enforce *jihadist* ideology not only in Somalia but in North and East Africa. Intelligence shows that al-Shabaab may coordinate and synchronise efforts with other militant Islamist groups including North African al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb[29] (AQIM) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Smith 2012). The threat manifested by the combined efforts by the militant groups may be very dangerous to the security situation in the African continent.

5.4.1 Security Situation in the Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

Two decades of conflict in Somalia had a great impact on the security situation of the Horn of Africa RSC. In this section, the security situation of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti will be outlined in the wake of the Somali conflict, according to the RSC Influence Model.

Ethiopia is one of the largest countries in Africa, which possesses regional hegemony in East Africa. Ethiopia is a regional military power, too. Its army is not only large, but it is very experienced and has enormous capabilities compared to other countries in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia also holds an important position in the African continent due to its ancient history and unique culture and therefore, the Ethiopian nationalism is very strong. Ethiopia maintains very good relations with the United States and Western countries. It therefore benefits from significant amount of aid, financial

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[29] The definition of Maghreb is as follows: „*North-West Africa, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya*" (Collins Dictionary).

assistance and political support from the developed world. It is not only a friendly state, but a strategic partner of the United States, which means it has an elevated status within the region. Probably the country's long history contributed to the fact that Ethiopia was a founder of the OAU and later the AU, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. The fact that important African institutions are headquartered in Ethiopia suggests that the country possesses strong diplomatic and political power in the continent, too. In line with the country's regional status it maintains a strong and confident foreign and security policy.

Somali–Ethiopian relations are difficult, for historic reasons. The two countries have been in territorial dispute over the Ogaden and the Haud region since the "*Scramble for Africa*" (as defined in section 3.4), which resulted in a full-scale war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–8. Although the Ogaden and the Haud remained under Ethiopian sovereignty since the defeat of the Somalis in the Ogaden War, the dispute is still pending. These regions are still dominated by ethnic Somalis, i.e. approximately 5.1 million Somali people live in these territories. Numerous independence movements have been striving for the separation of the disputed regions from Ethiopia and the unification of this territory with Somalia including the ONLF. "*The ONLF is seeking a referendum on independence for the (…) Ogadeni region of Ethiopia. (…) the ONLF intensified attacks against Ethiopian security forces*" (Think Security Africa). This remains a major internal security problem for Ethiopia.

It is also a security challenge for Ethiopia that the country is currently home for approximately 231,000 Somali refugees, who live primarily in the Dollo Ado Refugee Camps in the Ogaden region (UNHCR Ethiopia). The large number of Somali refugees in the disputed area represents a substantial security risk to the country.

An additional security risk for the integrity of Ethiopia stems from the fact that the country participated in the Somali civil war, as the main military supporter of the TFG between 2006 and 2009. "*On the national security front, (…) the situation in Somalia is the most threatening for Ethiopia. The biggest problem for Ethiopia was, arguably, the ICU, which declared jihad against Ethiopia in 2006 (…). In the event, the ICU was quickly defeated, but Ethiopia became bogged down in Somalia on an unsuccessful occupying mission, which cost the lives of 800 Ethiopian soldiers*" (Hettyey 2012, 29). Further, the US-backed Ethiopian troops were perceived as foreign occupying forces by opposition groups as well as by large numbers of the population in Somalia. Once the ICU was dissolved, al-Shabaab publicly

threatened Ethiopia because of its military intervention in Somalia on a number of occasions. As "*Ethiopia is still very much active in the border region, with frequent incursions and occasional attacks on al-Shabaab*" (Hettyey 2012, 29), the organisation is deeply hostile toward Ethiopia even up to present day. Nonetheless, it has never attacked the country on Ethiopian soil but there were plenty of attacks against Ethiopian interests within Somalia and in Uganda.

Ethiopia maintains tense relations with Eritrea at the present time. In 2009, with influential diplomacy as the strategic partner of Western countries, Ethiopia achieved the imposition of an embargo on Eritrea by the UN Security Council "*over concerns its government was providing finance and weapons to al-Shabaab [in Somalia]*" (Al Jazeera 2012). It is widely perceived that by supporting al-Shabaab, Eritrea fought a proxy war against Ethiopia on Somali soil. The participation of Eritrea in Somali affairs undermined Somali security and threatened Ethiopian integrity. Additionally, Ethiopia alleged that Eritrea provided financial assistance to insurgent forces active within Ethiopia. The country therefore earned a reputation of being the major destabilisation force in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia consequently fought a diplomatic war against Eritrea, which has proved to be successful up to the present time, resulting in complete isolation of Eritrea. Such further garnered for Ethiopia an international reputation as being the most stable peacemaker in the Horn of Africa.

Eritrea has a number of internal security challenges, which are primarily related to its archenemy, Ethiopia. The two countries tend to finance insurgence movements in each other's territories, thereby weakening their respective governments. The country's relationship with Djibouti is unfavourable, too, but this hostility is currently contained. Eritrea is generally isolated; it is subject to an arms embargo and is generally deprived of aid and financial assistance from the Western world.

The country was hit by the sanctions in 2008 based on the fact that it had sponsored Somali insurgent forces including ICU, HI and al-Shabaab, trained rebels and offered shelter to members of the al-Shabaab's leadership, who freely operated from exile in Eritrea. The Director of the International Crisis Group in Nairobi, E.J. Hogendoorn, suggested that "*in the past Eritrea has supported certain insurgencies in Somalia in an effort to continue its proxy war with Ethiopia. (...) evidence suggests that Eritrea withdrew its support of the group in 2009*" (Onyiego 2010).

According to Hettyey, the only goal of Eritrean engagement in Somalia in the past was to weaken Ethiopia. He points out that "*as long as the*

country had peaceful relations with Ethiopia, i.e. up until 1998, it did not support any faction in Somalia (...), although the civil war there was already going on for years. First information about Eritrean arms shipment coincides almost precisely with the outbreak of the war against Ethiopia" (Hettyey 2012, 25). Accordingly, the only aim of Eritrean support to Islamist factions must have been the blockage of Ethiopia's hegemonistic aspirations in the Horn of Africa. Mengisteab goes further by describing the Eritrean support to Somali insurgents as follows: *"It is not merely a proxy war. It can be viewed as strategic cooperation with Somali opponents of Ethiopian hegemony in that both countries are seeking to check Ethiopia's apparently expansionist tendencies*" (Reid (ed.) and Mengisteab 2010, 65).

There are only speculative answers as to why Eritrea would have given up on its sponsorship to Islamist factions in Somalia in 2009. According to Hettyey, the reason for this may be the fact that the isolation of the country may have become too burdensome for the political leadership. The government might have concluded that complete isolation was not beneficial for the country any longer. Its international relations were very poor and the country's economy was in a dire state. Without political and financial support, the economy would have completely collapsed. The unprecedented poverty may have endangered the regime. Therefore, it was essential to give up on the sponsorship of Somali insurgents and pivot slightly toward the international community. Another theory from Hettyey suggests that decreasing an Ethiopian presence in Somalia since 2009 led to the fact that Eritrea stopped fighting its proxy war against Ethiopia on Somali soil, therefore Eritrea lost the reason to support Somali insurgents. This theory seems to be the most plausible as the weapon transfer stopped in 2009, when Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia (Hettyey 2012, 26–27). As the sponsorship of Somali insurgents by Eritrea started exactly at the time when the Eritrean-Ethiopian relations perished and stopped when Ethiopian participation was terminated in Somalia, it suggest that the above theory may be valid. Certainly it may be the case that the economic difficulties of the country contributed to the decision.

It is interesting to consider why a country with Christian leadership and a significant Muslim population would have sponsored hardline Islamist groups in Somalia. Approximately half of Eritrea's population belongs to the Sunni Muslim religion and the country experienced attempts by radical Islamist organisations to overthrow the government. The Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) and its member organisations pledged to attack the regime in recent years (Tekle 2011). However, these groups did not fight

the government based on religious antagonism or fundamentalist Islamic ideology. Their fight against the government seemed to be purely based on political and economic reasons. Hettyey also points out that "*it is unlikely that Eritrea (...) would be engulfed by terrorist/Islamist activity emanating from Somalia*" (Hettyey 2012, 26).

Eritrea's internal security situation is currently not directly influenced by its former support to Islamist insurgents in Somalia. There is a low threat of terrorism or external attacks on the country. However, the country still experiences the consequences of its political isolation as well as the accompanying lack of financial assistance which is partly based on its rogue participation in the Somali conflict. It is still regarded by the international community as a country carrying out "*destabilizing activities in the broader Horn of Africa and remains subject to two UN Security Council sanctions resolutions*" (US Department of State 2013). This status poses a certain internal security risk that even an oppressing regime may be subject to, e.g. poverty or politically driven internal insurgency.

Eritrea does not have a common border with Somalia. For this reason, there is a very limited amount of Somali refugees in Eritrea. At the present time, around 3,500 Somali refugees reside in Eritrea (UNHCR Somalia 2013). Thus, Somali refugees do not pose significant security risk to the integrity of Eritrea.

Djibouti does not influence the Somali conflict materially and Djibouti's security is moderately affected by the Somali situation at the present time. The main threat to the country's security situation is caused by al-Shabaab. Djibouti deployed a 960-man strong contingent to the AMISOM mission in 2012, which increased its security risk. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom suggests that "*Djibouti and Western interests within Djibouti may be seen as a legitimate target by al-Shabaab because of its support to the Somali government and its participation in the African Union peacekeeping mission AMISOM. Al-Shabaab has previously issued public threats against Djibouti*" (UK Government 2013a). In addition, the relatively large number of Somali refugees poses a security challenge to the country. At the present time, approximately 18,400 refugees from Somalia are in the country, which is a rather large number compared to the size and total population of Djibouti. As its borders are rather porous, the country is exposed to both terrorist threat and to the influx of refugees from Somalia.

5.4.2 Somali-induced National Security Challenges in Other Countries in the Region

Beyond the Horn of Africa RSC there are several countries, the national security of which is affected by the Somali conflict. In particular, the countries that suffer from impacts of the Somali conflict include Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Yemen.

Kenya faces manifold security challenges including poverty, un-employment, ethnic clashes and regional security threats stemming from Sudan and Somalia. The conflict in Somalia has affected Kenya in a number of ways thanks to the lengthy and porous border between the two countries.

Kenya is home to approximately 2.3 million ethnic Somalis, most of whom are long-standing citizens, settled either in the Northern Frontier District of the country or in Nairobi. In addition, Kenya hosts a very large number of refugees mainly from Somalia and Sudan. According to UNHCR data, approximately 510,000 refugees were hosted in Kenya as of February 2013 (UNHCR Somalia 2013). A large proportion of the refugees were hosted in the refugee camp of Dadaab, which is known to be the largest refugee camp in the world. It is located approximately 100 kms from the Somali border in an area where predominantly ethnic Somalis live. UNHCR reports that "*in the recent past, the security situation in the Dadaab area has become high-risk and dangerous, following a series of incidents, including the abduction of aid workers and fatal attacks on refugee leaders and Kenyan security forces*" (UNHCR Kenya). The refugee camps in Kenya are heavily overcrowded and the country does not have additional capacity to accept any more refugees. The overcrowded camps and the ever-increasing crime in these camps pose a major threat to the security situation in the affected region of Kenya.

The large numbers of ethnic Somalis residents in Kenya imposes another security threat. Notably, al-Shabaab has approached ethnic Somali youth in Kenya and recruited fighters to its ranks from this population. In a report on al-Shabaab, Stanford University states that "*al-Shabaab is seen to have a growing impact in Kenya. The group is influencing Somali communities in Nairobi neighbourhoods such as Eastleigh, through mosques with radical Imams preaching for Somalis to return to Somalia and fight in the jihad. Al-Shabaab recruits students from schools, offering them money and free cell phones. The group controls restaurants and other local places in Kenya*

while dictating the lessons in many madrasas[30]*, teaching students math while simultaneously promoting jihad*" (Stanford University 2012).

In addition to recruiting, al-Shabaab also completed several operations on Kenyan soil. In 2011, the Islamist group attacked Kenya on multiple occasions, kidnapping foreign tourists and aid workers from the country. "*The accumulation of kidnappings and attacks caused Kenya to deploy troops to Somalia to fight al-Shabaab. In late October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to drive out al-Shabaab*" (Stanford University 2012). This was Operation Linda Nchi (as mentioned in Section 4.3.3), a coordinated operation between Somali, Kenyan, Ethiopian, French and U.S. military forces. In response, al-Shabaab declared war on Kenya and continued attacks on Kenyan soil in 2012. In response, Kenya integrated its troops into AMISOM, as of June 2012.

According to Hettyey, in 2011 and 2012 "*there have been at least 17 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. (…) Nine of these attacks occurred in North Eastern Province [Northern Frontier District]. Four attacks occurred in Nairobi and four in Mombasa. Targets included police stations and police vehicles, nightclubs and bars, churches, a religious gathering, a downtown building of small shops and a bus station*" (Hettyey 2012, 20). The security situation in Kenya remains fragile, due to the country's involvement in the Somali conflict. According to the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office "*there is a high threat from terrorism in Kenya. The main threat is from extremists linked to al-Shabaab*" (UK Government 2013b). It is expected that further terrorist attacks may take place in Kenya.

Uganda faces security challenges primarily due to its close proximity to war-torn Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The country also has a history of fighting internal Islamic rebels on its own soil. It is believed that this threat has been eradicated in recent years. Nonetheless, as the President of the country, Yoweri Museveni "*often stated, the fight against radical Islamists is one of the chief reasons for its Somali engagement*". (…) "*10–12 per cent of Uganda's population are Muslims, and the last thing Museveni wants is an Islamist government in Somalia, which could act as inspiration or sponsor for the disaffected Muslim youth of Uganda*" (Hettyey 2012, 33). Accordingly, Uganda was the first country to deploy troops to

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[30] Madrasa (مدرسة) is an Arabic word. The Definition of madrasa is as follows: „*A a school where people go to learn about the religion of Islam*" (Cambridge Dictionaries Online).

AMISOM in 2007 and ever since the Ugandans are the driving force behind the mission, providing its largest contingent of personnel. The commanders of the mission have always been provided by Uganda, too. Uganda also supported the transitory central governments in Somalia, organizing training for the Somali government troops and hosting the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia). For its participation, it is the recipient of large sums of international funds and aid. Also, thanks to the international commitment Uganda maintains very good relationships with the U.S. and other Western countries.

With regards to the Somali conflict, Uganda is primarily exposed to terrorist threat from al-Shabaab due to its involvement in the conflict. In 2011, al-Shabaab attacked Uganda in a twin suicide-bombing mission in Kampala. The missions took place in bars in Uganda, where people were watching the football World Cup. Seventy-four people died in the attacks, which was the first external operation of al-Shabaab. The Islamists regarded the mission as retaliation for massacres against Somalis (Stanford University 2012). The country is thought to be threatened with further attacks.

Uganda hosted approximately 28,500 Somali refugees as of February 2013. (UNHCR Somalia 2013). This is a sizable refugee community, but it does not impose a huge burden on the country. Uganda's security situation is generally not threatened by the Somali refugees.

In addition to Kenya and Uganda, a substantial contingent of AMISOM troops is provided by Burundi. Al-Shabaab has previously threatened Burundi, as well, but no attacks have materialised on Burundian soil, as yet. Nonetheless, the possibility of terrorist attacks taking place in Burundi cannot be discounted.

The political situation in Yemen is transitory. The country is unstable and fragile and its security is compromised due to several internal factors. Yemen has been a strategic partner of the United States in its fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), since 2009. The country has faced several attacks from AQAP; therefore the organisation is a major threat to its internal security.

Yemen is in very close proximity to Somalia. Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia share the same fundamentalist Islamist ideology as AQAP. The cooperation of the two organisations started in 2006. In Somalia, al-Shabaab used suicide bombers in its attempted assassination of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, in 2006. This was the first time al-Shabaab had used the technique, suggesting that the organisation had, by this point, established a knowledge-sharing connection with al-Qaeda. In 2010 there were statements

issued by al-Shabaab about combined forces for the sake of international *jihad*, led by al-Qaeda. In 2011 "*al-Qaeda…sent a delegation to Somalia to provide humanitarian aid for victims of the ravaging famine*" (Stanford University 2012) with the anticipated implicit aim being the recruitment of future fighters. In 2012, an al-Qaeda leader announced that "*al-Shabaab had officially joined the ranks of al-Qaeda*" (Stanford University 2012). In March, 2012 "*al-Shabaab sent around 300 Somali militants to Yemen at AQAP's request*" (Coombs 2012). The fighters were sent to Yemen from Somalia to help the AQAP's fight against the new Yemeni President, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi and his reformist, Western-oriented government. In return, al-Shabaab fighters were the beneficiaries of knowledge transfer from AQAP's expertise, including bomb-making practices. Also, in 2012, when al-Shabaab suffered substantial losses in south and central Somalia, hundreds of its fighters were offered shelter in Yemen. It has also been established that al-Shabaab in Somalia receives regular weapon shipments from Yemen.

With regards to the cooperation of al-Shabaab and AQAP, one of the major threats to international security is the export of the knowledge of AQAP to East Africa and beyond (Coombs 2012). Thus, the links between AQAP and al-Shabaab not only destabilise Yemen by the fact that the two groups provide support to one another, but the connection strengthens the Somali insurgency within Somalia. Furthermore, it destabilizes the entire East Africa area by attacks being carried out in countries located in the region. From East Africa, the connection can be easily established to West Africa and the Islamic Maghreb, where similar and linked fundamentalist organisations are active.

In addition to the fusion of the two terrorist organisations, the large numbers of refugees who have crossed the Gulf of Aden from Somalia create further challenges for Yemen. As of February 2013, the number of Somali refugees amounted to approximately 228,000 in Yemen (UNHCR Somalia 2013), where Somalis are granted *prima facie* refugee status. The large number of refugees in Yemen and the fact that the country grants Somalis automatic refugee status is a strain on the country's "*fragile economy, very limited public health and education services, and a highly volatile security environment*" (UNHCR 2013). Some of the refugees, who fled the conflict and poverty in Somalia end up being inducted by AQAP. Impoverished refugees may be open to engage in the *jihad* as fighters and are prime candidates for martyrdom. This may constitute a risk for Yemen's

internal security as well as for the security of East Africa and beyond, as described above.

5.4.3 International Security Problems Caused by Piracy in Somalia[31]

Piracy is old as seaborne trade. Even today, it poses serious problems to global security all over the world from the Straits of Malacca to the Caribbean Seas. Piracy in the Horn of Africa, off the shores of Somalia, is of a particular concern to global security.

Modern piracy incidents have been reported off the coast of Somalia from 2000 onwards and the number of piracy incidents in this location had risen significantly by 2005. The first known hijack off the coast of Somalia happened in 2005, too. Afterwards, hijacking with the purpose of holding crew, ship and cargo hostage for ransom became a widespread practice. The number of piracy attacks reached their all-time high in 2011. By this time, attacks had become increasingly violent, with it being suggested that: "*149 ships have reportedly been ransomed for an estimated total of USD 315 – USD 385 million*". Moreover, "*the large number of Somali incidents is matched by the remarkably wide catchment area, deep into the high seas well beyond Somalia's territorial waters*" (The World Bank 2013, xxi).

Somali piracy became the largest in scale and scope in the world. "*3,741 crew members of 125 different nationalities have fallen prey to these pirates, with detention periods as long as 1,178 days. (…) 82 to 97 seafarers have died either during the attacks, in detention after poor treatment, or during rescue operations*". Additionally, "*Somali piracy has imposed significant global cost*" (The World Bank 2013, xxii–xxiii). Piracy caused there to be a substantial increase in insurance premiums, significant expenditure in security equipment and personnel and increased cost with regards to alteration of trade routes to safer waters. The costs borne by maritime companies were largely transferred to the worldwide public in the form of increased prices of imported goods sold in local markets. Somali piracy increased the cost of global trade by "*an estimated USD 18 billion*" on an annual basis, in addition to the "*estimated USD 53 million average annual ransom payment since 2005*" (The World Bank 2013, xxiii). Regional

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[31] This section is based on The Pirates of Somalia: Ending a Threat, Rebuilding a Nation (The World Bank 2013).

economies suffered the most, due to dwindling fishing yields in the affected waters, as well as due to a significant decline in tourism.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia caused substantial economic problems. Nonetheless, the most harmful impact of piracy in this region was not economic in nature. The key problem it posed was a global security concern due to links between pirates and al-Shabaab. *"The potential scope and actual extent of mutually beneficial cooperation between pirates and some members of the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab is significant; (…) the possibility of enhanced cooperation between pirates and al-Shabaab is a threat to global security"* (The World Bank 2013, xxiv).

The international community has launched coordinated efforts to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. Counter-piracy operations were initiated, including Operation Atalanta (by the European Union Naval Force Somalia) and Operation Ocean Shield (by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) as well as Combined Task Force 151 (by 20 countries of the international community). Since 2008, the UN, the EU, the AU, NATO and the Arab League have pledged to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Additionally, several institutional, national and regional programmes were launched (including the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre and the Indian Ocean Commission Anti-Piracy Partnership Programme) to combat piracy in the region.

In addition to coordinated naval efforts, the FGS is key in combating piracy in Somalia. The FGS is the key actor that can discourage piracy within Somalia, by implementing and enforcing strong anti-piracy laws both at the level of perpetrators and the enablers of piracy. In this context, combating corruption is of utmost importance. Facilitating economic development in the country will also have a discouraging impact on Somali youth to join the ranks of pirates. Thus, *"the long term solution to piracy off the Horn of Africa cannot be dissociated from construction of a Somali state that is viable at both central and local levels"* (The World Bank 2013, xxv). Efforts in this area would appear to be on a prudent course as number of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa started to decrease, as of 2012. As of 15 April 2013, there are 5 vessels and 77 hostages held by Somali pirates (ICC Commercial Crime Services 2013), which are significantly lower numbers than in previous years.

5.4.4 Global Terrorist Threat Originating from Somalia

Al-Shabaab has threatened all of the countries which contribute troop contingents to AMISOM – notably Djibouti, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda. Additionally, it proclaimed *jihad* against Ethiopia due to its participation in the conflict between 2006 and 2009. The organisation also threatened the United States "*if President Obama refuses to embrace Islam*" (Stanford University 2012). The group also issued public threats against Eritrea, Ghana, Sudan and Israel in the past, although no attack took place against these countries. It also attacked Denmark in a propaganda video for having portrayed Prophet Mohammed in an offensive cartoon published in Jyllands-Posten in 2005 (Stanford University 2012).

Al-Shabaab has attracted not only local fighters to its ranks. Its prime target is the Somali and Muslim youth of the diasporas. The organisation actively recruited fighters in Western countries including the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia and Scandinavia. "*Over twenty fighters have come from the United States, one of whom is Abu Mansoor al-Amriki from Alabama, al-Shabaab's leading propagandist who joined the group in 2007. (...) With the help of Al-Amriki, al-Shabaab is actively recruiting U.S. citizens, especially from the Minneapolis Somali community*" (Stanford University 2012). Since 2011, it has been known that al-Shabaab "*has been seeking to exert international influence on other jihadist groups in the region*" and it is established that the organisation merged with AQAP and it has been cooperating with AQIM as well as with a *jihadist* group in Libya. Further, al-Shabaab is also known to have ties with Boko Haram of Nigeria, which is fighting for the introduction of *Sharia* law in Nigeria. Members of Boko Haram have been reported to have been trained with a-Shabaab fighters (Stanford University 2012).

Al-Shabaab has been heavily weakened in Somalia. However, some of its leaders and many of its fighters found refuge in Yemen and the group disseminates its *jihadist* ideology into East Africa, West Africa and the Islamic Maghreb, primarily in Algeria. It has links to numerous Islamist groups and cells all over the world. Therefore, its power and potential should not be underestimated, even if its presence in Somalia is being undermined and weakened at the present time due to the intervention of allied international forces. Even if Somalia were to be completely pacified, the international community would likely conclude that the fight against al-Shabaab and its global allies would need to continue. This will be a long,

difficult and costly war requiring unprecedented commitment from the international community.

6 Evaluation of the First Six Months of the Federal Government of Somalia[32]

At the conclusion of the first 100 days of the FGS administration Abdi Farah Shirdon, the Prime Minister, reviewed the accomplishments of the government and discussed the results with the Parliament. This act of the Prime Minister signalled the government's disposition and commitment to democracy. The review also demonstrated to the population, as well as to the international community, that the government is achievement-focused and results oriented. In this section, the achievements of the first 100 days and the subsequent 3 months (approximately) thereafter will be scrutinized and evaluated, i.e. the tenure from 20 August 2012 to early March 2013.

The examined period only gives an insight into how the government has started to implement its strategy and how well it has begun to respond to its own *"six-pillar policy framework"* (described in Section 4.3.3). The initial six-month period is certainly too short to conclude whether the performance of the FGS is satisfactory. Nonetheless, it shows whether the high-level political direction of the government is broadly in the strategic direction that the government had articulated for itself. The FGS functions under very challenging circumstances. After two decades of civil conflict in the country reconciliation between stakeholders is its highest priority. This is a very difficult task on its own, due to the antagonism prevailing between the key stakeholders, i.e. the central government and al-Shabaab. Other localised conflicts also have to be reconciled, which is also at the top of the government's agenda. Thus stabilizing the country and strengthening the internal security situation requires a predominant focus from the government. With the assistance of its allies, significant efforts have been made to secure the country and significant results have been achieved to date. As a result, during the first six months of the FGS administration, not only Mogadishu but the significant towns and cities in the most volatile south and central parts of the country have been all re-captured from the

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[32] Findings of this section are primarily based on the report of The Heritage Institution: "Reviewing the Somali Government's First 100 days: a Scorecard" (The Heritage Institute 2013).

insurgent forces. There is still a long way to fully combat the insurgency and secure the entire country, as sporadic and indiscriminate terrorist attacks happen regularly. Therefore, security remains the highest priority for the FGS going forward.

Designing and implementing the democratic political system and creating functioning institutions which support democracy is another very important task of the government. The foundations of laws, processes and institutions have been laid. According to the analysis of The Heritage Institution: "*there is reason to believe that the government is on the right trajectory. It has now passed seven laws, pertaining to finance, the judiciary, human rights and tariffs. Eight others, concerning police reform, telecommunications, media, and energy are pending*" (The Heritage Institute 2013).

In the area of foreign policy, the government has achieved substantial results, too. High-level political visits took place in Washington, London, Ankara, Brussels, Kampala, Doha, Nairobi, Cairo, Addis Ababa and Riyadh by the President of the FGS, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The FGS has also been the recipient of countless high-level diplomatic visits in Mogadishu since its inauguration. The FGS was acknowledged as the functioning permanent government of Somalia by the United States in January 2013 (Kumar Sen 2013). A range of Somali embassies were opened in overseas, in locations where sizeable Somali diaspora have settled. Further, several countries opened embassies or announced the opening of their re-presentations in Mogadishu. This is a sign of foreign governments acknowledging the FGS as a permanent and legitimate government of Somalia, as well as a sign of a substantially improved security situation.

However, the various high-level political visits and meetings have not yet communicated a direction for Somali foreign policy. They may be purely protocol visits, given the fact that the FGS is the first widely recognized government in Somalia for more than two decades. Also, the government has only recently been inaugurated. The visits may be driven by business interests or by genuine support and recognition. Still, the FGS has yet to articulate its foreign policy priorities, as well as the desired direction for its strategic political relationships.

The government successfully lobbied at the United Nations for a lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093. Following the unanimous affirmative decision of the UN Security Council, the arms embargo was partially lifted for a year, as of March 2013. Accordingly, the FGS is allowed to buy light weapons to fight al-Shabaab but it must notify the Security Council about the timing of

any purchases, as well as about the type of the military equipment concerned and the intended locations of their deployment. This decision signals the UN's full support for the FGS, while maintaining a control over the purchase and flow of weapons into the country. The FGS expects that this measure "*will help it strengthen its poorly equipped, ill-disciplined military, which is more a collection of rival militias than a cohesive fighting force loyal to a single President*" (Nichols 2013).

The SNSF has been organised but there are problems with regards to the regulation of the forces. The FGS appointed Dahir Adan Elmi as Chief of the Army as of March 2013. He is expected to introduce strict regulations with regards to the behaviour of military personnel and a functioning military judiciary. Plans to remobilise the Somali Air Force and to re-establish the Somali Navy remain outstanding.

Additionally, the FGS strongly opposed the request of Kenya for the funding of an AMISOM maritime component in value of USD 10 million in February 2011. Subsequently, the FGS succeeded in its lobbying and the UN Security Council did not approve the Kenyan plan. The reason for the Somali opposition against the establishment of an AMISOM naval unit was the FGS's preference to set up a Somali Coast Guard. The FGS argued that it would prefer to set up and control its own coast guard service and it postulated that an AMISOM naval force may make the country dependent on foreign security support (Hiiraan Online 2013). As the United Arab Emirates had committed USD 1 million to set up a coast guard in Somalia through the United Nations in 2012, the country may be able to raise funds from the international community to set up its own coast guard (Awad 2012). The resisting of Kenya's request to establish the AMISOM naval unit was a political success achieved by the FGS in the interest of establishing the national navy and associated maritime independence of Somalia. The fact that the UN supported the position of Somalia was also an acknowledge-ment of the capability of the Somali government to handle its own maritime security, despite the country's long-standing problems with piracy.

The FGS rejected the Grand Stabilisation Plan of IGAD in late 2012. The plan, which was designed during the final days of TFG administration, would have given the authority to Kenya and Ethiopia to put in place local administrators in the areas of south and central Somalia, which they recaptured and liberated from al-Shabaab. Ethiopia and Kenya proposed the plan to stabilise south and central Somalia with the aim of filling the power vacuum after the rule of al-Shabaab came to an end upon the recapturing of the territories concerned. However, the plan ignored the fact that this task

should be vested in the FGS, based upon the agreed constitution of the country. The Somali people residing in the affected areas would likely have regarded the Kenyan and Ethiopian plan as a strategy to occupy Somalia. The FGS could not accept the plan due to this consequence. As Mohamud M. Uluso pointed out, the plan *"weakens the centrally guided and coordinated implementation of the approved Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan, which outlines in detail the establishment of complex structures at national, regional and district levels"* (Uluso 2012).

Following the refusal of the proposition of Kenya and Ethiopia, Somalia accepted the revised Grand Stabilisation Plan of IGAD in January 2013 according to which the FGS would put in place local administrations in consultation with local leaders and clan elders in all territories that had been re-captured from al-Shabaab. The FGS delivered on this plan through the Prime Minister visiting Puntland, Galmudug and the central provinces of Somalia, where he managed to maintain a dialogue and ensured cooperation with local leadership. Local administrations were established in several cities in Galgaduud, in cooperation with ASWJ, which controls the area. The FGS also established local administrations in the Bay and Hiiraan regions. The FGS is on track in its initiative to create and maintain dialogue with local leaders and thereby establish a local administration in volatile regions, too.

Nonetheless, the establishing of a local administration in Jubaland remains outstanding. In this location tribal conflicts hinder the process of appointing a combined administration of Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions as Jubaland State. The establishment of a combined administration should reflect the tribal relationships in an all-inclusive manner. The parties in conflict have not yet found a mutually satisfactory solution to overcome their differences, therefore the establishment of the Jubaland State administration is still outstanding. Nonetheless, most of the tribal leaders agree with the FGS that the Kenyan proposition to create a regional administration in Jubaland influenced by Kenya is not in line with the integrity and sovereignty of Somalia. The FGS is concerned that the Kenyan involvement would be based on the Kenyan interests of protecting its territory by using Jubaland as a buffer zone between Kenya and the insurgents in Somalia. The FGS wishes to resolve the problem as it fears that a political battle within resident tribes and potential *"Kenyan support for particular tribes over others in Kismayo could set the region on fire"* (M. Ahmed 2012). The creation of local administrations in other areas also remains outstanding and the challenges to create an administration in Jubaland may influence other such processes in the country. There is an

imperative to resolve the issue. If these situations remain unresolved, political vacuums may lead to regional power clashes, thereby endangering the national reconciliation process. A high-level political solution must be devised to tackle these matters and the FGS has yet to arrive at such.

The FGS declared a high-level "*six-pillar policy framework*" (described in Section 4.3.3) which is to drive the reconciliation and reconstruction process of the country. The "*six-pillar policy framework*" contains the goal of economic recovery. However, the FGS has not yet elaborated the tactical and operational activities that will be taken to realise these very broad strategic goals, except for the introduction of a national taxation and tax collection system as of 2013. It established and re-established certain financial institutions, but no tangible steps have been taken to address the acute and grave economic problems including stabilising the volatile exchange rate of the currency and limiting the inflationary pressure on the economy. So far, the FGS has not demonstrated its capability to address the deep economic crisis. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said in January 2013 that: "*Somalia needs to restore operations with the World Bank. We believe [it] can play an important role in the reconstruction of Somalia, as well as the rebuilding of our public financial institutions*" (Africa Review 2013). The recognition of the FGS by the IMF as of April 2013 (BBC 2013b) gives hopes for the materialisation of international support with regards to economic policy advice and it signals the potential for the FGS to receive recognition from the World Bank in the near future, too.

Corruption remains widespread within the country. Although the FGS aims to abolish corruption at all levels, it is going to be a long and arduous task. The country was listed at being in last place, i.e. ranked 174th, along with Afghanistan and North Korea, on the corruption index of Transparency International in 2012 (Transparency International 2012). The FGS has yet to communicate a comprehensive strategy to tackle this deep and widespread problem. There is no transparency in the handling of government procurement activities and government spending is not audited thoroughly. A comprehensive mechanism is needed to limit the potential for corruption at the highest levels of politics and the government must establish robust policies to combat corruption in the country. In 2012, a Joint Financial Management Board was established to oversee the dispensation of government funds and international aid. It is to *ensure "transparency and accountability in the collection and efficient use of public revenues, as well as international development aid"* (Harper 2012). Nonetheless, it is not yet clear how well this body fulfils its mission.

The analysis of the Heritage Institute pointed out that the FGS suffers from an "*executive imbalance (…), which exists between the two highest office holders, the President and the Prime Minister*" (The Heritage Institute 2013). As per the constitution, substantial power is vested in the Cabinet, which hierarchically lies under the Prime Minister. In parallel, the President set up a so-called Policy Unit, which serves as an executive advisory unit to the President. There is an overlap in the functions of the Cabinet and the Policy Unit, which creates an imbalance of power. The parallel existence of two executive branches creates a systemic problem. The President, whose office is an elected one, should not hold executive powers, as such would be illegitimate under the constitution. The office of the President should be the upholder of the constitution and its primary function should be solely oversight. The measure of enacting two executive powers in practice may have long-standing political consequences hindering the national reconciliation process. This does not strengthen the government, even if the intention of setting up the Policy Unit was such. In reality, this may weaken the Cabinet by creating a rival power base and decision-making forum. The decision to establish the Presidential Policy Unit may be a contributing factor to the Cabinet not having achieved substantial and tangible results on implementing the "*six-pillar policy framework*", as yet.

Overall, the initial record of achievements of the FGS is commendable. Given the difficult situation the FGS inherited, the substantial ongoing challenges and the short period of time that the FGS has been in office, the progress can be said to be remarkable. The FGS appears to be on the right track for achieving reconciliation and nation building in Somalia. It has achieved substantial diplomatic recognition; it managed to achieve the partial lifting of the arms embargo and was successful in efforts to combat the ongoing insurgency of al-Shabaab to a large extent. Further, the FGS has been highly successful in establishing local administrations in several regions. It also deserves credit for assertively refusing interference from Kenya and Ethiopia in its sovereign matters with regards to the Jubaland administration, as well as for declining the Kenyan proposition to provide a navy under AMISOM to protect the Somali coast. Such actions convey confidence in the country's own abilities to tackle its internal political problems and part of its security challenges. This confidence is essential to carry out its own programme of reconciliation and nation building.

Nonetheless, the FGS must resolve the systemic problem of having created parallel powers in the Cabinet and in the Policy Unit. The FGS must operate with the parameters of the constitution, if that constitution is to

achieve widespread credibility and acceptance. Therefore, it is advisable to resolve the disparity between the Cabinet and the Policy Unit. Accordingly, the FGS must retain executive powers within the Cabinet and it should grant a solely supporting, advisory and non-executive role to the Policy Unit. Further, the government must focus on planning for tangible results to achieve its broad objectives within the *"six-pillar policy framework"*. Notably, it is essential to build out a comprehensive system of political institutions, combat corruption and prosecute corrupt officials at all levels, particularly those who abuse the high offices of state.

On the security front, the FGS must also continue with the efforts of securing and stabilising the country, with the help of the international community. At the same time, the government must facilitate the resolution of internal political conflicts between the central government and local tribes, clans and militias in rural areas of the country. Any failure to do so may be highly negative with regards to the national reconciliation efforts. In particular, the FGS must ensure the establishment of a local reconciliation process with regional stakeholders in Jubaland; and for other areas in dispute, with the view of forming temporary administrations following a 90-day interim period. Provision should be made for the steady-state administrative processes, which will be put in place with regards to election of local political powers including mayors, governors and other local government functions, after the expiry of the interim period.

Additionally, the FGS must prioritise the tackling of financial instability, inflation and other economic challenges in the country. In order to restore a healthy economy and to rebuild the infrastructure for such, it must be investigated how the IMF and the World Bank can assist with the process.

7 The Potential of Somalia

A mere six months in office for any government is not enough to draw long-standing conclusions or implications about that government's performance. Therefore, this short period of time does not offer the opportunity for outsiders to make credible and definitive statements about the future of Somalia. Nonetheless, based upon the perspective that has evolved about this country throughout my research, I believe that Somalia currently demonstrates substantial potential for an attractive future.

At the present time, the country is in an optimistic state of affairs with regards to the ongoing reconciliation efforts. Following the two decades

spent as a failed state, it is on the right path to become a unique and functional democracy, which equally respects parliamentarism as well as its tribal heritage and its Islamic roots.

The FGS is on track to prove that it is indeed possible to create a functioning system in Somalia. It is about to show that twenty years of lawlessness can be changed to law and order; and entrenched hostility can be replaced with peace and prosperity. The success of the FGS would not only prove that a failed country can be turned around. Its success would also show the world that it is indeed possible to fuse democratic principles with traditional political and cultural values in the country. It does not operate solely along the lines of a system which is exported from the West, but it bases its future on its traditional institutions, values, principles and religious heritage. Notably, the establishment of a modern democratic system is on the way in Somalia, which bases the governance of the country on moderate Islamic values, respects the traditional clan and segmentary lineage system of the country and applies the traditional legal structures as foundations for the successful governance of Somalia, while distancing itself from male exclusivity in political power.

Accordingly, the fusion of democracy and political tradition creates a unique political system in Somalia. The FGS operates along democratic principles, but parliamentarians were nominated by traditional power holders, i.e. by clan elders. The elders are thus able to participate in political power through their representatives in the Federal Democratic Parliament, who are delegated from the clans of the country based on the agreed "4.5 formula" (as discussed in Section 4.3.3 in more detail). The President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon are delegated by the two strongest clans, the Hawiya and the Darood, respectively. Thereby, the FGS is based on a clan coalition, where tribalism as well as the traditional segmentary lineage system of the country remain respected and included into the democratic political processes. Nonetheless, the highly traditional, male-dominated country has opened up to the possibility to include women in high political office, including as heads of ministries. In addition, the constitution and legislation of the country follow a modern legal system while *Sharia* law is used as the main source of law. In parallel, *Xeer* remains the main building block of the civil code. Traditional principles therefore appear in all systems of the country, while none of the systems remain antiquated.

The reconciliation process in the country is remarkable also for the reason that it is induced from within the country. It is not manufactured by outsiders

or dictated by third parties, but it is developed by Somalis for Somalis. Nonetheless, the peace process is acknowledged, actively supported and funded by the international community. High-level state visits ensure the FGS that it is the only internationally approved government of the country (including separatist Somaliland). Foreign embassies opened in Mogadishu in quick succession and the passport issued by Somali authorities is accepted as a valid travel document abroad. International Somalia conferences have been held to support the reconciliation and reconstruction efforts of the FGS in London and Istanbul in 2012 and the next event is scheduled for May 2013 in London. The British and Turkish governments act as key neutral supporters of the new regime in Somalia. The key powers in international politics – the U.S. and the EU – also back the country and its government. Further, the peace process is supported by UN and AU mandated international military forces and military contingents from neighbouring governments. The missions are funded by Western donors and training to local forces is offered by military experts of the developed world. The international community has also been helping to combat terrorism and piracy in and off the shores of the country. In recent years, substantial amounts of international aid have been offered to Somalia, too. The developing democratic processes in the country continuously trigger further aid and financial support from donor governments from all over the world, with the aim to eradicate poverty and support the reconstruction efforts. International NGOs keep expanding their operations in Somalia to offer humanitarian and human rights assistance for the local population. Thus, assistance to support the political process as well as to ease the needs of the society has been widely available for Somalia. Further, the channels of assistance are constantly expanding and the achievements of the FGS trigger further goodwill.

Based on all this assistance, I believe the international community offers full support to Somalia. Nonetheless, it is yet to be seen whether the FGS has long-term determination, strength and integrity to carry out the reconciliation and reconstruction process. It is to be determined whether it has the weight and authority to combat the manifold problems of the country and whether it is able to facilitate the full political recovery of Somalia. It is also unclear at the present time whether the FGS will be able to facilitate the financial and economic rise of the country. Somalia is in dire poverty but it has enormous potential, primarily in the energy sector. If the government can stabilise the financial and economic systems and can demonstrate to the international community that it is worthy for appropriate financial assistance and advice, it

will be able to set off on the path of perhaps slow but gradual economic development.

If the FGS can achieve the pacification and the strengthening of the southern and central parts of the country, a peaceful and strong Somalia may offer an attractive opportunity to separatist Somaliland to consider re-unification. As the international community does not show any commitment toward recognising Somaliland at the present time and there is no indication of a change of viewpoint in this regard, the best and only option for Somaliland may be to reconsider its position in this matter.

The pacification of Somalia (and certainly the reunification of Somalia with Somaliland) may benefit the Horn of Africa RSC, too. A stable, united and strong Somalia would no longer offer the opportunity for antagonistic third parties like Ethiopia and Eritrea to fight their battles on its territory. In absence of a battleground, the two countries may either relocate their conflicts to another volatile area within their reach, e.g. Sudan, or may commence a bilateral reconciliation process. It is not possible to predict how the bilateral relations of Ethiopia and Eritrea would develop, if we assume a fully pacified Somalia. Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage that a peaceful and strong Somalia could serve as a balancing power in the Horn of Africa RSC, thereby containing both the hegemonistic aspirations of Ethiopia and the underground and indiscriminate sponsorships offered by Eritrea to insurgent forces that fight against Ethiopia. This could potentially be manifested through the reconciliation of the two archenemies in the region, i.e. Ethiopia and Eritrea, over the longer term. Additionally if a strong Somalia took up the role of a balancing power in the Horn of Africa, it could contain smaller-scale political problems that tend to poison the entire region including border conflicts and ethnic and tribal tensions.

Somalia is an ally of the Western world at the present time and is committed to maintaining good neighbourly relations as per the "*six-pillar policy framework*" of the FGS, with the similarly important allies of the West, i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Under such circumstances, there is a good chance that the country will be able to maintain good-neighbourliness and to handle the matter of the sizeable ethnic Somali communities residing in these countries once it has resolved its domestic problems. A fully pacified and strong country would be much better equipped to address the question of the Ogaden and the Haud (as mentioned in Section 4.3.2 in detail) as well as the Northern Frontier District than a fragile and weak Somalia. As a balancing power, Somalia might even be able to use the power of diplomacy and achieve autonomy and self-determination for these

large ethnic Somali communities once it has proved its commitment to democracy and peace within its borders.

It is yet to be seen how the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments will treat their potentially strengthening neighbour. Historic evidence shows that Ethiopia has always preferred a weak Somalia. It having such aspiration was demonstrated in its so-called Building-Block Strategy toward Somalia in the late 1990s, (as detailed in Section 4.3.3). There are already signs that these two actors would prefer a stable, peaceful but weak Somalia. As Section 6 describes it in more detail, the Ethiopian and Kenyan IGAD initiative to create local administrations under their power in volatile territories in south and central Somalia, and the Kenyan plan to establish a naval force under the auspice of AMISOM off the coast of Somalia, show that these two countries envisage Somalia as a pacified but very weak country. Based on the strong negative response of the FGS to such plans, it can be inferred that Somalia will not content itself with such an inferior and suppressed role. Nonetheless, if these two sizeable countries envisage a weak role for Somalia, the FGS must stay alert to challenge any effort to weaken the country by outside players. It has to maintain very strong foreign allies and operate along the lines of skilful diplomacy to avoid being suppressed and victimised by its neighbours.

If Somalia is able to gain strength and can create a substantial role for itself on the political map of the Horn of Africa, it may become a role model for other countries in the African continent. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, there is no full democracy in mainland Africa at the present time and there is only a very limited amount of flawed democracies in the continent[33] (The Economist 2012). If Somalia manages to implement and maintain a functioning democratic political system, it may become the first internationally acknowledged democratic country in Central and East Africa. From Tunisia in the north, Benin and Ghana in the west and Zambia in the south there is no other democratic country in mainland Africa. Somalia could become the first such country in East Africa. If it establishes a functioning and proven democratic system, Somalia may become a role model in the continent with regards to democratisation. Further, it may influence the autocracies in its neighbourhood, over the longer term. It is yet

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[33] Mauritius is the only full democracy in Africa. Flawed democracies include Tunisia, Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Sao Tome & Principe, Somaliland, Seychelles, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa (The Economist 2012).

to be seen whether the FGS can assume the role of a driving force behind democratisation in Africa.

The country is full of potential with regards to changing the life of a nation that has been suffering due to more than twenty years of civil conflict. I believe that the Somali nation has every opportunity at the present time to create a brighter future for itself. This may be the last opportunity the country has to receive substantial support from the international community. It seems the FGS is ready to snatch at the chance to bring about the best of this opportunity. It is going to be a long and difficult battle to overcome all the challenges that this Thesis has analysed, but it is the only way going forward to build a strong, stable and peaceful Somalia.

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